Round The World
New Delhi, 10 September 2008
NSG Clearance To India
END OF NUCLEAR
APARTHEID
By Prof. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
After a hard diplomatic struggle, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group reportedly gave a clean waiver to India to the full satisfaction of
the Manmohan Singh Government. The opponents of the Indo-US civilian nuclear
cooperation initiative, however, continued to find fault with the outcome of
the NSG deliberations.
The main point of contention at Vienna
among the NSG members was, of course, related to a possible nuclear test by India in the
future. The group of six, consisting of Austria,
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Ireland and Norway wanted strict conditionality in the
waiver provisions to prevent any further nuclear test by India.
It was actually not easy for either India or the United
States to convince these countries to give a clean waiver
to India and accept the
draft prepared by the US in
consultation with India.
Austria and Switzerland,
for instance, are industrially developed countries which have traditionally
followed a policy of neutrality even during the prolonged Cold War. They are not members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization nor are they great economic partners of the United States.
The Netherlands
is a NATO member, yet a promoter of strict non-proliferation and Amsterdam decided to side with the minority of holdout
countries opposing the US
draft. Ireland is a close
trade and investment partner of the United States. American investment
in Ireland is more in dollar
terms than India, China, Russia
and Brazil
combined. It was still not easy for the US to use its leverage until the
last moment. Norway has
minimal stake in India.
It is not an energy starving nation and hardly realizes the energy requirements
of India.
New Zealand was the real tough nut to crack. It
entered into a trilateral strategic alliance with Australia
and the US
in 1951. The Labour government in 1985 used its non-proliferation principle and
demanded that the US
ships passing through its territorial waters must declare the nuclear status.
The US,
as a matter of principle neither affirms nor denies information about its
carrying nuclear weapons. New
Zealand was prepared to lose the benefits of
the ANZUS alliance rather than alter its non-proliferation policy. It has not
returned to ANZUS until now.
There is little doubt that hard bargaining and skillful
diplomacy by the US and the UPA
Government’s cooperation brought out the consensus at Vienna. One of the important developments
that impacted upon the deliberations was the leak of a letter written by the
White House to the Congress in reply to a host of questions raised by the
American legislators regarding the nuclear deal. A large number of questions
were on the credibility of the 123 agreement in promoting non-proliferation.
There were apprehensions that the nuclear deal with India
would enhance India's
nuclear weapon capability.
The 26-page letter tried to convince the US legislators that the Presidency was committed
to non-proliferation; that the 123 agreement with India
would in no way increase India's
weapon capability; that US
civilian nuclear cooperation would end in the eventuality of an Indian nuclear
weapon test. Expectedly, when this letter was made open to public, Indian
opponents of the nuclear deal raised a hue and cry. Their main argument being that
the Prime Minister's assurances to Parliament were negated by this letter.
Ironically, the same letter worked wonders at the 45-member
NSG meet. It convinced many suspicious members that the Bush Administration was
in no way rewarding India
with sophisticated technology to improve its nuclear arsenals. It facilitated
negotiations with the members by highlighting the non-proliferation and
environmental aspects of the nuclear deal and the need to security clean
energy.
Meanwhile, the Manmohan Singh government explained to its
public that it was not bound by the content of a letter exchanged between the two
branches of the US Government and reiterated that what mattered was the letter
and the spirit of the 123 agreement. Around the same time, Foreign Minister
Pranab Mukherjee issued a suo moto
statement on the country’s nuclear policy aimed at the NSG member countries. He
reiterated the no-first use of the nuclear weapon pledge. He also re-emphasized
the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Moreover, Mukherjee stressed
the export control mechanism put in place through appropriate legislations and
also indicated that despite being a non-signatory to the NPT, India has had a
robust non-proliferation record.
Clearly, these two developments had an impact on a large
number of NSG members, but a few holdouts appeared headstrong. It was argued
that the NSG waivers to India
should have more explicit provisions to ensure against any future nuclear test
by India; and that any
nuclear explosion by India
would automatically end nuclear cooperation of member countries with it.
Every one knew that such provisions would be considered in India as a red
rag to a bull. That implies that some interested parties were seeking to derail
the whole process to the disadvantage of India
and the US.
One such suspect turned out to be China. A report on the Chinese government-sponsored
People's Daily first made a critical
comment on the Indo-US nuclear deal. At one time, the Chinese delegate in Vienna threatened to
stage a walk out. Another source of opposition came from the non-proliferation
lobby of the United States.
Pakistan
was most likely lobbying against the deal, though relatively quietly.
Once the consensus was reached after top-level political
interventions by Washington,
there was expected unhappiness in certain quarters. What was not expected was
yet another round of strong reactions against the nuclear deal by the opponents
of the deal in India.
In the end, the communists and the nationalists should have respected the
majority support in Parliament to the deal. To the contrary, some of them continue
to call it a sell-out. Others characterized it as surrender of national
sovereignty. None other than the Government could point out that the NSG waiver
spelled the end of nuclear apartheid against India after a span of more than
three decades! ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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