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N-Deal Stuck In NSG:INDIA NEEDS TO BE FLEXIBLE,Sitakanta Mishra,26 August 2008 Print E-mail

Round The World

New Delhi, 26 August 2008

N-Deal Stuck In NSG

INDIA NEEDS TO BE FLEXIBLE

By Sitakanta Mishra

Senior Research Scholar, South Asian Studies Division,

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

With the unfolding of events since the trust vote on 22 July 2008, the discourse on India's credential as a sovereign nation has turned a full circle. First, the current nuclear conundrum is axiomatic of India's culture of democratic nuclearism, identity formation and national interest which have evolved through many ups and downs.

Second, India's stand at the recently held 15th NAM ministerial meeting in Tehran vindicates its responsibility as a demagogue in its region and its commitment for unbiased international order. Third, the unanimous endorsement of the India-specific safeguards by the IAEA Board of Governors at Vienna marks the beginning of the fruition of India's single-minded challenge to the lop-sided global nuclear order.

Finally, the hold up of India's waiver application in the NSG and the consequent diplomatic push and pull vindicate that the deal is not really straight-jacketed as has been branded by many. All these events underline the fact that national interest and sovereignty nourished by the democratic ethos is paramount in India's recent undertakings, although it has been coloured otherwise.

The domestic debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal leading to the trust vote seems to have been interpreted out of proportion. Undoubtedly, it is the first instance when the country’s foreign and nuclear policy issues were the bone of contention. But there is no denying the fact that nuclear issues have always been "highly opinionated" perhaps owing to our argumentative trait and "deeply entrenched" culture of democratic debate. Resulting in the nuclear policy and planning, except the operational aspects, being vigourously debated.

While on the one hand, the euphoria over the deal and the consequent political gimmick is an off-shoot of New Delhi's democratic nuclear discourse. On the other hand, the episode brings forth the nuances of the political-nuclear interface and the resultant domestic hubbub.

In relation to the deal, two inter-connected issues --- our independent foreign policy and the alliance with US --- have repeatedly been highlighted and claimed by the Left as stains on India's sovereign nationhood. While their principled opposition to the deal is understandable, on the flip side, it was a slap on India's proud claim as a vibrant democracy when a part of the system was unable to overcome ideological stereotypes. It is shocking that some leaders and parties failed to understand the fact that technology misunderstood is development missed.

The approval of the India-specific safeguards agreement through "consensus" by the IAEA Board of Governor on 1 August will permit regular IAEA surveillance of India's 14 declared civilian nuclear energy plants out of a total 22 facilities. Among the proposed 14, 6 are already under the agency's supervision and if things go right it would start implementing the new agreements at the facilities in 2009.

According to the IAEA Chief Mohamed EL Baradei the deal satisfies India's needs and also meets all legal requirements of the UN atomic watchdog. All eyes are now on getting a "clean and unconditional" exemption at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is likely to meet for the second time in early September.

However, the Congress-led UPA Government's hook or crook approach to silence the domestic dissent would certainly not work while dealing with international divergence. Small countries like Austria, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and New Zealand have already shown their discontent and have emphasised reintroduction of provisions for full-scope safeguard and India's membership in the NPT during the NSG meet.

Clearly, the Foreign Ministry needs to introspect why these small countries have raised apprehension about India's credentials when developed countries have wholeheartedly supporting the deal? Most of the Scandinavian countries have never found adequate attention in New Delhi’s international calculation.

One can easily perceive how Canada and South Africa were quickly convinced in comparison to other small nations perhaps owing to the fact that Ottawa and Pretoria bag greater attention from New Delhi than the Scandinavians. For that matter, the Left assertion on India’s foreign policy having a big-power-bias holds some truth.

The lack of consensus in the NSG to okay the India-specific waivers doesn't mean that the countries have opposed it outright. Instead, they wanted another round of debate on India's credentials. The hardened attitude of these countries can also be a consequence of the internal debate in India. This has generated a chain reaction in the countries which have dissent on the deal.

For example, the Indo-US deal is reflected in the local politics of Austria, a strongly anti-nuclear country which is preparing for fresh election in September. Austrian critics lament that their Government is not more vocal and firm in its opposition to the N-deal. Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer’s coalition Government has been accused for currying favour with India in order to win New Delhi's backing for an Austrian bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

In the US too, anxiety on the deal is gathering steam in tandem with the run-up to the Presidential election. Many hope that the deal would be passed during the current Congress and the choice of Joseph Biden as the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate has eased the situation. Moreover, Barack Obama's non-proliferation zeal may well be tempered by Biden's enthusiasm for India and the deal. Republican McCain is already committed to the deal. Thus the deal might have a spill-over effect in the electoral battle.

At this juncture, while India can demand a "clean exemption", and oppose any conditionality, for example signing the NPT and the CTBT, however “it does make sense to be reasonably flexible". The deal after all does have in-built mechanisms for any future eventuality.

The US on its part has already dispatched envoys to New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway and the Netherlands, among others to persuade them. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Glen Davies is in Wellington to persuade New Zealand, the staunchest hardliner, to support India.

More importantly, New Delhi needs to understand that there is no such thing as unconditional waiver. If in its next meet in early September the NSG remains chary of granting India carte blanche approval, a measure of flexibility on its part without compromising the core concerns, should be in place.

Therefore, to drive the deal towards its logical conclusion, India, in the short run, needs to mobilise all resources at its disposal to maintain unanimity on the deal while remaining flexible on substantive issues, if warranted. In the long-run, it needs to reach out to small nations by spreading its soft power.

Also it is in the interest of the Congress Party to demystify domestic apprehension by selling the benefits of the deal to the aam aadmi on a war-footing. Besides, the deal and New Delhi’s relations with the US should not become an end in itself. The Government must remain alert to anything going wrong or modification of provisions needed while negotiating with the NSG or with the US Congress. Therefore, it has rightly been said, "negotiating for an exception for India … would be like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire." ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

 

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