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Indo-US Nuclear Deal:WILL IT OVERCOME FOREIGN OPPOSITION?,Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra,29 July 2008 Print E-mail

Round The World

New Delhi, 29 July 2008

Indo-US Nuclear Deal

WILL IT OVERCOME FOREIGN OPPOSITION?

Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

After winning the trust vote in the Lok Sabha, the UPA Government has been exuding confidence that the Indo-US nuclear deal will see the day of the light before the US Congress adjourns on 26th September.  

To counter media reports on Pakistan's lobbying activities against the deal, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has stated that Pakistan would support India at the IAEA on the India-specific safeguards agreement. Despite several reports on China's ambivalent position on the US-India nuclear deal, the UPA Government has been assuring the Indian public that China would support India both at the IAEA and the Nuclear Supplier Group's (NSG) meeting.

Why is the Government of India so convinced of its success at the IAEA and the NSG? While the Indian diplomats have been at work in many concerned capitals to promote the nuclear deal with the United States, partly the confidence comes from the repeated assurances by the Bush Administration, indeed President George Bush himself, that the deal will be done.

How can the Bush Administration be so sure that no opposition would come from the NSG members to this deal? Significantly, there are still many opponents to this deal both within India and the US. The whole world witnessed the insalubrious scenes in the Indian Parliament at the time of the debate on the trust motion. By voting against the UPA Government, a large number of parliamentarians indicated their strong opposition to the nuclear deal. After all, the trust motion would not have been necessary, had the Left Parties not withdrawn their support to the Government only on the ground of the Centre’s position on the nuclear deal.

But more importantly, the questions raised by the Indian antagonists of the deal and the answers provided by the Government have now given ammunition to the foreign opponents to shoot down the deal. The relevance of Hyde Act to the 123 agreement, for instance, was hotly debated in India. The opponents contended that the provisions of the Act have the potential to challenge Indian sovereignty. The Government pointed out that India is not bound by this Act and the 123 agreement would override the Hyde Act.

The opponents in the United States to this deal, particularly the non-proliferation lobby, are making a case that restraints on Indian nuclear weapon activity will disappear, if the provisions of the Hyde Act are overridden. In other words, the Indo-US nuclear deal would strengthen India's nuclear weapons programme.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center, has argued that the Bush Administration "has tried to convince Congress that the enabling U.S. legislation for the nuclear deal, the Hyde Act, has mechanisms to check India's nuclear weapons ambitions. However, the Indian Government is indicating the opposite."

Some antagonists have suggested that the NSG should have similar provisions like that of the Hyde Act to restrain India's nuclear weapon programme. Since all member countries of the suppliers group will have to agree to exempt India from rules prohibiting nuclear sales to countries that do not accept full-scope safeguards agreements on all of their nuclear facilities, it would be ironic, according to these critics, if such an exemption were to be given to India, as the NSG was the byproduct of India's first nuclear test in May 1974 to restrict the spread of nuclear technology for weapons programmes.

The Washington, D.C-based Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is particularly active in lobbying against the nuclear deal. It has recommended the NSG and the US Congress not to make a hasty decision on the nuclear agreement, which has the potential to undermine the international non-proliferation regime. Monterey Institute of International Affairs too is not very excited about this nuclear deal and analysts here fear that the claim of the Bush Administration that it is a good deal for the US may not hold true. Here again, the ammunition provided to such arguments comes from India, where the Government tells the opponents that the deal is with the international suppliers and not just the United States.

The Washington Post, moreover, appears to be supportive of the nuclear deal and recommends its early approval by the US Congress. The New York Times is not so favourable to the idea of civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US. The main lines of arguments for and against the deal are not new and are along familiar track. The bottomline is whether this deal will lead to further proliferation or promote non-proliferation. An editorial in the New York Times said; "As far as we're concerned, there is no reason at all to rush. President Bush gave away far too much and got far too little for this deal. No promise from India to stop producing bomb-making material. No promise not to expand its arsenal. And, no promise not to resume nuclear testing."

The Government of India has taken pains to explain to the public that the country's strategic programme would remain untouched by the 123 agreement. This unsettles the non-proliferation fundamentalists in American strategic community. The Bush Administration officials have been harping on the non-proliferation benefits of this deal and this angers the Indian nationalists and the critics of the deal.

What then is the fate of the deal? The ball is clearly in the American court now. The Bush Administration is quite bullish about its ability to get over the perceived hurdles at the IAEA and the NSG. But it cannot sit idle and expect a favourable outcome. It is as much a test of Indian diplomacy to sell through in these two organisations. The US Congress is less likely to be a problem, unlike the concerns in certain quarters. Once the NSG gives clearance to India for international nuclear trade for civilian purposes, the US Congress is unlikely to turn down the 123 agreement. Doing so will lead to the French and the Russians clean up in the Indian nuclear market to the disadvantage of the US companies. Why should the US Congress do so, despite the incessant pressure from the non-proliferation lobby?--INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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