Round The World
New Delhi,
29 July 2008
Indo-US Nuclear
Deal
WILL IT OVERCOME
FOREIGN OPPOSITION?
Prof. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
After winning the trust vote in the Lok Sabha, the UPA
Government has been exuding confidence that the Indo-US nuclear deal will see
the day of the light before the US Congress adjourns on 26th September.
To counter media reports on Pakistan's
lobbying activities against the deal, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee
has stated that Pakistan
would support India
at the IAEA on the India-specific safeguards agreement. Despite several reports
on China's ambivalent
position on the US-India nuclear deal, the UPA Government has been assuring the
Indian public that China
would support India
both at the IAEA and the Nuclear Supplier Group's (NSG) meeting.
Why is the Government of India so convinced of its success
at the IAEA and the NSG? While the Indian diplomats have been at work in many
concerned capitals to promote the nuclear deal with the United States, partly
the confidence comes from the repeated assurances by the Bush Administration,
indeed President George Bush himself, that the deal will be done.
How can the Bush Administration be so sure that no
opposition would come from the NSG members to this deal? Significantly, there
are still many opponents to this deal both within India
and the US.
The whole world witnessed the insalubrious scenes in the Indian Parliament at
the time of the debate on the trust motion. By voting against the UPA
Government, a large number of parliamentarians indicated their strong
opposition to the nuclear deal. After all, the trust motion would not have been
necessary, had the Left Parties not withdrawn their support to the Government
only on the ground of the Centre’s position on the nuclear deal.
But more importantly, the questions raised by the Indian
antagonists of the deal and the answers provided by the Government have now
given ammunition to the foreign opponents to shoot down the deal. The relevance
of Hyde Act to the 123 agreement, for instance, was hotly debated in India. The
opponents contended that the provisions of the Act have the potential to
challenge Indian sovereignty. The Government pointed out that India is not
bound by this Act and the 123 agreement would override the Hyde Act.
The opponents in the United States to this deal,
particularly the non-proliferation lobby, are making a case that restraints on
Indian nuclear weapon activity will disappear, if the provisions of the Hyde
Act are overridden. In other words, the Indo-US nuclear deal would strengthen India's nuclear
weapons programme.
Henry Sokolski,
executive director of the Non-proliferation
Policy Education
Center, has argued that the Bush Administration
"has tried to convince Congress that the enabling U.S. legislation for the nuclear deal, the Hyde Act, has mechanisms to check India's nuclear weapons ambitions.
However, the Indian Government is indicating the opposite."
Some antagonists
have suggested that the NSG should have similar provisions like that of the
Hyde Act to restrain India's
nuclear weapon programme. Since all member countries of the suppliers group
will have to agree to exempt India from rules prohibiting nuclear sales to
countries that do not accept full-scope safeguards agreements on all of their
nuclear facilities, it would be ironic, according to these critics, if such an
exemption were to be given to India, as the NSG was the byproduct of India's
first nuclear test in May 1974 to restrict the spread of nuclear technology for
weapons programmes.
The Washington, D.C-based
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is particularly active in lobbying
against the nuclear deal. It has recommended the NSG and the US Congress not to
make a hasty decision on the nuclear agreement, which has the potential to
undermine the international non-proliferation regime. Monterey Institute of
International Affairs too is not very excited about this nuclear deal and
analysts here fear that the claim of the Bush Administration that it is a good
deal for the US
may not hold true. Here again, the ammunition provided to such arguments comes
from India, where the Government
tells the opponents that the deal is with the international suppliers and not
just the United States.
The Washington Post, moreover, appears to be
supportive of the nuclear deal and recommends its early approval by the US
Congress. The New York Times is not
so favourable to the idea of civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US. The main lines of arguments for
and against the deal are not new and are along familiar track. The bottomline
is whether this deal will lead to further proliferation or promote
non-proliferation. An editorial in the New
York Times said; "As far as we're concerned, there is no reason at all to rush. President
Bush gave away far too much and got far too little for this deal. No promise
from India
to stop producing bomb-making material. No promise not to expand its arsenal.
And, no promise not to resume nuclear testing."
The Government of
India has taken pains to explain to the public that the country's strategic
programme would remain untouched by the 123 agreement. This unsettles the non-proliferation
fundamentalists in American strategic community. The Bush Administration
officials have been harping on the non-proliferation benefits of this deal and
this angers the Indian nationalists and the critics of the deal.
What then is the
fate of the deal? The ball is clearly in the American court now. The Bush
Administration is quite bullish about its ability to get over the perceived
hurdles at the IAEA and the NSG. But it cannot sit idle and expect a favourable
outcome. It is as much a test of Indian diplomacy to sell through in these two
organisations. The US Congress is less likely to be a problem, unlike the
concerns in certain quarters. Once the NSG gives clearance to India for
international nuclear trade for civilian purposes, the US Congress is unlikely
to turn down the 123 agreement. Doing so will lead to the French and the Russians
clean up in the Indian nuclear market to the disadvantage of the US companies.
Why should the US Congress do so, despite the incessant pressure from the non-proliferation
lobby?--INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
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