Home arrow Archives arrow Defence Notes arrow Defence Notes 2007 arrow Henderson-Brookes Report: PUBLISH IN NATIONAL INTEREST, by Lt Gen Pran Pahwa, 29 October 2007
 
Home
News and Features
INFA Digest
Parliament Spotlight
Dossiers
Publications
Journalism Awards
Archives
RSS
 
 
 
 
 
 
Henderson-Brookes Report: PUBLISH IN NATIONAL INTEREST, by Lt Gen Pran Pahwa, 29 October 2007 Print E-mail

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 29 October 2007

Henderson-Brookes Report

 PUBLISH IN NATIONAL INTEREST

 By Lt Gen Pran Pahwa

The months of October and November 1962 represent perhaps the darkest period of India’s post-Independence history. By the end of November, the country stood humiliated and friendless with its army comprehensively defeated by the Chinese, its foreign policy in tatters and not a single of its non-aligned friends coming out in its favour.

The unhappy experience of 1962 brought home to the Government the importance of having the country’s military capability match its foreign policy. With a view to making the Indian army a more efficient fighting machine, Lieutenant General Henderson-Brookes was directed to inquire into the causes of the army’s defeat and suggest remedial measures.

Lt General Henderson-Brookes submitted his report within a short period thereafter but it has never been made public. It is in the interest of the country that the report be published and not kept under wraps any longer.

It could be argued that unlike Pakistan, which even now masochistically continues to brood on its 1971 defeat, India has put the memory of 1962 behind it and moved on. Nothing would therefore be achieved by publishing the report now. Such a step would only reopen old wounds and lead to needless mud slinging at people who are long dead and gone.

These are valid arguments but there are equally strong other reasons why the report should be published. The Government and the army took some patently unsound decisions like the ‘forward policy’ both before and during the operations. It is important to know if the Government consulted the army before ordering such militarily untenable moves.

Similarly, we must know what was the army’s reaction when it was given the task of throwing out the Chinese, something it knew it did not have the capability to do? Was it given an opportunity to present its side of the case to the Government, and if so, at what level? Who finally over-ruled the army’s objection and for what reasons?

The report can throw light on this and other inter-actions between the Government and the army. It may also highlight the drawbacks in the system of higher defence management and communication or lack of it between the heads of the Armed Forces and the decision-makers at that time. This which will enable us to see whether there has been any meaningful improvement since then.

The report could also clarify how it was that the army meekly accepted a task that it fully well knew it could not carry out. Voices within the army must have been raised against it. How and why were they suppressed? This information is necessary to guard against the country being once again pushed into a situation that is not militarily viable.

One would also like to know what directions were given by the Army Headquarters to the subordinate formations for such tasks and how it dealt with any objections raised by them.

The reasons for the Government deciding not to use the air force against the Chinese have never been convincingly explained. Was it a purely political decision or did the army also oppose its use, fearing that it might adversely affect the maintenance of its forward troops by air?

The air force has often claimed that it had a clear edge over the Chinese air force at that time and that had it been used it could have altered the final outcome of the war. Did it convey this to the Government and the army, and if so, what was their reaction? If the non-use of air was on account of poor inter-service coordination and understanding then it needs to be seen whether any steps have been taken to improve it.

Soldiering is not a profession which gives one the opportunity to learn on the job. The lessons thrown up by earlier conflicts play an important role in a soldier’s training for war. That is another reason why the Henderson-Brookes report must be published. The army must learn from the lessons of the operations against the Chinese.

It may be argued that the 1962 war was fought a long time ago and that what happened then will not be relevant now, but that is not true. The lessons of war are immutable and those from the 1962 operations are as relevant today as they were then.

It is difficult to understand why all the Governments since 1962 have refused to release the Henderson-Brookes report. There does not appear to be any logic to it. The report could affect only three classes of people --- the political, the army and the bureaucracy.

It could be that the report is too critical of the politicians and the Government of that time (which it probably is not, as this aspect would normally be outside the charter of a military professional), but that could hardly be a reason for its non-publication because all the key political figures of that time are already dead.

Moreover, there have been several non-Congress Governments at the Centre since then which would have been only too happy to release a report that damages the image of their rival.

The army could have objected on the grounds of security when the report was first submitted but that can not be a reason today. The military situation now is totally different from that of 1962 as the construction of a large number of roads in the forward areas has totally changed the topography of those regions.

The defensive positions, weapon systems, communications and logistics of today have no relationship with those of the earlier days. Nothing that is written in the report can therefore affect future operations. It is understood that the army has already conveyed to the Government that it has no objection to the report being declassified.

That brings us to the third set of people affected --- the bureaucracy. The report in all probability holds, among other factors, the procedures and systems followed in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) at that time as being to quite a degree responsible for the lack of operational readiness and ineffectiveness of the army.

Not only were these procedures tedious and time consuming, they also interposed civilian bureaucrats between the service headquarters and the Government at every stage, thereby obstructing direct communication between the military and the political decision-makers.

Much has changed in the Forces and the MoD since 1962 but these procedures, which gave over-riding powers to the bureaucrats, have remained largely unchanged. It is possible that the bureaucrats fear that there may be a public outcry for reviewing these procedures and the civil-military relationship in the MoD if the report is published and this may in turn result in diluting their powers.

There have been earlier cases where they have succeeded in shelving reports whose recommendations if implemented would have impinged on their authority. In the case of the Henderson-Brookes report too, the bureaucrats may have somehow managed to prevail upon successive Governments to withhold the publication of the report. It is difficult to think of any other reason.

However, notwithstanding the objections from any quarter, the Government must now release the report, as it would be in the national interest to do so. ---- INFA

(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)

 

 

< Previous   Next >
 
   
     
 
 
  Mambo powered by Best-IT