DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 4 September 2006
Military
Procurement Policy
PLAN FINE, ENSURE
IMPLEMENTAIOTN
By B.K. Mathur
Earnest efforts are being made by the Defence Ministry to
set right the controversial and complex process
for acquiring defence equipment that involves substantial public funds ---and
the increasing scams that go with it. The present Defence Minister, Pranab
Mukherjee initiated guidelines and worked out a Defence Procurement Procedure
(DPP) and Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) last year. This has again been reviewed and further
improved to ensure enhanced transparency and public accountability. The new policy stipulates a “collegiate
manner” for major decisions by the Defence Acquisition Council, increased
transparency in field trials and level playing field for indigenous vendors
vis-à-vis foreign suppliers.
One very good thing which the new policy has tackled is the
indigenisation of military machines production.
Successive Defence Ministers
have concentrated their efforts on this front, but have not been able to get
the required results and obtain one hundred per cent indigenisation right from
the designing stage of expensive machines.
This has been happening for years, which does not seem to have been
considered in depth in the latest Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) and Manual.
Why is it that despite the internationally-recognised fact that young Indian
defence scientists are inferior to none in the world, India has to
depend so heavily on imported machines?
And, how is it that even though the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) has designed several state-of-the-art machines they
invariably fail at the production stage?
It is true that the Defence Ministry has taken a wise step
in including in the DPP-2006 a separate procedure for the “make category” (for
producing the military machines fully indigenously. Earlier, the procedure was laid down only for
“buy” (off-the-shelf purchase from abroad) and “buy and make” (off-the-shelf purchase
abroad with licensed production indigenously). The addition in the policy of
the “make procedure”, as spelled out by Pranab Mukherjee, is based on the
recommendations of the controversial Kelkar Committee and the Sixth Report of
the Defence Ministry’s Parliamentary Standing Committee. The procedure has been
designed to enable Indian industries to develop high-tech complex systems and
their production wholly indigenously.
In this context, it needs to be considered that production
of military machines is quite different from that of other items. A
state-of-the-art military machine requires thousands of components which cannot
be produced under one roof. No industry, whether in public sector or private,
can afford to produce all the components with their limited use. Take, for
example, the requirement of just one or two small components of a specific
design for use in a big machine. It is not economically viable for anyone to
set up a facility to produce that small component. It is either to be imported or produced in
bulk for exports to the countries which are producing same kind of machines or
some other product where that particular part could be used.
This kind of approach requires two things: Government’s
support and active cooperation of the private sector industry. None of these is
happenings, even though the Defence planners have been repeatedly talking of
increasing indigenization of defence production for decades. But when it came to acquiring a machine the
choice invariably fell on direct off-the-shelf import at high price. In this
process several vested interests got
involved and scandals erupted. Poor
Indian designers, young scientists and technicians remained dissatisfied, cursing the Defence Ministry for
inadequate support for their work.
During the last three decades or so, the DRDO and the Indian
Defence industry have undertaken production of two major fighting machines for
the armed forces: main battle tank (MBT) and the light combat aircraft (LCA)
and several smaller equipments and weapon systems. The MBT has been named three or four times
since 1972 when it was first thought of, and now some pieces produced so far
have imported engine. And, more concernedly, the Arjun tank is not going to be the
Indian Army’s MBT. It is the Russian tank which the producer updates almost on
five-yearly basis. Same is the case with
the LCA, which has undergone several trial runs with imported machines, but is
yet to be inducted into the Indian Air Force.
In the meantime, we have purchased fighter and trainer aircraft from
abroad at high costs.
Call it coincidence, if you like, but actually it is a
normal practice. About the time when Pranab Mukherjee had announced the
DPP-2006, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL)
declared the scrapping of its earlier plan to produce indigenously the
latest Su-30MKI fighter aircraft it was required to do following the
license-production deal with its Russian
producers in December 2000 --- the single-largest Indo-Russian
defence contract in 40 years. The last of
the 140 indigenously-produced aircraft were to be supplied to the IAF by
2017. Wonder what will happen to the
deal, even though the Russian
company has so far supplied 26 kits to the HAL for the assembly
of the aircraft. It would earn $350 million for this supply.
Another lacuna which the new policy has tried to tackle is
the unusual delay caused in finalizing the purchase of a modern machine. In some cases, by the time a decision is
finalized after satisfying several vested interests, the machine that
ultimately gets into the hands of the users, that is the armed forces, becomes
obsolete and a new version is ready with the producer. The new policy has
introduced a welcome change in this process.
Efforts have been made to shorten the timeframe for procurement which presently
starts with the enunciation of qualitative requirements by the armed forces,
followed by acceptance of necessity,
identification of vendors, issuance
of requests, technical evaluation and final approval.
The DPP-2006 includes a revised fast track procedure to
expedite the acquisition of equipment which the armed forces need to meet
urgent operational requirement within the shortest possible
time. Fine, but enough does not seem to
have been provided to determine the priorities for acquisition. You just can’t acquire everything that has
been produced in the world at a time and within the budget provision. Take, for example, the purchase of the most
controversial 155 mm gun for the artillery, which even caused the fall of a
Government. It is true that the
procurement of the howitzer was required in the interest of the Army’s
modernization. But the 130 mm Russian gun was well serving the purpose, as proved in
1971 and 1999 in Kargil. The priority at that time should have been on a raised
platform for the artillery.
Likewise, the Defence planners do not seem to have given
proper consideration for prioritizing the procurement of expensive equipment
for the Navy. Should the sea force first have nuclear-powered submarine or an
aircraft-carrier? Indeed, the ideal situation would be to have both. But
prioritywise, a submarine should be the first choice, which is not happening at
present. More about it another time. In regard to the procurement policy for
the armed forces which has now begun to receive attention at the highest level,
it is necessary to have full
cooperation and understanding between the users, producers and policy makers.
Merely plans on paper are not enough.
They need to be implemented faithfully--- and in the interest of the
nation, not individuals. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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