DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 27 June 2006
Army’s New War
Doctrine
SMALL STRIKE FORCE
IN NUCLEAR ERA
By B K Mathur
The week-long military exercise in Punjab
last month, code-named Sange Shakti, was designed to test the Indian Army’s new
combat concept for conventional offensive operations in the plains. The exercise
was basically aimed at concentrating and coordinating India’s
military fire-power. With the creation of smaller strike groups, the exercise
was also intended to fine-tune the Army-Air Force joint operation in a
strategic battlefield and offensive operations against a nuclear backdrop. The
idea of the new strike force is to speed up the troop movement to ensure early
handling of any enemy attack.
The thrust of the new doctrine to suit the changing battle
strategies across the world is on
the formation of “integrated battle groups” drawn from the Army, Air Force and
the Navy. These groups are being so trained as to be able to make swift and
hard inroads into the enemy territory. The highlight of the doctrine is, and
rightly, that the strikes are “limited and calibrated” to ensure that nuclear
weapons do not come into play in a military operation. The need for swift
strike by small integrated forces, unlike the earlier policy of moving to the
front the entire strike Corps, was felt following the experience during “Operation Parakram” in 2002.
The Army undertook a massive
forward mobilisation for that operation from Mathura,
Ambala and Bhopal
to launch pads along the Line of Control (LoC) after the terrorist attack on
Parliament House on December 13, 2001.
The movement of the three strike Corps took the Army nearly one month to
get to the operational readiness
along the LoC. Imagine, if it was an
actual war and the enemy attack had already taken place when the movement of
the strike force started, the Indian Army would have been caught napping – and,
perhaps, without the support of the air force.
Obviously, the concept of an integrated military action is
welcome. As disclosed during last
month’s Operation, eight strike groups have been constituted, instead of the
earlier three “strike groups” at the Corps level, based far away from a possible scene of operation. The details of the composition of the smaller
strike groups has been finalized by the Army and the Air Force commanders and
approved by the Defence planners and the Cabinet Committee on Security. It is
hoped that before the new doctrine was tried at last month’s operation, several
aspects and drawbacks of the earlier system were considered carefully.
The concept of integrated military operation, inter-Service
cooperation and joint command and control has been under discussion for a long time. At one stage the Government
had almost decided to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) above
the three Chiefs of Staff, those of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. But certain difficulties were obviously seen
in the CDS system which prompted the Government to re-think about the
matter. In fact, there have been sharp
differences among the military commanders and Defence experts about the
creation of the CDS. One expert who has
vehemently opposed the move all along told me the other day: “One of the
achievements of the Vajpayee Government on the military front is its failure to
create the post of the CDS.”
The present Defence Minister was initially opposed to the
creation of the post. He had indicated this in response to my question at a Press Conference.
But he seems to have changed his mind now, in pursuance to suggestions
from various quarters after last month’s military exercise during which new
strike concept was tried and its shortcomings were registered, especially
taking into consideration the operational requirements in the nuclear era. The Defence Minister has now sought the
advice of all the political parties regarding the creation of the CDS. The CPM has already raised some doubts about
it.
The creation of the post is a subject that requires
examination in depth. It will be taken
up another time. At the moment, the creation of smaller strike forces, as tried
last month, with the requirement of joint command and control needs to be
carefully planned, against the experiences gained by the Army last month.
Several things have to be considered, among these mainly three aspects:
inter-arm cooperation within the Army, inter-Service understanding, proper
training for a joint military action and ability to undertake successful operation against possible
use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.
Remember, Pakistan which continues to be India’s potential enemy despite
the present peace efforts by both, is a nuclear power and Gen. Musharraf had
threatened several times before the peace moves about the use of nuclear
weapons in the event of a war.
Experience during the wars India has fought post-independence,
including the Kargil operation which professionally
cannot be described as a war, shows that inter-arm and inter-Service
coordination miserably failed. In 1962,
the Army was caught unawares when China attacked. The
Henderson-Brooke Committee went into the causes of the disaster the Indian Army
suffered. Its report has not yet been disclosed. and the Defence planners have
failed to make use of the findings of the Committee for improvement in the operation
strategy subsequently during wars against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Years
after the report was submitted, Major-General Henderson-Brooke, who lived in Australia after retirement and passed away recently, told me during his short visit
to New Delhi: “Total failure of command and
control” was the cause of India’s
reverses.
Several Regiment-level commanders who fought the 1971 war
against Pakistan
now tell us of several incidents when they failed to get air support for their
forward moves. At times they had to depend only on artillery support, that too
of the field artillery because till then the gunners were not provided with
gunships, that is, armed helicopters, even though the other major armies of the
world had them.
The Air Force failed to provide timely support because of a
lacuna: faulty system being followed even now, irrespective of the composition
of the strike force. The demand for air
support has to follow a chain of command that causes delay. Beside this, any
war doctrine or integrated operation strategy requires a well-trained
force. Fist of all, the Army needs to be
freed from increasing deployment in aid of civil power. The troops require to
be put on vigorous training at all levels and in all possible
scenarios. For joint operations, the
integrated groups for rapid deployment have need to be trained accordingly
under joint command and control with complete coordination of the three
Services. Then only can the new war
doctrine be successfully
implemented. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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