Defence Notes
New Delhi, 15 May 2006
Indo-Pak Talks
SIACHEN GLACIER ON BOIL AGAIN
By B.K. Mathur
This is a repeat of what one
heard, spoke and wrote last year before and after the tenth round of Defence
Secretaries parleys to resolve the prolonged Siachen Glacier issue between India
and Pakistan.
Like last time this year too, it was reported prior to the talks last week that
both sides were slowly inching towards a solution for the withdrawal of troops
from the Siachen Glacier and Saltoro ridge, the highest battleground in the
world. One hoped against hopes that some
sort of an understandings could be arrived at to demilitarize certain areas, to
start with. President Mushrraf had indicated Islamabad’s willingness
to work out a formula and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too has been holding
that an understanding could be a major breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations.
Nothing of the sort has happened.
India wants, and rightly too, Islamabad to authenticate the positions of the Indian
troops in the region at present to eliminate any mischief by the Pakistan Army
in claiming those strategically advantageous heights which the Indian troops
are presently occupying at high costs, notwithstanding clear indications prior
to the Rawalpindi talks that Islamabad was, in principle, inclined to arrive at
an agreement for the withdrawal of Indian troops. Islamabad
obviously wants New Delhi
to be flexible on the distance to which the Indian troops will pull back with
actually no commitment about the withdrawal of troops from where to where and
why. Naturally the controversy remains
unresolved, notwithstanding the diplomatic and political statements by the top
leadership of the two countries.
Strategically, the Indian troops
are based at a height very advantageous to them in the event of a war. This is
hurting the military rulers in Pakistan
against the backdrop of its defeats at the hands of India’s armed forces in 1948, 1965,
1971 and 1999. All the time the Pak
forces have attacked India
from the Kashmir side and had to pay heavily,
despite assistance and support from
powerful, developed countries. Islamabad now
wants the Indians troops to be withdrawn from these heights over the Saltoro
ridge, which India
should not leave. Islamabad may have lately accepted in
principle the Indian troops’ positions. But there is certainly need to first
get confirmation of the “actual ground position line (AGPL) as the defining
line or Line of Control.
In other words, the LoC which was
earlier drawn up only up to NJ 9842 should be extended as part of a firm
compromise and defined upto the end. Nothing short of which need to be
accepted, notwithstanding Islamabad’s
diplomatic pressure for world
consumption. The Indian side, particularly the Defence side, including the
armed forces, should ignore what the Pakistan Defence Secretary’s delegation
had reportedly stated after the last week’s unsuccessful
round, like in May last year: India has remained adamant on its demand for
authentication of the present position of Indian troops, even though we had
offered to “record” the positions. This
clearly means that Islamabad
remains adamant to its known position that it does not want to legalise the
AGPL.
What the Indian Army insists is
to have a “clearly defined operational response mechanism.” A firm provision needs to be incorporated in
the agreement, that in the event of the Pakistani troops intruding into the
Indian territory and taking positions belonging to the Indian Army and
withdrawn under the agreement\, the Indian troops would be within their right
to undertake an operational response and re-capture the positions on the
Glacier heights held by them prior to the implementation of the agreement, if
any. But before the “give and take”
arrangement which PM Manmohan Singh seems willing to work out with President
Musharraf, it is necessary for New Delhi to draw the LoC
upto the end.
The defining of the AGPL is at
the root of the prolonged Siachen problem.
Remember, following the Shimla Agreement after the 1971 war, the
ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) and so delineated
on the maps. This exercise established
Point NJ 9842 as the anchor around which the LoC got further defined as “thence
north to the glaciers”. This controversy over the “undrawn” LoC beyond NJ 9842
and its continuation towards north or “north-east” has remained unresolved,
which consequently led to the operation “Meghdoot” in 1984. The Indian forces then occupied the strategic
heights. The inviolability of the LoC
has to be maintained and made an important national objective, as stressed by former Defence and External Affairs
Minister, Jaswant Singh of the BJP.
This national objective must be
kept in mind while working out any agreement with Pakistan. It should not be treated casually because the
LoC in the Siachen sector has been turned into the AGPL. If New
Delhi is now considering withdrawal of troops from the heights
acquired through great efforts in 1984, then there is need for secure certain
commitments and assurances from Islamabad. Any formula to
resolve the contentious issue must,
therefore, include the confirmation of the AGPL, as the defining line,
commitment against the re-occupation of the heights surreptitiously by Pakistan,
defining the extent of the withdrawal and, importantly, cleaning of that part
of the Glacier which has been under the Pakistani troops for a long time.
Any withdrawal of Indian troops
from the strategic heights for a military operation needs to be negotiated
after obtaining adequate assurances,
with a clause for immediate military action against the violator, that is, Pakistan.
In this context, it must be remembered that the positions on which the Indian
troops are deployed are not over Siachen but the Saltoro glacier west of
Siachen. Pakistan has attempted several
times since 1984 to dislodge our troops from that height and has, in the process, lost substantial number of troops. Evidently, therefore, any agreement with Islamabad without confirming the validity of the AGPL
would amount to a violation of the sanctity of the LoC – and dilution of India’s
stand all these years.
In the past successive Army Chiefs have expressed
their concern about an agreement on withdrawal of the troops from these heights
in a hush hush manner, at times warning of the consequences. The Chief of the
Army Staff, General J.J. Singh had boldly stated: last year prior to the tenth
round of the Defence Secretaries meet: “We have conveyed our concern and views
to the Government and we expect that the composite dialogue will take care of these
concerns and the decision of the Government will be taken in consonance with
the views which have been projected.”
The Army’s main plea now, as on two earlier occasions in 1989 and 1990,
is that some kind of a mechanism should be incorporated in the agreement that
defines the Indian troops’ positions after withdrawal.
Truly, it will be suicidal for India
to agree on anything less than
getting Indian troops present position “authenticated” before any withdrawal.
This done, another “precautionary measure” must be taken: continued presence of
the Indian Air Force, even if the troops are ultimately pulled back. The IAF
bases of the Western forward area should remain in full “operational readiness”, because Kashmir
and its annexation has always remained close to the hearts of all military
rulers. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has disclosed the other day in her
amended autography that Musharraf as Director of Military Operations has
“sought” permission to “take”
Kashmir and assure control of Srinagar in 1996. What he wanted was foolishly attempted in
Kargil in 1999. Please remember this.---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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