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Extraordinary Agreement:Global Implications of Indo-US Ties, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra,21 March Print E-mail

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 21 March 2006

Extraordinary Agreement

Global Implications of Indo-US Ties

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

As never before, the Indo-US relations have come under the spotlight of international affairs since President George Bush’s historic visit to India earlier this month. Some foreign analysts have compared this path-breaking trip of a Republican President of the US to President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in early 1970s.

Nixon’s China visit constituted a turning point in Sino-US relations in the emerging balance of power in Asia. It aimed at facilitating the US withdrawal from Vietnam, stemming Soviet expansionism in the Far East and promoting the US business interests in the large China market.

President Bush’s mission to India likewise constituted a significant milestone in emerging cooperative ties between the two countries, particularly exemplified by an extraordinary agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Bush’s visit also came at a time when his administration appeared to be facing two life-size challenges in the resource-rich Persian Gulf region--the Iraq imbroglio and Iranian intransigence on its suspected nuclear weapons ambitions. Moreover, some strategic experts see an American gameplan to use India as a counterweight to spreading Chinese influence in Asia, including in the Persian Gulf region. 

There are quite a few similarities between these two US missions. But the differences in the nature and possible outcome of these two relationships are equally fundamental and need to be factored into any analysis of the issue. The two most vital points are: President Nixon aimed at using Communist China against Soviet Communists at a time when China and the USSR had a relationship of intense hostility.

Today, India and China are partners in development and have an increasing trend of economic ties. Secondly, unlike China, which is a Communist country and which can take fast decisions with little domestic opposition, India is a democratic country and no Government of India can take a substantial foreign policy decision without consulting and taking on board a variety of differing opinions.

In any case, one cannot compare the US determination to contain the Soviet power during cold war years with the current desire of the American ruling elites to manage the growing power of China. There is no dispute about the fact that the US has had a substantial contribution to the growing power of China. There are about fifty five thousand Americans who live in Hong Kong to conduct various types of business activities. More than one hundred big US corporations are doing business in China and have concluded thousands of joint economic ventures. The US has allowed the Chinese companies to sell their products in the American market, resulting in billions of dollars of Chinese trade surplus.  Despite reports about 60 per cent of Chinese surveyed believing in an American design to contain China, the fact remains that the US companies would be the first to oppose any containment strategy against China. In a non-democratic country like China, moreover, one should take such reports with large pinches of salt.

The Chinese analysts often suspect a US plan to contain the growth of the Chinese power. Some American experts and opinion makers themselves fuel such suspicions in China through their writings and comments. The Bush Administration under the influence of neo-conservatives departed from the traditional policy of strategic partnership with China to a new view of China as a strategic competitor.

The war on terrorism, continuing robust economic ties between the two countries and Chinese willingness to cooperate with the US in dealing with non-proliferation concerns in the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf  have generated a new understanding in Washington that China is a stakeholder in sustaining the current world order.

Under the complex developments of the post-Cold war era, China along with Russia and others has spoken about meeting the American unilateralism by establishing a multi-polar world. This in a way is a containment strategy against the US. The US appears to have no problem with Chinese economic growth but has reservations against China’s growing military prowess.

Under such circumstances, China views the growing Indo-US relations with substantial anxiety. The recent Bush-Singh nuclear agreement has not generated a positive response from the Chinese, unlike the French, British and the Russians. The Government of India needs to cautiously approach this problem first, by guarding against further strengthening of Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation and secondly, by seeking to convince the Chinese that India has no intention to participate in any containment strategy against China.

How would India convince the Chinese? First of all, a persistent dialogue on regional security needs to be conducted with China. Secondly, India should give further boost to its economic cooperation with China. Thirdly, India can also look into ways and means of establishing a civilian nuclear cooperation with China.

Pakistan is another country that has been wary of emerging closer the Indo-US relations in a wide-spectrum of areas, including defence and security cooperation. It has taken specific exception to the civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US. This is partly because of Pakistan’s perennial difficult desire to equate itself with India on every issue. India got a deal from the Bush administration on the nuclear issue, whereas the major non-NATO South Asian ally of the US failed to receive a similar treatment. This is the primary concern. Secondly, the Bush-Singh nuclear deal has the potential to remove a long-standing thorn in the Indo-US relations. Pakistan fears that its strategic importance to the US would slowly erode along with a steady rise in Indo-US cooperation.

India needs to take note of this adverse reaction in its immediate neighbourhood to the new nuclear understanding with the US. First of all, it should enter into a nuclear dialogue with Pakistan for increasing mutual confidence in addition to the composite dialogue. This should be part of a broader dialogue on security issues aimed at developing convergence of interests between the two countries on a range of security issues which affect both adversely. Secondly, India should also seek to establish energy cooperation with Pakistan beyond the proposed gas pipeline project involving Iran.

Russia was the third country that developed certain amount of anxiety over increasing cooperation between the US and India and more particularly in the area of civilian nuclear cooperation. It has a continuing stake in the India nuclear market and its concerns are genuine. However, the Russian Prime Minister’s recently-concluded visit to India seems to have removed doubts and suspicion on this issue.

While seeking to address the domestic opponents of Indo-US relations, the Government should not neglect the implications abroad and take appropriate steps without delay.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

 

 

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