ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 21 March 2006
Extraordinary
Agreement
Global
Implications of Indo-US
Ties
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
As never before, the Indo-US relations have come under the
spotlight of international affairs since President George Bush’s historic visit
to India
earlier this month. Some foreign analysts have compared this path-breaking trip
of a Republican President of the US
to President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in early 1970s.
Nixon’s China
visit constituted a turning point in Sino-US relations in the emerging balance
of power in Asia. It aimed at facilitating the
US withdrawal from Vietnam, stemming Soviet expansionism in the Far
East and promoting the US
business interests in the large China market.
President Bush’s mission
to India
likewise constituted a significant milestone in emerging cooperative ties
between the two countries, particularly exemplified by an extraordinary
agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Bush’s visit also came at a time
when his administration appeared to be facing two life-size challenges in the
resource-rich Persian Gulf region--the Iraq imbroglio and Iranian
intransigence on its suspected nuclear weapons ambitions. Moreover, some
strategic experts see an American gameplan to use India
as a counterweight to spreading Chinese influence in Asia, including in the Persian Gulf region.
There are quite a few similarities between these two US missions. But the differences in the nature and possible outcome of these two relationships are
equally fundamental and need to be factored into any analysis of the issue. The two most vital points are: President Nixon
aimed at using Communist China against Soviet Communists at a time when China and the USSR had a relationship of intense
hostility.
Today, India
and China
are partners in development and have an increasing trend of economic ties.
Secondly, unlike China,
which is a Communist country and which can take fast decisions with little
domestic opposition, India
is a democratic country and no Government of India can take a substantial
foreign policy decision without consulting and taking on board a variety of
differing opinions.
In any case, one cannot compare the US determination to contain the Soviet power
during cold war years with the current desire of the American ruling elites to
manage the growing power of China.
There is no dispute about the fact that the US
has had a substantial contribution to the growing power of China. There
are about fifty five thousand Americans who live in Hong
Kong to conduct various types of business
activities. More than one hundred big US
corporations are doing business in China and have
concluded thousands of joint economic ventures. The US has allowed the Chinese
companies to sell their products in the American market, resulting in billions
of dollars of Chinese trade surplus.
Despite reports about 60 per cent of Chinese surveyed believing in an
American design to contain China,
the fact remains that the US
companies would be the first to oppose any containment strategy against China. In a
non-democratic country like China,
moreover, one should take such reports with large pinches of salt.
The Chinese analysts often suspect a US plan to
contain the growth of the Chinese power. Some American experts and opinion
makers themselves fuel such suspicions in China through their writings and
comments. The Bush Administration under the influence of neo-conservatives
departed from the traditional policy of strategic partnership with China to a new view of China as a
strategic competitor.
The war on terrorism, continuing robust economic ties
between the two countries and Chinese willingness
to cooperate with the US in dealing with non-proliferation concerns in the
Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf
have generated a new understanding in Washington that China is a
stakeholder in sustaining the current world order.
Under the complex developments of the post-Cold war era, China along with Russia
and others has spoken about meeting the American unilateralism by establishing
a multi-polar world. This in a way is a containment strategy against the US. The US appears to have no problem with Chinese
economic growth but has reservations against China’s growing military prowess.
Under such circumstances, China views the growing Indo-US
relations with substantial anxiety. The recent Bush-Singh nuclear agreement has
not generated a positive response from the Chinese, unlike the French, British
and the Russians. The Government of
India needs to cautiously approach this problem first, by guarding against
further strengthening of Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile
cooperation and secondly, by seeking to convince the Chinese that India has no intention to participate in any
containment strategy against China.
How would India
convince the Chinese? First of all, a persistent dialogue on regional security needs
to be conducted with China.
Secondly, India should give
further boost to its economic cooperation with China. Thirdly, India can also look into ways and means of
establishing a civilian nuclear cooperation with China.
Pakistan is another country that has been
wary of emerging closer the Indo-US relations in a wide-spectrum of areas,
including defence and security cooperation. It has taken specific exception to
the civilian nuclear cooperation between India
and the US.
This is partly because of Pakistan’s
perennial difficult desire to equate itself with India on every issue. India
got a deal from the Bush administration on the nuclear issue,
whereas the major non-NATO South Asian ally of the US failed to receive a similar
treatment. This is the primary concern. Secondly, the Bush-Singh nuclear deal
has the potential to remove a long-standing thorn in the Indo-US relations. Pakistan fears that its strategic importance to
the US
would slowly erode along with a steady rise in Indo-US cooperation.
India needs to take note of this adverse
reaction in its immediate neighbourhood to the new nuclear understanding with
the US.
First of all, it should enter into a nuclear dialogue with Pakistan for
increasing mutual confidence in addition to the composite dialogue. This should
be part of a broader dialogue on security issues
aimed at developing convergence of interests between the two countries on a
range of security issues which
affect both adversely. Secondly, India
should also seek to establish energy cooperation with Pakistan beyond the proposed gas pipeline
project involving Iran.
Russia was the third country that developed
certain amount of anxiety over increasing cooperation between the US and India and more particularly in the
area of civilian nuclear cooperation. It has a continuing stake in the India nuclear
market and its concerns are genuine. However, the Russian
Prime Minister’s recently-concluded visit to India seems to have removed doubts
and suspicion on this issue.
While seeking to address
the domestic opponents of Indo-US relations, the Government should not neglect
the implications abroad and take appropriate steps without delay.---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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