ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 14 March 2006
The Debate
Continues
Indo-US Nuclear
Deal: What Next?
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
It is almost eight months since the July 2005 nuclear
understanding reached between US President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and the debate over this issue
is not over yet. The Left parties in India, have spearheaded a
persistent opposition to the deal. The main argument has been the following:
first, it is a compromise of India’s
non-alignment and independent foreign policy. Second, India has become part of the US global
geopolitical strategy by signing this agreement. Third, the US is an
unreliable partner. Fourth, the US
wants to build up India
against China
and the current nuclear agreement is part of that strategy.
On the last point, the stand of the Indian Left and the
Chinese Government overlap. After all, China alone among the Big Five
Nuclear Powers has been critical of the Indo-US nuclear deal. While commenting
that the Indian nuclear agreement with the US
should conform to the NPT guidelines, Beijing
has reportedly toed a different line on the Pakistani demand for a similar
deal.
Weeks before President George Bush visited South Asia, the
Pakistani President was in Beijing.
On the eve of this trip, the Pakistani media reported that China was prepared to sell two additional
nuclear reactors to Pakistan
and that it would care less about
what other members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group would say on this. If the US
Congress approves the nuclear
agreement signed by President Bush with India,
China is most likely to
supply two reactors to Pakistan.
It is to be seen if China
would be mindful of the NPT guidelines then.
There is little doubt that it is the independent decision of
the UPA Government that it should sign a nuclear agreement with the US to be able
to acquire advanced technology and nuclear fuel from the international market.
It would enable India
to partially maintain its energy security without giving up the nuclear weapons
program. How does it compromise non-alignment policy of India? What is
the other pole that India
is aligned against? The US
has not forced India
to sign such an agreement. How does it then affect India’s independence in foreign
policy making? As far as the trust/unreliability argument is concerned, little
said is better. Almost every country can be guilty of it some time or the
other.
Those who campaigned about India surrendering its sovereignty
have kept quite after hearing Prime Minister’s explanation in the Parliament.
Others who raised the fast breeder reactor issue
have been silenced after it was clear that it would not be open for
international inspection. The Left Parties have opposed the deal, but
simultaneously are unprepared to bring down the coalition government on this issue.
The Prime Minister appears to have been successful in selling his nuclear deal with President
George Bush. Now the ball is squarely in the American court. There are skeptics
and opponents in the US
too. They are opposed to the nuclear deal with India as well. Their main arguments
are: First, it is a deal that rewards India for proliferation and
discourages non-proliferation. Secondly, it sends a wrong message to Iran
and North Korea, which are
under US
pressure to give up their nuclear
ambitions. Thirdly, it would promote an arms race in the region. Fourthly, the
Bush Administration is prepared to give too much to India
in return of too little from India.
The Bush Administration officials have provided answers to
all these questions and issues quite
forcefully. First, it has been argued that the American nuclear agreement with India is
actually aimed at promoting non-proliferation. India has agreed to open up 14 out
of 22 of its nuclear reactors to IAEA safeguards and that constitutes a
non-proliferation achievement. In the absence of such an agreement, India could use
any of its un-safeguarded reactors for military purposes.
Secondly, there is no message
for Iran or North Korea, since those two countries are much
different from India
on many counts. Unlike India,
both those countries have signed the NPT and then lied about their nuclear
activities and ambitions. They are also walking away from the IAEA at a time
when India
is inching towards that international nuclear watchdog.
Thirdly, the US-Indian nuclear cooperation efforts are not
aimed at nuclear weapons program, but at civilian nuclear technology for power
generation. The deal would constrain India’s existing nuclear capability
to some extent by limiting the number of nuclear reactors available for
military purposes. How would then this deal cause an arms race?
Fourthly, it is not an inequitable deal since the Bush
Administration is convinced that America’s
strategic partnership with India
is in keeping with the country’s interests. It would open up India’s more
than $60 billion of nuclear market for US and other businesses. It would assist
India
in managing its energy security and in turn the expected pressure on the international energy market would be less and thus indirectly US consumers would also
benefit from a stable energy price in years to come.
All these arguments are powerful and convincing. Moreover,
there is a bipartisan conviction in the US that the emerging ties with India
would benefit American economic as well as national security interests. India
is increasingly seen in the US as a growing economic power house, a stable and
resilient democracy, a responsible country, an emerging player in global
economic and political issues and a
country that has similar ethics and values.
Although the two countries have divergent approaches to
several international issues, the
foreign policy goals of the Americans and Indians are converging a great deal.
India and the US, for instance, have similar goals on Iraq and Iran issue. Both want a democratic and stable Iraq and a
non-nuclear cooperative Iran. While New Delhi and Washington have different
approaches to these issues, such
differences are acceptable by democracies.
Notwithstanding the Congressional
election year, it is most likely that the current Republican-dominated US
Congress will give the green signal
to the Bush Administration to establish civilian nuclear cooperation with
India. The real battle will thus be fought in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group,
where the US has to convince several other countries the benefits that may be
brought by the nuclear agreement with India. Unlike the US Congress, these countries will not judge the issue on the basis of American national interests but
on the ground of their own respective national interests. --INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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