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The Debate Continues:Indo-US Nuclear Deal: What Next?, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra,14 March 2006 Print E-mail

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 14 March 2006

The Debate Continues

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: What Next?

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

It is almost eight months since the July 2005 nuclear understanding reached between US President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the debate over this issue is not over yet. The Left parties in India, have spearheaded a persistent opposition to the deal. The main argument has been the following: first, it is a compromise of India’s non-alignment and independent foreign policy. Second, India has become part of the US global geopolitical strategy by signing this agreement. Third, the US is an unreliable partner. Fourth, the US wants to build up India against China and the current nuclear agreement is part of that strategy.

On the last point, the stand of the Indian Left and the Chinese Government overlap. After all, China alone among the Big Five Nuclear Powers has been critical of the Indo-US nuclear deal. While commenting that the Indian nuclear agreement with the US should conform to the NPT guidelines, Beijing has reportedly toed a different line on the Pakistani demand for a similar deal.

Weeks before President George Bush visited South Asia, the Pakistani President was in Beijing.

On the eve of this trip, the Pakistani media reported that China was prepared to sell two additional nuclear reactors to Pakistan and that it would care less about what other members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group would say on this. If the US Congress approves the nuclear agreement signed by President Bush with India, China is most likely to supply two reactors to Pakistan. It is to be seen if China would be mindful of the NPT guidelines then.

There is little doubt that it is the independent decision of the UPA Government that it should sign a nuclear agreement with the US to be able to acquire advanced technology and nuclear fuel from the international market. It would enable India to partially maintain its energy security without giving up the nuclear weapons program. How does it compromise non-alignment policy of India? What is the other pole that India is aligned against? The US has not forced India to sign such an agreement. How does it then affect India’s independence in foreign policy making? As far as the trust/unreliability argument is concerned, little said is better. Almost every country can be guilty of it some time or the other.

Those who campaigned about India surrendering its sovereignty have kept quite after hearing Prime Minister’s explanation in the Parliament. Others who raised the fast breeder reactor issue have been silenced after it was clear that it would not be open for international inspection. The Left Parties have opposed the deal, but simultaneously are unprepared to bring down the coalition government on this issue.

The Prime Minister appears to have been successful in selling his nuclear deal with President George Bush. Now the ball is squarely in the American court. There are skeptics and opponents in the US too. They are opposed to the nuclear deal with India as well. Their main arguments are: First, it is a deal that rewards India for proliferation and discourages non-proliferation. Secondly, it sends a wrong message to Iran and North Korea, which are under US pressure to give up their nuclear ambitions. Thirdly, it would promote an arms race in the region. Fourthly, the Bush Administration is prepared to give too much to India in return of too little from India.

The Bush Administration officials have provided answers to all these questions and issues quite forcefully. First, it has been argued that the American nuclear agreement with India is actually aimed at promoting non-proliferation. India has agreed to open up 14 out of 22 of its nuclear reactors to IAEA safeguards and that constitutes a non-proliferation achievement. In the absence of such an agreement, India could use any of its un-safeguarded reactors for military purposes.

Secondly, there is no message for Iran or North Korea, since those two countries are much different from India on many counts. Unlike India, both those countries have signed the NPT and then lied about their nuclear activities and ambitions. They are also walking away from the IAEA at a time when India is inching towards that international nuclear watchdog.

Thirdly, the US-Indian nuclear cooperation efforts are not aimed at nuclear weapons program, but at civilian nuclear technology for power generation. The deal would constrain India’s existing nuclear capability to some extent by limiting the number of nuclear reactors available for military purposes. How would then this deal cause an arms race?

Fourthly, it is not an inequitable deal since the Bush Administration is convinced that America’s strategic partnership with India is in keeping with the country’s interests. It would open up India’s more than $60 billion of nuclear market for US and other businesses. It would assist India in managing its energy security and in turn the expected pressure on the international energy market would be less and thus indirectly US consumers would also benefit from a stable energy price in years to come.

All these arguments are powerful and convincing. Moreover, there is a bipartisan conviction in the US that the emerging ties with India would benefit American economic as well as national security interests. India is increasingly seen in the US as a growing economic power house, a stable and resilient democracy, a responsible country, an emerging player in global economic and political issues and a country that has similar ethics and values.

Although the two countries have divergent approaches to several international issues, the foreign policy goals of the Americans and Indians are converging a great deal. India and the US, for instance, have similar goals on Iraq and Iran issue. Both want a democratic and stable Iraq and a non-nuclear cooperative Iran. While New Delhi and Washington have different approaches to these issues, such differences are acceptable by democracies.

Notwithstanding the Congressional election year, it is most likely that the current Republican-dominated US Congress will give the green signal to the Bush Administration to establish civilian nuclear cooperation with India. The real battle will thus be fought in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, where the US has to convince several other countries the benefits that may be brought by the nuclear agreement with India. Unlike the US Congress, these countries will not judge the issue on the basis of American national interests but on the ground of their own respective national interests. --INFA

 

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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