ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 7 February 2006

Iranian Nuclear Tangle

 Challenges BeforE India

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Iran has stunned the world by refusing to compromise on its suspected civilian nuclear programme, even though the Big Five nuclear weapon powers, which are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, threatened to take the question to the Security Council.

After the majority of member countries voted in favour of the resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)meeting in Vienna last week, to refer the Iranian nuclear question to the Security Council, Tehran adopted a confrontational stance and announced that it would now begin full-scale production of enriched uranium, would end all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA and would not allow the IAEA’s short-notice inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol of the NPT.

This stance of Tehran, accompanied by its high rhetoric against the United States, Israel and the West in general, has made it difficult for countries friendly to Iran, such as India, China and Russia to take a stronger stand favourable to Iran. Germany and France, which adopted anti-US positions on the US approach to Iraq, were also prepared to assist Iran and avoid the American confrontational approach, but the Iran-EU dialogue went no where due to Iran’s intransigence and the EU-Three were also finally induced to make common cause with the United States.

India has been consistently improving its ties with Iran. Apart from its commercial and business relations, New Delhi announced a “strategic partnership” with Iran in the midst of its international isolation. The proposed gas pipeline project from Iran to India through Pakistan was given high priority considerations in India to cement Indo-Iranian cooperation. However, even New Delhi found it difficult to support Iran at the IAEA in view of its un-conciliatory attitude and offensive diplomacy.

Iran perhaps hoped that India would abstain from the IAEA voting in view of the strong pro-Iranian position of the Left parties, which support the current UPA coalition. While many Indians fail to understand the Left parties logic behind supporting Iran, it did generate expectations in Tehran. In order to make and implement an independent foreign policy, New Delhi does not have to oppose the US all the time.

But the Left appears to have drawn a line between the hegemonic US and the theocratic Iran and prefers to say and do every thing against the US, even if it would mean backing theocracy in principle.

Significantly, the Left parties have not made their position on the basis of the economic rationale, such as the gas pipeline project. The statements of Left leaders are clear that they support Iran, because the US and its allies are against Iran. It is wrongly believed that if India would have gone with the microscopic minority vote at the IAEA, it would have bolstered India’s image or served its national interests. Moreover, how can one argue, that supporting Iran would have reflected an independent foreign policy?

Having said that, India’s diplomacy will face more intricate challenges in the weeks and months to come due to its vote at the IAEA.  What is the likely future of Iran’s nuclear issue? First of all, there is still a silver-lining in the dark sky and diplomacy may ultimately triumph. Tehran has not closed all its doors to negotiations. Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, said soon after the IAEA meeting that, “Adoption of the policy of resistance doesn’t mean we are on non-speaking terms or non-cooperative. We had two options. One was resistance and the other surrender. We chose resistance.”

India has an option open for playing a role in future negotiations. The Indian Ambassador in Tehran rightly remarked that India was willing to “invite Iran and the negotiation parties to dialogue.” However, this willingness will turn into wishful thinking, unless New Delhi plays a proactive role and succeeds in coordinating a new dialogue process to resolve the Iranian tangle. The challenge would be whether Iran would be willing to listen to India after its vote at the IAEA in favour of the US-backed resolution.

Secondly, there is also a possibility that punitive measures may be adopted at the UN Security Council in the future, if Tehran refuses to budge from its current position. Russia, China, France and even Britain would make it hard for the US to follow a policy of sanctions in view of their ongoing economic and commercial interests in Iran. However, if Iranian intransigence continues, such an outcome cannot be ruled out. India is not a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. Its role and influence there would be extremely limited and indirect. But a question may arise as to whether India would support the anti-Iranian sanctions? Will not India be bound by a decision to follow the UN verdict?

The third challenge would come, if the UN Security Council fails to have a unanimous view on sanctions policy. Washington may decide to adopt unilateral sanctions against Iran, which would be stronger than the earlier Iran-Libya sanctions Act adopted by the Clinton Administration in 1996. Will India then support the US sanctions policy? If it does, the apprehensions of the Left parties that the Indian Government  is conducting its diplomacy at the behest of the US would be proved. If it does not, what will happen to India’s nuclear deal with the United States for civilian nuclear cooperation? Additionally, the whole Indian approach at the IAEA may be interpreted as a waste and a failure.

The fourth challenge would come if the Bush Administration escalates its confrontation with Iran and seeks some kind of a military solution to the whole issue. Some analysts argue against such an eventuality. They point out that Iran is not Iraq. Iran has a larger population base and deeper strategic depth. When the oil prices are skyrocketing and the Americans appear to have been stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington cannot take military action against Iran. Many Iranians will probably go along with this line of thinking. But you never know Washington, especially the Bush Administration. This Administration is a risk taker. It may not commit US troops and yet take certain military action. What will be India’s position on this? Yes, one clear position will be opposing a military approach to resolve international issues. But this will be only a position on the principle. What will New Delhi do?

There is just a little time for the foreign policy community to deliberate on such possibilities. And the considerations and discussions should begin now. ----- INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)