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Difficult Days Ahead:INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra,23 January 2006 Print E-mail

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 23 January 2006

Difficult Days Ahead

INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The official excitement expressed in July last by both the Indian and American officials after an understanding on civilian cooperation arrived at between the Indian Prime Minister and the American President has been replaced by more caution after the recent visit of the US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns to Delhi.

The conviction of Indian and American officials reflected after the first meeting on this issue in October last, that the new civilian nuclear deal would be ready for implementation by the time President George Bush makes an official trip to India no longer remains after the latest meeting between Burns and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. India now feels that more dialogue with greater details is necessary and the US officials doubt if an agreement for implementation would be ready before Bush’s visit to India.

However, both New Delhi and Washington have not changed their views on the importance of this agreement for strengthening international non-proliferation efforts, as well as for meeting the energy requirements of a fast-growing Indian economy. Significantly, neither the US nor India is comfortable with sharing the content and nature of the official dialogue with their respective people. The dialogue between the officials of the two countries is shrouded with substantial secrecy.

Had it been pure economics or just a matter of energy supply, perhaps open diplomacy would have been adopted. If the Indian Prime Minister considered it important to strike a nuclear deal with the US President without first taking the Indian people into confidence or even consulting with the coalition partners of the UPA Government, one can safely assume that the matter involves issues of national security and thus open debate and discussion are not encouraged.

Democracies and open societies with vibrant media, nonetheless, cannot remain quiet and refrain from debating the issue or demanding transparency. Indians are so fond of debates that every bit of national security affairs becomes a matter of public information and discussion – the NPT, CTBT, FMCT or just name it. The aftermath of July 18 agreement between the US and India too saw a healthy debate on the issue in our country.

Several analysts expressed their fear that civilian nuclear cooperation with the US might force India to compromise its national security. They did not believe that it would be possible to separate the civilian nuclear facilities from the ones necessary for the country’s military requirements. The previous NDA Government circulated a draft nuclear doctrine that spelled out an ambitious nuclear weapons capability on the sea, land and air. Not many in India challenged such an ambition. How could the Government now achieve that goal after separating the nuclear facilities and opening up a large number of them to international inspection? Others raised apprehension that India’s nuclear weapon capability would be exposed to outsiders after the Indo-US deal was implemented.

The UPA Government initially gave an impression that the US would accord the same status to India as other nuclear weapon powers have on matters of international inspection. Probably every one, including the Indian Government, was shocked when it was revealed that it was not so. Earlier, the general feeling was that the understanding reached between the Prime Minister and American President was enough for the White House to approach the US Congress to bring about necessary legislation for enabling supply of civilian nuclear technology to India. Soon another eye opener incident occurred when Indians came to know that New Delhi would have to take certain concrete steps demanded by Washington before the US Congress would act upon the issue.

The US expectation was, however, not limited to what India would do to its nuclear programmes and facilities at home. Washington also desired India to prove and demonstrate its non-proliferation credentials on the foreign policy front. The real challenge came when the Iranian nuclear issue was raised in the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA. India had to vote on the side of the US in the process risking the proposed gas pipeline project with Iran.

Subsequently, as Tehran took up the issue with New Delhi and expected a change of behaviour next time, Washington expressed its pleasure over Indian voting and desired that New Delhi would continue to do so in the future. The Bush Administration pointed out that such foreign policy behaviour was necessary to enable it to convince the members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) the need for co-opting India into the non-proliferation regime.

All these are clear indications that the new relationship with the United States will involve rethinking of Indian foreign policy postures and stances on certain issues now and even in the future. It is important that Indian foreign policy establishment and international affairs analysts begin serious study and analysis on this subject. A vigorous foreign policy debate is called for to protect Indian foreign policy interests.

It is also required that the national security team, both in the Government and the policy analysis community, discuss the security ramifications of the proposed Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation. After India separates the civilian nuclear facilities from the military ones and gives such a list to the US, interested members of the international community will quickly know about India’s nuclear weapons facilities. Even if we discount the possibility of any nuclear exchange in the region, even theoretically the real and potential adversaries of India would be able to target India’s facilities. Such an eventuality has to be seriously considered before we go forward with the required nuclear facilities separation.

There is no doubt that the country’s improved relation with the US is significant and desirable. But the cost and benefit analysis of a nuclear deal, such as the proposed one, is essential to protect and enhance the country’s national interests and security. While the Government should maintain certain amount of secrecy for national security reasons, some amount of transparency too is necessary to evolve a healthy police approach.

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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