REWIND

New Delhi, 13 December 2023

VILE DISINFORMATION ON KASHMIR

By Inder Jit

(Released on 3 July 1990) 

Public memory is proverbially short. It seems to be even shorter in regard to the Kashmir developments, especially those preceding and following independence. This is not only so among our masses but also among those who should know better, both at home and abroad. Pakistan has taken full advantage of this ignorance in the past and is continuing to do so even today to spread vile disinformation. A case in point is Pakistan’s renewed demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. Most of our commentators have justifiably faulted Pakistan in the matter. Pakistan has none but itself to blame for the non-implementation of the UN resolution advocating a free and impartial plebiscite. Yet Islamabad and its spokesmen at the UN, world capitals and even in New Delhi are again accusing India of having impeded the functioning of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) through “machinations” and thereby prevented “the implementation of the resolutions calling for plebiscite to which it was, and continues to be, a party.” 

In a cleverly-worded letter in a New Delhi daily, the Pakistan High Commission stated the other day: “The provisions of the UN resolutions envisaged the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir... The withdrawal of the armed forces on the two sides had to be so coordinated in timing as not to place either side at a disadvantage and to prevent any possibility of the resumption of fighting. Thereafter, the stage would have been set for holding a free and impartial plebiscite. On its part, Pakistan secured the withdrawal of all tribesmen from Jammu and Kashmir, and in the meeting of representatives of the two parties convened by UNCIP in March 1949 suggested a framework within which the High Commands of the two armies could work a detailed and synchronized withdrawal programme, indicating that the completion of the Pakistani troops’ withdrawal would be achieved within three months. But the Indian side blocked discussions for synchronized withdrawal; nor did it submit any plan of its own for joint discussions and agreement. India’s machinations...”

What are the facts? The UNCIP came forward on August 13, 1948, with a resolution which was accepted by India on August 20, 1948 and by Pakistan late in December, 1948. This resolution was in three parts. Part I related to the Cease-fire Order, Part II to the Truce Agreement and Part III to reaffirmation by India and Pakistan “that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir would be determined in accordance with the will of the people.” Part I was implemented speedily. A cease-fire was brought about through separate and simultaneous orders of the High Commands of India and Pakistan in accordance with Part I which, importantly, also provided: “The High Commands of Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (For the purpose these proposals, forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organized and unorganized fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.) But Part II relating to a Truce Agreement never came to be implemented.

Why? Before attempting an answer, we would do well to recall the crucial Part II, the preamble of which states: “Simultaneous with the acceptance of the proposal for immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.” The rest of Part II consists of three parts: A, B and C. Part A reads: “1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State. 2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endevour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu & Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting. 3. Pending a final decision, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.”

Part B reads: “1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. 2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary. 3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu & Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will the safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.”

We need to remember the initial and basic fact of Pakistani aggression, which Islamabad and its propagandists conveniently forget. This, as Nehru emphasised in the Lok Sabha on March 29, 1956, was important “because everything subsequently flowed from it.” The UNCIP recognised this basic fact in its aforementioned resolution of August 13, 1948 which proposed: “As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.” Nehru added: “The point to remember is that because of this admission of aggression, the first thing that the Commission required was that Pakistan should withdraw its forces from the area of the State occupied by it. We were asked to withdraw the bulk of forces later, that is, on Pakistan withdrawing from that area... The right of our Army to be there was recognised but it was stated that since Pakistan was withdrawing completely... India also could reduce her forces... to bring about a better atmosphere...”

Pakistan was required under Part II A 2 “to secure the withdrawal from Jammu & Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.” But this was not done. What is worse, the entire scheme of militarisation under Part II B was jeopardised by Pakistan through a fraud perpetrated by it not only on India but also on the Security Council. New Delhi and the Security Council were suddenly confronted with a new issue in regard to the demilitarisation of the state --- the disbanding and disarming of the “Azad Kashmir Forces”, forces which Pakistan had all along denied were there. (These forces were armed, equipped and officered by Pakistan and comprised some 35 battalions.) The UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, contained no reference to these forces, constraining India to tell the UN in March 1953 that it would not have accepted the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948 had it been aware of their existence. It would have insisted on the disarming and disbanding of these “Azad Forces” in the truce agreement.

There is no truth whatsoever in Pakistan’s renewed charge that India had “blocked discussions for synchronised withdrawal”, and it did not “submit any plan of its own for joint discussions and agreement.” In fact, an identical accusation was made by Mr Feroze Khan Noon in the Security Council in 1957. But Mr Krishna Menon effectively rebutted it. He conceded in the Security Council that India and Pakistan had agreed early in March 1949 to submit their plans for the withdrawal of their respective forces. But it was not true that India “first asked for more time and later refused to honour this agreement.” He quoted UNCIP’s Third Interim Report of December 3, 1949 to assert that the Commission had on March 28, 1949 “received the Government of India's views.” India had then conveyed its preparedness to accept a period of three months for the complete withdrawal of Pakistan forces. Its memorandum also contained a suggested schedule for the withdrawal of Indian forces. But it declined to disclose its own programme to Pakistan until a satisfactory agreement had been reached regarding the withdrawal of Pakistan forces and the replacement of the “Azad Kashmir Forces” by a Civil Armed Force.

Pakistan has also tried to confuse opinion on the plea that it had sought a balanced and “synchronised withdrawal” of Indian and Pakistani forces. Not many, however, remember that the UNCIP itself had rejected Pakistan’s view (a) that the objective of the truce agreement was to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of its regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronisation of this withdrawal with the bulk of the Indian forces. The UNCIP candidly told Pakistan that “no simultaneity was intended” and that “synchronisation would be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission.” Further, Pakistan troops were required to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal was not conditional on Pakistan’s agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal. In the final analysis, Pakistan calculatedly blocked the implementation of the UNCIP resolution as it clearly saw Jammu & Kashmir affirming its accession to India. There is no other explanation for the way Pakistan mixed up its alphabet and insisted on the implementation of Part B of the resolution before Part A! Islamabad cannot fool all the people all the time. --- INFA

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