REWIND

New Delhi, 24 August 2023

CLIMBING SINO-INDIAN EVEREST

By Inder Jit

(Released on 8 November 1983) 

Sino-Indian talks on the border dispute are like climbing the Everest. There has been an encouraging movement from the base camp upward. But this does not mean that the ascent ahead is going to be easy and assured. Stiff and slippery slopes have yet to be negotiated. Little progress was achieved in the first three rounds. Most of the time was spent by the two sides restating their well-known positions. Beijing wanted India to agree to its package plan: recognition of the present line of actual control in the eastern sector, namely the McMahon Line, in exchange for the status quo in the western sector, namely acceptance of China's claim to Aksai Chin plus its occupation of some 2,500 sq miles of additional territory in 1962. New Delhi declined to accept this approach and instead pressed China to discuss the dispute sector by sector. Happily, the talks in the fourth round went off unexpectedly well and were appropriately described by India’s spokesman as encouraging and fruitful. Beijing has agreed to take a look at New Delhi’s proposal for a sector by sector approach and New Delhi at Beijing’s package plan. 

This is not to suggest a breakthrough, not even remotely. Beijing and New Delhi continue to hold fast to the substance of their positions. Significantly, however, both have showed much-needed flexibility and agreed to evolve one set of principles or working propositions which should govern negotiations on the border question. Last year, China suggested five principles: Equality; (2) Friendly consultations; (3) Mutual understanding and mutual accommodation; (4) A fair and reasonable settlement; and (5) A comprehensive solution. India came forward with six working propositions: (1) A solution must be found as early as possible; (2) It should be a just solution taking into account the legitimate interests of both sides; (3) Both sides should find a commonly agreed approach and basis for discussions; (4) The proposals advanced by either side, as constituting an approach to the problem, should be considered by the other; (5) It is necessary to consider steps to create a propitious atmosphere; and (6) Efforts should be made to settle the border issue in each sector into account the different aspects of each sector. 

At the latest talks, both sides discussed the respective proposals “principles”, as China chooses to call them and “working propositions”as India prefers to describe them-- and decided to marry them. Each then came forward with two separate sets of eight propositions. These were discussed and, encouraged by the progress, the talks were extended by one day to Sunday. Importantly, the number was reduced to six and agreement reached on all but one. Difficulty arose in regard to the wording of the proposition relating to consideration of appropriate steps and preliminary measures for resolving the dispute. Mutually acceptable wording could have been found to paper over the differences and an agreement reached, if necessary by extending the talks to the sixth (This would have, no doubt, interfered with the Conference of Chinese Ambassadors to South Asian countries called by Mr Gong Defei, leader of the Chinese delegation and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. But agreement, as an authoritative source said, would have been vastly more important and welcome to both sides.) Eventually it was felt that they must avoid using words ina hurry which might mean different things to either side and create issues of substance at the next round. Both China and India have come a long way since the tragic happenings of 1962. Strong emotions roused at the time have perceptibly yielded to a sober and pragmatic reappraisal. Time was when India declined to discuss the border dispute with China and virtually refused to look at the six principles put forward by Mr Chou En-lai in 1960. These were: (1) A boundary dispute existed between India and China; (2) A line of actual control had come into existence with the two countries exercising administrative control on either side: (3) In settling the boundary dispute, certain geographical principles should be taken into accounts; (4) The settlement should take into account the national feelings of the two countries; (5) Pending such a settlement, the two sides should adhere to the existing line of control and refrain from advancing further territorial claims; and (6) To ensure tranquillity along the border, both sides should refrain from patrolling it. The feeling in New Delhi hardened following the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962. Both Houses of Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution, moved by Nehru, that India would not rest until every inch of aggression was vacated from its sacred soil. 

Some fourteen years later, Mrs Gandhi boldly decided it was time that fences were mended. She suggested an exchange of ambassadors as the first step towards rapprochement, the embassies of the two countries were looked after by Charge d'Affaires during the intervening period. The Chinese initially played it cool. They argued that India should send back its ambassador first since it was the first to withdraw him. This was done and a Chinese Ambassador arrived in New Delhi before long. Little happened thereafter until the Janata Government came to power. Another bold initiative was then taken by New Delhi. Its Foreign Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited Beijing. But the welcome move towards building bridges ended abruptly when China invaded Vietnam while Mr Vajpayee was still on the Chinese soil. Mr Vajpayee reacted sharply and honourably and cut short his visit as a protest against the scant respect paid by Beijing to India’s sensitivity to the developments in the region and its failure to breathe even a word about Vietnam to him. 

Beijing’s attitude to India underwent a marked change following Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. Before long, it sent signals for better understanding to New Delhi overlooking Mrs Gandhi’s criticism of China’s decision to join hands with the US to increase military aidto Pakistan. (The decision of the US-China “combination”, she said, would pose a danger to India and the rest of the Third World.) Beijing sent a new senior Ambassador, Mr Shen Jian, to New Delhi almost immediately after Mrs Gandhi’s return to power in 1980, without waiting for India’s replacement in Beijing to arrive. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Huang Hua, attended India’s Republic Day celebrations in Beijing for the first time in twenty years and called for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations and the improvement of“mutual understanding and cooperation.” The visit of Pakistan’s President to Beijing four months later provided further evidence of China’s new outlook. For the first time, the Chinese leaders maintained discreet silence on Kashmir, ignoring Gen Zia’s pointed references. 

At Belgrade on the occasion of President Tito’s funeral, the Chinese leader, Mr Hua Guofeng, met Mrs Gandhi and the leaders of the two countries held talks at the top level for the first time after the Nehru-Zhou parleys twenty years earlier. The two leaders agreed that better Sino-Indian relations were essential for peace and stability in Asia and that bilateral problems could be solved only if the two countries avoided confrontation and resorted to mutual consultations. Mr Hua suggested that “both countries should concentrate on the present and put aside past differences.”Not long thereafter, China’s Vice Premier, Mr Deng Xiaoping, took in June what China watchers describe as “the most significant step” in Sino-Indian relations. First, he confirmed in an interview to an Indian editor that China would not continue its support of Pakistan’s call for self-determination in Kashmir, declaring it to be a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan that “should be settled amicably.” Second, he publicly proposed what Mr Zhou had offered before 1962: settlement of the border dispute with each side agreeing to the present line of control. 

Beijing continues to hold by its new outlook on New Delhi as reflected in Mr Deng’s subsequent statement that normalisation of relations with India is the first item on China’s agenda. This is not difficult to explain. Beijing no longer views India as a “stooge” or a “client State” of the Soviet Union as it did in the sixties --- or as one with hegemonistic ambitions. On the other hand, it now sees India as a country which could be counted upon to stand up to Soviet designs in South Asia even if it does not quite acknowledge India’s independence in foreign affairs. (In mid-1981, China’s Premier, Mr Zhao Ziyang, underlined China’s recognition of India as a “major Asian power” during his visit to Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh -- prior to Mr Huang Hua’s visit to India. Significantly, he added that Beijing also recognized India as a power with which China and others should live in peace “in the interest of regional and world stability.”) True, China continues to give arms to Pakistan. But Beijing explains that this is part of its efforts to strengthen the sub-continent. Available evidence confirms that Beijing has been urging Islamabad to be friendly with New Delhi. 

Internal factors within China have also encouraged Beijing to seek an improvement in its ties with India. (Beijing now concedes at long last that the border dispute is the “only obstacle”.) China’s top leaders have moved from ideology to pragmatism and recognise once again the basic concept and truism that a country’s real strength depends mainly upon its economic strength. Every effort is consequently on to push ahead vigorously with its Four Modernisation Programmes relating to agriculture, industry, science and technology and the People’s Liberation Army. Authoritative experts tell me that both agriculture and industry have already received a tremendous boost through the introduction of various incentives, the right to hire and fire, sideline production and permission to hire individuals. Great encouragement is being given to science and higher technology and Chinese scholars abroad total some 10,000 in US, 15,000 in Europe and 4,000 in Japan. Total emphasis in the PLA, which showed many weaknesses during the last war with Vietnam, is now being put on quality instead of numbers. Among other things, the concept of ranks has been restored. 

China clearly needs a period of tranquillity on its borders for the success of its efforts to further develop its economy. India has a key role to play in this scheme of things -- both in terms of a peaceful border and in checkmating Soviet expansionism in South Asia. (A settlement with India is also likely to help Beijing in troubled Tibet.) Beijing’s attitude to the question of normalising relations with India and resolving the dispute has to be seen in this light. In fact, China’s overall desire to build closer and friendly ties with India and to resolve the border problem at an early date was emphasised by its Prime Minister, Mr Zhao Ziyang, when he made a gesture to New Delhi and received India’s Ambassador, Mr A.P. Venkateswaran, last month. India, too, would stand to gain greatly from a settlement of the border dispute and a return to thebhai-bhai days. All those interested in the greater good of our two countries will need to keep their fingers crossed. --- INFA. 

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)