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Political Diary
New
Delhi, 9 November 2021
Indo-China: Deep
Distrust
PEACE DISTANT DREAM
By Poonam I Kaushish
Neighbour
or enemy? Both. Indeed, India-China relations are like playing a poker game. Show no emotions even as one plans strategy,
play is multi-causal, defiantly
stand one’s ground and gambling on a winning hand. Both New Delhi and Beijing are doing just that,
betting, with the underwritten message: Don’t mess with me.
The latest Pentagon
report to the US Congress on
China is worrying. Not only does it refer to Beijing building a tiny
village in Arunachal Pradesh’s upper Subansiri region but underscores it is the “only country capable of combining its economic,
military, diplomatic and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to
democracies through military modernisation by expanding its nuclear warheads to
1,000 by 2030.”
Adding to the over-21
months continuing standoff in Eastern Ladakh, there is a new headache: Bhutan. Whereby Thimpu didn't
think it necessary to take New Delhi into confidence about the ‘roadmap’ it
signed with Beijing recently vis-à-vis resolving their longstanding boundary
dispute. Making plain it did not want to be dragged into the geo-political
rivalry between India and China.
Giving Beijing, an opportunity
to thumb its nose at New Delhi as its roadmap came four days after the 13th
round of India-China corps commander level meeting. Delhi's muted reaction
betrays bewilderment mixed with suppressed fury and puts a hole through its
Doklam narrative which has complicated Indo-Sino ties
Recall, in June 2017,
Chinese troops attempted to construct a road near Doklam plateau claimed by Bhutan
and China. Indian troops stepped in as the territory lay close to its highway. After
a 73 days face-off both sides withdrew troops, but subsequent satellite images
show Chinese military infrastructure therein on permanent footing. Strangely, New
Delhi preferred to look away.
Undeniably, despite umpteen military and diplomatic dialogues,
Beijing continues to take “incremental and tactical” actions to press its
claims along the LAC, including its new village/ PLA’s military camp in
Arunachal. Said a China watcher “One of Beijing’s strategic aims in the standoff
is to prevent India from deepening its ties with US.”
There seem to be two
strands in Chinese thinking about India. One, which recognizes India’s
economic, scientific, and military capabilities rise, though not as rapidly as
China’s. Two, many Chinese leaders are dismissive of New Delhi’s claims of
being a major power and considers these unrealistic and pretentious.
Yet, both are ambivalent
about the other’s success and wary of the other’s ambitions but also respectful
and mindful that both would rise in comparison with the world. Some feel though
modus vivendi is already under stress
due to gap in the relative comprehensive national power of both countries, yet
they are not pessimistic about the future despite mistrust.
Besides, China’s
growing footprint in South Asia are also viewed negatively by Raisina Hill
resulting in rifts over unequal benefits from its engagement policy, exposing
underlying strategic dissonance and rivalry. Said a seasoned diplomat, “China
seems to follow ‘wen shui zhu qingwa’
(slowly heat water to kill the frog) policy wherein one arouses minimal
suspicion in India before the new equilibrium, to China’s advantage.
Today, India is enveloped in a deeply troubled relationship with
China which poses the biggest strategic-security challenge. Not only has chill set in but deep mistrust and lack
of confidence is apparent. Yet the two have not rejected dialogue, even when it
is no more than repetition of known positions. New Delhi cannot afford to take
any chances with what constitutes India’s national security and strategic
interests and pursue them doggedly.
China’s desire to restrict India as a regional power has
been further exacerbated by New Delhi’s vocal criticisms of Xi’s Belt and Road
Initiative. Modi’s shift to a hyper-active foreign policy has seen deepening
partnerships with US and other Indo-Pacific powers. Moving from its
long-standing “Act East” policy, New Delhi has swiftly adopted the Indo-Pacific
concept into its strategic thinking.
Certainly, Beijing realizes India’s centrality in its
competition with the West, particularly US hence it sees India’s Indo-Pacific
partnerships as a potential threat to its own interests. It views India’s focus
on building strategic partnerships around Indo-Pacific as a hedging attempt
against its interests in the region. Although India remains far behind China,
these developing ties could pose a threat to Chinese global ambitions.
Modi
realizes that in today’s geo-strategic political reality pragmatism dictate
real politic. There are no short cuts. India needs an all-encompassing and
multi-pronged strategy to deal with China even as it wants durable peace though
this alone cannot guarantee non-escalation. Dealing with a revisionist, authoritarian power which
intends to refashion the global order to suit its own interests is dicey. From
New Delhi’s perspective, it will require mobilising all factors to counter
Beijing’s threat.
India would need to give China full
attention, partner closely with US and Quad alongside adopting an all-of-Government
approach to counter Chinese belligerence. Said a foreign diplomat, “The biggest challenge
for New Delhi is that whether initiatives such as Quad and anti-China metrics
can reverse India's growing isolation in South Asia.”
India cannot afford
to lower its guard given both countries will find it increasingly difficult to
calibrate and control their responses in ways that satisfy their political,
military and strategic aims. Moreover, their failure to manage the 2020 border
dispute peacefully shatters a useful precedent: Neither side can be confident
about which redlines the other will observe. China-India relations have entered
a new, more precarious, and unpredictable era.
With bilateral tensions
remaining high and warning indicators for conflict continuing to blink red
Indo-Sino ties remain “profoundly disturbed.” Modi and Xi have a good measure
of each other and share mutual respect. They should be able to talk about the
identity misperceptions and possible ways of reconciling their respective
visions. A key consideration could be whether China can afford to have an
antagonistic India on its border as it moves to world centre-stage and whether
India can afford to close a door to multi-alignment that has served it well.
The prospects of
forward movement will depend on lessons China and India draw from Ladakh
crisis. If Beijing believes that Indo-Sino relations hold no great prospects in
the current international scenario and that India is already a quasi-ally of US
then it might be difficult to manage bilateral differences whereby it could
lead to more confrontations.
If New Delhi believes
Beijing is intent on bullying or humiliating it because of its superiority by always
pro-actively resetting borders or trying to damage India’s global or regional
profile the situation might become challenging. China is a totally different beast whom we have hardly been
able to understand, let alone manage to tame and befriend it on our terms.
As they stand at a
crossroad both neighbours will have to build trust brick by brick towards
coexistence of cooperation and competition, beginning with eastern Ladakh.
China should be prepared to put aside any idea that faith can be restored by
decoupling the boundary question from the larger bilateral relationship. The
boundary is fundamental to the relationship and the key is to find a mutually
acceptable resolution.
Else, a new phase of antagonistic rivalry could start as
the strategic periphery of China collides with the strategic backyard of India. Clearly, as Beijing strives to create a ‘new normal’,
tough responses to provocations and clear red zones are the best guarantee of
peace in the sub-Continent. An intoxicating mix of muscular diplomacy and
ruthlessness masked in velvet gloves. India
has spelt out rules of the game: It takes two to tango! ---- INFA
(Copyright, India News & Feature
Alliance)
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