Round The
World
New Delhi, 22 November 2019
Sri Lanka Elections
NEW DELHI RECLIBRATES STRATEGY
By Dr. D.K. Giri
(Prof. International Politics, JMI)
The island state Sri
Lanka elected its 7th President last Saturday. The clear and
decisive winner is Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former Defence Secretary in his elder
brother Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government. His opponent Sajith Premdasa, son of
another former President Ranil Premadasa, lost by a margin of over 10 per cent.
The issues in the Sri
Lankan elections are not of great concern to India, as these are their internal
matters. The determining factors, however, were stability and security of the
country, which were the hallmarks of Gotabaya’s campaign. Compared to the
incumbent government’s inefficient rule, when the outgoing President Sirisena
created a constitutional crisis by
sacking the UPFA (United People’s Freedom Alliance) Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe and brought Mahinda in his place, which the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court overruled, and reinstated Wickremesinghe.
Later, in October
2018, the country was shaken by a barbarous Jihadi attack engineered by ISIS on
Christians worshipping in Easter. The government was accused of failing to
prevent the attack despite having early warnings. Third, the government failed
to carry out the constitutional reforms promised during the 2014 elections. On
the contrary, Gotabaya promised national security and protection against
extremism, which soothed the security anxieties of the majority Sinhalese
community who voted overwhelmingly for him.
Gotabaya is also
credited with finishing off the protracted civil war in the country when Tamils
were fighting violently for a separate State. He is accused of war crimes, as
at the last stage of the war, nearly 40,000 Tamils and their leaders were
killed. He was also charged with the White Flag case when Field Marshall Sarath
Foneska alleged him of murdering the Tamil fighters ready to surrender. It is
another matter that he has not been found guilty of any of these crimes by Commissions
set up to investigate.
What should concern
New Delhi more is the perception that Rajapaksa brothers including the current
President Gotabaya are pro-China! Such a perception is based on at least three
developments between Sri Lanka and China. Towards the end of the Sri Lankan
civil war, 2006-2009, New Delhi refused to be involved, pushing it to the
Chinese embrace. Sri Lanka was provided by China with F-7 fighters,
anti-aircraft guns, air-surveillance radars and armed personnel carrier etc.
These weapons and war equipments contributed to Sri Lankan army’s victory over
the dangerous, suicidal Tamil insurgents who fought for decades.
The second factor is
Chinese investment in Sri Lanka. Beijing and Colombo signed a strategic
partnership in 2013, during Mahinda’s regime. Up to 2015, China had invested $10
billion in Sri Lanka. By 2016, China-Sri Lanka trade touched $4.43 billion
surpassing that of India-Sri Lanka at $4.37. The notable Chinese investment is
in Hambantota port, not far from India’s shores. To maintain the
debt-servicing, Sri Lanka has handed over the port to China along with 15000
acres of land for 99 years. Although Sri Lanka’s claim that the port has been
given only for commercial purposes, one cannot ignore the strategic and
intelligence possibilities due to the port’s location.
Furthermore, on
connectivity, China is developing an airport at Matale in the constituency of
Rajapaksa. It is building a network of highways across the country, namely the
Katunayake Expressway and Southern Expressway. And the Chinese prompted Colombo
International Financial Centre -- a self-contained Chinese smart city project
is soon opening for business. This will expand Chinese commercial involvement
in Sri Lankan capital.
Admittedly, Sri Lanka
is aware of the risks in Chinese investment. Experts have figured out that
projects financed by Chinese are overpriced. In November 2016, Sri Lankan
government complained to the Chinese of their high interest rates. Japan funded
ADB loans come at 0.1% interest rate whereas Chinese loan is at 6% interest
although Chinese claim that it is only 2%. What is more, Chinese investment is
totally in the form of loan, whereas India’s is 70% loan and 30% grant. It is
no secret that China seeks to bind smaller countries in debt-traps. Sri Lanka
is aware that it is heavily indebted to China.
Obviously, Beijing is
conducting its expansionist foreign policy on the back of its new economic
might, and cash-strapped economies in the Asian region are enticed to tap the
surplus money in China. Nepal and Sri Lanka in the India-Pacific region are
falling fast for Chinese support. This puts extra burden on India which has
geographical proximity and closer historical-cultural ties with these
countries.
How should India
respond to this new development, the election of so-called pro-Chinese President
elect in Sri Lanka, and re-calibrate its policies towards Sri Lanka in order to
prevent it sliding further towards China? The first thing New Delhi needs to do
is to remind itself of two maxims in international politics. One, that there are
no permanent friends or enemies, and second, human instinct is to fall for
time-tested friends rather than fair-weather ones.
India has, in
cultural economic and security terms, interdependent relations with Sri Lanka.
India has the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, in addition to the historical
relations, over 2500 years old. Basi Rajapaksa, the other brother of Mahinda, who
was the campaign-in-charge of Gotabaya, had said in an interview to the Indian
media, that “Sri Lanka may have economic relations with China, but in political
and security matters it will turn to India”. But it may take a lot more for New
Delhi to make Colombo pursue an India-first policy, both in letter and spirit.
New Delhi must draw the ‘Laxman Rekha’
(red line), an appropriate metaphor for Sri Lanka and enforce it even through
coercion.
New Delhi and Colombo
are members in more than one regional institution – Bay of Bengal initiative of
which Colombo is the current chair, BIMSTEC, Indian Ocean Rim Association
(IORA) and of course the defunct SAARC. New Delhi tends to engage Sri Lanka
bilaterally more for short-termism, but it should deal with Sri Lanka in
multilateral forums as well although they are slow and complex. This would help
Colombo shed off the small-power complex, which is often a psychological
obstacle in India’s relation with all its neighbours.
The existing ties
between India and Sri Lanka notwithstanding, New Delhi will have to counter
Chinese incursions into New Delhi’s ‘sphere of influence’, its neighbourhood.
New Delhi has taken the first correct step. The foreign minister was the first
to call on the new President, who is visiting India next week, the 29th
November. New Delhi says, it had foreseen the election outcome and was prepared
for it. Mahinda Rajapaksa is said to have made up with New Delhi after he had
assumed and alleged that New Delhi was partly responsible for inciting the
defection of Sirisena from his (Mahinda’s) tent. So, in fitness of things, New
Delhi should smooth-sail with Gotabhaya.
Despite the optimism,
it will not be a cake-walk for New Delhi to insulate its neighbours like Sri
Lanka from Chinese economic seduction. This is where New Delhi needs to turn to
its allies like Japan, USA and others who have a stake in Sri Lanka. The US has
considerable interest as it considers Sri Lanka to be “a significant strategic
opportunity in the Indian ocean”. Last year it extended $39 million to Sri
Lanka countering Chinese investment. This is a part of $300m package Washington
had set aside for South and South-east Asia to ensure a “free, open, and
rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. US military presence in Diego
Garcia is also of great help.
Likewise, India and
Japan were building a deep sea container terminal in Colombo. Japan had
extended $180m grant to Sri Lanka for maritime activities. India was roping in
Oman to build a $3.85 billion refinery around Hambantota.
New Delhi needs to
co-ordinate more with its allies to deepen its influence in the region. On its
own, India could not compete with Chinese trade and investment. Hence,
strategic alliance building is necessary for hedging South Asia against Chinese
incursion into the area. At the same time, it needs to win over the Sri Lankan
state, not just Tamils for better relations. It has such soft spots in its
foreign policy towards Sri Lanka and Nepal for Tamils in the former, and the
Madhesis in the latter. New Deli has erred in overstating the soft spots in the
past; it should leave them as the internal matters of those countries and
re-focus on bilateralism. This is not too radical a shift to make. Is it?
---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
|