Round The
World
New Delhi, 21 March 2019
UNSC Permanent Seat
NEHRU’S CHINOPHILIA CURBED INDIA
By Dr. D.K. Giri
(Prof. International Politics, JMI)
Following the Chinese
veto for the fourth time on listing Masood Azhar as an international terrorist,
India woke up to the historic blunder made by Nehru on refusing UNSC permanent
membership. The debate has revived and rages on as Parliament election unfolds.
The admirers of Nehru seek to shroud it in the smoke of history; argue that the
offer was never made to India, and yet others contend that Nehru was right in
refusing it; the critics scream that Nehru almost sinned by depriving India of
the most powerful position in world politics.
Admittedly, the
historic slip committed or not by Nehru is seven decades ago. So why dig it up
now? But as the aphorism goes, those who do not learn from their mistakes are
doomed to repeat them. Hence, unless we are cautious, we may be repeating the
starry-eyed approach of Nehru to China in particular and internationalism in
general.
Let me preface my
critique of Nehruvian foreign policy, as I limit my argument to UNSC membership,
by acknowledging that Nehru was a democrat, an integral part of freedom
movement, a favourite protégé of Mahatma Gandhi and so on. But indubitably,
Nehru erred on our foreign policy, prompted by his visceral approach to
idealism, far from realpolitik, a euphemism for national interest. Even
observers like Shashi Tharoor, MP, a former Minister in Congress government has
said on more than one occasion, that Nehru’s foreign policy was like a “running
moral commentary”.
Having said that, let
us substantiate our change vis-à-vis the UNSC membership, offered to India in
1950, and again in 1955. The Nehru apologists’ defensive arguments are: the
membership was not offered to India at all, in 1950 by the US and not even by
Nikolai Bulganin in 1955. They quote Nehru’s answer to a Parliament question
raised on 27th September 1950, by Member of Parliament, J.N. Parekh,
“There have been no offer, formal or informal of this kind (membership), the
composition of the Security Council is prescribed by the UN Charter according
to which certain specified nations have permanent seats. No change or addition
can be made to this without an amendment of the charter”.
But this is contradicted
in Nehru’s own notes on his tour of the USSR and the other countries,
“Informally, suggestions have been made by the US that China should be taken to
UN, not as a Security Council member though, India should be in the Security
Council.” Vijay Laxmi Pandit, our ambassador in Washington wrote to Nehru the
Prime Minister, that India was being offered the SC membership. So, it was
offered to India. No ambiguity on that.
Secondly, in 1955,
Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, on the 10th anniversary of the UN,
offered the membership to Nehru. He rejected the Soviet offer and insisted “that
priority must be given to China’s admission to the United Nations”. The minutes
of the meeting between Nehru and Bulganin are now circulating in the media,
which shows crystal clear the offer and Nehru’s declining it.
The sidebar to the
offer is that India was not fully Independent in 1945 when the membership of
UNSC was firmed up. The offer was made in mid-1950 after India became fully independent.
So those denying Nehru’s error of judgement are chronologically off the mark.
Second issue that
calls for discussion is, if Nehru was not aware of any offer in 1950 or 1955,
how he made such statements on the membership, write letters to Vijay Laxmi
Pandit, and mentioned in his notes. He wrote in his answer to Vijay Laxmi
Pandit, “We will not countenance the US offer to us to replace China in UNSC…we
shall go on pressing for China’s admissions in the UN and the Security
Council.” In his notes on the Soviet visit, he mentioned, “We cannot accept the
US offer to take the seat in UNSC in place of China as it means falling out
with China and it would be very unfair for a great country like China not to be
in the Security Council”.
Nehru said to
Bulganin, “I feel that we should first concentrate on getting China admitted.”
He expressed similar views in his letter to Vijay Laxmi Pandit, “India is not
anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great
county, she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China to take
her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered
separately.”
Arguably, some
commentators suggest than Nehru did the right thing by twice rejecting the
offer. But, clearly Nehru, in his self-proclaimed idealism failed to secure
India’s interest. Now China is blocking every proposal that aims to put India in
the word leadership, or seeks to promote India’s interests. Our memberships in
the UNSC would have given us the veto on Kashmir and related issues. Admittedly
Nehru’s policy towards China was full of foibles.
Remember Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar’s criticism of Nehru’s China’s policy from 25th October
1951 to 8th February 1952. Nehru admirers dismiss it as a part of
election rivalry. But foreign policy was not a major issue in Indian elections,
it was a genuine concern by an informed and highly educated man like Ambedkar
about Nehru’s missteps on China.
Nehru’s reading of
history and international political perceptions drove him to seek accommodation
with China. He was wary of growing US hegemony. According to him, a post-partition
India did not want a new imperial master in the US. He was perturbed about
being drawn into a defence network the US was apparently building to contain
the presumed communist expansionism. He was anxious about the consequences of
the invasion by North Korea of the South which became a theatre of a big power
rivalry, the South Korea supported by Allied powers led by the US and North by
USSR and China. He was worried that the Korean crisis would spiral out of
control leading to another world war, use of atom bombs etc. Nehru was obsessed
with international politics but denied India a historic opportunity of being a
part of the table with six-powers running the world.
Nehru in the cold war
era, followed a policy of non-alignment, but tilted towards Soviet Union. India
was insisting on recognising China, a communist, authoritarian state, remained
in angst of USA, a democratic country. US President Truman regretted that India
was holding aloof from the democratic nations.
So evidently, the US
did make offer to befriend India. But Nehru dithered and even rebuffed them.
Only after Nehru’s rejection of US overtures, the latter made a military pact
with Pakistan. This initiative towards India challenges the assumption that the
US was committed to a strategy of equidistance between India and Pakistan. Further,
Pakistan would have felt alienated from the US if India became a permanent
member of the UNSC, assisted by the US, giving India an upper hand on the Kashmir
issue.
Nehru’s China policy
including Tibet which could be discussed on another occasion has cost India
dear. Anybody arguing that India did not give away its UNSC membership to China
or Nehru was right in doing so is oblivious of history and China’s invidious
attitude to India. It is high time to correct the fault lines drawn by Nehru on
the shifting sands of international politics and of India’s foreign policy in
particular. ---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
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