Open Forum

New Delhi, 18 July, 2018

Simultaneous Elections

ACCOUNTABILITY & STABILITY MUST

By Dr. S. Saraswathi

(Former Director, ICSSR, New Delhi)

The nation is seized with a debate on a major Constitutional change involved in holding Lok Sabha and State Assembly elections simultaneously, meaning according a fixed tenure for these bodies. It has good many supporters for the idea and greater number of rejecters by reason of practical difficulties.    

Elections have become such a normal event of political life in India going on somewhere almost every month that many agree that it is time to think of cutting down the time, energy, and financial and manpower resources spent on these. Round the year preoccupation with elections affects developmental work with or without the Model Code of Conduct restricting promises and projects. 

No wonder, any government keen on national development will seek a way out of election mania. Unfortunately, political parties have their concentration centred on strengthening themselves as an organisation and increasing their strength in the legislative bodies. They have reason to welcome elections as an opportunity just like job seekers look for job vacancy advertisements when they are not in power, but would like to club elections when in power.

Since people generally accept the incontrovertible arguments of administrative and financial considerations to find a method of reducing the number of election days, attention has to proceed to the next stage of examining the possibility of making necessary constitutional and statutory changes.

The problem is to make a democratic arrangement for commencing synchronisation of elections and continuing the elected bodies for their full term without violating people’s right to be ruled by people’s elected representatives.  If we fail in the task and proceed with the great change, points raised against simultaneous elections will come into operation in no time to lead to constitutional chaos.

It is not an impossible task. But, it requires collective will and cooperative effort – something missing in Indian politics today. There is also a major divide between national parties and established regional parties.

Under fixed tenure system, it is well known that there is no place for No-Confidence Motion – an important democratic weapon of opposition parties. However, it is not provided in the Constitution or law books. It is found only in Rule 198 of the Rules and Conduct of Business of the Lok Sabha, which states that 50 or more members can move a No-Confidence Motion, and if it succeeds, the government has to resign and if no other party/parties can form the government, premature elections will follow.

Rules of Procedure can be amended by the Speaker on the recommendations of the Rules Committee of the House and approval by the House under Article 118 of the Constitution. 

However, synchronizing State-Centre polls will not put an end to our woes with perennial election fever. Still, elections to lakhs of village panchayats, thousands of panchayat samitis and hundreds of zilla parishads and municipal bodies have to be conducted.

Reporting in the context of frequent Lok Sabha elections in the 1990s, the Law Commission recommended that the rule regarding moving of a No-Confidence Motion should be amended so as to provide that the leader of the party who wants to replace the Leader of the House has to bring a No-Confidence Motion along with a Confidence Motion in favour of another leader.  If it is passed, the Lok Sabha would “avoid premature dissolution without diluting the principle of democracy” and also remain consistent with the notion of “collective responsibility” enshrined in Article 75(3) of the Constitution. Thereby, in the view of the Commission, stability and transparency of the system could be protected.

Effectively, such a change in Rules will provide for changes in the Council of Ministers while retaining the House for five years. But, it will   promote groupism in the legislatures.

The NDA government, mooted the idea of fixed tenure for Lok Sabha and State Assemblies in 2003, but it found not many supporters. Again last year, the need to debate the issue was put forward by the President in his address to the Joint Session of Parliament at the beginning of the Budget session. “Frequent elections put on hold development programmes, disrupt normal public life and impact essential services and burden human resource with prolonged period of election duty”, he said commencing a serious debate on a question that is not a simple electoral reform, but a Constitutional reform that will change the form and substance of parliamentary democracy.

The size of the country with 36 States and Union Territories, the federal system with clear demarcation of Union, State, and Concurrent subjects for legislation, multiple party system with recognized national, regional/State parties, other organizations and independents contesting elections, numerous pressure groups extending support to specific parties will all be impacted by this one reform which substitutes the words “during the pleasure of the President” or the “Governor” for the tenure of the Council of Ministers at the Centre and States  respectively by fixed tenure of five years which also will coincide with one another.

Since multiple issues are involved, debates on the issue must have nationwide participation of political parties and leaders, election machinery at the Centre and the States, concerned administrative machinery, academics, neutral thinkers, and common citizens. Political and administrative convenience cannot be the sole ground for a decision to be left to political parties and Election Commission. Long-term implications for democracy, possible side effects  of the change, likely new problems that may arise, and scope for manipulation of changes to obliterate the good in the proposal need to be studied.

Indeed, to keep intact the democratic content of our government should be our primary concern.  Any dilution of democratic norms and practices will be counter-productive.

It involves combining accountability and stability of the system in equal measure.    Parliamentary system of government can ensure accountability of the Executive to the Legislature, but its stability depends on its ability to retain legislative majority. Introducing fixed term for legislators without diluting accountability will need certain other changes in the working of the executive. 

The Law Commission’s report of 1999 dealt with electoral reforms and recommended that, “the rule ought to be one election once in five years for Lok Sabha and all legislative assemblies”. This reform will involve Constitutional Amendments to several Articles – 83, 85, 172 and 174.

Even the unitary state of England has chosen to hold general elections and local government elections simultaneously since 1997. Italy, Belgium, and Sweden are some countries that conduct general and local elections together.

Fixed tenure will encourage consensual decisions. Leaders may emerge cutting across party lines. Parties will become less important than the legislative majority. Defections will die automatically and disruptions in Parliament will lose meaning.

Regional parties are worried that simultaneous election would lessen their importance. It is true to some extent. At the same time, there is also a possibility that some strong regional parties may sweep the polls for both Assembly and Lok Sabha in some States without having any national policy or agenda.

Ability to make necessary administrative arrangements will not solve our problems. All likely political fall-out from the change must be assessed so as to avoid jumping from the frying pan into fire.---INFA

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)