Political
Diary
New Delhi, 11 July 2017
India-China Poker
WHO WILL COME UP TRUMPS?
By Poonam I Kaushish
Neighbour or enemy?
Both. Indeed, India-China relations are like playing a game of poker. Show no emotions even as one plans strategy, play
is multi-causal, defiantly stand
one’s ground and gamble on a winning
hand. Both New Delhi and Beijing
are doing just that, betting, with the underwritten message: Don’t mess with me.
The latest flashpoint
is an 89 sq km Doklam area close to Chumbi valley at
the corner of India-Bhutan-China tri-junction not far from Sikkim witnessing a
face-off between Indian and Chinese troops after the Indian Army blocked
construction of a road by the Chinese PLA. Whereby, India made plain that this
was aimed at getting closer to its last military post on its border with Bhutan
and China and represented a significant change of status quo with
"serious" security implications for it.
China retaliated by accusing New Delhi of “trespassing” on its
recognised “undisputable sovereignty” over the delineated boundary between
them, accusing India of being a “third-party” to the China-Bhutan dispute and
demanded withdrawal of Indian troops as a precondition for “meaningful
dialogue” to resolve the situation. This stand-off resulted in not only cancellation
of the Kailash Mansarovar yatra through Nathu La in Sikkim but also a bilateral
between Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg as
the climate was not conducive. Never mind a five minute guftagu. .
Undoubtedly,
this till yesterday unknown place, is important for
India as it could allow the Chinese to further run roughshod over a key precept
of India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis
Bhutan. China has no formal diplomatic ties with
Bhutan and India through the 2007 Friendship Treaty serves as a virtual
security guarantor of Bhutan.
The valley holds strategic significance for India, China as well
as Bhutan. India sees it as a dagger pointed towards its so-called ‘chicken’s
neck’ sector in the Northeast and rapid Chinese road construction in Tibet
could make things difficult for India. At the same time, Sikkim is one of the
few sectors where India has an advantage. China, citing the 1890 China-Britain
treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the fact saying the
convention applies to the India-Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.
Questionably, does India
have the appropriate diplomacy to counter China’s drive for supremacy in the
region? Can it defuse this? What
options does it have on the table?
And do the present assertive trends of Indian foreign policy portend the
likelihood of an aggressive outcome?
Indisputably, New
Delhi is busy countering China's 'string of pearls' strategy (befriending its
neighbours to check Indian interests on multiple fronts) by claiming its space
in Asia’s sun by forging alliances with Beijing’s neighbours. In its Look-Act
East Policy it is engaging with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam etc. Aware of the
deep inroads China has made in Myanmar New Delhi is making an effort to woo the
generals back into its fold. Last month, Indian Army Chief Gen Rawat made an
important trip to Myanmar.
Vietnam renewed a
license granted to ONGC Videsh, to explore an oil block in the South China Sea
which has seen disputes between China-Vietnam-Philippines, a clear indication
that the decision is driven by strategic rather than commercial considerations
since return on investment in the area is minimal.
Worse,
a defiant Beijing prone to bullying smaller
neighbours into submission through a mix of cheque book diplomacy and military
heft, is trying to squeeze Indian influence and interests and circumscribe the
foreign-policy choices of India’s smaller neighbours. Be it influencing Nepal’s
domestic politics, funding Bangladesh’s new ports with the potential of
dual-use in the foreseeable future, constructing roads through
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or drowning Sri Lanka in debt in order to gain
eventual political leverage, Beijing continues to successfully block India’s
entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is furious
about India’s rejection of the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, a personal
prestige issue of President Xi.
Today, a
chill has set in Indo-China ties. Deep mistrust and lack of confidence is
apparent. Yet the two have not rejected dialogue, even when it is no more than
a repetition of known positions. New Delhi cannot afford to take any chances
with what constitutes India’s national security and strategic interests and
pursue them doggedly.
Craft a long-term
China policy that combines dialogue with diplomatic pressure. Simply
inter-acting, is not a solution. We need to take the bull by the horns and
hammer out differences across the table. Irrefutably, time for out-of-the-box
thinking and guts. Beijing has to match its words with deeds.
Modi realizes only too
well that in today’s geo-strategic political reality pragmatism dictate real
politic. There are no short cuts. New Delhi needs an all-encompassing and
multi-pronged strategy to deal with Beijing even as it wants durable peace
though this alone cannot guarantee non-escalation.
What next? In this
trilateral poker, New Delhi needs to watch out for two serious consequences.
One, should it back off, it would send a signal to Bhutan and other neighbours that
its policy of relying on India as protector is not good enough. Bhutan could
establish formal diplomatic ties with China. Consequently, this could change the balance of
forces in the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction in favour of China further
imperiling the strategically-sensitive Siliguri Corridor.
Two, if India abandons
Bhutan, it would showcase that New Delhi is not trustworthy and expecting it to
stand-up against China is imprudent, succinctly
its bark is worse than its bite. Certainly, a disaster for India’s elusive
pursuit of regional primacy as aspiring hegemons do not abandon allies.
Thus, New Delhi new
assertiveness would need all the wisdom and restraint to ensure that it remains
in control of the Indo-China script. Certainly, in this zero sum game the
muscle-flexing and one-upmanship will continue till both get a face saver and
back-off. The long-term prospects of India-China relations will be determined
to a large extent by India’s strategic goals and objectives in the context of
the evolving regional and global security environment.
There is definitely a
strategic imperative of peace between the two Asian powers as both need to
focus their energies and resources on the gigantic task of economic evolution necessitated
by the changing competitive global environment. Modi is slowly changing the
rules of the game from defensive posturing to being a hard negotiator whereby India
is no longer China's underdog but an equal, controlled aggressor.
Modi should take a
leaf from ex-US President Nixon book The Real War: “Nations live or die by the way they respond
to the particular challenges they face. The time when a nation most craves ease
may be the moment when it can least afford to let down its guard. The nation
that survives is the one that rises to meet that moment: that has the wisdom to
recognize the threat and the will to turn it back, and that does so before it
is too late.”
It remains to be seen
if Modi will rise to the occasion and sustain his ‘zero tolerance to provocations’
policy as he navigates tricky ties with Chin. Tough responses to provocations
and clear red zones are the best guarantee of peace in the sub-Continent. An
intoxicating mix of muscular diplomacy and ruthlessness masked in velvet
gloves. By changing the rules of the
game, Modi has spelt out: It takes two to tango! ---- INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
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