Political Diary
New
Delhi, 13 December 2016
The Defence Dynasty
SECURITY
SLUSHED OUT
By Poonam I Kaushish
History repeats itself a
la Bofors. Today the Rs 64 crores has magnified to the Rs 3,600-crores
Choppergate. Both standing testimony to military perfidy. Leaving one angry and
astonished about the power of greed, over and over again. In a sinking morass
of déjà vu!
Predictably, all hell broke lose in New Delhi Friday when
the CBI arrested former Air Force Chief SP Tyagi, his cousin and lawyer-businessman
Gautam Khaitan in connection with the Agusta Westland VVIP helicopter deal. His
crime? Changing the IAF’s service ceiling of the helicopters from 6,000 metres
to 4,500 metres. The first time that a military chief, retired or serving, has
been arrested for corruption totaling Rs 362 crores
in defence procurement.
Recall, in 2010 India signed a
contract with Augusta Westland, Finmeccanica’s subsidiary for procuring 12
helicopters to ferry VVIPs but cancelled the deal
in January 2014 “on grounds of breach of the pre-contract integrity pact and
the agreement” by AWIL. Thanks to the Italian Government arresting
Finmeccanica’s CEO for paying Rs 362 crores as bribes to bag the deal.
Undeniably, Tyagi’s arrest has again opened the Pandora’s Box on murky defence deals and raises uncomfortable
questions: Who finalised and signed the VVIP chopper deal? Does the helicopter
deal have any link to the Congress? Is this one part of BJP’s agenda of Congress-mukt Bharat?
How is Tyagi connected to real estate company Emaar-MGF
owned by Rahul confidant Kanishka Singh’s relatives? Why should security
agencies require a separate expensive fleet of helicopters for VVIPs? Even
President Obama refused to buy Westland
as they were exorbitantly costly,
choosing to fly in regular planes.
More. Choppergate has again exposed the shadowy world of
arms dealers or interventionists and their political patronage. It is the same
cast of middlemen and agents whose power remains intact no matter who rules India.
Succinctly, ‘agents’ have always been an ‘unofficial’ part
of our defence sector, be it Quottrocchi in the Bofors Howitzer guns, Nanda’s
in HDW Submarine deal, Choudhrie in the Barrack Anti Missile System contract,
Abhishek Verma of German arms supplier SIG Sauer fame languishing in Tihar jail
for the 2006 Navy war room case et al.
Alongside, the key to nailing a coveted contract is cultivating
powerful bureaucrats connected with a deal and who are close to the
powers-that-be. Besides, they are
suitably “rewarded” in cash and kind after the job is done besides getting
coveted posts after their retirement.
Pertinently, post the Bofors scandal in the late 80’s,
middlemen were banned for years. In 2003, a report recommended legalizing
middlemen and making negotiations transparent, but it failed to end corruption
as no agent registered with the Government.
Today, under Modi Raj the Government is willing to give
conditioned and limited approval to dealing with banned defence firms.
Primarily, to boost defence procurement at a time when the country needs
critical technology and equipment systems but faces hurdles with many foreign
manufacturers finding it difficult to negotiate the Indian environment and the
language.
Over two years ago Defence Minister Parrikar asserted that a
new Government policy legalizing middlemen in arms purchases would be in place
soon. Adding, “The middle men have to be declared and their commission cannot
be linked to the outcome of negotiations.” The agents would also be allowed to
participate in meetings to help the company they represent, since it may not be
possible for official representatives to attend all meetings in India.
Yet the NDA cancelled the purchase of mine sweeper ships -
which the Navy needs desperately for the security of its ports - after the
South Korean manufacturer told the Government that it had used the services of
a Delhi-based agent for his English-speaking skills. Sic.
Add to this, procurement delays which not only lead to
shortages but also obsolescence of acquired weapons and equipment and
escalation of purchase costs. A global tender was floated to get a medium
multi-role combat aircraft in August 2007. Of the six jets in contention, the
French Rafael was selected but the $20 b deal for 126 fighters has just been inked.
Ditto the case of the Rs 50,000 crores acquisition of six
new generation submarines with missile capabilities for greater underwater
endurance, the initial RPF is yet to be issued.
The same is the story vis-à-vis
the Rs.3000-crore acquisition of 197 new light utility helicopters for IAF and
Army and the Russian Kamov Ka-226T helicopter pitted against Eurocopter AS 550
C3 Fennec. But the opening of bids was stalled due to complaints of technical
deviations and corruption charges. Resulting in keeping the Armed Forces
perennially short of modern weaponry.
Scandalously, the functioning of the
Defence Ministry has shown a consistent inability to organise an efficient,
foolproof and transparent system of procurement and an effective operative
procedure that would automatically take follow up action on allegations of
corruption, without waiting for Ministers to do so.
Any Government worth its salt will
claim that it only goes in for the best buy at the best possible price.
However, the equipment must not only be good but must also appear to be so.
This will be possible only making the complex acquisition procedures less
cumbersome and accountable.
What next? If India wants to come out of this
cycle of scams it needs to find a way that the best defence equipment is
purchased without fraud or kickbacks. Our leaders must stop being the world’s
largest importer of arms and instead start indigenous procurement. Towards that
end we must create a robust military-industrial complex, restructure its
engineering curriculum, procurement procedures et al.
Think. If we can go to Mars and orbit the earth why can’t we
‘Make in India’
arms, fighter jets, warships and submarines? Clearly, our policy framers need
to put an end to painful decision-making and help push Indian private sector
into the procurement cycle instead of buying expensive equipment abroad.
Also, the procurement manual needs to
be rewritten. As long as there are mind boggling procedures, there are bound to
be scams and middlemen involved. Indeed, a credible system would eliminate
scope for any suspicion. Another way is to allow Parliament’s Defence Committee
to look into every deal confidentially and by taking strong action on the CAG
audit.
In
sum, not only is netting a defence contract complex business. But as the trail
of the AgustaWestland contract and many hush-hush others unravel it underscores
a cash-making merry-go-round. Nobody gets punished,
or so it seems. That was the case in the jeep scandal, and that was the case in
Bofors, HDW scandals and after the Tehelka exposé.
It remains to be seen whether the rotating blades of VVIP
Choppergate will gain speed and chop through the multi-million-dollar kickbacks
between our netas, businessmen and
intermediaries. Will it end the well-oiled entrenched, middlemen in India’s defence
dynasty story?
Who knows, as the temptation to make money is always great,
indeed irresistible. Can a nation afford to pawn itself for a few dollars more
in a miniscule of private pockets? Can we allow our national security to be
jeopardized? Time will tell. ---- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
|