Round The World
New
Delhi, 29 June 2016
India’s Membership Tales
DEFEAT IN NSG, VICTORY
IN SCO
By Amrita Banerjee
(School of
International Studies, JNU, New Delhi)
It has been a mixed week for India’s foreign
policy and diplomacy with one unsuccessful attempt in attaining membership of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bringing in disappointment and one successful
membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) bringing in cheer.
True, diplomacy often does not yield
instant results. It involves years of consistent efforts. Happily, India’s efforts in the SCO were rewarded finally
when the communiqué issued by the SCO leaders in Tashkent granted membership.
However, New
Delhi’s diplomatic efforts were snubbed in Seoul
when in spite of the intense lobbying that included cross-Continent campaigns
between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jingping did not yield
fruitful result in spite of Modi’s call to China
to make a fair and objective assessment of India’s application and judge it on
its own merit.
In
reality, New Delhi had gone to Seoul
without any certainty of victory and knowing that Beijing
could create hurdles in India’s
pathway, as it was nothing new. Even though China
cited ‘procedural hurdles’ and insisted India sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) before getting membership.
But the
real reason was that it did not want to annoy its ‘all-weather ally’ Pakistan, another
non-signatory of the NPT, which too was seeking membership of the NSG. This
Chinese tactics of hyphenating relations between India
and Pakistan
has set a dangerous trend.
Indeed, it
is ironic that a country which desires to rewrite the rules of the 21st
Century world, could not judge another country’s membership objectively in
spite of repeated insistence. The loud Chinese opposition also encouraged eight
other members to raise procedural questions also. Whereby India lost despite getting overwhelming support
from the US, Japan, Russia,
UK and France.
Notably, even
though the bloc didn’t shut the door at the future participation of countries
which have not signed the NPT, a NSG statement reiterated the centrality of NPT
to the NSG membership.
At the
outset, it might look as if India
lost and China won but in
reality the NSG membership bid was actually a case of ‘missed opportunity’ for Beijing. If China would have adopted a different yardstick
for judging India
this time, it could have laid a foundation of a stronger relationship with its
Asian neighbor.
Also, it
could have bridged the ‘trust deficit’ existing between the two countries since
the 1962 War and that might also have facilitated a quicker solution to the
lingering India-China boundary dispute.
However, Beijing decided to play safe by shutting the NSG door but
opened the SCO door for India
as it was convinced New Delhi
would have a marginal role to play because it is the Russia-China dynamics
which shapes the trajectory of the organization.
Undoubtedly,
the SCO has served both as a means to keep control of Central
Asia and limit American influence in the region. With India’s membership, China hopes to stave off some of
the criticism of the organization
as a grouping of nations with little affection for the Western world order.
Beijing has also made sure that even as it supports India’s membership in SCO, its ally, Pakistan gets a
berth in the organization too. Analytically, the SCO has emerged as a
significant factor in the post-9/11 environment as growing ethnic nationalism
and Islamic fundamentalism surfaces as major causes of concern for Russia, China and Central Asian countries.
Importantly,
if security is the uniting factor in the SCO, apprehensions have been raised about the
incompatibility between India’s
and Chinese security interests. Also, China does not look at Pakistan-sponsored
anti-India organizations in its mission to combat terror.
Pertinently, if ever India tries to move any resolution against such terror
groups, the motion will not garner support from China and its puppet nations in the
SCO. Further, fighting cyber terrorism would be another challenge as Beijing itself is a cyber
bully and has (State-sponsored) Chinese hackers.
Moreover, SCO is mired with certain
problems. First, it has no clear idea as to how the organization would deal
with challenges if chaos there flares up to engulf the region, like the Afghan
situation.
Second, despite the SCO bindings
Central Asian countries showed their strong inclinations for cooperating with
the West on a broad set of issues. Third, the growing China-Russia contradiction
also has the potential to impede the SCO’s growth.
Lastly, the problems vis-à-vis expansion which becomes
limited because the SCO’s ‘official language’ clause (which includes only
Chinese and Russian) keeps the English speaking countries away from entering
the grouping.
Certainly, even though the SCO is
not free from lacunae, it can bring credible benefits for India. One, gain
geopolitically i.e. to protect New Delhi’s interests in Afghanistan, keep a
close watch on Russia-Pakistan nearness, rebut any useless resolutions put by Islamabad
on the SCO table and learning from SCO’s success in containing the spread of
extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.
Two, the SCO membership could give
India a new way to build promising bridges with Central Asia by giving New
Delhi more leeway in pursuing its energy interests and along with Pakistan’s
membership, projects like CASA, TAPI, IPI might eventually also see light.
Three, India
can create a vast network of physical and digital connectivity which extends
from Eurasia's northern corner to Asia's
southern shores. The International North South Transportation Corridor is a
step in that direction.
Four, India brings decades of experience in
dealing with social issues especially in the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and
multi-cultural settings that could be shared with SCO countries which are
confronted with many social and religious challenges.
Five, India could gain from SCO’s public
information and mass media mechanisms for enhancing greater presence in the
Eurasian space. Six, New Delhi could gain access in Eurasian region’s soft-political
areas through participation in educational, environmental protection, disaster
management and rescue operations, climate change debate, water related issues
and people-to-people contact (through institutional means).
Seven, participation in other
non-conventional security areas such as food security measures,
drug-trafficking control, information and cyber security, etc could be of
advantage for India.
Last, New Delhi’s
participation in the SCO’s military and counter-terror exercises could be
beneficial for our armed forces to understand and interact with other
militaries, thereby instilling greater confidence at the regional level.
Clearly, India
would gain from the SCO membership but uncertainty about the possible benefit still
remains as the membership has not just been given to India
but also Pakistan.
Seeing the Indo-Pak track record in SAARC, it is hard to imagine how their
paired inclusion would allow the SCO to become a more dynamic and cooperative
forum.
Nonetheless, having got an
opportunity in the organization, India must have a clear pro-active policy
otherwise it might risk becoming a focal point of criticism by Central Asia nations,
akin to the way New Delhi is targeted in SAARC. The future alone would be able
to say whether India
actually benefitted in SCO. Till then, we must wait and watch. ---- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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