Round The World
New Delhi, 13 January 2016
Pak Terror
TIME FOR STRATEGIC
CULTURE
By Amrita Banerjee
Research Scholar,
JNU
Prime Minister Modi’s ambitious
project to “turn the course of history” by visiting Lahore to meet his Pakistan
counterpoint Nawaz Sharif on Christmas got tested by fire when Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists attacked the
Pathankot air base in the new year. Today, predictably, the proposed talks
between the Foreign Secretaries of the warring neighbours in Islamabad continue to hang in balance.
Undoubtedly, the Pathankot was no
surprise. This kind of heinous activity has almost become a pattern in the
Indo-Pak relationship wherein each past effort at peace has provoked similar
strikes. India faced the
Kargil offensive post former Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore bus yatra in 1999 and the Parliament attack after the failed Agra
Summit in 2001.
It is well known that in Islamabad, the shots are
called less by the civil Government and more by the Army and Islamic militants.
The more complex truth is that while Pakistan’s all- powerful army seeks
to avert a military crisis which could drain its energies given its grave
internal turmoil, it does not seek normalization. Its Army Chief General Raheel Sharif has made
clear that he will not accept the status quo on Kashmir.
Notably, both the Pathankot strike
carried out by the ISI’s old client, Jaish-e-Mohammad
and terrorist attack on the Indian Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan)
almost at the same time prove the point that Indo-Pak peace process and India’s
engagement in Afghanistan would not be tolerated.
True, ‘Operation Dhangu’ in Pathankot might be over but it has raised
serious questions about India’s
security preparedness. One, how did six heavily armed men succeeded in entering
an airbase protected by high concrete walls, topped with barbed wire?
Two, why were dozens of military
personnel stationed at Pathankot not mobilized instead of flying National
Security Guard (NSG) commandos from Delhi
which resulted in loss of crucial time? Three, why were the Special Forces of
the Parachute Regiment (Para SF) ideal for this Operation not used?
Four, why was the reaction to
intelligence adhoc? Especially when genuine intelligence alerts were available
both from Intelligence Bureau and US agencies? Last, but not least, why did neither
the police nor the Defence Security Corps (DSC), tasked with base security,
receive specialist counter-fidayeen training?
There is no gainsaying these were grave security lapses.
In fact, there were striking
similarities between the Pathankot attack and last year’s 27 July 27 strike in
neighbouring Gurdaspur district. Both times the terrorists struck in districts
close to the Pakistan
border and snatched vehicles to execute their plan.
Secondly, just as during the Gurdaspur
incident, this time too the terrorists are suspected to have come at least two
days prior to the attack. Thirdly, in both the cases police stations and
defence installation were attacked. Fourthly, in both operations, the
terrorists engaged the security forces for more than 10 hours.
Till date the National Investigation
Agency (NIA) and Border Security Force (BSF) have not been able to conclusively
conclude the exact number and precise way in which the ultras entered the air
base. Raising some worrisome questions. When will India learn from its mistakes? Does
the lives of soldiers killed in such operation does not ring bells for New Delhi?
Arguably, if an important defence
establishment can be attacked, what possible protection do ordinary citizens have?
How should India
strengthen itself to avert terrorist attacks in future and when will it stop
being a ‘soft State’? Certainly these hard queries require genuine
introspection.
Notably, India’s response to the present
imbroglio can be three fold. First, Delhi
must resist the temptation to call off talks. Derailing the dialogue process
would mean giving veto power to the terrorist. Realizing this, there has been a
show of foreign policy adeptness on both sides.
Pertinently, Modi called the
attackers “enemies of humanity who can’t stand to watch India develop”,
thus leaving a window open for the dialogue process. Similarly, Pakistan also wished to “build on the good will
created by the high-level contacts between the two countries” and promised to
partner India
to completely eradicate the terrorism menace.
Leading to a ray of hope as there
are reports that Nawaz Sharif has ordered a joint investigation team (JIT) to
look into the leads provided by India
on the attack. Already a few Jaish-e-Mohammad
militants have been arrested.
Clearly, India through the dialogue
process must bring to the table a clear agenda for the actions it expects
Pakistan to take on terrorism --- and critically along-with a roadmap for what it is willing to do in
return for those demands being met like demilitarization of Siachen.
New Delhi must also ensure that
Islamabad takes legal action against the perpetrators of violence against
India, its civilian leadership publicly accepting the stipulation that violence
shall not be used to press for a solution of the Kashmir problem and the
military infrastructure of terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad
be dismantled.
Pertinently, India must consider what elements of national
power it can marshal to deter Pakistan
from continuing to sponsor jihadist groups. Factually, New Delhi has many excellent reasons to avoid
crisis-inducing steps, like the use of military force, which would hurt its own
economic objectives.
The most important lesson for India is that any
terrorist attack on Indian soil irrespective of the casualties is an assault on
our national security and should never be taken lightly. Shockingly, the terrorists
were minutes away from fighter jets and without the valor of our brave soldiers
there could have been a serious casualty.
Undeniably, national security is too
serious a matter to leave on God. That it took Indian troops over 18 hours and
the loss of at least seven lives to defeat four poorly trained terrorists whose
attack plans were known, makes it clear that the lessons of 26/11 have not been
learned.
India desperately needs a programme of
counter terrorism capacity building, based on the honest admission of
weaknesses and a clear roadmap for change. The bungled response to Pathankot
underscores the need for a three-pronged revamp: Parliamentary oversight, a
well-defined national security doctrine and an independent federal commission
of accountability.
Even though individual States are
responsible for the maintenance of law and order, such insurgencies are beyond
the professional capability of State forces. Thus, it is high time that the
Centre-State blame game is stopped and efforts to set up NCTC and the Nat Grid
as an overarching edifice of the country’s internal security be
institutionalized.
The truth is that terrorism can be
defeated not by angry talk but calm action. The Pathankot experience has shown
that terror responses cannot be left to the whims and fancies of a lionized
few. A recalcitrant neighbour promoting faith based militancy against the
country has to be countered on the borders as well as on other planes through a
comprehensive strategy that is our own and in sync with India’s
strategic culture.
In sum, the Peshawar,
Paris,
Pathankot link pushes for the need to have more international cooperation on
counter-terrorism because we no longer inhibit a world where the argument ‘your-terrorist-is-not-my-terrorist’
holds much weight. India
has no option but to exhibit patience and arm herself more strongly in future.
As for Pakistan, the entire
world has its eyes set on it as this incident will truly test Islamabad’s intentions. ---- INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
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