Open Forum
New Delhi, 20 October 2015
SC No To NJCA
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY INTACT?
By Dr S Saraswathi
Former Director, ICSSR, New
Delhi
The striking down of the National Judicial Appointments Commission
Act 2014 by the Supreme Court in a majority opinion describing it as
unconstitutional is a setback not only to the present NDA Government, which
piloted the bill in Parliament and which also tried a similar legislation in
2003, but to all the supporters of this enactment not excluding the Congress,
which originally introduced a Bill.
As such, this episode exposes the existence of conflict
between two branches of the government – the Executive whichever party is in
power, and the Judiciary supposed to remain aloof from politics. Political
parties sometimes exhibit admirable unanimity when questions of power,
privileges, and status of political personnel are to be safeguarded and
promoted.
The principal argument for the verdict against the NJAC is
that it infringes on the independence of the judiciary, which is a basic
feature of the Constitution and cannot be touched. The Act, unanimously passed
by Parliament, is the 99th Constitution Amendment Act seeking to
replace the Collegium System for appointment of judges in the higher judiciary
with a Judicial Commission in which the government, that is, the Executive,
would have a prominent place and a significant role.
The Commission, according to this invalidated Act, was to be
constituted with six members – the Chief Justice of India, two senior-most
judges of the Supreme Court, two “eminent persons” and the Union Law Minister.
The two eminent persons are to be selected by a group consisting of the Prime
Minister, the CJI, and the Leader of Opposition.
The judgement held that the presence of the Law Minister in
the Commission and inclusion of the PM and the LoP in the group formed for
selection of two “eminent persons” would constitute political involvement in
judicial appointments.
However, Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has rubbished
the majority opinion tweeting in his personal capacity that it had an
“erroneous logic.” While the judgment has upheld the primacy of one basic
structure, the independence of judiciary, it has diminished five other basic
structures of the Constitution, namely, parliamentary democracy, an elected
government, the council of ministers, an elected PM and the LoP, he noted
adding that the SC opinion is final. It
is not infallible.
Be that as it may, the Collegium stays. Recall this system
restored by this judgement was introduced in 1993 by the Constitution Bench
under Justice J S Verma. It established the supremacy of the judiciary in
making appointments and made the Chief Justice of India the final authority in
the matter. By this, it put an end to naked interference of the Executive
possible and practicable in appointments and transfers of judges in the 1970s
and 1980s and imposition of the notion
of “committed judiciary” – committed to
serve the Executive rather than the dictates of law.
The verdict in the Keshavanand Bharti case which
categorically declared that Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the
Constitution was indeed a rude shock to the then government. It led to some
drastic steps by the Executive affecting even the Judiciary. The Collegium System was supposed to rule out
the possibility of mass transfers at the will of the Executive and appointment
of establishment candidates in the Judiciary.
Under the Constitution, the CJI and other judges of the SC are
to be appointed by the President of India. The CJ must be consulted in the
appointment of other judges. They could be removed only by an order of the
President issued according to the prescribed procedure for impeachment in Parliament.
Judges of the High Court other than the CJ were appointed by
the President after consultation with the CJI and the Governor of the State,
and the CJ of the concerned high court. The procedure laid down for removal of
judges of a High Court and Supreme Court was similar.
The right to be consulted does not bestow the power to
decide appointments to the Judiciary. Therefore, judges were virtually
appointed by the government – a system open to criticism by the protagonists of
separation of powers. The system had the potential to politicize appointments
and transfers.
Judiciary being the guardian of the Constitution and its
principles, the method of selection and appointment of judges seems vital for
upholding the letter and spirit of the Constitution. But, judicial
interpretation of law, and the responsibility of the Judiciary to uphold law
without fear or favour entrust a vital responsibility on the judges to remain
independent and impartial whatever be the mode of appointment.
Judges in any society under any form of government are
treated with utmost respect. Judicial impartiality was counted as the foremost
quality of a good ruler even in those days when separation of power was not
known.
Modern democratic constitutions are based on the maxim of
separation of powers propounded by Montesquie. This doctrine demarcates the
sphere of the law making body (parliament), law enforcing authority (the
executive government), and law interpreting and judging body (judiciary).
However, separation of powers cannot be total and completely
isolate the three branches of governance from one another as these have to
support democracy jointly as its main pillars. Judges cannot be elected. Nor
can they be selected by their own clan excluding representatives from other
branches.
Separation of powers lies in the quality of performance and
not in the mode of appointments. Decades ago, there were some genuine apprehensions
of political interference in the judiciary. Today, the problem is coupled with
apprehensions of judicial block to democratic political decisions. A way out
must be found without widening the wedge between the two branches of government.
The Collegium emerged from the principle of judicial
independence established by the SC in a series of cases known as “three judges’
cases”. In the first, appointment of judges was entrusted with the Executive
and kept secret and confidential. The Constitution introduced the provision for
consultation. It didn’t guarantee a clean system or ensure flawless
appointments. There was scope for corruption and nepotism. In the second case,
the appointment of judges gave primacy to the judiciary with the CJI as the
head.
The third case introduced the Collegium System with the CJI
as the head and with a group of consultants comprising two
senior-most judges of the Supreme Court. For selection of judges of the High
Courts, the Collegium comprised the CJI and four senior-most judges which were to
review recommendations made by a similar Collegium in High Courts.
The NJAC is not a novel Indian experiment. Such a commission
as an independent body has been constituted in Britain in 2006 to strengthen the
independence of the Judiciary. The JAC
(Judicial Appointments Commission) is an executive, non-departmental public
body of members drawn from the judiciary, legal profession, non-legally qualified
judicial office-holders, and the public. In most countries, the Executive
retains the power of appointing judges with all its drawbacks and with strong
public opinion favouring an alternative system.
The country has enough experience to decide the matter of
judicial appointments without reference to foreign models. The apex court has
admitted the need to make changes in the Collegium System. After all, the utility
of any arrangement depends on the intentions of persons executing the
arrangement. There can be no foolproof arrangement. The best features of the
Collegium System and that of NJAC should be combined to make a new system. --- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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