Round The World
New Delhi, 12 March 2014
Nuclear
Security Summit
CRITICAL ISSUES FOR DEBATE
By Prof. Arvind
Kumar
(Dept. of
Geopolitics & Intl Relations, Manipal Univ)
All eyes would be on the forthcoming
international Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) 2014
scheduled to be held on 24-25 March at The Hague,
Netherlands.
Its main agenda is to discuss and explore ways and mechanism by which nuclear
terrorism can be prevented. This is so as the threat perceptions emanating from
the rise of non-State actors and its linkages with the probable use of nuclear
material has forced a greater challenge to global peace and stability. Such
threats cannot be ruled out in the emerging geopolitical environment, more so
because by and large these are common across the spectrum.
The fear of nuclear terrorism has
unfortunately not subsided yet. There is a nagging fear that nuclear materials
can fall into the wrong hands and this would be most damaging, especially in
the context of its usage. Therefore the NSS will be mainly aimed towards coming
up with agreements among world leaders and organizations present on the critical
issues relating to the prevention of nuclear terrorism. International
cooperation in this regard would indeed be vital to the objectives and mandates
of the NSS.
The challenges to the safety and
security of nuclear material around the world will need to be addressed, given
that nation States must reduce the stockpiles of hazardous nuclear materials. While
there are a number of nations, which possess hazardous nuclear material, it has
been very difficult to have a proper nuclear material protection, accounting
and control because the exact quantity of the nuclear material is unknown.
There is, obviously, a lack of transparency in the declaration of the amount of
nuclear material possessed by each of the members of the international
community.
At the same time, it is becoming a
responsibility of the various nation States to have both accountability as well
as control of the nuclear material so that it is kept secured. However, despite
knowing it well that no nuclear material is absolutely safe and any material is
vulnerable, there are hardly any mechanisms which can assure its protection and
security. In fact, these issues have always been a formidable challenge for the
international community, as the concepts of safety, security and safeguards are
all inter-related. The safety of nuclear material assures that the material
does not cause harm to the populace at large and the workers inside through an
accident or improper configurations.
Further, the security of nuclear
material largely means preventing it from leaving an authorized area or transferring
it to some unidentified element in an implicit manner. The safeguards largely
ensure that the material is accounted for and is under constant control in the
facility. There is also a growing realization that weapons-usable material must
be kept out of the hand of adversaries because it might prove fatal to mankind.
Therefore, how does one assess the quality and quantity of the material at the
facility remains a crucial question both for debate and analysis.
It goes without saying that the security
measures necessary to protect nuclear material need to be improved, intensified
and augmented. It can be possible only when there is a strong security culture
of Personnel Reliability Programme, which instils the merits of a fundamental
element of facility security and takes into account the consequences of
unreliable irresponsible behaviour. Undoubtedly, nuclear security relies heavily
on a well- developed integrated combination of nuclear material accountancy and
physical protection.
Whether the nation States can
prevent the theft or illegal purchase of fissile material forms a major part of
the debate. It must be emphasized here that preventing theft is far easier than
stopping terrorists from transporting and detonating a bomb. Hence, nuclear
terrorism must be controlled at the source itself.
The United Sates after assessing the
imminent danger took a major initiative of raising the debate on nuclear
security issues among the members of international community. It was a follow
up of President Obama’s speech at Prague
during April 2009, where he made a categorical statement that a new
international effort will be made to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials
around the world within a four-year timeline. The speech also highlighted the
need for having a global summit on nuclear security, which finally the US hosted in
2010. Undoubtedly, the Prague
speech institutionalised the nuclear security efforts in a totally new and
different way.
The first NSS was held in April
2010, in Washington DC where 47 countries participated. Since
then, there is certainly a movement forward in securing hazardous nuclear
material (Highly enriched Uranium and Plutonium). The second NSS held at Seoul in 2012 was intended to renew the commitments made
in Washington DC and to identify further steps to strengthen
nuclear security. The agenda there was expanded beyond nuclear material to
encompass the interface between nuclear safety and nuclear security at nuclear
facilities and the security of the radiological material, which can be used in
building the radiological dispersible devices (RDD). At the ensuing third
summit the major goal would be to chart out the accomplishments and propose
ways and means to achieve all the objectives enshrined.
It needs to be emphasized here that
the nuclear summits so far have regrettably not resulted in any binding
international obligations to tackle the nuclear security challenge relating to
the threats emanating from nuclear terrorism. Whether Hague will be successful
in having one in place is the big question.
There have been multiple documented
cases of real theft of kilogram quantities of real weapons-usable nuclear
material. The International Atomic Energy Agency has come up with a database
that so far includes 20 incidents involving seizure of stolen HEU or Plutonium
that have been confirmed by relevant States. One can cite the example of Russia, where
18 kilograms of HEU was stolen from one of its reactors because of a conspiracy
hatched by one of its insiders. As luck would have it, Russian officials
reported the incident and the conspirators were caught before the nuclear
material left the facility.
It would be pertinent and worthwhile
on part of the major powers and responsible players in the international system
to work in tandem to address the growing concerns emanating from nuclear
source. India’s
credentials in terms of both non-proliferation and the security of nuclear
material remain very high. As against this, the US has to change its stance and
come to the reality of maintaining a consistency between rhetoric and action.
It possesses a huge amount of stockpile of nuclear material and thus needs to
address as well as set an example by reducing these drastically. The NSS can
become meaningful only when the US
takes some tough stance on these many issues or else it may end up as just
rhetoric. --- INFA
(Copyright,
India News & Feature Alliance)
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