Round The World

New Delhi, 24 December 2013

China-Pak N Pact 

TEST FOR NPT SIGNATORIES

By Prof. Arvind Kumar

(Dept of Geopolitics & Intl Relations, Manipal Univ)

Notwithstanding concerns voiced by members of the world community, China has recently defended its ongoing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. While the international community has viewed the cooperation as violation of international guidelines governing nuclear trade and commerce, Beijing has asserted that such collaboration helps Pakistan in augmenting its power generation and serves the interests of the people.

Pakistan formally inaugurated two 1,100 MW reactors at the second and third phases of the Karachi nuclear power project. Further, it’s a well-known fact that China has given support to Pakistan’s nuclear complex at Chasma, where two reactors have been constructed with Beijing’s assistance.

Recall that in 2009, China also signed agreements with Pakistan for the construction of the third and fourth reactors in Chasma. It triggered a controversy because these were the first deals signed by China after its joining of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). Pakistan is a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas the NSG mandates its members not to transfer technology to countries that have not signed the NPT. Hence, it is becoming difficult for China to make a case for its nuclear agreements with Islamabad despite the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards would apply to protect the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

If one goes back and analyses the genesis of the Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation, it becomes evident that Islamabad had made several serious efforts in exploring possibilities of cooperation in nuclear technologies in the early years of its friendship with Beijing during 1960s. It must be emphasized here that China’s response in these early years was not very favourable. Beijing, itself, had been grappling with its own internal contradictions of Cultural Revolution and to a larger extent suspected Pakistani intentions. The Chinese nuclear programme was nascent in character and it wanted to shroud everything in secrecy.

The first major reason for not being favourable to Pakistan’s desire to procure nuclear technologies from China was Islamabad’s strong and ardent support to Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ statements. The Chinese approach to these US statements was absolutely opposite in character especially in comparison to Pakistan’s optimism and enthusiasm.

However, the interests between China and Pakistan had never waned because of their friendship treaty signed in the year 1963. Over the years, Beijing gradually changed its approach towards Islamabad and the genesis of Sino-Pak cooperation can be seen during the latter part of the seventies after Mao’s death. By then, China had matured its nuclear programme to a greater extent and had evolved nuclear exports as a preferred policy largely driven by economic considerations. It was mainly to generate foreign currency, which was needed to revitalize the Chinese economy. Hence, Beijing started cooperating with Pakistan in the nuclear arena.

It was during 1985-86 that the intense cooperation between the two nations began, with China signing the nuclear cooperation agreement. In fact, it is suspected that China’s assistance to Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme over the decades was crucial and pertinent to the latter’s nuclear weapons development. It was mostly debated on those aspects of nuclear cooperation, which happened before 1984, when China became the member of IAEA.   

Given the obligations on part of the IAEA, especially on nuclear trade and commerce, China conveniently devised some of its own principles. It declared that its nuclear trade and exports should be used exclusively for civilian purposes. All nuclear exports by China should be subject to IAEA safeguards and the recipient country should not transfer the nuclear technology to a third country without its prior approval.

Despite Beijing’s stated principles, nuclear cooperation with Pakistan had sparked off numerous debates among the members of the academic and strategic community. What emerged was the perennial leniency on the part of China insofar as matters related to nuclear trade with Pakistan were concerned.

It needs to be emphasized here that China’s nuclear exports with Pakistan have been driven mostly by politico-strategic considerations, rather than economic concerns. Additionally, it has been motivated by Beijing’s security concerns. Undoubtedly, China has been very successfully attempting to build Pakistan as a counterweight to India in the region. Pakistan has been treated and categorized as a long-time ally and an all-weather friend. In the international system, it is perhaps only Pakistan where China has been able to maintain its relationships. It has worked so well between the two countries without any formal military alliance.

On the one hand, China has been showing a very consistent record of cooperation and collaboration in the nuclear sphere. On the other, it has never formally asked Pakistan to abide by the full scope safeguards enshrined in the IAEA, as the provisions are intrusive in nature. In a way, China has maintained double standards by not adhering to the conditions enshrined for its nuclear trade and commerce.

There is considerable evidence to show that Beijing exported nuclear technology contrary to the existing non-proliferation regimes. Its formal acceptance of IAEA in 1984, signing the NPT in 1992 and becoming a member of the NSG in 2004, itself suggests that it maintained duplicity in its efforts in maintaining an international standard for nuclear trade and commerce.

The most controversial discussion on China-Pakistan nuclear weapon cooperation centers around a report regarding the transfer of 5,000 ring magnets from China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation to an unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear facility in Kahuta, Rawalpindi District. It set off a major debate internationally.

Despite China’s growing acceptance of international non-proliferation regimes and its verbal promises, the nuclear cooperation it has with Pakistan has posed a number of challenges to the world community. There remains the nagging fear of diversion – from civilian to military purposes. Even after joining the NSG, China has not been maintaining the requirements for nuclear trade and commerce.

To what degree, it will disclose the background of its nuclear relationship with Pakistan remains to be seen in the years to come. Undeniably, more transparency is needed in any nuclear cooperation – either civilian or military. India needs to calibrate a strategy and mobilize international public opinion against the ongoing Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. Better sooner, than later. ----INFA   

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)