Defence Notes
New Delhi, 16 October 2013
National Security
Environment
CRITICAL TO CONTROL
BABUS
By Col
(Dr) PK Vasudeva (Retd)
At a recent Chief of the Staff Committee (CoSC) its Chairman
Air Chief Marshal Browne pitched for a common pay commission for the armed
forces and wanted representation from their side. Moreover, in a letter to
Union Defence Minister Antony he demanded that the terms of the newly announced
Seventh Pay Commission must include anomalies which have crept in the
emoluments of armed forces over the decades and demanded “full representation”.
Towards that end he underscored, “the Forces must have representatives
in the Commission to explain their case, peculiar condition of service and the
equivalence of parity, status and so forth. Especially against the backdrop,
that “from the Third Pay Commission onward, lot of anomalies had crept into the
system which have still not been resolved till date.”
But the underlying message was crystal clear: “Forces do not
have faith in the civilian dispensation,” read bureaucracy to “fully grasp the
unique challenges” of military service. Resulting in their eroding “status,
parity and equivalence” compared to their civilian counterparts.
Undeniably, there seems to be huge politico-bureaucratic resistance
to critical reforms in higher defence management as suggested by late K
Subramanyam Kargil Review Committee, the 2001 Group of Ministers’ Reforming the
National Security System Report and last year’s Naresh Chandra Taskforce
Committee Report. Indeed, one of the main reasons for the failure to bridge the
divide.
Pertinently, the Government set-up a Task Force under former
Rajya Raksha Mantri Arun Singh to give its recommendations on a Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS) appointment alongside defence and security matters as
recommended by the Subrahmanyam’s Kargil Report. Singh too endorsed the CDS formation
on the lines of other world democracies. Dittoed by another GoM under Dy Prime
Minister L K Advani in 2000.
Notably, the Government also finalised the basic structure
of the CDS to revamp the top defence management. The setting up of a Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and a tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command under
an Indian Naval Vice Admiral was also approved. With the conceptual framework
complete, it was felt the new apex set up would promote joint planning and
execution of military affairs.
But, for reasons best known to it, even as the Government accepted
all the GoM’s recommendations on instituting a CDS it decided to consult
Parties before taking action on it. The consultation process with national and regional
parties was initiated in March 2006, a reminded sent in June 2006 and again in January
2007. Alas, only four parties replied the rest were silent.
Add to this, perhaps the worst kept secret during former
Army Chief General V.K. Singh’s controversies-ridden tenure was the lack of
“defence preparedness.” According to informed security experts the deficiencies
stemming from higher defence mismanagement were known but unfortunately Gen
Singh’s confidential letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was leaked.
Significantly, other controversies centering on
civil-military relations revealed the crisis of confidence and trust deficit
between military officers and bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry whereby Anthony
admitted to “bitterness” between them.
There is no gainsaying the reasons for this are many, including
the legacy of the controversies over the Sixth Pay Commission. But more
important, it is a structural problem arising from three peculiarities in our
institutional structures.
Besides, with many complaints pending in various courts against
the Defence Ministry vis-à-vis pay
and allowances discrepancies, defence procurement scams and lurking threat
perception from China and Pakistan, the
Government constituted the 14-member Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012 to
suggest ways to revamp defence management.
The Committee’s main objective was to contemporarise the 2000 Kargil
Review Committee’s recommendations and examine the state of border management
and restructuring system. The Committee submitted its report on 8 August 2012
recommending a permanent CoSC Chairman to exercise “administrative control”
over nuclear arsenal, separate joint Special Forces command head, prioritizing
the Forces modernisation and prepare an annual defence operational status
report.
Sadly, akin to the politico-bureaucratic combine scuttling the
recommendation for a CDS post the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Defence Ministry
expressed major reservations against the Committee’s fresh proposal for a
permanent CoSC Chairman.
Worse, a few months back, the Ministry quietly rejected most
of the key recommendations by the Naresh Chandra Taskforce. Pointing to lack of
consensus in the Armed Forces and the need to consult parties, it shot down the
proposal to create a permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Indeed, the CoSC, a four-star General like the three Service
Chiefs with a fixed two-year tenure, would have been the Government’s Principal
Military Advisor and an “invitee” to the Cabinet Committee on Security. He
would have also helped usher some desperately needed synergy among the Army,
Navy and IAF in planning, procurement, operational and doctrinal issues.
Similarly, another key recommendation junked was “cross-staffing”,
posting of military officers to the Defence Ministry. Thereby, ignoring
Subramanyam’s suggestion that “India
is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces HQs are outside the
apex Governmental structure.”
The situation remains somewhat similar till this day. The
three Service HQs, once merely "attached offices", have been
rechristened "integrated HQs of ministry of defence" with some
delegation of financial powers. But the nomenclature change is perceived to be
"largely cosmetic". Till the armed forces get some concrete
institutional role in policy-making, along with effective cross staffing, the
divide and the drift will probably continue.
Undoubtedly, it is not only surprising but also shocking as
to why the Government should appoint high-powered committees when it is not
going to implement its recommendations? Why should the taxpayers’ money be
wasted over such an expensive exercise? Clearly, the bureaucracy needs to be
tamed and controlled so that the political leadership overrules its objections in
national security interest. ----- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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