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Indo-Vietnamese Meet: CHOPPY SIGNAL TO CHINA?, By Amrita Banerjee, 16 July, 2013 Print E-mail

Round The World

New Delhi, 16 July 2013

Indo-Vietnamese Meet

CHOPPY SIGNAL TO CHINA?

By Amrita Banerjee,

Research Scholar, School of International Studies, JNU

 

India couldn’t have asked for better timing. The recently-concluded 15th India-Vietnam Joint Commission Meeting in New Delhi sent out positive signals, much to the chagrin of China, which is increasing its assertion in South China Sea (SCS) and mounting pressure on Hanoi to suspend its oil deals with India.

 

Indeed, the visit of Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh is welcome as he minced no words and asserted that India has the right to pursue 'exploration and exploitation work' in South China Sea as they were within Vietnamese 'exclusive economic zone'. It also voiced support to India's Look East policy that manifests in New Delhi playing a "more active role in the Asia Pacific region" and the world at large.

 

The South China Sea, with up to 213 billion barrels of oil, has been termed the “Second Persian Gulf” by the pro-Government Chinese daily Global Times. The scramble for greater control over such a resource rich region is obvious. As in well known the conflict between India and China over the SCS has been building up for nearly two years now.

 

It all started when India signed an agreement with Vietnam in October 2011 to expand and promote oil exploration in the South China Sea and then reconfirmed its decision to carry on despite the Chinese challenge to the legality of Indian presence. By accepting the Vietnamese invitation to explore oil and gas in Blocks 127 and 128, India’s state-owned ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL), not only expressed New Delhi’s desire to deepen its friendship with Vietnam, but also ignored China’s warning to stay away.

 

In response to India-Vietnam closeness, China has reacted by deploying a powerful force of civilian, paramilitary and naval vessels to back up its disputed claims to about 80% of the waters and seabed of the South China Sea. While it has little or no basis in international maritime law for its claims, China has become increasingly assertive because of its growing military power much to the annoyance of the small littoral States.

 

India’s growing engagement with Vietnam, and by extension in the South China Sea, is a logical expansion of its Look East Policy (LEP). While the Chinese do not consider Indian Ocean to be India's Ocean or even India's strategic backyard, they do consider the South and East China seas to be China's seas! This assertiveness of China affects India’s interest. New Delhi has reiterated its stance on the “freedom of navigation” (FoN) underlining the necessity for uninterrupted access to international waters.

 

India’s stakes in the South China Sea, in this regard, is both economic and diplomatic. The economic factor is driven by the presence of energy resources and trade that plies between India and the nations in the region. Diplomatically, India would like to be seen as a responsible growing power that advocates healthy relations between nations, thereby ensuring a secure regional architecture, wherein nations settle their differences amicably.

 

In standing with this approach, India has adopted a neutral stance, and has requested nations to sort out their differences peacefully. New Delhi has further requested the nations to establish a code of conduct that would ensure ‘freedom of navigation’ and ‘access to resources’.

 

Beijing, on the other hand, has repeatedly conveyed its commitment to act amicably with the ASEAN member States only in words but not in deeds. The China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)’s announcement, in 2012, of a vast sweep of new exploration blocks, has left the nations confused about the Chinese intentions. Vietnam, thus, sees India as a reliable and friendly partner to achieve its economic and developmental goals. During his visit to India in December last year, the Vietnamese Prime Minister had surprised many by even exhorting India to play a more active role in the South China Sea crisis.

 

However, of late, OVL has relinquished block no.127 and suspended work in block no.128, which had been the epicentre of diplomatic uproar. It relinquished block 127 after it encountered dry wells. It had already invested US $50 million in exploration in block 128 until last year. After repeated exploration, it was found that due to the hard seabed in the area, the prospect of finding oil in the block was low. Hence, it was not a very cost effective project to continue. Besides, India had to pay US $15 million as exit fee to Petro Vietnam to get out of the block. By giving up exploration in these two blocks India has extracted itself from the SCS dispute.

 

Despite the withdrawal, India is keen on maintaining a strong role for itself in the region. India suspended the work because it was not a commercially viable project. However, the timing of the announcement was not appropriate especially when India is expanding its maritime boundaries. The Southeast Asian countries look upon India as a trustworthy balancer of China, and thus Vietnam was disappointed with the Indian exit.

 

Thus, Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh also took the opportunity to press New Delhi to let Indian companies like OVL, continue with the exploration of two oil blocks which have been allocated to it. The latter, fortunately, set to rest Vietnam’s concern and asserted that it has not totally withdrawn and still has access to the undisputed Block 06.1, in which it has 45 per cent stakes.

 

Even though India has extracted itself from the SCS dispute, the need of the hour is to have a well defined, coherent South China Sea policy and other such maritime policy to prevent any confusion in future. Also, the issue at stake here is whether India really supports freedom of navigation in the SCS. If it is so, it will be necessary for it to assert, back up and safeguard its own interests in the region. Since, almost 55% of India’s trade with the Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS, it is quite evident that India derives considerable economic benefits from the SCS.

 

A strong Indian signal to China should be the first step. The South China Sea has a number of nations that India is engaging economically and diplomatically. As India grows and its influence expands the number and intensity of such engagements will and should increase. This stance should not be hindered by the view point of China since these engagements are based on accepted international laws.

 

As India is out of SCS dispute now, this is a splendid opportunity for her to wait and watch and not get embroiled in the quarrels. India should strengthen her naval presence, have an ambitious maritime vision and act firmly and assertively in case of any standoff in future. ---INFA

 

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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