Open Forum
New Delhi, 8 May
2013
Chinese Standoff
‘SOFT’ DELHI NEEDS TO ACT TOUGH
By Col (Dr) PK Vasudeva
(Retd)
Notwithstanding, the
Chinese troops withdrawal which ended the standoff in Ladakh, the Sino-Indian
boundary dispute cannot be put behind. It is expected to loom larger in the
upcoming bilateral engagement during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit than it
would have ordinarily done. The face-off, which had kept the two countries on
tenterhooks for three weeks, ended on May 5, following Indian and Chinese
deciding to pull back from their respective campsites in Depsang plains in
eastern Ladakh.
The sudden withdrawal was
completed by 7:30 pm, following tough high-level negotiations between the two
sides and the fourth Brigadier level flag meeting at Chusul a day earlier. The pullback came following another round of
discussions between local military commanders. However, the stubborn refusal by
the officials to even confirm what on the face appears to be a victory for
Indian diplomacy gives rise to suspicions on the terms of agreement.
The concessions may
involve Indian troops pulling back from their forward positions in some sectors
close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The withdrawal leaves unanswered key
questions: What Chinese demands did India accept? Has the People’s
Liberation Army platoon retreated to its side of the LAC? Why has India withdrawn
troops from its own areas?
As Chinese troops
returned to their pre-April 15 position, Indian troops from Army’s Ladakh
Scouts and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), too, returned to their base
camps. The closest ITBP camp at Burtse is 15 km from the face-off site at Raki
Nalla, which is a dry riverbed running parallel to the LAC.
The campsite is 40 km
south east of Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), a World War II airstrip reactivated by
the Indian Air Force in 2008 as part of India’s strategy to bolster border
defence. Beijing
has reportedly objected to new constructions at the DBO, which lies just 10 km
from the LAC and 80 km south of the Siachen glacier.
With the exception of
Siachen, DBO is India’s
northernmost military post, from which India can keep an eye on the
strategically vital 15,937 ft high Karakoram pass. Close on the other side of
the LAC are at least four known Chinese border defence regiment posts, two of
which are at Chip-Chap (25 km from the LAC) and Sundo (40 km from the LAC).
Unfortunately, India’s
acceptance to remove some of the structures is only a “face saver” to enable
Chinese troop to withdraw to their pre-April 15 positions. This shows that
Depsang Bulge, a tabletop plateau of 750 sq km area in northern Ladakh: an area
roughly half the size of Delhi
becomes a disputed area and is considered to be a ‘no mans’ land’. The face-off
site is just about 35km south of the strategic Karakoram Pass,
which is at the tri-junction of China-Pakistan-India borders, and overlooks the
Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post in
the Chumar sector to the east.
Anxiously, Indian foreign
policy towards China has
been tested now, with PLA intrusion into Indian Territory and when India was in
‘catch 22 situation’. Though the diplomacy partially succeeded, New Delhi, however, should have acted tough with Beijing. Clearly, it was
not a localised action as was made out in the initial stages. How can India dismantle infrastructure on its side of
LAC and stop development of the border areas when China
has already made highways and airstrips in Aksai Chin area claimed by India.
Sources in the security
establishment familiar with the negotiations and the local topography noted
that the 21-day confrontation on Ladakh's desolate Depsang plains ended only
after the Indian Army agreed to demolish bunkers it had built in the region of
Chumar near the LAC, to keep an eye on the Karokram Highway. The Chinese, close to
what India
considers its current border and part of the proactive measures, had objected
to these.
But, in future, New Delhi needs to realise that only a hardline policy
pays dividends, when dealing with China, especially with incidents of
territorial violations of such a serious nature. This is borne out by the fact
that the 1986-87 Sumdorung Chu episodes, when the Indian and Chinese troops
were in a similar face-off against each other, was resolved through an Indian
show of force at the tactical level. If the Ministry of External Affairs was
solely allowed to manage the crisis, the chaos perhaps would have been
unimaginable. Fortunately, the Indian Army had good field level commanders who
acted as they deemed fit which saved the day in the Sumdorung Chu episode.
Evidently no other
Government agency, apart from the Army and the ITBP, really knows the layout of
the land; but their local commanders are not allowed autonomy to act
instantaneously and instead have to await instructions from the MEA mandarins.
The problem is that the Ministry bosses are not familiar with the terrain,
which proves a major handicap in their decision-making during crises of a
territorial nature.
If New Delhi needs to adopt a hardline policy,
how does it translate on the ground? Well, it should act tough with Beijing by suspension of trade ties, however small it may
be, which is bound to impact China.
Why does New Delhi have to bend backwards and be
worried or overly sensitive about Beijing’s
sentiments? It is high time that it speaks tough and not projects a meek face
and ‘we-are-desperate-to-be-friendly with you’ attitude.
The only way out of such
an impasse is to jolt relations with China
and convey clearly to Zhongnanhai — the seat of Chinese government, that South
Block means business and India
is strong in political, military and economic terms. Any other policy approach
would amount to appeasement and convey the wrong signal to Beijing.
For some strange reasons,
LAC on DBO side is patrolled by the ITBP – a force of 5,000 and beefed up but
without matching teeth by which the Chinese hold this sector. Further, it has
been handed over to the Home Ministry, whereas the ITBP and BSF, along the
borders should be under the command of the Army for operational purposes.
The Government is so
short-sighted that after being slaves for centuries, it has no shame in losing
border territories, making police, customs and bureaucrats superior to the
military every one way or the other, degrading it at every corner.
The Defence Secretary is
responsible for the defence of India
as per the Rules of Business of Government of India. Strangely, there is a
National Security Adviser (NSA) who is responsible for total security of India and the
three Service Chiefs report to him. Both of them should have been shown the
door by now.
Is this hold of the
bureaucracy because of the fear of the Army take over? The Government in the
name of democracy and rule of the law has sadly been humiliating and degrading
the Armed Forces since Independence.
It is high time that it make all efforts to modernise the Armed Forces to
safeguard national integrity and sovereignty and involve them in
decision-making, rather leaving it to Defence Secretary and NSA, who have no
clue of defence strategies. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News and
Feature Alliance)
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