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New Delhi, 26 December 2007

US-Pakistan Security Ties

INDIA: NO ROOM FOR COMPLACENCY

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Some US officials claim that Pakistan used most of the money supplied by the US as part of a military assistance programme to combat Al Qaeda and their supporters has been diverted by the Musharraf regime to bolster the Pakistani military capability vis-à-vis the Indian military.

This assertion is undoubtedly correct, but why has this realization come now and not earlier? Was it a mistake or an unintentional omission to monitor the destination of the US money? Did the US have either motivation or interest or need to monitor? Can anything be done about it?

There is no dispute that the war on terror was fought with a high doze of sentiments, uncontrolled passion and an all pervasive fear to use the strategic partners against the terrorist threats. The Bush Administration was well aware and the then Secretary of State Colin Powel had given his views during official discussions that the war on terror could not be decisively won without the help of Pakistan.

The Bush Administration used the proverbial carrot and stick approach to enlist Pakistan, under military rule, as a frontline ally against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. The stick was the use of threat and the carrot was the billions of dollars worth of military and economic assistance to a military ruler that was under coup-related sanctions. Musharraf after brief shilly-shallying agreed to play ball.

At least, on the surface President Musharraf sounded committed to fighting the Al Qaeda and announced several policy changes some of which were music to even the Indian ears. The Bush White House was very munificent in spending money on Pakistan with the hope that Osama bin Laden would be brought to justice, the Al Qaeda would be eliminated at least from South Asia and Afghanistan would emerge as a normal country with a friendly Government.

While Pakistan lost about a thousand of its soldiers and policemen, offered logistic support to the US and the coalition forces in bringing down the Taliban regime in Kabul and accepted the US offer of a major non-NATO ally status, the above-mentioned goals of the US have not been by and large fulfilled. 

President George Bush will step down from office in January 2009. He has barely 12 months to go. What he could not achieve in the last six years, especially in bringing to justice Osama bin Laden, can he do so during the remaining period of his term? When assessments and cost-benefit analysis are being attempted, Pakistan’s performances are bound to figure. And that is what has happened.

This is not the first time that Islamabad has made full use of its alliance with Washington to bolster its military capabilities against India. From its very birth, Pakistan has been suffering from a sort of complex that impels it to oppose, compete and, if possible, damage India beyond repair.

When non-aligned New Delhi was critical of alliance politics, Islamabad was rather excessively willing to join the US-backed alliances. The US was more interested in fighting communism and particularly the former Soviet Union. Pakistan had little to do with containing communism, but it sought to make judicious use of its America connection to build up its military.

When sophisticated US weapons made a way into Pakistan under various programmes, Indian leaders and analysts criticized or condemned such deals. Some American Administrations sought to explain that the US weapons supply to Pakistan was not aimed against India. Neither New Delhi was convinced nor did Islamabad refrain from using those weapons against India during its wars with its neighbour.

During the ten-year Afghan crisis sparked off by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan got highly sophisticated and modern US weapons. It was able to acquire nuclear weapon capability through clandestine activities that were not unknown to the American intelligence community.

The recently de-classified materials of the Nixon era also throw much light on Pakistan’s incessant desire for a military build-up against the backdrop of its threat perception. In a way, successive Pakistani Governments, both civilian and military, have been obsessed with India and the current military regime is no exception.

While promising to end cross-border terrorism, reforming the terrorist incubators in the madrasas, instituting confidence-building measures with India and cooperating with New Delhi in vigorously participating in a peace process, Musharraf has always sought to modernize his military with the help of US money and materials.

To Musharraf’s advantage, the Government of India and Indian commentators have practically ceased to take due note of Pakistan’s military modernization. First, there is a notion in certain circles that Pakistan, like India, is a nuclear weapon power and there is no longer any need to monitor its conventional capabilities.

Secondly, some have developed a quiet satisfaction over the country’s improving security ties with Washington and ignore the US arms transfer to Pakistan. Thirdly, Pakistan’s internal instability marked by the rising trend of terrorist attacks in the country and the Pakistan army’s engagement in its North West Frontier Province have given a negative assurance that Pakistan could pose no security threat to India. Last but not the least, the chanting of ‘India: the Emerging Global Player” appears to have inculcated a false sense of security among the national security policy team in India.

Had the Indian warning on the arms transfer issue, though in a different tone, been served to US policy makers, the recent discovery of Pakistan diverting US funds to build up its military preparedness vis-à-vis India rather than to strengthen its counter-insurgency capabilities would have been made much earlier.

India need not overreact to Pakistani military build up and its efforts to alter the military balance in South Asia. It would not be proper for an aspiring global power to do so. But under-estimating the significant military developments in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan, could be terribly counter-productive.

India should not sleep peacefully with the hope that the US, after discovering Pakistani misuse of its funds, would stop equipping that country’s military with sophisticated weapon systems. On the other hand, we should learn that the sole super power of the world gives considerable attention to events and issues in neighbouring Cuba! --- INFA

(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)