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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 12 September 2007
Sino-Bangladesh Ties
NOT WITHOUT COSTS
By Sitakanta Mishra
Jawaharlal Nehru
University
Call
it ‘strategic access’ or a ‘string of pearls’, China has a definite sub-continental
design under the veil of its self-proclaimed dictum of ‘peaceful rise’. While Pakistan, Nepal
and Sri Lanka in South Asia,
Myanmar in East
Asia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Congo,
etc. in Africa are the known clients of its military hardware, Bangladesh seems to be positioned in a higher
plane of Beijing’s
strategic calculations. The recent report on Beijing’s export-import of conventional arms in
2006 to the UN underlines the nuances of its regional power game.
The
report reveals that Bangladesh
is the prime buyer of weapons made in China. Beijing
has sold 65 large-calibre artillery systems, 16 combat aircrafts and 114
missiles and related equipments to Dhaka in
2006. These figures also conform to the Bangladesh report on its arms
imports to the UN. It is also reported that in 2005, 20 122-mm guns and some
200 small arms like pistols and sub-machine guns were imported along with
regular 82-mm mortars.
The
growing profile of China as a
major arms supplier both in Asia and Africa over the last few years reveals an
incidental cozying of Beijing’s
ulterior designs and the regional small nations’ fear psychosis towards their neighbouring
big brother. It is also a truism that small countries always seek outside
intervention in their pursuit to counter-balance a regional heavyweight. One
such example is the India-South Asian discourse.
Though
New Delhi was instrumental in the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation
to which Beijing was objecting, surprisingly at a later stage Dhaka found it
convenient to hold the dragon’s tail in matters of defence, trade,
infrastructure development, natural resources exploration, et al. Not because
any other regional power lacked the potential to offer all this but only to
fetch Dhaka a bargaining power vis-à-vis India.
In
its pursuit of access to strategic points in Asia, China has successfully built
networks of ports, roads and bases in and around its neighbourhood. The Gwader
port in Pakistan, radar
facility in Myanmar, its
presence in Sri Lanka and
its vital access to the Chittagong
port, assist it to protect the sea lanes of communication through which a huge
volume of oil and sea trade flourish. These strategic calculations of China coincide
with the malignant desire of the Asian small countries. Bangladesh is
no exception.
Though
the Sino-Bangladesh courtship is only three decades old, the robust nature of
their inter-action speaks volumes. China
extended formal recognition to Bangladesh
only in 1975, four years after its independence. However, a U-turn in their
relationship took place with the emergence of the military in Bangladesh politics in the mid-1970s along with India’s arrogant
and non-engaging attitude towards the military junta.
The
India-fear of Dhaka’s military rulers pushed them towards China’s doors.
There was a tacit understanding between the then military ruler Mohammad Ershad
and the Chinese leaders not to allow movement of Indian troops through Bangladesh in
case of a future Sino-Indian war. Since then Bangladesh has followed a sub-continental-centric
policy aimed at military cooperation and security enhancement. Obviously, China is its
first choice due to its easy reach.
Not
only that. Out of 35-years of its existence as a sovereign nation, Bangladesh has
been ruled by its military for 15 years. This is believed to be a major factor
in boosting the Sino-Bangladesh strategic partnership. Moreover, the civilian governments could never reverse this trend as
the India-card became the peg of Bangladesh domestic politics. By
this time, China’s
involvement in Bangladesh was
comprehensive and is simply a part of its larger policy towards Asia.
In
2002, China and Bangladesh
signed an open-ended defence agreement which was deliberately made ambiguous to
bring any future dealing into its ambit. Under this agreement Bangladesh receives military hardware and
training of its armed forces from China. Dhaka has also bought F-7 BG
fighter planes from Beijing.
In March 2006, China donated
police equipments to Bangladesh
as a part of their cooperation.
While
Dhaka is hesitant to seek India’s
assistance, Beijing’s contribution towards
infrastructural development, exploration of natural resources like natural gas,
coal, nuclear energy, etc. in Bangladesh
is enormous. The air route connecting Kunming
and Dhaka is already operational and the construction of a link road between Kunming and Chittagong via Myanmar is
under construction.
In
reciprocation, Dhaka has actively engaged Beijing
and values its interests. Both countries celebrated the 30th anniversary
of their diplomatic relationship and declared 2005 as the ‘China-Bangladesh
Friendship Year’. All along, Dhaka has pursued a ‘One-China Policy’ by considering
the sensitivities of its trusted ally’s soft under-bellies – Taiwan and Tibet. Bangladesh
has also extended China the
naval access to the Chittagong
port.
During
the visit of Wen Jibao to Bangladesh
in April 2005, a 13-point Joint Communiqué to strengthen bilateral relationship
was signed along with three MoUs to cooperate in the field of agriculture,
telecom, management of water resources and the Barakpuria coalmine. On the
trade front, China is
preferred and is the number one import source for Dhaka, overtaking India for the
first time in 2005. Notwithstanding, that its trade deficit vis-à-vis China is much higher compared to the deficit
between India and Bangladesh.
This
symbiotic relationship between Bangladesh
and China,
no doubt, flourishes but not without costs for all the three countries. Though
Dhaka may gain many short term benefits by wooing Beijing,
negligence of its age-old relations with India would bring catastrophe in
the long run.
As
one cannot choose ones neighbours, leaders in Dhaka need to understand that it
is in their interest to keep cordial relations with New Delhi. The geographical proximity,
socio-cultural affinity cannot be overlooked and sacrificed purely for
strategic considerations. It would hamper regional peace and cooperation
thereby affecting the economic development of the region as a whole. When Bangladesh is deeply concerned for China’s national interests, it must equally
respect India’s
vital regional concerns.
India on its part needs to reorient its neighbourhood
policy by discarding its own version of the Monroe doctrine of insulating the region from
the outside world. It needs to understand that mutual accommodation is the rule
of today’s international game and nobody is going to discard or unseat India’s
supremacy in its backyard. Unless, New Delhi’s politically unstable neighbours
become its liabilities, hampering India’s own growth. Again, India cannot
become a major player when it does not enjoy the goodwill of all its neighbours.
In
sum, China must re-calculate its regional strategy. It cannot become a global
player with a dominant country – India – dissatisfied in the vicinity. If
Beijing wants to cast it heavy weight at the international arena it needs to
carry along with it a unified Asia. ---- INFA
(Copyright India News &Feature Alliance)
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