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Nuclear Proliferation:Bush Strategy Containing,by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 11 December, 2007 Print E-mail

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 11 December, 2007

Nuclear Proliferation

Bush Strategy Containing

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

After years of expressing concerns, imposing sanctions and threatening military intervention to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear weapons capability, the US intelligence assessment has revealed that Iran stopped its nuclear weapon programme way back in 2003.

Why was such information not shared earlier? What was the need to raise a hue and cry over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme? What was the motive behind the diplomatic offensive against Tehran’s claimed civilian nuclear programme?

If such a revelation had come earlier, the votes in the IAEA, the debate in the UN Security Council and the European Union’s (EU) Troika’s painstaking exercises and the Iranian President’s critical remarks and rhetoric would not have been necessary or at least would not have acerbic contents.

Did it take four years for the US intelligence community to establish that Iran did not have a nuclear weapon ambition since 2003? Any attempt to answer this question would not be credible. That simply means that the Bush Administration has had a highly sophisticated approach to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly in the Third World.

Significantly, the Iranian President Ahmedinezad was quick to celebrate this piece of information by announcing his victory. What was the victory about? Was it that President Bush was wrong in claiming the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapon programme? Was it that his claim of the civilian nature of the country’s nuclear activities was vindicated by the American intelligence officers?

The fact remains that it was at best a Pyrrhic victory. Tehran did not refute Washington’s intelligence claim that it had a nuclear weapon programme prior to 2003. By implication, President Bush was right in denying an ability to Iran to perfect the art of enriching uranium, because that could have enabled Iran to restart its weapon programme any time it chose to do so. And that means all the US effort to prevent Iran from enriching uranium on its soil was not an exercise in futility. That also means future American effort to keep the heat on Tehran on the nuclear issue would aim at preventing further spread of nuclear weapons.

Was it not a smart move? It was. The Bush Administration perhaps timed the revelation of this intelligence assessment to prevent the regional concerns over an impending or imminent American military intervention in Iran. Keeping in mind the forthcoming Presidential elections and the Democratic Party’s stand on Iraq, the Republican President did not want to create political problems for the Presidential nominee of the party.

Simultaneously, President Bush could claim success in handling the Iranian nuclear ambition without going in for costly intervention. The reluctance of the European and Asian allies and the Gulf countries to support any US plan for military action against Iran could certainly raise the political cost of intervention.

Moreover, domestic opposition to any further military adventure abroad against the backdrop of the worsening situation in Afghanistan and the rising expenses of holding on Iraq could have made an intervention in Iran prohibitively costly in terms of finances.

Further, the Bush Administration has been able to rule out any intervention in Iran in time, simultaneously making it difficult for Tehran to indulge in any kind of nuclear commerce with other countries or even in the nuclear black market.

In fact, exposure of the Abdul Qadeer Khan international nuclear black market is another achievement that the US Administration can take credit for. By turning the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme into an international criminal, Washington has sought to restrict Islamabad’s nuclear activities. It would be difficult for Pakistan too to search for nuclear weapons-related materials and equipment in a clandestine manner at least to an extent it was able to do earlier.

The next achievement of the Bush White House in containing nuclear proliferation is encouraging Libya to give up the nuclear weapon path. This was done by adopting an approach that combined persuasion and pressure, reward and punishment. To some extent, the US unilateralism demonstrated in the invasion of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein from power had influenced Libya and Iran to change course in their nuclear activities.

Incidentally, the Bush Administration justified military intervention in Iraq on the ground of destroying that country’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) arsenals. No WMD was found later and the Administration had to face severe criticism at home and abroad. But it claims that the military intervention has at least achieved in creating an Iraq that would be rid of any infrastructure of WMD production.

The most spectacular success of the President Bush in containing nuclear proliferation can be seen in the Korean Peninsula. By adopting a multi-lateral approach and a hard-line policy of refusing bilateral negotiations, the Bush Administration was able to persuade the North Korean regime to roll back its nuclear weapon programme.

After South Africa, North Korea is the second country to give up its acquired nuclear weapon capability. The difference is that South Africa claimed that it had destroyed its nuclear weapons, which no one had seen. But the world had witnessed the testing of a nuclear device by North Korea.

Last but not the least, the Bush Administration has devised a novel approach to deal with the proliferation issue with India. The US-India nuclear deal aims at making India a partner in non-proliferation and encouraging New Delhi to turn 65 per cent of its nuclear reactors into energy producing machines.

Among the nuclear capable countries outside the recognized P-5, India happens to be the only country that has the potential to become a major global player. Keeping in mind this factor, the Bush Administration has attempted to establish a strategic partnership with a nuclear India.

While Washington’s policy towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya and to some extent Pakistan have shown positive outcomes in varying degrees, Indo-US nuclear deal continues to be under a dark cloud. It is likely that by the time Americans get ready to vote for a new Presidential candidate, the Bush Administration would be able to claim unprecedented success in nuclear non-proliferation. ---- INFA

(Copyright India News and Feature Alliance)

 

 

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