Round The World
New Delhi, 5 June 2007
N-Deal Talks: Are
Differences Narrowing?
By
Prof. Christopher S. Raj
School of International Studies, JNU
The latest round of
three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials
ended in New Delhi on 03 June without resolving certain specific aspects
relating to Indo-US “full civilian cooperation”.
It may be recalled
that on 18 July 2005, US
President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in Washington a landmark agreement on civil military
cooperation that, if implemented as intended, would mark the end of what
Jaswant Singh, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, once famously called
“nuclear apartheid” against India.
This agreement had spelled out the term “full civilian cooperation” provided
India voluntarily provide separation plan and bring its civilian nuclear
facilities under the international safeguard regime.
On 02 March 2006 when
President Bush visited New Delhi, India provided such a separation plan among
other things to attain “full nuclear cooperation” with the US, including an assurance
of uninterrupted fuel supply to all the civilian nuclear facilities in India.
However, all these assurances
suffered a setback when the US Congress
passed the Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 in December.
The Hyde Act did
redefine the nature of the “full civilian cooperation.” thereby giving the
impression to India that the US was shifting the goal post of
July Joint Agreement. However, the Bush Administration
officials like Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
asked India “not to rock the boat” and that the provision of section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which forms part of the Hyde Act (section 103) would
be as 123 Agreement or bilateral agreement between the US and India that need
to be worked out would be the operative part of the Indo-US civil nuclear
cooperation. After signing the Hyde Act, President George Bush in reference to
controversial Section 103, had said “The executive branch shall construe such
policy statement as advisory.”
India is hoping that it
could resolve some of the concerns of the Hyde Act. While
negotiating the text of the 123 agreements the negotiation with American officials have been
held at Washington, New
Delhi, London, Cape Town since January to the current round
of talks ending on 3 June. As of today, the negotiations have revealed
that disagreement existed on five major issues:
(a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to: reprocessing spent fuel, reprocessing
technology and heavy water technology.
Assurance of permanent fuel supplies has been a major
concern. The Department of Atomic Energy officials had been noticing from the
beginning that placing of all the civilian reactors under permanent safeguards
was on the assurance of permanent
fuel supply. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar points out that there was
another 123 agreement which India
signed with the US
relating to Tarapur reactor in 1963. It had contained very specific
provisions for reliable supplies to Tarapur, but nothing prevented the Americans
from reneging on that 123 agreement. Therefore, the Indian technical team
wants to putdown clearly the American assurance
on fuel supply in the 123 Agreement, including that of developing a “reserve of
nuclear fuel”, to ensure uninterrupted supply over a lifetime of India’s
reactors.
Such an assurance is not forthcoming from the American side
led by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who had been referring to the
Hyde Act Section 103(b) (10) which is structured to limit nuclear power reactor
fuel reserves to amount commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements. Furthermore, according to the Congressional
Report, the US officials
have testified to Congress that America does not intend to help India build a
stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that
might be imposed in response to Indian action such as conducting another
nuclear test.
On conducting a
nuclear test, the Indian officials seem to have indicated that there was no way
India
could commit itself not to test. Yet there is some indication that on this issue a compromise formulation are being
attempted. Nevertheless this issue involves the sovereignty and security of the
country. Indeed American officials have repeatedly indicated that current
strategic partnership with India
has been to make India
power.
Our neighbourhood is
surrounded by untrustworthy nations. The relation of China with Pakistan,
supply of magnetic rings to Pakistan,
transfer of Korean missile
technology to Pakistan
and the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute are the threats to Indian security.
For the US the threat is
only from the terrorist but for India
it is from the terrorist and the countries funding and abetting them directly
or indirectly plus nuclear blackmail from China
and Pakistan
combined. Compromising on this issue
is akin to compromising with the security of nation in the long term.
Section 123(a)(4) of
the US Atomic Energy Act give the US government the right to require the return
of any nuclear material and equipment transferred under this deal and any
special materials produced through the use thereof, if India conducts nuclear
test or terminated or abrogates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards agreement. Presently, the Hyde Act does not exempt India from this
clause. However, there are suggestion of setting up a consultative mechanism
that get into action in case of nuclear devise thereby to reduce complete
breaking down of the right to return clause.
On the other key issue of reprocessing
of spent fuel right, the American officials have conceded that neither the Hyde
Act nor any other law prevent US from giving consent on reprocessing to India. All that the US Atomic
Energy Act and Hyde Act seek that India would have to get the consent
of US for reprocessing.
Therefore, all that Indian officials are legitimately seeking for “permanent
consent for reprocessing written in
the 123 agreement. Reports indicate that while the American officials
would concede on this count but would not immediately accept on the contentious
issue of denial of technology
transfer for uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing
and heavy water production. In fact these technologies are specifically under
section 103(a)5 and 104(d)(4) of the Hyde Act.
It is noteworthy
that July 2005 Joint statement, in effect, accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapon
power. The US atomic
Energy Act nor Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not deny
the right for these technologies even to non-nuclear weapon states Yet the Hyde
Act denies these technologies to India. Moreover, Under
Secretary of State Burns during the Senatorial hearing of the Hyde Act affirmed
the:”we do not export enrichment or reprocessing
technology to any State. Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with
India will not include enrichment or reprocessing
technology.”
Secretary of State
Rice also informed the Senators that “the US does not foresee transferring
heavy water production equipment or technology to India.” Still the
Indian side is seeking these technologies for India by pointing out already
Euroatom and Japan has received these technologies. The American
officials reportedly have pointed out that these technologies were not
immediately provided to Japan and Euroatom. Possibly
this could be way out in resolving this issue
of technology transfer by committing the US to transfer of these technologies
on the specific time-frame.
For India an ideal
nuclear deal written into 123 agreement could be right to testing, the right to
reprocessing; unrestricted uranium
supplies; full civil nuclear cooperation without exceptions of certain parts of
the fuel cycle; lifting embargoes on civil nuclear activity; and safeguards in
perpetuity to be made contingent on continuing bilateral cooperation so as to
avoid any Tarapur-like situation. Viewed in terms of sovereign rights, of
entitlements without anybody limiting, especially relating to nuclear deal
would depend on our capability to exercise that right. We are thankful to our
scientists that having exercised the right have successfully
provided us nuclear installation of dignity of almost 24 reactors. Yet we
need adequate fuel supply of uranium for these reactors and further growth
which we lack. The US deal does not give us all we ought to get.
Meanwhile, there are
bizarre championship of opponents to the deal in domestic environment of India
and the US and also in countries like Pakistan and China. Any compromise which
indicates a compromise of sovereignty of India would threaten the life of the
UPA government in New Delhi. For President Bush the problem is less as his administration would end only
constitutionally in December 2008 only. Yet India cannot let go the historic
opportunity of ending “nuclear apartheid.”---INFA
(Copyright, India News
and Feature Alliance)
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