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N-Deal Talks: Are Differences Narrowing?,by Prof. Christopher S. Raj, 5 June 2007 Print E-mail

Round The World

New Delhi, 5 June 2007    

N-Deal Talks: Are Differences Narrowing?

By Prof. Christopher S. Raj

School of International Studies, JNU

The latest round of three-day Indo-US nuclear deal talks between Indian and American officials ended in New Delhi on 03 June without resolving certain specific aspects relating to Indo-US “full civilian cooperation”. 

It may be recalled that on 18 July 2005, US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed in Washington a landmark agreement on civil military cooperation that, if implemented as intended, would mark the end of what Jaswant Singh, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, once famously called “nuclear apartheid” against India.  This agreement had spelled out the term “full civilian cooperation” provided India voluntarily provide separation plan and bring its civilian nuclear facilities under the international safeguard regime.

On 02 March 2006 when President Bush visited New Delhi, India provided such a separation plan among other things to attain “full nuclear cooperation” with the US, including an assurance of uninterrupted fuel supply to all the civilian nuclear facilities in India.  However, all these assurances suffered a setback when the US Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 in December.

The Hyde Act did redefine the nature of the “full civilian cooperation.” thereby giving the impression to India that the US was shifting the goal post of July Joint Agreement.    However, the Bush Administration officials like Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns asked India “not to rock the boat” and that the provision of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which forms part of the Hyde Act (section 103) would be as 123 Agreement or bilateral agreement between the US and India that need to be worked out would be the operative part of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation. After signing the Hyde Act, President George Bush in reference to controversial Section 103, had said “The executive branch shall construe such policy statement as advisory.”

India is hoping that it could resolve some of the concerns of the Hyde Act. While negotiating   the text of the 123 agreements the negotiation with American officials  have been held at Washington, New Delhi, London, Cape Town since January to the current round of talks ending on 3 June. As of today, the negotiations have revealed  that disagreement existed on  five major issues: (a) Testing; (b) Right of return; (c) Safeguards; (d) Fuel assurances; and (e) Right to: reprocessing spent fuel, reprocessing technology and heavy water technology.

Assurance of permanent fuel supplies has been a major concern. The Department of Atomic Energy officials had been noticing from the beginning that placing of all the civilian reactors under permanent safeguards was on the assurance of permanent fuel supply.  The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar points out that there was another 123 agreement which India signed with the US relating to Tarapur reactor in 1963.  It had contained very specific provisions for reliable supplies to Tarapur, but nothing prevented the Americans from reneging on that 123 agreement.  Therefore, the Indian technical team wants to putdown clearly the American assurance on fuel supply in the 123 Agreement, including that of developing a “reserve of nuclear fuel”, to ensure uninterrupted supply over a lifetime of India’s reactors. 

Such an assurance is not forthcoming from the American side led by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who had been referring to the Hyde Act Section 103(b) (10) which is structured to limit nuclear power reactor fuel reserves to amount commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements. Furthermore, according to the Congressional Report, the US officials have testified to Congress that America does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian action such as conducting another nuclear test.

On conducting a nuclear test, the Indian officials seem to have indicated that there was no way India could commit itself not to test. Yet there is some indication that on this issue a compromise formulation are being attempted.  Nevertheless this issue involves the sovereignty and security of the country. Indeed American officials have repeatedly indicated that current strategic partnership with India has been to make India power.

Our neighbourhood is surrounded by untrustworthy nations.  The relation of China with Pakistan, supply of magnetic rings to Pakistan, transfer of Korean missile technology to Pakistan and the unresolved Sino-Indian border dispute are the threats to Indian security.  For the US the threat is only from the terrorist but for India it is from the terrorist and the countries funding and abetting them directly or indirectly plus nuclear blackmail from China and Pakistan combined.  Compromising on this issue is akin to compromising with the security of nation in the long term.

Section 123(a)(4) of the US Atomic Energy Act give the US government the right to require the return of any nuclear material and equipment transferred under this deal and any special materials produced through the use thereof, if India conducts nuclear test or terminated or abrogates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.  Presently, the Hyde Act does not exempt India from this clause. However, there are suggestion of setting up a consultative mechanism that get into action in case of nuclear devise thereby to reduce complete breaking down of the right to return clause.

On the other key issue of reprocessing of spent fuel right, the American officials have conceded that neither the Hyde Act nor any other law prevent US from giving consent on reprocessing to India. All that the US Atomic Energy Act and Hyde Act seek that India would have to get the consent of US for reprocessing.  Therefore, all that Indian officials are legitimately seeking for “permanent consent for reprocessing written in the 123 agreement.  Reports indicate that while the American officials would concede on this count but would not immediately accept on the contentious issue of denial of technology transfer for uranium enrichment, spent-fuel reprocessing and heavy water production. In fact these technologies are specifically under section 103(a)5 and 104(d)(4) of the Hyde Act.

It is noteworthy that July 2005 Joint statement, in effect, accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapon power.  The US atomic Energy Act nor Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not deny the right for these technologies even to non-nuclear weapon states Yet the Hyde Act denies these technologies to India.  Moreover, Under Secretary of State Burns during the Senatorial hearing of the Hyde Act affirmed the:”we do not export enrichment or reprocessing technology to any State.  Therefore, full civil nuclear cooperation with India will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology.” 

Secretary of State Rice also informed the Senators that “the US does not foresee transferring heavy water production equipment or technology to India.”  Still the Indian side is seeking these technologies for India by pointing out already Euroatom and Japan has received these technologies.  The American officials reportedly have pointed out that these technologies were not immediately provided to Japan and Euroatom.  Possibly this could be way out in resolving this issue of technology transfer by committing the US to transfer of these technologies on the specific time-frame.

For India an ideal nuclear deal written into 123 agreement could be right to testing, the right to reprocessing; unrestricted uranium supplies; full civil nuclear cooperation without exceptions of certain parts of the fuel cycle; lifting embargoes on civil nuclear activity; and safeguards in perpetuity to be made contingent on continuing bilateral cooperation so as to avoid any Tarapur-like situation.  Viewed in terms of sovereign rights, of entitlements without anybody limiting, especially relating to nuclear deal would depend on our capability to exercise that right. We are thankful to our scientists that having exercised the right have successfully provided us nuclear installation of dignity of almost 24 reactors.  Yet we need adequate fuel supply of uranium for these reactors and further growth which we lack. The US deal does not give us all we ought to get.

Meanwhile, there are bizarre championship of opponents to the deal in domestic environment of India and the US and also in countries like Pakistan and China. Any compromise which indicates a compromise of sovereignty of India would threaten the life of the UPA government in New Delhi. For President Bush the problem is less as his administration would end only constitutionally in December 2008 only. Yet India cannot let go the historic opportunity of ending “nuclear apartheid.”---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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