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Great Wall Of Suspicion:CHINESE WHISPERS, NO GAIN, by Poonam I Kaushish,18 December 2010 Print E-mail

Political Diary

New Delhi, 18 December 2010


Great Wall Of Suspicion

CHINESE WHISPERS, NO GAIN

By Poonam I Kaushish

 

Think Peking Duck. Think China. Goes a Beijing tourist slogan. Politically speaking, the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was a lame-duck visit as the astute leader used his Chinese whispering tricks whereby Peking ducked on core issues!

 

Clearly, it was a ‘Wen-Wen’ situation for China. Not only did the Chinese Premier skirt New Delhi’s core concerns, failed to make any political concessions but has shown that 'trade' is the factor that can better the average on the Sino-India bilateral relations balance sheet. While being free to inflict greater strategic wounds on its Asian rival.

 

Wen's sole agenda was only focused on increasing a lop-sided trade relationship that has already turned India into the raw-material adjunct of a burgeoning Chinese economy. And he went home laughing all the way to the bank having netted business worth over $16 billion worth of contracts from the growing Indian market. Without giving any commitment on when and how India's ballooning trade deficit of over $ 25 billion would be addressed.

 

Sadly, India fell into the trap. The joint statement was vacuous failing to address key issues such as the long-standing border disputes, recognition of J&K as an integral part of India and key question of 'stapled visas', Pakistan’s role as a terror factory and endorsing India’s bid for the UN Security Council. Notwithstanding the effusive display of warmth and the positive spin given by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, “We were straight-talking. We expressed our concerns and we could discuss all the issues,” the Chinese Premier's visit has not been a game changer.

 

True, the Chinese Premier tried to dispel an impression that Sino-Indian ties are fragile and difficult to repair. Calling the border dispute a “historical legacy”, asserted Wen, “To completely resolve this problem, it will not be an easy task. We need enough patience and a fairly long period of time."

 

Also correct this failed to cut ice with New Delhi. . For the first time, in a tit-for-tat it refused to reiterate the "one China principle," referring to Taiwan, and Tibet Autonomous Region, issues close to Beijing's heart in the joint statement.

 

Earlier too, New Delhi had ignored Beijing's discontent over the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in Arunachal earlier this year. Moreover, disregarding Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo given to Liu Xiaobo, the jailed Chinese dissident, New Delhi sent its representative.

 

But the moot point: Is this enough to change decades of trust? Can New Delhi honestly assert that its relationship is on course? No. At the heart of India-China ties is the contentious border issue. Said an old China hand, “If the border issue is not resolved, the national identity is not defined, which means that the normalisation of relations between the two neighbours is not complete. That is the biggest source of mistrust. There is no road map, no progress.”

 

This is not all. Of equal import was Wen refusing to heed New Delhi’s sensibilities as he made a rare stop-over in Pakistan post his India visit. To reaffirm China’s "all-weather" friendship that has endured and flourished despite Pakistan's troubles and Beijing's improved ties with New Delhi.

 

It is no secret that Beijing is busy executing new railroad infrastructure projects in Pakistani-held Kashmir and Tibet which are aimed at bolstering its military strength and intervention options against India in the event of another war between the sub-continental rivals. Already, a geo-political crisis is in the making in Afghanistan.

 

Further. Beijing already has a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Islamabad, a counter-weight to the India-US nuclear agreement. It has built a 300-mw nuclear power reactor at Chashma in Punjab province and another of the same capacity is under way and has got access to the Gwader port, Pakistan’s gateway to Europe.

 

What to speak of billions worth of arms and military hardware. Add to this Islamabad’s dependence on Beijing’s financial and political clout to offset the perceived threat from rival India and rescue its economy from the doldrums of catastrophic flooding, a severe energy crisis and poor foreign investment.

 

Clearly, Beijing’s game-plan to gain Asian supremacy in the long-term is to make its neighbours specially in Southeast Asia and South China Sea, increasingly dependent on it, both militarily and economically. Besides Pakistan, it has made inroads in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

 

In this scenario, not only will China’s belligerence towards India increase but could also pit them against each other. Thus, to prevent any potential challenge that New Delhi might pose in the future, Beijing has consistently followed a ‘contain India’ strategy since the 1960s.

 

Think. Till 2005, there was no reference to Arunachal Pradesh in China’s official media or any talk of the ‘unfinished business of the 1962 War’. Resurrecting old issues and manufacturing new disputes to put the other side off balance and enhance bargaining leverage is an old Chinese negotiating tactic.

 

Add to this, intermittent articles in the PLA-run media which attack India for its hegemonic designs, perceive it as inimical to China’s growth and talk of merits of a confrontation. Some articles even hint of a military showdown to put “India in its place.”

 

All in all, New Delhi needs to desist viewing the Indo-China relations through a blinkered approach. As dealings will continue to be characterised by competition, tension, endless talks, and limited cooperation on issues of mutual concern. Both will employ strategic maneuovers to checkmate each other from gaining advantage or expanding their spheres of influence. According to a foreign policy expert, “while a hot war is out of the question, a cold war between the two countries is increasingly likely.”

 

In the ultimate, as an old China hand asserted, “The outcome of talks between India and China can not be like instant noodles. When these two countries talk and engage themselves the outcome doesn’t come in a day.” India has to take a larger strategic view of the trade relationship with China. For Beijing, the business with New Delhi is now business while it continues its strategy of regional containment of India.

 

Against this backdrop, India needs to calibrate its China policy differently. Also, till New Delhi takes the bull by the horns and hammers out its differences across the table with Beijing nothing is going to change. One needs to press and project one’s area of influence in the neighborhood to contain China’s growth. For that one needs out-of-the-box thinking and guts. Does New Delhi have the stomach for this? ----- INFA

 

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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