Political Diary
New Delhi, 18 December 2010
Great Wall Of
Suspicion
CHINESE WHISPERS,
NO GAIN
By Poonam I Kaushish
Think Peking Duck. Think China. Goes a Beijing tourist slogan. Politically speaking,
the recent visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was a lame-duck visit as the
astute leader used his Chinese whispering tricks whereby Peking
ducked on core issues!
Clearly, it was a ‘Wen-Wen’ situation for China. Not only
did the Chinese Premier skirt New Delhi’s core concerns, failed to make any
political concessions but has shown that 'trade' is the factor that can better
the average on the Sino-India bilateral relations balance sheet. While being
free to inflict greater strategic wounds on its Asian rival.
Wen's sole agenda was only focused on increasing a lop-sided
trade relationship that has already turned India into the raw-material adjunct
of a burgeoning Chinese economy. And he went home laughing all the way to the
bank having netted business worth over $16 billion worth of contracts from the growing
Indian market. Without giving any commitment on when and how India's
ballooning trade deficit of over $ 25 billion would be addressed.
Sadly, India
fell into the trap. The joint statement was vacuous failing to address key
issues such as the long-standing border disputes, recognition of J&K as an
integral part of India and key question of 'stapled visas', Pakistan’s role as
a terror factory and endorsing India’s bid for the UN Security Council.
Notwithstanding the effusive display of warmth and the positive spin given by
Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, “We were straight-talking. We expressed our
concerns and we could discuss all the issues,” the Chinese Premier's visit has
not been a game changer.
True, the Chinese Premier tried to dispel an impression that
Sino-Indian ties are fragile and difficult to repair. Calling the border
dispute a “historical legacy”, asserted Wen, “To completely resolve this
problem, it will not be an easy task. We need enough patience and a fairly long
period of time."
Also correct this failed to cut ice with New Delhi. . For the first time, in a
tit-for-tat it refused to reiterate the "one China
principle," referring to Taiwan,
and Tibet Autonomous Region, issues close to Beijing's heart in the joint statement.
Earlier too, New Delhi had
ignored Beijing's
discontent over the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in Arunachal earlier this
year. Moreover, disregarding Chinese entreaties and pressure tactics not to attend
the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo given to
Liu Xiaobo, the jailed Chinese dissident, New
Delhi sent its representative.
But the moot point: Is this enough to change decades of
trust? Can New Delhi
honestly assert that its relationship is on course? No. At the heart of
India-China ties is the contentious border issue. Said an old China hand, “If
the border issue is not resolved, the national identity is not defined, which
means that the normalisation of relations between the two neighbours is not
complete. That is the biggest source of mistrust. There is no road map, no
progress.”
This is not all. Of equal import was Wen refusing to heed New Delhi’s sensibilities as he made a rare stop-over in Pakistan post his India visit. To reaffirm China’s "all-weather" friendship that
has endured and flourished despite Pakistan's
troubles and Beijing's improved ties with New Delhi.
It is no secret that Beijing is
busy executing new railroad infrastructure projects in Pakistani-held Kashmir
and Tibet which are aimed at
bolstering its military strength and intervention options against India in the
event of another war between the sub-continental rivals. Already, a geo-political
crisis is in the making in Afghanistan.
Further. Beijing already has
a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Islamabad, a counter-weight to the India-US
nuclear agreement. It has built a 300-mw nuclear power reactor at Chashma in
Punjab province and another of the same capacity is under way and has got
access to the Gwader port, Pakistan’s
gateway to Europe.
What to speak of billions worth of arms and military
hardware. Add to this Islamabad’s dependence on Beijing’s financial and political clout to offset the
perceived threat from rival India
and rescue its economy from the doldrums of catastrophic flooding, a severe
energy crisis and poor foreign investment.
Clearly, Beijing’s game-plan
to gain Asian supremacy in the long-term is to make its neighbours specially in
Southeast Asia and South China Sea,
increasingly dependent on it, both militarily and economically. Besides Pakistan, it has made inroads in Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
In this scenario, not only will China’s
belligerence towards India
increase but could also pit them against each other. Thus, to prevent any
potential challenge that New Delhi might pose in
the future, Beijing has consistently followed a
‘contain India’
strategy since the 1960s.
Think. Till 2005, there was no reference to Arunachal
Pradesh in China’s
official media or any talk of the ‘unfinished business of the 1962 War’.
Resurrecting old issues and manufacturing new disputes to put the other side
off balance and enhance bargaining leverage is an old Chinese negotiating
tactic.
Add to this, intermittent articles in the PLA-run media
which attack India for its
hegemonic designs, perceive it as inimical to China’s growth and talk of merits
of a confrontation. Some articles even hint of a military showdown to put “India in its
place.”
All in all, New
Delhi needs to desist viewing the Indo-China relations
through a blinkered approach. As dealings will continue to be characterised by
competition, tension, endless talks, and limited cooperation on issues of
mutual concern. Both will employ strategic maneuovers to checkmate each other
from gaining advantage or expanding their spheres of influence. According to a foreign
policy expert, “while a hot war is out of the question, a cold war between the
two countries is increasingly likely.”
In the ultimate, as an old China
hand asserted, “The outcome of talks between India
and China
can not be like instant noodles. When these two countries talk and engage
themselves the outcome doesn’t come in a day.” India
has to take a larger strategic view of the trade relationship with China. For Beijing, the business with New Delhi
is now business while it continues its strategy of regional containment of India.
Against this backdrop, India
needs to calibrate its China
policy differently. Also, till New Delhi takes
the bull by the horns and hammers out its differences across the table with Beijing nothing is going
to change. One needs to press and project one’s area of influence in the
neighborhood to contain China’s
growth. For that one needs out-of-the-box thinking and guts. Does New Delhi have the
stomach for this? ----- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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