Round The World

New Delhi, 23 November 2010

Afghan Quagmire

STRETCHING NATO THIN

By Monish Tourangbam

Research Scholar, School of International Studies (JNU)

As leaders from countries that commit forces to the Afghan conflict sat down at Lisbon for the NATO summit to deliberate mainly on the withdrawal timeline, one thing became crystal clear. The Afghan quagmire has clearly stretched the NATO thin. As of now, there are basically two timelines on the withdrawal of foreign forces. One is 11 July 2011 by which the Obama Administration has decided to start the process of decreasing American force strength from Afghanistan. And the more recent is of 2014 by the end of which NATO countries including the US “aspires” to end combat mission and hand over responsibilities to the Afghan establishment and its forces.

But the NATO countries will remain engaged for training Afghan forces and other non-combat assistance, thus propagating that foreign forces will not leave the Afghans in the lurch as had happened post the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the repercussions of which led to the establishment of the Taliban regime. But, there are many conditions attached, with the main caveat being that of assessing the ground realities, before any concrete decision is taken.

There is enough vagueness within the NATO regarding the current situation and with respect to the specifics of the NATO strategy in war-torn Afghanistan. Evidently, all the countries committing forces to Kabul are undergoing what can be termed as ‘war-fatigue’. All are seen as looking for the most viable ways to have a respectable and a justifiable exit. Leaving an Afghanistan that is manageable with an insurgency that would be highly depleted, if not defeated.  Countries including the US are wary of the domestic public who has become more and more vocal with escalating casualties and sky-rocketing costs of the war.

According to sources, the coalition forces have lost more than 2200 lives since the operation started in 2001, with more than 650 deaths this year itself; with American forces accounting for over 450 casualties. The Obama Administration would like its domestic audience to believe that America is not going to be sucked into an endless conflict. But at the same time, wanting to keep a benefit a doubt for the sake of strategic leverage where the timeline could be kept stretchable, depending on ground realities.

In view of the recent setbacks that the Democratic Administration suffered in the House of Representatives, a weakened Obama would need public support all the more. Already his popularity ratings have plummeted mainly because of the way he has handled the Afghan conflict.

The Taliban wants all the foreign forces immediately out of the country as a condition for any kind of resolution.  However, the message that NATO countries want to give is that they (insurgents) will not be allowed to run rough-shod over the country and that foreign forces were in for a long-haul, in some form or the other to see the country through to reasonable stability.

President Obama said the US endorsed NATO's plan to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces by 2014, but stressed that counter-terrorism operations against the Al Qaeda in the region would likely continue after that date. "Certainly our footprint will have been significantly reduced (by 2014). Beyond that it is hard to anticipate exactly what will be necessary to keep the American people safe as of 2014. I'll make that determination when I get there,” he underscored.

Pertinently, NATO has been careful to attach conditions to the timeline lest it be criticized of making haste without due considerations. When President Obama earlier announced his decision to begin phased withdrawing in July 2011, he came in for much criticism. But critics argued that setting a date would unnecessarily embolden Taliban who seem to believe that they are on the winning side.

The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told a news conference, the aim was for foreign troops serving in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to cease combat before 2015. “I don't foresee ISAF troops in a combat role beyond 2014, provided of course that the security situation allows us to move into a more supportive role,” he told reporters.

The NATO summit came at a time when there have been acute tensions between President Karzai and his western allies. In an interview with the Washington Post, the Afghan President was critical of the U.S. military and called for a reduced American military role. He said US raids on insurgent targets at night were counter-productive and incited support for the Taliban. Refuting these remarks, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus, averred that Karzai's remarks could undermine the war effort.

Many western officials are seriously concerned with the ability of the Afghan Government to govern effectively because the withdrawal strategy hinges on how the Kabul Establishment takes up responsibility and maintains the tide in its favour. One of the major flaws of the present campaign is the severe corruption charges against the Afghan Government, which in turn is feeding sympathy and support for the insurgent groups.

In order to take bigger responsibilities, the Afghan Government in Kabul should make its presence felt in the far-flung provinces of the country. Wherein, ‘making a presence’ does not translate into autocratic provincial Governments, knee-deep in corruption and totally immune to the dire conditions of the local populace. The drug trade that substantially funds the Taliban insurgency has to be curtailed. In the absence of a serious policy to deal with this resourceful menace, it would be a stiff task to contain the insurgency.

Moreover, the security threat arising out of the region cannot be controlled effectively unless Pakistan, especially its powerful military and tainted intelligence are made to come clean. The Pakistani Establishment should point the gun sincerely towards the Afghan Taliban and the dreaded Haqqani network nestled in North Waziristan.

In the event of a messy withdrawal by the foreign forces, Islamabad definitely wants to build links with elements that might play major roles in a future Afghanistan. As such, the Obama Administration needs to give its AfPak strategy more teeth. Besides, all that is being done to keep Pakistan cooperative, more pressure should be put on Islamabad’s Establishment not to collude in strategic games that would be detrimental for the future of Afghanistan, the region and the world at large.

While it is important for NATO countries to have an exit, it is equally important that the way out comes with a sizeable decrease in the strength and writ of the Taliban. It should be leaving an Afghan Establishment that has reasonable control over at least major sections of the country. Whereby it is able to get the confidence of the people on the streets and is capable of securing the country at least to an extent, where it does not become a liability for regional or international security and for the Afghan people. Afghanistan is vital because the assessment of the country’s conditions will have deep and widespread repercussions on the trajectory of Islamist radicalism around the world.  ----- INFA

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