Round The World
New
Delhi, 26 February 2008
Advantage Musharraf
NAWAZ SHARIF HAVING
SECOND THOUGHTS?
By Sitakanta Mishra
South Asian Studies
Division, JNU
The message
from the 18 February polls is axiomatic: public opinion matters despite all
systemic political imperfections. With an Army General as the Chief Executive,
a legislature of the extremist forces, a truncated judiciary, and a censored
media, Pakistanis have exercised their franchise the way it is desired. The
initial fear of rigging and violence has been turned into the post-election
euphoria owing to the fact that moderate forces rooted out the incumbent party,
otherwise, Musharraf would have been accused of manipulation.
However, complacency is unwarranted
as this election does not bring the changes Pakistan has long been striving
for. A fractured mandate, a sentimental coalition partner (Sharif) with
revengeful conditionality and a mal-adjusted micro-economy --- all indicate the
wide split that the extremist forces would certainly exploit for their
survival.
Though the poll claimed to be
relatively peaceful, a 45.6 per cent turnout clearly vindicates how the shadow
of violence has circumscribed the voting. A suicide bomb killed a candidate and
9 other people on the election-day. Despite the deployment of 60,000 Armed Forces
in the North West Frontier Provinces alone, threats from the militants kept
women away from exercising their right. In Peshawar, the women turnout was roughly 8 per
cent while it was 20 per cent in the case of men.
However, the outcome of the election
is an expression of the discontent among the people with the Mullah-Military
rule. Other factors like, the micro-economic mismanagement, peoples' resentment
toward feudalism, assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the manner in which the war
on terror is being fought and the tampering of the judiciary are major
determinants to reduce the sarkari PML-Q’s
popularity to 38 seats.
Politics is the art of possible. The
Pakistani People's Party's (PPP) determination not to side with the Mullah-Military
alliance that backs Musharraf left the only option for a circumstantial coalition with the PML-N. In spite of their enmity
for decades and the absence of any ideological proximity, it is this
circumstance that has brought the PPP and the PML-N together to form the Government
with 153 members, lacking a two-third majority in a House of 272.
If all the 27 elected independent
candidates and other smaller players like the Awami National Party leader,
Afsandyar Wali Khan, the Tehreek-e-Insaaf leader Imran Khan and Altaf Husain's
MQM that won 19 seats are brought on board, a tight-roped two-third majority
can be achieved. But the onus lies with the leadership --- the ability of the
Prime Minister to mend all factions together for a five-year term. The veteran
politician Makhdoom Amin Fahim, a longtime Bhutto loyalist from the Sindh
province with a reputation as a "consensus builder" and good at
"papering over differences" is the pragmatic choice.
But the Nawaz Sharif camp is
beginning to have some serious doubts about the PPP, especially with respect to
the agenda on President Pervez Musharraf. The PPP leaders have not yet clearly
indicated whether they will go for an impeachment motion. Particularly as Fahim
is not in favour of the idea and the PPP's co-Chairman Asif Ali Zardari has
repeatedly referred to a consensus in the Parliament on the issue.
If Sharif is going to have a second
thought on his support to PPP, the plan to form a "grand coalition"
would unnecessary delay the democratic process and the situation would turn in
favour of Musharraf to play his own cards. As is seen, immediately after the
poll, Musharraf engaged all his aides to persuade Zardari not to deal with the Nawaz
Sharif-led PML-N to form the Government.
In fact, a split between Sharif’s
PML-N and the PPP on trivial issues is not a healthy sign. If the proposed
coalition does not materialize, the PPP has to redraw the configuration of the
coalition, not surprisingly, availing the support of the PML-Q. This, though is
remotely possible and only if Musharraf can convince Zardari.
Therefore, the success of the
proposed PPP-PML-N coalition lies in having a common minimum programme which accommodates
the aspirations of the coalition partners and efficiently pacifies them on the
sticky issues which could be dealt with at a later date. For example, issues
like Nawaz Sharif’s demands for an early impeachment of President Musharraf and
the reinstatement of the Supreme Court judges are potential to create ripples
in the nascent coalition. The priority of the new Government should be to
consolidate its power and reach out to the people by addressing the poor
micro-economic condition.
Also, the longevity of the coalition
partially depends upon the new Government's dealing with the President. There
is no gainsaying that Musharraf is going to remain as an important factor in
Pakistani politics for not less than a few years, because no political Party at
this juncture can stand alone. And getting a two-third majority to impeach him
is practically impossible.
Moreover, even if he is out of his
uniform, the Army, as an institution, will continue to back him and may not
entertain any humiliation to its ex-Chief which would diminish the Army's
pre-eminence in Pakistani politics and society. Also the PML-Q, that backs Musharraf,
will be in the opposition to the new Government and would try horse-trading
with the independent candidates and small players and probe at the fault lines
to weaken the coalition.
It is also expected that the US would counsel the PPP leaders to be soft on
Musharraf and it is certain that whoever comes to power can not afford to
sacrifice Washington’s
friendship. However, it is prudent for Musharraf to plan for an honourable exit
strategy gradually through a negotiated surrender of power. By doing this, the
dividend of conducting the sacrosanct 18 February election would certainly save
his face.
To perpetuate popular support and
sympathy, the PPP has to devise a strategy to broaden its vote bank and provide
a strong leadership at par with Benazir's stature. The best strategy in the short
term would be to prepare Zardari for a landslide victory in a bi-election that would raise his
popularity and legitimacy in national politics.
Also, the success of the coalition
lies in the skill of the leading political Party to draw the attention of its
partners towards the broader economic and global issues. An inward-looking
coalition is bound to give rise to political bickering, which in turn, would
lead to instability and become an excuse for the Army to act.
It is also prudent not to instigate
the extremist forces at this stage to derailing the democratic process by
resorting to violence. Therefore, the need of the hour is to have an
outward-looking coalition with a common minimum agenda and the consolidation of
the Government.
There is sufficient rational in the
argument for bringing Musharraf to book, so that no Army would dare to
interfere in the democratic process in the future. But the time is abysmally
not ripe. At best, the PPP after the formation of the Government with the help
of the PML-N can appease Nawaz Sharif by issuing an ultimatum to Musharraf to
hand over power and seek exile as he did to Nawaz Sharif or be ready for an
impeachment at a later stage. Unless, of
course an anti-Musharraf dispensation creates splits in the coalition which
sooner or later might derail the transition of Pakistan to being a democracy. ----
INFA
(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)
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