Political Diary

New Delhi, 10 April 2010

Naxalites:  Centre +/ -- States

WHERE DOES THE BUCK STOP?

By Poonam I Kaushish

Remember Alfred Lord Tennyson’s famous poem, The charge of the light brigade. Two stanza’s read: 'Forward, the Light Brigade!' Was there a man dismay'd ? Not tho' the soldier knew, Someone had blunder'd: Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do & die, Into the valley of Death Rode the six hundred.

Cannon to right of them, Cannon to left of them, Cannon in front of them Volley'd & thunder'd; Storm'd at with shot and shell, Boldly they rode and well, Into the jaws of Death, Into the mouth of Hell Rode the six hundred.

This 1894 poignant ode, a symbol of warfare at both its most courageous and its most tragic, befits the eulogy of the 100 CRPF policemen who walked straight into the jaws of death, were savagely ambushed and butchered by 1000-odd deadly Maoists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh last week. Fury and anguish apart, it tore asunder the carefully cultivated mirage of the  rarified air-condition portals of New Delhi’s Raisina Hill and State Capitals that the Red brigade menace was not as serious as made out to be. Exposing the harsh reality that the 1967 peripheral peasant threat had now reached a critical mass.

It is to Union Home Minister credit that he was not only refreshingly candid by putting the Naxal threat higher than jihadi terrorism. But also conceded that “something had gone drastically wrong in the operation by the forces” and offered to quit. Adding, “The buck stops at my door.”

High sounding words, indeed. But a war cannot be fought by battle cries of courage. Given that Dantewada has raised the stakes to an unprecedented level. Think. Maoists have ensnared 20 States and 223 districts in their deadly tentacles, killed over 1,600 security personnel in the past six years, have an armed contingent of 11,000 well-trained, highly motivated and well-equipped groups and are managed by 8 top leaders whose whereabouts are not known to security agencies.

Sadly, successive Government’s over the years have reveled in pass-the-buck mind games and taken the easy way. Discounting the moot point: Has India underestimated the Maoists’ military capabilities? Prepared its security forces enough to tackle a well-entrenched and motivated guerrilla force?  Covering the entire panoply of counter-insurgency skills ranging from training to technology, intelligence to social development. After all, counter-insurgency is not a picnic.

More. The problem is not firepower, it is much more systemic than that. According to Home Ministry sources, the Maoists is to physically occupy the countryside (swathes of land in 7 States have already slipped beyond State control) and surround the cities until they can force regime change. Simultaneously, they want to transmute the social structure through the barrel of the gun and are getting moral & material support from the Nepal, Pakistan’s ISI and China. Their ambition is to have a ‘red corridor’ from Pashupati to Tirupati.

Thus, tackling the Maoist cannot be dismissed as a rural or tribal problem of quelling a mob of stone-throwers. Four, factors need to be borne in mind. One, coordination, cooperation and complete understanding between the CRPF and the State police. Given that the State police are sons of soil and know the terrain while the CRPF gets battalion from all over for short periods who have neither the knowledge of the terrain or the local language. Toward that end, the police must be motivated, given pre-induction training and the right kind of equipment before being sent to the battlefield. The forces need to be vigilant and follow standard operating procedures.

Two, if we demand hands-on bravery from our foot soldiers we need to treat them as humans. Not expendable chhillar currency. Horrific stories of how CPRF camps are set up in the back of the boondock, where they have to trudge four kms for water and 40 kms to the next humam habitat. There is no radio, phone or TV. We expect them to fight?

Three, provide intelligence back-up. As Dandewata shows there was enough information but it was either not shared or simply ignored. The authorities need to sanitize people in the periphery of the security forces: drivers, sweepers and local policemen to ensure that Maoists do not have access to vital information that would help them to mount deadly attacks. Also, one has to think out-of-the-box and adopt unique tactics. Along with constant and continuous uniformity in response.

Four, one has to be ever vigil. It is a well-known fact that one should not use vehicles on the beaten track as it could be mined, instead move on foot. Take a page of Andhra and Punjab. In Andhra it was compulsory for every sub-inspector recruited to train in anti-Naxal operations and IPS officers were posted in Naxal-hit districts before being made SPs.’ In Punjab,  terrorism was  rooted out by the police taking on the terrorists head on. With the CRPF, BSF and the Army playing a supporting role.

Further, learn from the forces. When the military finds the condition tough, it does a tactical retreat, regroup and again assault. The security forces need to do the same. The role and the task of the paramilitary forces need to be overhauled and restructured in terms of command and control. An integrated manpower policy needs to be adopted for the armed, paramilitary and central police forces.

What next? We need to remember that war is a continuation of politics by another name. As Chanakya told Chandragupta Maurya, it is not enough to cut off an offending plant you must destroy its roots. Similarly, the  roots of Maoism lie in the deficit of democracy and development in large parts of rural and tribal India. Our leaders need to address this. Collectively forge a policy to make land-tillers stakeholders and implement laws on forest rights.

Unless and until we have a two-pronged approach --- superior counter-insurgency to put down violence, and good governance to remove the exploitation of tribals by non-tribals blood will continue to flow in the jungles and districts of India. With a judicious mix of the law and order and winning hearts this can be achieved. The forces need to be seen by the exploited masses as caring and sensitive to their anger and bitterness towards the Maoists.

In sum, the time has come for Prime Minister Singh for  working out a comprehensive political, operational and human strategy for dealing with the menacing Red Brigade. Time to abhor sentiment and emotion, roll up on sleeves and think ruthless. The lives of our security personnel is not easy currency. Chidambaram is dead on:  The buck stops with the Government. It remains to be seen if the powers-that-be have the heart for spilling blood. Needless to say, it’s going to be a dirty, messy and bloody war till the finish. Certainly, not for the chicken hearted! ---- INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)