Political Diary
New Delhi, 10 April 2010
Naxalites: Centre +/ -- States
WHERE DOES THE BUCK STOP?
By Poonam I Kaushish
Remember Alfred Lord Tennyson’s
famous poem, The charge of the light brigade. Two stanza’s read: 'Forward, the
Light Brigade!' Was there a man dismay'd ? Not tho' the soldier knew, Someone
had blunder'd: Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but
to do & die, Into the valley
of Death Rode the six
hundred.
Cannon to right of them, Cannon to
left of them, Cannon in front of them Volley'd & thunder'd; Storm'd at with
shot and shell, Boldly they rode and well, Into the jaws of Death, Into the
mouth of Hell Rode the six hundred.
This 1894 poignant ode, a symbol of
warfare at both its most courageous and its most tragic, befits the eulogy of
the 100 CRPF policemen who walked straight into the jaws of death, were savagely
ambushed and butchered by 1000-odd deadly Maoists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh
last week. Fury and anguish apart, it tore asunder the carefully cultivated mirage
of the rarified air-condition portals of
New Delhi’s Raisina Hill and State Capitals that the Red brigade menace was not
as serious as made out to be. Exposing the harsh reality that the 1967
peripheral peasant threat had now reached a critical mass.
It is to Union Home Minister credit
that he was not only refreshingly candid by putting the Naxal threat higher
than jihadi terrorism. But also
conceded that “something had gone drastically wrong in the operation by the
forces” and offered to quit. Adding, “The buck stops at my door.”
High sounding words, indeed. But a
war cannot be fought by battle cries of courage. Given that Dantewada has raised
the stakes to an unprecedented level. Think. Maoists have ensnared 20 States
and 223 districts in their deadly tentacles, killed over 1,600 security
personnel in the past six years, have an armed contingent of 11,000
well-trained, highly motivated and well-equipped groups and are managed by 8
top leaders whose whereabouts are not known to security agencies.
Sadly, successive Government’s over
the years have reveled in pass-the-buck mind games and taken the easy way.
Discounting the moot point: Has India underestimated the Maoists’ military
capabilities? Prepared its security forces enough to tackle a well-entrenched
and motivated guerrilla force? Covering
the entire panoply of counter-insurgency skills ranging from training to
technology, intelligence to social development. After all, counter-insurgency
is not a picnic.
More. The problem is not firepower,
it is much more systemic than that. According to Home Ministry sources, the
Maoists is to physically occupy the countryside (swathes of land in 7 States
have already slipped beyond State control) and surround the cities until they
can force regime change. Simultaneously, they want to transmute the social
structure through the barrel of the gun and are getting moral & material
support from the Nepal, Pakistan’s ISI and China. Their ambition is to have a
‘red corridor’ from Pashupati to Tirupati.
Thus, tackling the Maoist cannot be
dismissed as a rural or tribal problem of quelling a mob of stone-throwers. Four,
factors need to be borne in mind. One, coordination, cooperation and complete
understanding between the CRPF and the State police. Given that the State police
are sons of soil and know the terrain while the CRPF gets battalion from all
over for short periods who have neither the knowledge of the terrain or the
local language. Toward that end, the police must be motivated, given
pre-induction training and the right kind of equipment before being sent to the
battlefield. The forces need to be vigilant and follow standard operating
procedures.
Two, if we demand hands-on bravery
from our foot soldiers we need to treat them as humans. Not expendable chhillar currency. Horrific stories of
how CPRF camps are set up in the back of the boondock, where they have to trudge four kms for water and 40 kms
to the next humam habitat. There is no radio, phone or TV. We expect them to
fight?
Three, provide intelligence back-up.
As Dandewata shows there was enough information but it was either not shared or
simply ignored. The authorities need to sanitize people in the periphery of the
security forces: drivers, sweepers and local policemen to ensure that Maoists
do not have access to vital information that would help them to mount deadly
attacks. Also, one has to think out-of-the-box and adopt unique tactics. Along
with constant and continuous uniformity in response.
Four, one has to be ever vigil. It
is a well-known fact that one should not use vehicles on the beaten track as it
could be mined, instead move on foot. Take a page of Andhra and Punjab. In Andhra it was compulsory for every
sub-inspector recruited to train in anti-Naxal operations and IPS officers were
posted in Naxal-hit districts before being made SPs.’ In Punjab, terrorism was
rooted out by the police taking on the terrorists head on. With the
CRPF, BSF and the Army playing a supporting role.
Further, learn from the forces. When
the military finds the condition tough, it does a tactical retreat, regroup and
again assault. The security forces need to do the same. The role and the task
of the paramilitary forces need to be overhauled and restructured in terms of
command and control. An integrated manpower policy needs to be adopted for the
armed, paramilitary and central police forces.
What next? We need to remember that
war is a continuation of politics by another name. As Chanakya told Chandragupta
Maurya, it is not enough to cut off an offending plant you must destroy its
roots. Similarly, the roots of Maoism
lie in the deficit of democracy and development in large parts of rural and tribal
India.
Our leaders need to address this. Collectively forge a policy to make land-tillers
stakeholders and implement laws on forest rights.
Unless and until we have a
two-pronged approach --- superior counter-insurgency to put down violence, and good
governance to remove the exploitation of tribals by non-tribals blood will
continue to flow in the jungles and districts of India. With a judicious mix of the
law and order and winning hearts this can be achieved. The forces need to be
seen by the exploited masses as caring and sensitive to their anger and
bitterness towards the Maoists.
In sum, the time has come for Prime Minister
Singh for working out a comprehensive
political, operational and human strategy for dealing with the menacing Red
Brigade. Time to abhor sentiment and emotion, roll up on sleeves and think
ruthless. The lives of our security personnel is not easy currency. Chidambaram
is dead on: The buck stops with the
Government. It remains to be seen if the powers-that-be have the heart for
spilling blood. Needless to say, it’s going to be a dirty, messy and bloody war
till the finish. Certainly, not for the chicken hearted! ---- INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
|