Open Forum
New
Delhi, 20 January 2010
India’s Internal Wars
POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDERS
By Dr. Nitish
Sengupta
There was some heated discussion, a
few months ago on India’s
internal wars, at the release function of veteran IPS officer and former
Governor of Manipur Ved Marwah’s excellent book “India
in Turmoil”. But little did the author or any one else present there, realise
that these internal wars will only snowball in intensity in the days ahead.
That is what has happened.
The Jehadis in Jammu & Kashmir
have become bold enough to go on shooting innocent Kashmiris at random, while
followers of the Hurriyat Conference are giving bandh calls with impunity. In
Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh the Maoists have made their presence felt as never
before and even tried to stall the Assembly elections. In West Bengal, the Maoists
have, for practical purposes, gained physical control over the whole of West
Midnapore district and large areas in Bankura, Hooghly,
Burdwan and Purulia districts. In Darjeeling
the resurgent Gorkhas are launching fast unto death for a separate State,
taking the cue from Telangana.
In Assam, despite the recent
discomfiture suffered, the ULFA rebels have made their presence felt with bomb
blasts and other disruptive actions. In fact, the way the Centre’s announcement
on Telangana was followed by agitations from Vidharbha, Gorkhaland, Bundhelkhand,
Harit Province, Cooch Behar, Bodoland and other regions it looks as if there
was a computer programmed reaction in India to the notorious blogger article in
China advocating secessions.
Finally, there are intelligence
alerts from both the US and
other sources about a repeat of 26/11 Mumbai type of situation, either in
Mumbai or Delhi
or Kolkata. Undoubtedly, India’s
internal wars are going to occupy a lot of her energy in the future. The only relieving feature is that China seems to have quietened down following
international compulsions in the wake of the Copenhagen
talks and the felt need for both Beijing and New Delhi to stay together
in the face of the western countries aggressiveness on the climate issue. But
even this is somewhat counter-balanced by the Nepali Maoists, who are clearly
dependent on China, and are hell-bent on helping Maoists in India and creating
disturbances (see Prachanda’s warning to New Delhi not to interfere in Nepal’s
internal affairs.)
Marwah, who has served in nearly all
the troubled areas in the country in various capacities, has blamed our
political class for many avoidable blunders, whether in Kashmir
or Nagaland or Jharkhand, which is mainly responsible for the deteriorating situation.
He also points out to the negative role of the administrative leadership and the
police and forcefully brings out that had they functioned more effectively and
imaginatively, external forces could not have so easily exploited the
situation.
Successive governments have shown
tendencies during the 1980s and 90s for politicians to try to be one up on their
counterparts of the preceding government. He has quoted several such examples
in J&K. In Nagaland, there is the
classic case of a successor Central government reopening talks with a breakaway
Naga group after a long history of successful talks with Phizo’s movement and
the history of elected governments in Nagaland for nearly 10 years. There was
little justification for recognizing this breakaway group, except that they are
speaking more on behalf of the Nagas living in Manipur than those in Nagaland.
Interestingly, the State government has been kept out of this discussion and so
also the Government of Manipur.
Starting with J&K, Marwah has
traced the rise of the Jehadi terror through several stages. He has blamed the
generosity that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi showered on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
and Pakistan
at Shimla. The fact is that our
leadership was never able to gauge the true feelings of Bhutto or, for that
matter, his successors and, above all, the fact that Islamabad, backed by the
ISI, took a firm decision to take revenge on New Delhi for Pakistan’s miserable
defeat in 1971 by openly encouraging terrorism all over India and bleeding it at
thousand places.
The fact is that no matter who is
officially in power in Pakistan,
it is the hard core Army establishment, led by the ISI, which is totally
anti-Indian, that rules the country. Our leaders failed to understand this and
take the necessary corrective action. He also blamed V. P Singh’s government
fairly and squarely for bringing about a situation where 90 per cent of the
Pundit population had to flee the Valley and that the Jehadi elements were
allowed to occupy a dominant position in the Valley, which they have held for
at least two decades.
He also points to the lack of trust
between Governor Jagmohan and the Centre, and the confusion which prevailed
during V. P. Singh’s government, when Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed’s
objective was to embarrass Farooq Abdullah rather than bring stability in the Valley.
Had the agitation in 1990 in
Srinagar,
specially the funeral procession of the Mirwaiz, been handled more competently,
maybe the situation could have been controlled then itself and need not have
taken the turn it did later.
He regrets that we continue to make
the same mistake even today, and the Director of I & B and the National
Security Adviser (NSA) who may have never served in the police in his entire
service career, continues to advise top brass of the government on police
matters. This has complicated the political management of the crisis.
Turning to Left extremism, it is
pathetic to note that the Maoists are active in 15 States, i.e. over half of
the country, and that 165 districts out of the 602 are seriously affected. The
Naxalites have become so powerful in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa that
they strike at any target they like and at any time with impunity.
This has been the case for several
years, and yet the government turns a blind eye. On the other hand, political parties
take advantage of the Naxalite cadre in their election campaign. In Jharkhand,
the Naxals played an important role, in some case ensuring the election in
favour of their favoured candidates. There could be no two opinions that the
elimination of poverty and exploitation of the backward, especially tribal
population, are the core problems. And yet, except for a lot of rhetoric and
development schemes which remain largely on paper, successive governments, both
at the centre and the States, have done little.
Interestingly, even in West Bengal,
which is ruled by the Left Front government, development has on the whole bypassed
the affected areas, such as West Midnapore,
Bankura, Purulia and Birbhum. For several years there was a government
department for Jhargram development. But nothing noteworthy has happened and
recent instances illustrate how the general population continues to be ill-fed,
ill-clothed and ill-housed. Thus,
concentration of development must be first priority which has to be accompanied
by serious and anti-militancy actions, if necessary with the backing of the
Army.
Improving communication network in also
a top priority. Marwah points out how as Jharkhand Governor he could not
communicate with the Officer-in-Charge of a police station on phone or wireless
because the communication system was obsolete. One would whole-heartedly agree
with his conclusion that Left extremism has gone beyond the stage of being a local
law and order problem left to the State governments, and that the Centre has to
take charge.
Many of us had thought that
conferring statehood on some of the backward areas like Chhattisgarh and
Jharkhand would largely sort the problem. But the opposite has happened. Problems
have grown. Marwah had also quoted many examples of high level corruption in
some of the States. His final chapter
“No soft options, back to basics” is an excellent prognosis which needs to be carried
out.
His observation is that the power to
delay is the most effective tool in the hands of the bureaucracy to harass
citizens by indefinitely delaying even the most trivial decisions. He quotes
examples such as the decision to storm the Golden
Temple at Amritsar
by the Army in 1984, or sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force to Sri Lanka in
1986, which were ill-thought, hasty decisions which cost the nation dear. This
has to be avoided. This is a ‘must read’ book for all those who sincerely wish
to see India
succeed in fighting her internal wars. --- INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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