POLITICAL DIARY

New Delhi, 25 July 2009

Indo-Pak Ties

PEACE ROAD TO NOWHERE

By Poonam I Kaushish

The monsoon has brought relief to the Delhiwalas from the prolonged searing heat. But real politik and diplomacy have heated up the Union Capital. It is a moot point if the temperatures will ever come down in Indo-Pak relations. The neighbours have been in a “love-me-love-me not” syndrome for more than six decades. Swinging from one extreme to another. Guns followed by roses and back to the guns!

Importantly, Indo-Pak relations are now hostage to two references in the infamous Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement following a meeting between  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the NAM Summit in Egypt mid-July. One, the de-linking of dialogue with acts of terrorism and the out-of-the-blue reference to Balochistan.

Clearly, Manmohan Singh has walked more than an extra mile to for Gilani and ceded ground to Pakistan. The formulation in the joint statement that “action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed” appear to be a climb-down. Post the Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks, New Delhi has consistently maintained that no talks would take place till the culprits were brought to book.

Predictably, all hell broke lose. How could the PM agree for talks? Was he swayed by Gilani’s assurances that Islamabad would do “everything in its part and bring the 26/11 culprits to book irrespective of whether the dialogue was de-linked to terror? How could he fall for Islamabad’s promise which was nothing but a puerile statement and needed to be discounted totally? That he had washed away any gains achieved by New Delhi in the war against terrorism. Turned India’s foreign policy on its head? Was he coerced by the Americans in doing so?

Making matter worse, Islamabad read it differently. Said Gilani: “All core issues that were pending under composite dialogue should be discussed …. these should not be bracketed with the Mumbai incident.” Of import in this context, the statement was silent on Pakistan’s 2004 commitment that it would not allow its territory to be used for terrorism against India. Thus, Gilani had shrewdly freed Islamabad from that promise.

Resulting in the Prime Minister and Government trying to retrieve lost ground by claiming that the composite dialogue would not resume unless and until terrorist attacks were properly accounted for and the culprits brought to book. Adding, that Islamabad could not ask for resumption of dialogue without showing “action on terror”. Besides, by taking Kashmir off the agenda, and making it only one of several "outstanding issues," the “core issue” had been diluted.

However, instead of bridging the widening divide between the two neighbours it has led to more mistrust. Needless to say, the Prime Minister has taken a big risk. Everything could backfire in the event of another big terror strike on India. True, the delinking of talks with action on terror does reverse India’s policy of the last six decades, but it also allows for a new atmosphere of talks. The continuing stalemate was getting us nowhere.

At one level, the joint statement signifies a way forward. A country can never afford to take a position where it refuses to talk to a nation. By snubbing Islamabad, New Delhi was diminishing its influence over Pakistan’s ongoing cross-border terrorism. After all, even when joint statements carried bland sentences of “constructive and cordial dialogue”, it didn’t co-respond to a decline in Islamabad’s proxy war.

Aversely, by not talking New Delhi was only strengthening and emboldening the jehadis to continue fomenting trouble. Why should statements become barometers of success of every Indo-Pak summit? Further, the statement was not a binding legal document but merely a diplomatic testimonial. Notwithstanding, that generally joint testaments form the basis of a dialogue process. Remember, the Shimla pact post the 1972 Indo-Pak war which became the bedrock of future ties, 1999 Lahore declaration and the 2004 Vajpayee-Musharraf statement of holding a composite dialogue.

However, it is the inclusion of the word Baluchistan which has ignited indignation all-round. How did the innocuous line in Para 6: "Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas" creep in?

Time and again, Islamabad has privately accused New Delhi of inciting terror in Baluchistan. Whether the allegations are true or false is not the point. So far, it has been just conjectures. However, by including the word Baluchistan for the first time New Delhi has obliquely acknowledged its hand in fomenting trouble there. Significantly, we have given Pakistan a handle to equate Baluchistan with Kashmir. A tit for tat policy --- we do it in Kashmir, you do it in Balochistan. Wherein Balochistan would now serve as the model for all future discourse between India and Pakistan.

Compounding the issue, was Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon’s appalling confession that that the statement was “badly drafted” and “these things happen.” Really? According to foreign policy mandarins, Balochistan was a small price to pay for the exclusion of Kashmir. That New Delhi had no option given that the ISI had briefed the Indian High Commission in Islamabad of India hand in fomenting trouble. As also, Manmohan Singh’s insipid assertion, “we have nothing to hide”.

According to highly placed sources, the Prime Minister decision was based on the fast changing developments within Pakistan, the increasing strife, trouble in SWAT, rise of Taliban and its impact on India. Even as there would be no let-up on Islamabad to bring the 26/11 culprits to book. Confided a senior official, “the last thing India wants is instability and chaos in Pakistan. It is in New Delhi’s interest to ensure Pakistan remains stable and democratic. Be that it may, skepticism continues to abound.

Where does all this lead to? True, South Block has no illusions about any dramatic transformation in Islamabad’s policy. Given that post Sharm-el-Sheikh the Pak Army and ISI wants to be included in all future dialogue as they are part of policy formation. Dialogue can only take place once Islamabad shows its serious intent in handing over the 26/11 culprits. It has to put more efforts to put Hafeez Sayeed back in jail. The taste of the pudding is in the eating.

As matter stands today, both sides continue to be wary of each other. Deep mistrust and lack of confidence is apparent. Islamabad needs to do a lot more than just generating artificial illusions. There is little scope for talking peace and friendship with a neighbour who is busy throwing stones at you and even sniping. So far Islamabad’s track record has been woeful. It wrecked the Lahore pact by scripting the Kargil inclusion. Agra was stillborn. It has to match its words with deeds. Or else, the long thorny road to peace will end up as a peace road to nowhere. ---- INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)