ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 21 May 2009

Obama’s CTBT Quest

INDO-US CONFRONTATION ON CARDS?

By Hina Pandey

(School of International Studies, JNU)

The silver tongued US President Barrack Obama has certainly made some big promises. With an air of great optimism he has appeared to convince not only fellow Americans but the global community as well, that yes, he can certainly promise (to deliver).

In Prague on April 5^th, during his speech Obama made promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy. He reiterated his commitment to the immediate and aggressive pursuit of Senate’s ratification of the CTBT to be put into force, thus taking a step closer to non-proliferation efforts. He also assured to begin negotiations on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START) with Russia to make mutual cuts in warheads and reduction of deployments.

However, when it comes to issues like these, there emerges a clear divide between the real world and Obama's imagery, both standing in contradiction to each other. The real world consisting of the Permanent Five --the possessors of deadly nuclear weapons with other NWSS and there is Obama’s imagery, which has the absence of nuclear weapons as a perquisite for the sustenance of world peace.

Nuclear issues are indeed most controversial, largely because of the degree of destruction that is attached to them and this controversial nature has been further enhanced especially in this new age of terrorism. The earliest efforts to curb the spread of these weapons began with the initiation of the “Baruch Plan”, which remained an official foreign policy of the US till 1953 and was continued by President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace Programme”, that eventually created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in  1957.

One can see a reflection of similar sentiments in the Obama speech as well when he said:  “Cold War has disappeared, but thousands of weapons have not, the threat of nuclear war has gone up and more and more nations have acquired these weapons technology”. The statement is indeed the resonation of Truman and Eisenhower’s non-proliferation efforts.

It has been more than five decades that the US and the international community has realized the need to strengthen or to at least maintain a controlled Non-Proliferation Regime, yet the illegal spread of this technology continues even today. The NPT that is signed, breached, withdrawn and ‘not’ ratified by various States continues to face challenges for its own effective functioning. On the other hand, there is non-NPT signatory country, such as India, which continues to maintain an impressive record in a way acting as a catalyst in strengthening the treaty.

Bearing this in mind the decision of a much-idealist President to send the CTBT for reconsideration to the Senate may have important consequences for India’s foreign policy. New Delhi has always made it clear in principle as well as in practice ever since its “laughing Buddha Programme” that it would not appreciate any capping of its nuclear capability, come what may! Despite the change in leadership, New Delhi maintained its nuclear option, as in when, Pokhran-II was completed, the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made known his decision to abide by a self-moratorium on further nuclear tests. Subsequent governments, as on earlier occasions have stuck to this decision. Not respecting it and any effort to unnecessarily corner New Delhi on the issue of nuclear test would be a serious mistake on the part of the Obama Administration.

Like Madeline Albright once said that the task of presidency is analogous to “redesigning the plane, while flying it”. It is clear that Washington has definite challenges ahead, in case it wants to get this task done, bearing in mind the presence of the huge Indian lobby that it may have to face. There is little doubt that the democratic administration led by Obama would articulate its own set of perceived challenges. It is also clear that would actually seek the ratification of CTBT. The question that we in India should be asking is: will there be a direct pressure on India to sign the CTBT? Will other members of nuclear club side with the Obama administration and demand Indian signature on CTBT?

Having said that, a risk involved in pressurizing India must not be overlooked, as its reaction would most possibly invite or demand an action from Pakistan. This is to say that Delhi would certainly resist going non-nuclear if Pakistan doesn’t provide any assurance. In that case influencing Pakistan would again become a strenuous task for Washington, as it is Pakistan has a lot to deliver.

Washington and New Delhi both share several similar concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, horizontally as well as vertically. India’s concern regarding disarmament was echoed in the “Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan”, a commitment which was extended to the world in the UN General assembly Speech (1988). The late Rajiv Gandhi’s proposed NWFW- Nuclear Weapons Free World was ignored by the US media, and neither did Washington respond to it officially. Now exactly after two decades, the current President want’s to support the idea of a return to a nuclear weapons free world through CTBT.

Despite a degree of convergence on nuclear issues between Washington and Delhi, the CTBT question may once again create political tension. Would there be a repeat of 1998 sanctions if India refuses to be a member? What would ultimately become of the CTBT? Would this not be hypocrisy on Obama’s part when the US itself maintains a record of the highest nuclear arsenal in the world, having the ability to conduct computer simulation and sub-kiloton tests to actually ask India to be a signatory to any treaty like the CTBT?

There is another question that emerges with the evolving debate on proliferation, and here the strategist in the US must answer as to how the elimination or signing of the NPT actually translates into “sustenance of peace”,  as today it is widely acknowledged that the most grave threat comes more from terrorists and not from countries like India or Israel.

These are difficult questions to answer at this point in time, especially when signing the treaty is much awaited. Perhaps with time more questions would evolve and unfold themselves to new answers. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)