Round The World
New Delhi, 3 March 2009
Revolt In Dhaka
CALL GEN KAYANI’S
BLUFF
By M D Nalapat
(Prof, Geopolitics, Manipal
Academy)
The ghastly revolt of the BDR in Bangladesh
seems to have been orchestrated by the Pakistan army and its puppet,
Khaleda Zia. Now that Sheikh Hasina has come to power through the ballot box,
no longer does the writ of the Punjabis run in their former colony, a change that
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is seething over. Controlling as his army does the
minority Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baloch, the General would like to see Khaleda
Zia restored to office, to “rule” over Bangladesh
the way Aisin Gero Pu Yi “ruled” over Manchukuo
for the Japanese during the years before the defeat of Japan in 1945.
How has the Pakistan
army become such a malign force, intervening with impunity in countries across
the region through its surrogates? The roots go back three decades, to the
start of the Western war against the USSR
in Afghanistan, a war
outsourced to the Pakistan
army by Zbigniew Brezezinski (President Jimmy Carter's National Security
Advisor) and his successors in the Reagan administration.
After a decade of struggle, a demoralised and collapsing USSR crashed to defeat in Afghanistan in
1989. This defeat was a tactical victory for the Western alliance, but a
strategic defeat. For, the induced success of the jihadis resulted in a boost
of vain glory within them, leading to the expansion of their jihad to include
the West. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are the unintended consequences
of the 1979-87 Brezezinski-Casey strategy of funding, training and equipping
jihadists to fight a conventional force. Those lessons are now coming in handy
for terrorists operating in the Afghan countryside, where NATO is floundering
in a manner similar to the 1983-84 travails of the Soviet battalions.
If it can be said that the economic and other costs of the
Afghan war helped push the USSR into collapse, then those determined to
destabilize the West can argue that the immense financial cost of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan (along with the concomitant speculative rise in commodity
prices sparked by the conflict) are responsible for the meltdown in western
economies that is being witnessed since the latter part of 2008.
Iraq and Afghanistan are two theatres made
wholly different by conditions on the ground. While in the former, it has been
the policy of occupation that has led to an essentially nationalist rebellion
against the US and the UK (thus giving the religious Shiite parties an
opportunity to secure the political space made empty by the recourse to
insurgency of the secular nationalists), in Afghanistan, the resistance has
come from the jihadists who since 1996 have been known as the Taliban. And as in
the 80s and the 90s, the principal support base for this militia has been the Pakistan army.
Whether it is training given by soldiers “on leave” or access to funds, safe
houses and munitions, the Taliban would not be able to put up a viable front
against NATO for more than a few months, had such support been denied to them.
Astonishingly, as yet the CIA, the DIA and numerous other US intelligence agencies appear clueless about
the extent to which the Pakistan
army is providing sustenance to the Taliban. Aware that numerous military, diplomatic
and academic careers in the US
would go up in smoke were it to be accepted that the policy of relying on the Pakistan army to fight its own auxilliary has
been flawed, officials in the US
are still in denial about the fact that the epicentre of terrorism is Pakistan
By refusing to take effective action against the sanctuaries
given by the Pakistan
military to the Afghan jihadis, NATO planners are preparing the ground for a
Soviet-style retreat from Afghanistan
that would give the jihadists the oxygen, lost after the setbacks caused by the
US
military and other action since 9/11.
The “head of the snake” i.e. the Taliban is the Pakistan
army, and it is here that attention needs to be focussed, now that Gen Kayani has
failed in his gambit of using the Mumbai terror attack to divert international
attention away from his reluctance to engage the Taliban in Waziristan and in
FATA. Because cash and other help gets funneled through religious “trusts” and
other cutouts, and because of an undeclared policy that all soldiers
fraternizing with the Taliban should be dressed in the same garb as the
militia, thus far the apparently somnolent US intelligence agencies have failed
to detect the multiple contacts between the Pakistan army and the jihadists, including
the clearance given by the higher brass to missions directed against India and
NATO
Kayani’s bluff needs to get called in a way that Soviet
leaders did not do during the time when Zia ul-Haq (the founder of jihadism in
a once-professional Pakistan
army) was soaking up billions of dollars from the US
to send irregulars into Afghanistan.
The de facto President-cum-Prime Minister (aka army chief) of Pakistan needs to
be given the message that unless his forces take out the Taliban within Waziristan
and FATA, NATO will provide assistance in the form of air sorties, missile
strikes and even troops on the ground that would decapitate the Taliban.
That the elimination of the Taliban within their nests in
Pakistan has become a national security priority for the US and the EU, and
that it is intolerable that success be denied because of the desire of the
Pakistan army to be allowed to do a job that it is clearly unable or unwilling
to accomplish, is a fact that was ignored by George W Bush, but hopefully will
not by President Barack Obama
As matters are evolving, despite the infatuation of so many
US and EU officials for the Pakistan military, planners in Western capitals may
finally accept that the rapid metastizing of jihad from the safe areas in
Pakistan is a hazard that needs immediate action to quell, and that the present
policy of relying on Pakistan has not worked. And, after the 2009 elections in
India, the new government in New Delhi may, on the request of Afghanistan Government,
be willing to commit Indian troops to Kabul, to assist in the battle against a
jihadist force that has carried out so many mass terror attacks in India.
While a fresh terror attack on India after Mumbai 26-28/11
may not lead to a military attack on Pakistan, it may convince the authorities
that India needs to place military boots on the ground in Afghanistan, so as to
assist that country and its friendly people resist the Pakistan army-sponsored
Taliban.
Unless the Pakistan army gets liberated from the jihadist
influence that has been steadily injected into it since the days of General
Zia, it will remain an accessory to terror rather than a defender against it.
Gen Kayani had calculated that the Mumbai attacks would lead to a troop
mobilization by India on its western frontier, thus giving him a reason to
refuse NATO's requests that he go after the Taliban rather than cosset them. That
has not happened. The Indians have not mobilized.
However, what needs to be done next is not more of the same failed
medicine (of depending on Kayani) but a clear ultimatum, followed by NATO
action to take out Taliban nests. The people of FATA, Waziristan and the NWFP
will themselves hand in the Taliban, once they see that having them in these
areas does not bring goodies from the Pakistan army, but death from NATO
attacks. The road to success in the war against the jihadists runs through
Pakistan, and this route is too vital for the security of the world to remain
in the control of the current leadership of the Pakistan army, unless that army
can throw away the poisoned legacy of Brezezinski, Casey and Zia. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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