Spotlight

New Delhi, 10 May 2025

AI &Media

TOOL TO AID OR HURT?

By Sabina Inderjit 

Imagine having a super-smart assistant that can gather information, write drafts, generate videos, clone voices, et al. Incredible possibilities that artificial intelligence (AI) offers in the media. Yes, it’s transforming journalism by handling routine tasks, analysing vast data sets, and enhancing content delivery. And like any powerful tool, AI comes with its own set of ethical and legal dilemmas. 

The power and peril of AI has sparked a heated discussion in the media, often referred to as the Fourth Estate--wielding influence, shaping public opinion and a watchdog of democracy.Will it help safeguard or play mischief? At the same time, AI’s rapid development has sparked fears among journalists whether they would become obsolete! 

That may not be the case, as speakers during a session ‘Shaping the Future of Journalism in the AI media Era: Copyright and Ethical Challenges,’ at the World Journalists Conference 2025, organised last month by the Journalists Association of Korea would have the 70-odd participants from over 50 countries believe. 

AI won’t replace journalists—it will replace journalists who don’t use AI. Good journalism relies on human traits that AI lacks: empathy, curiosity, and the ability to ask hard questions in real time. AI won’t meet informants, uncover hidden documents, or attend a press conference and challenge a prime minister. When disaster strikes, it’s human journalists who head to the scene to speak with witnesses and capture the raw, emotional truth. 

The plus and minuses of the evolving media landscape shaped by AIwere spelt out by speakers from China, Poland, South Korea and the US. AI could achieve remarkable things, such as in Kunshan, East China’s Jiangsu Province, wherein police used AI to catch criminals who had swindled $145,000. The AI system traced the money in just 10 minutes and stopped half of it from being transferred. The suspects were caught, highlighting how AI can analyse data faster than any human and help resolve complex cases that might otherwise go unsolved. 

On the flip side, the same power can be misused. In Kunming, Yunnan Province, a fraudster used AI face-swapping software to impersonate a victim’s friend and nearly tricked them into sending $43,500 worth of gold bars. Fortunately, police intervened in time.In another case in Beijing, a voice actor’s voice was cloned without her consent and used in audiobooks. The court ruled this a violation of her rights—a clear example of how AI can cross ethical and legal boundaries. 

While AI offers substantial benefits, it also poses serious threats to privacy, identity, and intellectual property. There’s a need to strike a balance between embracing innovation and safeguarding citizens’ rights. AI use should never infringe on reputation, privacy, or image rights. It’s not just about creating regulations—education, awareness, and continuous research are vital to establishing ethical boundaries. 

In early March in China’s ‘Two sessions’, most significant political meetingsmany lawmakers and experts called for deeper research and clearer AI legislation. Globally, this conversation is intensifying, particularly around copyright issues and fair use of journalistic content. 

In the U.S., The New York Times has filed a lawsuit against OpenAI over alleged copyright infringement, and similar concerns are growing in South Korea. The Korean Newspaper Association (KNA) initially determined that Naver, dominant web portal and search engine, often referred to as “Google of Korea” had incorporated news content from media outlets into its AI services without proper authorisation. It plans to file formal complaints against both domestic and international tech companies, including Google and OpenAI, for using news content in AI training without proper authorization. 

The KNA argues this unauthorized use violates copyright laws and constitutes an abuse of market dominance under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Without clear legal frameworks, the unchecked use of news content by AI could severely impact journalism’s sustainability by eroding its economic foundations and remain a persistent challenge. 

In Poland, in July 2024 there was a nationwide media protest wherein hundreds of editorial offices participated calling for changes to the copyright law. Theycalled for a mechanism to negotiate payment for content used by global tech companies and that it shouldn’t remain a legal fiction but become a real tool. Eventually a compromise was reached, albeit unsatisfactory. Negotiations are ongoing between publishers and Google, and if an agreement isn’t reached, the state administration would need to step in. 

Besides, in Poland, where the political and media landscape is polarised, the ethical use of AI becomes particularly important. But this problem affects practically every country especially the global geopolitical situation-- the war in Ukraine, the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula, or the massive changes in US politics. AI algorithms, which are based on data patterns and user behaviour, can deepen media fragmentation, leading to creation of information bubbles, which will only further intensify existing political divides.  

The EU was the first to adopt a comprehensive AI Act, followed by South Korea. These regulations include provisions to label AI-generated content and outline prohibited uses. However, ambiguity remains around what qualifies as ‘creative input’ when AI helps write an article. The EU law won’t be fully applied until 2026, and AI’s capabilities may evolve dramatically by then. 

Additionally, as traditional media loses influence in the advertising market, distribution models are shifting in ways that weaken competition and diversity in the media landscape.To address these concerns, the EU adopted the Digital Single Market Directive in 2019, requiring platforms like Google to sign agreements with publishers for content usage.

Under current EU copyright laws, training AI on content is allowed unless explicitly forbidden by rights holders. Yet publishers argue that if tech giants use their work, they should compensate accordingly. Google, for example, benefits from journalistic content while trying to position itself as a publisher—without paying for the work it leverages.This places publishers in a difficult spot: they face the dominance of tech giants while also needing to fund quality journalism.

Fortunately, they are doing so, using AI as anally and not a replacement. For example, Ringier Axel Springer Polska, one of Poland’s largest media companies, is using AI to handle some tasks—like creating localised weather forecasts during night shifts—freeing journalists to focus on meaningful work. Tools like AI-assisted article summarization help readers quickly digest key stories when they’re short on time, improving user experience.

Another example is that of The New York Times. In October 2024, in an investigation titled “Inside the Movement Behind Trump’s Election Lies,”it used AI to analyse over 500 hours of video from the Election Integrity Network. AI translated and indexed 5 million words from the recordings, allowing journalists to find recurring themes and identify key figures. But the final product was carefully verified by human reporters, and the AI usage was explained to readers.

This blend of AI efficiency and human judgment is key. Trust and credibility take years to build—and seconds to lose. Transparency, verification, and ethics must remain central to journalism. And while AI is transforming journalism, it doesn’t diminish the role of journalists—it elevates it. When used ethically and intelligently, AI enhances reporting, speeds up workflows, and allows for deeper investigative work.

To shape the future responsibly, journalists must learn how AI works, understand both its risks and rewards, and continuously update the frameworks—legal, ethical, and professional. The tools are here. It’s up to the media to use them wisely.---INFA

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

SPOTLIGHT

New Delhi, 3 May 2025

India & Pakistan

ESCALATION OF TENSION

By Piotr Opaliński

(Former Polish Dy Ambassador to India &Ambassador to Pakistan; CIR) 

The April terrorist attack in Pahalgam has reignited a new wave of tensions between India and Pakistan. It exposed not only the fragility of bilateral relations but also the persistent nature of the decades-old unresolved Kashmir conflict, which continues to impact the regional situation. 

Tensions between India and Pakistan—two neighbouring nuclear-armed countries—have a long history, beginning on the very day British India was divided based on religious lines. However, the current dynamics—combined with the passive stance of key international players—pose a serious risk of deteriorating security and destabilizing the entire region. 

The brutal attack on tourists in Pahalgam, carried out on April 22 this year by members of The Resistance Front (TRF)—allegedly linked, according to New Delhi, to Pakistani organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen—was the deadliest attack on Indian civilians since the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Tourists numbering 26 were killed, and 17 injured. The incident caused a sudden spike in tension, evolving into one of the most dangerous crises in South Asia in recent years. 

India’s Reactions

India accused Pakistan of directly supporting the attackers and, as a sanction, suspended the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, closed the Attari–Wagah border crossing, revoked visas for Pakistani citizens, and initiated reciprocal reductions in diplomatic personnel. India also deployed significant military forces to the Jammu and Kashmir region and reinforced border control. It further threatened military action in response to “any further provocations.” 

India’s decisions were also influenced by strong nationalist sentiments and the pressure of upcoming regional elections, which pushed the BJP-led government at the Centre to take a hard line against Pakistan. 

Pakistan's Reactions

In response to India’s actions, Pakistan closed its airspace to Indian aircraft, suspended the 1972 Simla Agreement, and froze bilateral trade, including trade through third countries.At the same time, Islamabad rejected New Delhi’s accusations and called for an international investigation into the Pahalgam attack under UN auspices. It traditionally condemned “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” and declared “only moral and diplomatic” support for the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination. 

It also pointed out that Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism, accusing India of supporting anti-Pakistani armed groups in the Afghan-bordering provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.It is worth noting that despite New Delhi’s sharp reaction, Islamabad continues to appeal for international intervention, emphasising that war with India is not a solution but rather a path to further destabilisation. 

International Inaction

Despite the UN’s call for restraint from both sides, no world leader has proposed an effective mediation mechanism. The U.S. President Donald Trump downplayed the significance of the conflict, calling it “a thousand-year-old dispute.” China, a traditional ally of Pakistan, called for peace while Pakistani media reported on intensive consultations between Islamabad and Beijing.Saudi Arabia limited its response to a call for dialogue without offering a specific initiative.Russia, though traditionally maintaining close relations with India, declared neutrality in this matter.The European Union, while expressing concern and urging both sides to engage in dialogue, also refrained from proposing concrete actions, staying within the bounds of general appeals. 

Rising Tensions

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty—already referred to by Islamabad as a casus belli—could have catastrophic consequences for Pakistan, where 80% of agriculture depends on the river system. The growing tensions with India could break the existing taboo around the use of “water weapons” as a tool of conflict. For Pakistan, this would mean not only the loss of vital resources but also economic destabilisation and rising social unrest that could turn into a crisis with international implications. 

The scale of the problem may also draw other regional players into the rivalry, especially China, which has strategic interests in managing Indus waters due to its infrastructure projects in Pakistan and neighbouring areas. Potential Chinese involvement could further complicate the geopolitical situation and elevate the water dispute to a broader Asian forum. 

Both countries are experiencing rising socio-political tensions: in India, there is an increase in nationalist sentiment driven by upcoming regional elections, while in Pakistan, political militarisation is progressing, sidelining civilian institutions. 

Both trends increase the risk of radical political decisions that could have irreversible consequences for both countries. Escalating political polarisation creates a space for military decisions that could lead to tragic outcomes. 

Outlook

In the short term, the most likely scenario is continued military pressure from India through limited operations, as well as ongoing violations of the ceasefire by both sides.The absence of effective mediation or pressure from key powers increases the risk that the current conflict between South Asia’s two nuclear states could escalate into a major threat to international peace and security. 

The previous escalation of tensions following the Pulwama attack in 2019 showed how real the danger of a full-scale war was under similar circumstances, making a strong case for urgent and intensified efforts toward a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the current crisis. ---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

Spotlight

New Delhi, 26 April 2025

India-EU Closer To Trade Pact

By Dr. Krzysztof M. Zalewski

(Boym Institute& Centre for International Relations, Poland) 

Negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India have been ongoing for 18 years, with breaks. Despite the ongoing difficulties, for geo-economic reasons its finalisation now seems more likely than ever before. It will probably be the largest free trade area in the world next to RCEP. 

Given the scale of Indian economy, from Poland’s perspective this agreement creates both enormous challenges and great opportunities. The impact of this trade agreement on the economy depends on the negotiated detailed solutions and the ability of the Polish administration to cooperate with business. The Polish debate on this FTA should not be dominated by defensive interests. 

“ The EU-India free trade agreement would be the largest of its kind in the world (...). Timing and determination count, and this partnership comes at the right time for both sides. That is why we have agreed with Prime Minister Modi that we will strive to achieve it this year”, said the President of the European Commission, Ursulu van der Leyen in New Delhi during an unusual foreign visit of the entire College of commissioners in February. She was echoed by Prime Minister Modi: We have prepared a plan of cooperation in trade, technology, investment, innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility. We have instructed our teams to conclude a mutual technology, investment, innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility.We have instructed our teams to conclude a mutually beneficial bilateral free trade agreement by the end of this year.” 

Will the two major economies – currently the world’s second and fifth largest – be connected by an FTA? The history of the EU-India comprehensive trade agreement is not very encouraging. It has often seemed that an agreement was within reach, but in the end it didn’t happen. 

Let us recall that the work on the jointpolitical declaration of 1993 and cooperation agreement of 1994 was accompanied by the idea of deepening trade relations between New Delhi and the bloc countries. When in 2004 India and the EU became “strategic partners”, both sides expressed hopes for the imminent conclusion of a free trade agreement. However, thenegotiations started in 2007 were suspended in 2013. The reason was the difficult to overcome differences in interest in sectors like automotive, agriculture and food production or pharmaceutical industry. 

There were fears of too deep economic and social disruptions caused by the agreement. Reducing tariffs of more than 100% on groups of goods suchas dairy products, vegetables, fruits, sugar and confectionery products could cause a collapse in production and a crisis in the industries. Boththe EU and India heavily subsidised their own agricultural production, perceiving it as an inalienable component of food security. In turn, different interests and rules regarding intellectual property in the pharmaceutical market caused, on the one hand, European fear of a flood of cheap Indian generic drugs, and on the subcontinent - fear of a practice called ever-greening, i.e. maintaining drug patents by European companies by introducing minimal changes to them. 

After eight years, in 2021, a will was announced to return to negotiations, which startedin 2022. At that time, the interest in India on the European side was mainly motivated by the intensifying competition with China. New Delhi, on the other hand, had ambitions to take advantage of the de-risking policy promoted by EU institutions, i.e. reducing EU’s dependence on imports from China. At the corporate level, this principle was called" China plus one ". In principle, large international corporations should not base their extensive supply chains solely on the Middle Kingdom, having an alternative place of production and sourcing of raw materials. India seemed to be the ideal partner for this. 

But for over two years, there was a lack of political will to overcome obstacles old and new. Although negotiating teams met, the scant information about the talks suggestedno breakthrough had been achieved. EC officials involved in the negotiations complained that Indian delegations lacked information or authority to make binding decisions. 

This doesn’t mean that trade has not flourished. Quite the opposite - over the past decade, trade has almost doubled, both in goods and in services. As per EC, EU remains India's largest trading partner, accounting for trade in goods worth €124 billion in 2023, or 12.2% of India's total trade, ahead of the US (10.8%) and China (10.5%). India has a surplus in its relations with EU every year. Exports to EU and the US each accounted for 17% of India's total exports. 

Although India is only the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, accounting for just over 2% of total EU goods trade in 2023, its position has been steadily growing over the past two decades. Trade in goods has almost doubled in the decade since the FTA negotiations were suspended, despite the pandemic crisis (2020-21). Trade in services has grown even faster, almost doubling in 2020-23 from €30.4 billion to €59.7 billion. Direct investment has been growing at a slightly slower pace, rising by justover 30% in 2019-22 to €108 billion. 

It is precisely the rapidly growing trade in services and goods and the solid value of investments that make both sides seem inclined to quickly conclude a trade and investment agreement to maintain the existing trend. Trade and investment need a stable legal basis, providing certainty of turnover. 

More important factors that speak in favor of quickly concluding an agreement that hadpreviously been impossible for decades.Firstly, India-EU ties, especially in bilateral relations with individual MemberStates, have gained a strategic dimension not only in terms of declared plans and values, but in terms of interests. Brussels and New Delhi are currently united by the desire to deepen cooperation in trade and technology, security and defence issues, but also in the broad sense of global connectivity, i.e. building multidimensional infrastructural, economic and business connections. 

Secondly, bothEU and India are trying to acquire new trading partners in the face of the unpredictable policy of the US administration. The level of additional US import tariffs announced on 2 April - 27% on Indian products and 20% on EU goods - in both cases surprised business analysts. Since the US remains the leading trading partner for boththe European " 27" and India, such high tariffs could cause economic disruption and crisis. Bilateral FTA may therefore be a way to escape forward. 

Third, even before the new U.S. tariffs were announced, India’s economic growth, still the fastest among theworld’smajor economies, appeared to be slowing. It fell to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2024, well below the RBI’s expectations of 6.8% annual growth. Direct investment data was also disappointing, with Vietnam and Malaysia benefiting much more effectively from the policy of relocating some production from China. 

In turn, on the Old Continent, most EU economies are stagnating, and the continent's largest economy, Germany, is in its third year of recession. For both partners, an FTA would be a way to stimulate economic growth. 

Fourthly, why the current plan to speed up negotiations may succeed is the clear change in attitudes among Indian elites towards international trade and FTAs. Until now, New Delhi has been haunted by the shadow of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's long-time post-war prime minister, who, becauseof India’s unfavourable modern experience in relations with the West, saw international trade as a threat of colonisation. 

After a period of liberalization that began in 1991, tariffs have been rising again since at least the middle of the last decade. The Modi government has sought liberal economic reforms within the country since coming to power, but it has also believed that a combination of higher tariffs and investment incentives should attract manufacturing. 

But New Delhi has changed its attitude toward trade agreements in recentyears, recognizing their potential for growth and modernization and exposing Indian companies to external competition. Concerns about domination by a rival from across the northern border, China, prevented India from joining RCEP in 2020, an agreement that liberalizes trade between the 10 nations of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and its five regional trading partners, South Korea, Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand . 

However, India has sought trade agreements with smaller entities on a bilateral basis. In 2022, an agreement was signed with the UAE and with Australia a few months later. Negotiations on pact with UK were resumed. The pressure to quickly conclude an agreement with EU is therefore part of a broader trend among the Indian elite: after cades of skepticism, the Indian subcontinent is now dominated by faith in its own strength and the ability of domestic entrepreneurs tocope with external competition. 

The preparations for this incomparably largeragreement also have a practical dimension. During Raisina Dialogue conference in New Delhi one could sense a certain optimism among hosts and European guests regarding the acceleration of talks and the prioritisation of them by the leadership of the EC and Indian government. Moreover, the ministers of the member states – with the exception of Hungary – presented an exceptionally coherent position not only on the issue of relations with India, but also on global challenges. 

Teams on both sides have been strengthened, and both sides at India's most important geopolitical conference have publicly expressed hope that the talks will be concluded bythe end of this year. The decision in 2022 to negotiate on three separate platforms, namely a free trade agreement, an investment protection agreement and an agreement on geographical indications (GI) for food products ,has reduced the risk that a blockade on anyone of them will lead to the collapse of the whole. 

This does not mean, however, that the conclusion of the agreement is certain. It may be delayed or permanently blocked by the relations of the EU with its external partners or by internal factors in India and the Union.The biggest risk factor in trade issues remains the unpredictable policy of US administration. Given the importance of the economic partnership between both EU and US and US and India, it is possible that the current hectic negotiations with Washington will drive Brussels and New Delhi apart. 

India has adopted a different negotiation strategy than Europe. While EU is currently focused on finding an internal compromise on tariffs on American goods, subsequent Indian trade missions are focusing on creating conditions forsigning a trade agreement withUS too. Before Modi's visit to Washington in February, tariffs on American bourbon and motors were reduced. During the visit, the Indian side declared its willingness to purchase more American gas (LNG), crude oil and arms. There is hope in New Delhi that a trade agreement on trade in goods with the US will be concluded by autumn 2025, the goal being to achievetrade exchange of $500 billion in 2030, from $ 210 billion lastyear (an average of 15% annually). 

Indian negotiators hope that while they will likely not be able to avoid an increase in U.S. tariffs on products from the subcontinent, the tariffs will be lower than those on goods from other parts of the world, giving Indian products a comparative advantage in US market. However, the parallel talks with Washington could cast a shadow over EU-India negotiations, especially since it may not be in U.S. interest to conclude such an agreement between the two American trading partners any time soon.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

REWIND

New Delhi, 15 May 2025

A WAY OUT OF THE ARMS RACE

By InderJit

(Released on 21 April 1981) 

India continues to strive hard to somehow block American arms for Pakistan. New Delhi has not only communicated its views on the subject to Washington, but also sought to use the British Prime Minister's visit to India to mount pressure on the US Administration. Mr's Gandhi raised the issue with Mrs Thatcher both privately and publicly in her official talks and in Parliament's Central Hall where a departure was made from established practice on the occasion of the British Prime Minister's address to MPs to enable her also to speak. "The spectre of cold war peeping in our doorway causes us grave apprehension", said Mrs Gandhi and added: "We have already spoken to you about the dangers of giving sophisticated arms to Pakistan." But New Delhi has again drawn a blank. What is worse, Mrs Thatcher made out a powerful case for Pakistan in New Delhi at her Press conference which will be remembered for her superb performance. She answered questions candidly and forthrightly without the slightest attempt to either hedge or side step or, like Mr Morarji Desai, reply with counter questions!

We in India have undoubtedly every reason to be gravely concerned over the prospect of fresh supply of American arms to Pakistan. Our country has been attacked thrice by Pakistan in the past three decades and more proving right Krishna Menon's brilliant quip: No one has yet produced a gun which fires only in one direction. Experience has also shown that military regimes are inclined to be less restrained and more trigger happy; both the 1965 and 1971 wars were launched by Pakistan while the country was ruled by Generals Ayub and Yahya Khan. But then Pakistan, too, has a problem on its hands, as Mrs Thatcher argued at her Press conference. The Soviet Union has "invaded" and "occupied an independent and non-Aligned Afghanistan", posing a threat to Pakistan. "I would be concerned if I had Soviet troops on my border. I would be getting all the means to defend myself and my people." India, she added, had increased its defence capability "enormously" and was in a position to defend itself. "You cannot deny the same right to another sovereign nation."

A question which needs to be asked is: Can something be done to avert an arms race in the sub-continent? Two possible answers are available. Ideally, the best would be to get the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan. All the countries, including Pakistan, have now veered round to India's view that this can be achieved only through a political solution and not militarily. Yet, enough has not been done for a political solution. The recent non-aligned meet in New Delhi took welcome initiative in setting up a four-nation committee to help resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict. The committee has since been vigorously following up its mandate and shuttling between world capitals. Yet the meet did not consider it necessary to either send a mission to Moscow on the Afghan issue or to set up a committee to help find a political solution. Even today, many feel that India, which has a vital security stake in getting the Soviets back to the Oxus, could help itself, the sub-continent and peace generally by taking a clear initiative regionally.

Opinion is divided on whether any such initiative would yield results. The Soviet Union seems to have little intention of pulling out of Afghanistan. But this need not cause us despair in rest our search for some way to avert an arms race between India and Pakistan. A second solution lies in taking Gen Zia at his word and accepting a unilateral offer he made to Mr Swaran Singh in April last year an offer which he repeated to me in an interview in reply to the question: "Do you think some kind of a permanent arrangement needs to be made to ensure against the build-up of a dangerous war psychosis between our two countries?" He said: "Well, the whole thing starts from a lack of trust. We must not forget that India and Pakistan have fought three wars. I only hope we have both realised the futility of wars... Wars do not solve political problems. In this year of the Lord 1981, might should not be right... We must create more confidence in the minds of not only the people but also at the Government level."

He then recalled his offer to Mr Swaran Singh: "I said to him. Tell us, whether Pakistan should have a force for its own security or not. Should India have a force for its security or not? And if you come to the conclusion that there is justification for Pakistan to have an armed force for its own security, then ask your (military) experts to tell us what should be the strength of our forces considering the defence requirements of a country like Pakistan and its geographic borders. I would accept their assessment and not debate it. In the process, you may probably ask our reaction. If you were to say all right, Pakistan should have this much and India that much. I said have as much as you like, I am not concerned. But I would be very much concerned when 18 divisions face Pakistan. We have then to think twice as to what all this exercise is about. But I made this offer. Unfortunately, we had no reaction at first. The reaction that came much later was 'No'. India said this is not a fair proposition. Because, Pakistan should have what Pakistan thinks necessary and India should have what India thinks necessary.

"Then I said, if that be the case, why should India get allergic to Pakistan's stress on its legitimate defence requirements. Here again, I proposed that if you want to know what we have and what we do not have, please come and ask me. I will tell you exactly what we have. And what you have I will not challenge. India is a big country. Pakistan realises this... We very humbly suggest to you and through you to the people of India that it is about time that both countries decided what was good for them. As for Pakistan, I can say there is no doubt in my mind that the good of both the countries lies in peaceful relationship, in mutual understanding, confidence, and respect. Pakistan is a small country. India is a bigger country, Pakistan today does not consider itself in competition with India. We can't. We are 80 million people. India is 650 million people. India is a bigger partner in this. It has a clear role to play and we grant it that much. But I think there is need for a better understanding and more confidence. I am sure sooner or later these will come."

I then said: "These are excellent thoughts, Mr President, I recall having a chat with SardarSwaran Singh on his return. He and many others in the country felt that any discussion in regard to the defence forces of the two countries would have to be preceded by some political understanding. Is that what he said to you?" Gen Zia replied, "No, he did not say so. We were discussing bilateral relations and came to the question of defence forces. This is what I offered unilaterally, as an idea. However, I agree that everything must emerge from a political understanding which willabout better military understanding and more confidence in each other. (Almost a year to the day, I wrote: "Notwithstanding their difference of perception, New Delhi has sought to end Islamabad's misgivings about India and, in the bargain, conceded Pakistan's concern for its security from across the Afghan border. Islamabad has been reassured by Mr Swaran Singh that India presents no security problem to Pakistan and that Pakistan should regard its eastern border with India as "a frontier of peace.")

Gen Zia also made some other remarks in the course of the interview which assume urgency and importance on two other grounds. First, in the context of the continuing talk of Pakistan's determined effort to go in for the nuclear bomb and Mrs Gandhi's forthright declaration in Parliament that India would respond appropriately in case Pakistan decided to go in for nuclear arms. (Some leading commentators are already advocating the view that India should exercise its nuclear option before Pakistan does so.) Second, in the overall context of the continuing cold war between the two countries and the fresh arms race, Gen Zia emphatically denied that Pakistan had any intention of either making a nuclear bomb or of detonating a nuclear device for peaceful purposes. Pakistan, he said, wanted nuclear technology to fill the gap of its energy requirement. Its programme was "peaceful and modest." Gen Zia also said that he regarded the Simla Agreement as a no-war pact and emphasised: "We should stop living in the past... (and) start a new chapter."

From here to where? Gen Zia has spoken and, as I said earlier, we should take him at his word. Full advantage should be taken of Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Islamabad next month to begin a meaningful dialogue to avert an arms race and end the cold war, which is already causing both India and Pakistan enormous damage. Some Soviet commentators have reportedly suggested that the American arms for Pakistan are designed to prod Islamabad to fulfil "its old territorial ambitions in regard to Kashmir." But this is essentially an attempt on the part of Moscow to fish in the sub-continent's troubled waters. Pakistan may or may not accept the line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir as an international frontier under the Simla Agreement. However, its willingness to go by India's assessment of its security requirements reflects a departure from its old policy and an inclination to accept a peaceful final settlement of the Kashmir issue.

Time is here for a bold response to Gen Zia's offer and to test his sincerity. It is not enough that we keep talking of the East-West detente. New Delhi and Islamabad need to turn their thoughts to lowering tensions within the sub-continent itself. India should accept Pakistan's need to strengthen its defences as a frontline state in terms of Gen Zia's offer. Simultaneously, it should also seek an agreement in regard to nuclear development and leave no scope for mutual distrust. Indeed, Mrs Gandhi and Gen Zia should meet to gain understanding of each other's viewpoint and explore the areas of cooperation. Mrs Gandhi conveyed to Gen Zia in February last India's respect for the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan. Gen Zia has reciprocated by sending a warm message through Mrs Thatcher. India and Pakistan already regard the Simla Agreement as a "no-war pact." They should now consider ending the arms race which will only make them more dependent on the Super Powers. The two countries need to go beyond the Agreement towards a possible treaty of peace and friendship.----INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)