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Political Diary
Indo-Pak Talks: SIACHEN GLACIER ON BOIL AGAIN, by B.K. Mathur, 15 May 2007 |
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Defence Notes
New Delhi, 15 May 2006
Indo-Pak Talks
SIACHEN GLACIER ON BOIL AGAIN
By B.K. Mathur
This is a repeat of what one
heard, spoke and wrote last year before and after the tenth round of Defence
Secretaries parleys to resolve the prolonged Siachen Glacier issue between India
and Pakistan.
Like last time this year too, it was reported prior to the talks last week that
both sides were slowly inching towards a solution for the withdrawal of troops
from the Siachen Glacier and Saltoro ridge, the highest battleground in the
world. One hoped against hopes that some
sort of an understandings could be arrived at to demilitarize certain areas, to
start with. President Mushrraf had indicated Islamabad’s willingness
to work out a formula and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too has been holding
that an understanding could be a major breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations.
Nothing of the sort has happened.
India wants, and rightly too, Islamabad to authenticate the positions of the Indian
troops in the region at present to eliminate any mischief by the Pakistan Army
in claiming those strategically advantageous heights which the Indian troops
are presently occupying at high costs, notwithstanding clear indications prior
to the Rawalpindi talks that Islamabad was, in principle, inclined to arrive at
an agreement for the withdrawal of Indian troops. Islamabad
obviously wants New Delhi
to be flexible on the distance to which the Indian troops will pull back with
actually no commitment about the withdrawal of troops from where to where and
why. Naturally the controversy remains
unresolved, notwithstanding the diplomatic and political statements by the top
leadership of the two countries.
Strategically, the Indian troops
are based at a height very advantageous to them in the event of a war. This is
hurting the military rulers in Pakistan
against the backdrop of its defeats at the hands of India’s armed forces in 1948, 1965,
1971 and 1999. All the time the Pak
forces have attacked India
from the Kashmir side and had to pay heavily,
despite assistance and support from
powerful, developed countries. Islamabad now
wants the Indians troops to be withdrawn from these heights over the Saltoro
ridge, which India
should not leave. Islamabad may have lately accepted in
principle the Indian troops’ positions. But there is certainly need to first
get confirmation of the “actual ground position line (AGPL) as the defining
line or Line of Control.
In other words, the LoC which was
earlier drawn up only up to NJ 9842 should be extended as part of a firm
compromise and defined upto the end. Nothing short of which need to be
accepted, notwithstanding Islamabad’s
diplomatic pressure for world
consumption. The Indian side, particularly the Defence side, including the
armed forces, should ignore what the Pakistan Defence Secretary’s delegation
had reportedly stated after the last week’s unsuccessful
round, like in May last year: India has remained adamant on its demand for
authentication of the present position of Indian troops, even though we had
offered to “record” the positions. This
clearly means that Islamabad
remains adamant to its known position that it does not want to legalise the
AGPL.
What the Indian Army insists is
to have a “clearly defined operational response mechanism.” A firm provision needs to be incorporated in
the agreement, that in the event of the Pakistani troops intruding into the
Indian territory and taking positions belonging to the Indian Army and
withdrawn under the agreement\, the Indian troops would be within their right
to undertake an operational response and re-capture the positions on the
Glacier heights held by them prior to the implementation of the agreement, if
any. But before the “give and take”
arrangement which PM Manmohan Singh seems willing to work out with President
Musharraf, it is necessary for New Delhi to draw the LoC
upto the end.
The defining of the AGPL is at
the root of the prolonged Siachen problem.
Remember, following the Shimla Agreement after the 1971 war, the
ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) and so delineated
on the maps. This exercise established
Point NJ 9842 as the anchor around which the LoC got further defined as “thence
north to the glaciers”. This controversy over the “undrawn” LoC beyond NJ 9842
and its continuation towards north or “north-east” has remained unresolved,
which consequently led to the operation “Meghdoot” in 1984. The Indian forces then occupied the strategic
heights. The inviolability of the LoC
has to be maintained and made an important national objective, as stressed by former Defence and External Affairs
Minister, Jaswant Singh of the BJP.
This national objective must be
kept in mind while working out any agreement with Pakistan. It should not be treated casually because the
LoC in the Siachen sector has been turned into the AGPL. If New
Delhi is now considering withdrawal of troops from the heights
acquired through great efforts in 1984, then there is need for secure certain
commitments and assurances from Islamabad. Any formula to
resolve the contentious issue must,
therefore, include the confirmation of the AGPL, as the defining line,
commitment against the re-occupation of the heights surreptitiously by Pakistan,
defining the extent of the withdrawal and, importantly, cleaning of that part
of the Glacier which has been under the Pakistani troops for a long time.
Any withdrawal of Indian troops
from the strategic heights for a military operation needs to be negotiated
after obtaining adequate assurances,
with a clause for immediate military action against the violator, that is, Pakistan.
In this context, it must be remembered that the positions on which the Indian
troops are deployed are not over Siachen but the Saltoro glacier west of
Siachen. Pakistan has attempted several
times since 1984 to dislodge our troops from that height and has, in the process, lost substantial number of troops. Evidently, therefore, any agreement with Islamabad without confirming the validity of the AGPL
would amount to a violation of the sanctity of the LoC – and dilution of India’s
stand all these years.
In the past successive Army Chiefs have expressed
their concern about an agreement on withdrawal of the troops from these heights
in a hush hush manner, at times warning of the consequences. The Chief of the
Army Staff, General J.J. Singh had boldly stated: last year prior to the tenth
round of the Defence Secretaries meet: “We have conveyed our concern and views
to the Government and we expect that the composite dialogue will take care of these
concerns and the decision of the Government will be taken in consonance with
the views which have been projected.”
The Army’s main plea now, as on two earlier occasions in 1989 and 1990,
is that some kind of a mechanism should be incorporated in the agreement that
defines the Indian troops’ positions after withdrawal.
Truly, it will be suicidal for India
to agree on anything less than
getting Indian troops present position “authenticated” before any withdrawal.
This done, another “precautionary measure” must be taken: continued presence of
the Indian Air Force, even if the troops are ultimately pulled back. The IAF
bases of the Western forward area should remain in full “operational readiness”, because Kashmir
and its annexation has always remained close to the hearts of all military
rulers. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has disclosed the other day in her
amended autography that Musharraf as Director of Military Operations has
“sought” permission to “take”
Kashmir and assure control of Srinagar in 1996. What he wanted was foolishly attempted in
Kargil in 1999. Please remember this.---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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Sentinels Of Coastline: SMALL MARINE FORCE FOR BIG JOB, by B.K. Mathur, 26 March 2007 |
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Defence Notes
New Delhi, 26 March 2007
Sentinels Of Coastline
SMALL MARINE FORCE FOR BIG JOB
By B.K. Mathur
Increasing threat from the sea is
now receiving New Delhi’s
attention. It is well reflected in Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s recent
statements in Parliament and outside. He has talked about the urgent need to
strengthen India’s
Coast Guard to tackle the latest recent infiltration efforts by the militants.
Those trying to sneak in to India
from the sea route are not only the militants from Pakistan
but also Sri Lanka’s
LTTE cadres. A number of them have reportedly been found in Tamil Nadu and
Kerala. Antony
has also talked in Port Blair the other day about the need to bolster Andaman
and Nicobar security.
He has indicated
threats posed to the region by China
and the terrorists.China’s
fast-growing footprints in the Indian Ocean about which Antony has talked is known for long. So also
the need to strengthen military infrastructure and force levels of unified
theatre command in the region. Equally urgent for national defence is the need
to give the much required boost to the country’s young armed force, the Coast
Guard which has not received the attention it required all these 29 years it
has been in existence, considering its duties to safeguard India’s long
coastline. Happily, attention has now turned to the sentinels of the coastline
especially, because of the tightened security of our land borders and the
infiltration attempts from the sea.
About the Unified Command which Antony indicated at Port
Blair the other day another time. First the need to strengthen the Coast Guard.
Believe it, this marine force is one organization which could earn more than
what it spends, given the fact that the constabulary in a way was thought of in
the 1970s to protect massive sea
wealth and living and non-living resources in about 28.5 million sq. km. of
Exclusive Economic Zone, extending upto 200 miles into the sea. India
has been known for long for smuggling of gold and silver and its sea fish
potential of about four million tonnes per year. If all this massive wealth is protected, the entire force could
not only be financed but much of the collections could be utilized in national
development.
The task of the force is all the
more enormous in view of the prevailing security environment, especially the
latest terror threat from the sea. In fact, the geo-strategic situation of India, the international maritime legislation,
the U.N. law of the Sea and the Law of the Sea Convention have made India’s
position vulnerable politically, because we have island territories far away
from the mainland. India’s major interest has thus not been covered by
international laws, giving rise to a complexity of legal rights and duties, the
magnitude of which can be understood by the fact that the country has the
largest Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf upto 350 miles from the coast in
the Bay of Bengal and 300 miles in the Arabian Sea. The area has to be
protected by the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard also has the
challenging responsibility of facing along with the Navy the ever-growing
threats to the peace and security of the country. At present the potential
threat is from Pakistan
which has been strengthening its Naval force since 1971. Moreover, Islamabad is gradually
changing its strategy. Earlier, its sea force was dependent on its air force
for any Naval operation. But now it is a real blue-water Navy, giving rise to
the urgency for the Indian defence planners to draw up the maritime boundaries
with Pakistan
and other neighbouring countries. Several times in the past Pakistan boats have been captured
with explosives being smuggled for militancy. Lately, the Pak-trained militants
too have started entering India.
This requires a considerable
increase in the Coast Guard’s firepower and equipment to become a fighting
force in the sea, rather than the constabulary. All these years since it was
constituted in 1978, the force has not received its due. In early 1980s a
five-year Coast Guard Development Plan (CGDP) was worked out by the Government
for 1985-1990. But it could not be formally approved due to the acute crunch
the country faced. The acquisition proposals were on a piece-meal basis and the
amount sanctioned for the purpose was restricted to just Rs.518.88 crore. Then
again in the CGDP for 1990-95 was recast to 1992-97 in line with the national
five-year plan owing to severe resource crunch, leading to a two-year plan holiday.
The same treatment to the Coast
Guard has continued since then. For the 1992-97 plan, a projection was made for
Rs.2286.92 crore, but ultimately it was approved for only Rs.1223 crore. This
reduction has led to drastic cuts in the initially projected force level
required for the massive
responsibilities of the force. The CGDP for 1997-2002 was initially projected
for Rs.3277 crore. But it was finally approved for Rs.1850 crore. The result?
Much required machinery, fighter boats, observation posts, hovercraft,
helicopters etc could not be acquired and the constabulary continued to operate
with obsolete machines and manpower under the control and command of the Indian
Navy. The force by itself has never been
equal to its task all these 29 years of its existence.
The Coast Guard continues to be a
small force. The last figure that I have is that it is a force of just 5440
uniformed personnel---633 Officers, 4560 enrolled personnel including 82
Officers and 145 personnel from the Navy and other Defence Services on
deputation. The situation is so despite the fact that the force is taking on
the ever-increasing responsibilities in protecting the national interests in
the maritime zone. At present, about 70 per cent of these personnel are serving
at sea or manning the front line Squadrons to operate its 65 ships and 44
aircraft. Indeed, this is an excellent tooth to tail ratio by any standard. But
this does not make the maritime force fully equipped to meet its challenging
task. It has to be fighting force and sort of a “second line” of defence for
the Navy at the time of its operation on sea.
More than 200-year-old Coast
Guard forces in Britain and America,
both great Naval powers in the world, are one hundred per cent fighting forces
in those two countries. They can be deployed as fully combatant Navies in times
of need. Doubtlessly, India
cannot afford to have a parallel Navy. In fact, a lot more is required to
strengthen the Indian Navy itself. But the requirements of the Coast Guard too
need to be commensurate with its task. The force is also important for the
Navy, which could not be expected to be fully effective without a policing
force.
The strengthening of the Coast
Guard with modern sophisticated machinery and fully-trained manpower of the
force’s own automatically strengthens the Navy. When the fighting Navy prepares
itself for a sea battle, the sentinels of the maritime zone keep an effective
vigil on the vast coastline India
has. They are a force which ensures India’s interests on sea adequately
protected. The young Coast Guard of India has a long way to go in men,
equipment and experience before it can rely on its own inherent strength. It
requires as much attention as any other military or para-military organization.
Remember, the country’s safety lies on the sea also, especially in the present
day context when the sea terror has raised its ugly head. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Unplanned Exercise: MORE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, by B.K. Mathur, 12 March 2007 |
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Defence Notes
New Delhi, 12 March 2007
Unplanned Exercise
MORE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
By B.K. Mathur
Routinely the Union Finance
Minister has provided more funds for defence in his budget proposals for
2007-08, like the annual increments the armed forces have been getting for
decades without adequate expert planning and programming. A provision of Rs.96,000
crore has been made with a commitment, again routinely, that “any additional
requirement for the security of the nation will be provided.” The allocation is Rs.7,000 crore more than
initially provided for the current fiscal. Considering the revised estimate, it
should be Rs.10,000 crore increase in view of the Ministry’s failure to utilize
Rs.3,000 crore, a trend which has become a regular annual feature in view of
bad defence planning in regard to modernization efforts.
The budgetary allocation for the
coming financial year includes Rs.41,922 for capital outlay and Rs.37,458 for
revenue expenditure (day-to-day expenditure) as against Rs.89,000 crore and
34,458 crore respectively initially earmarked for the current fiscal. This means that India’s defence spending will
continue to hover around 2.5 per cent of the GDP against the experts’ defence
demand of 3 per cent. There is always a demand for more and more to spend, even
if you can’t do it. But the most important point is that India’s defence spending continues to be less than that of immediate neighbours Pakistan and China, which have been spending
around 4.5 per cent of their GDPs. But of greater concern is that the
modernization plans will continue to go on in its typically slow manner,
leading to failure to spend what has been allocated for the purpose.
Why does this recurring ghost of
unspent funds continue to haunt India’s
arms modernization programme? Failure of the Defence Ministry to improve its
procurement procedures which continue to be faulty despite thoughtful
recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) after the Kargil operation in
1999. In fact, if one goes by the “committed liabilities” of the Defence
Ministry towards procurement of weapons and weapon systems, a major chunk of
the capital outlay of Rs.41,922 crore proposed for the next fiscal should go in
terms of installments towards big deals for armaments signed in recent years. Most
of these deals took a long time to finalise, resulting in cost escalations and
failure to fully utilize the allotted funds.
These deals include the French
Scorpene submarine project costing Rs.18,798 crore, the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal for the
Navy for Rs.6,900 crore, Rs.,8,000-crore British Hawk deal and the Israel
Phalcon AWACS deal costing Rs.5,000 crore. The Army too has projected a plan
for its artillery modernization at a cost of Rs.8,000 to 10,000 crore. Besides
these, the Defence Ministry should be finalising soon its other proposals, including
the Indian Air Force’s urgent requirement for fighter aircraft. It is more than
one year since the Government had agreed in principle for the procurement of
126 fighter aircraft to replace the earlier outdated versions of the MiG
aircraft. Informal offers have already been made by different producers, but
lack of planning, not funds, is mainly responsible for the delay.
In fact, successive Finance Ministers have followed faulty budgeting
system for the armed forces all these years. In a well-researched write-up, a
retired Colonel, P.K. Vasudeva, states: the “system should ensure that the
right amount is spent on defence in the light of the pattern on national
priorities and the right military capabilities are developed in the light of
the structure of security priorities… the defence budget, in short, must be
seen not only in terms of what we must defend ourselves against but what we
have to defend… Once the tasks are defined, the question of building up the
capabilities to perform them follows by formulation of plans for specific
programmes.
“If the scarce resources are to
be spent efficiently for defence the budget has to be the vehicle for
implementing the programmes so planned.
This has not been possible in
Indiassions and objectives”.
as defence budgets are drawn up in terms of inputs (amounts spent on
acquisition of arms, personnel etc) and not programmes designed to enable the
defence to meet the tasks set for them. Equipment is acquired without taking
account of the personnel required to use them or their training. Budgets in
defence are focused heavily on “acquisition” rather than on building
capabilities. No such exercise has far been undertaken to ensure that the
budgetary provisions for the armed forces are based on their “mi
In an effort to ensure the objectives
and accountability, the concept of Planning Programming and Budgeting (PPB) was
introduced in the United
States during the 1960s. The UK too followed this method. But
subsequently it was found inadequate to link the military strategy with defence
budgeting. The concept of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) was then introduced
for a five-yearly comprehensive review of the force structure, modernization
plans and other elements of the military planning and programming for the next
20 years. Unfortunately, India’s
planners and financial advisers have failed to follow what the militarily
advanced countries like in US and the UK practise while planning budgets
for their armed forces.
In fact, it is necessary to have in place some institutional system for
budgeting for the armed forces, with much say of the Defence Ministry, which
presently does not have any decision-making authority for military budgeting.
The Financial Adviser (Defence Services) draws up the budget on the basis of
the projection of the three military Services in isolation after, of course,
bilateral discussions with the
Service Headquarters and the Finance Division. The allocation is routinely
decided on the basis of previous years, budget provisions and revised expenditure
towards the end of the financial year and ongoing programmes without even
caring the progress in those
programmes finalized without working out priorities.
Again, there is need to take note
of what happens in the UK before finalizing the annual budgetary allocations
for the armed forces on the basis of the QDR—the 20-year plan which, remember,
the late Jagjeevan Ram had thought of seriously as the Defence Minister but
failed to implement the idea because of vested interests which cared more for
personal gains rather than national interest. In Britain there is a Council, headed
by the Defence Minister. It takes all policy decisions in consultation with the
Service Chiefs and expert advisers on military strategies and force levels
required to execute the strategy and lay down policy framework as the main
guideline for working out the defence budget. We need to have such institutions
like a defence council or defence management board.
The long-planning concept for
defence budgeting, first proposed by the Plawden Committee of the UK, necessarily requires honest integration of the Service
headquarters with the Defence Ministry which has been suggested by various
experts and this column for years. A meaningful budget for the armed forces has
need to be prepared by a body, “committee or a council or whatever you name it,
comprising the Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and the other Defence
departments under the Defence Minister. It is only this body which should take
decisions that alone should guide the budget-makes. Routine budgeting should
now stop in national interest.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Exploit Indigenous Expertise:LACUNAE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY, by B.K. Mathur, 26 February 2007 |
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Defence Notes
New Delhi, 26 February 2007
Exploit Indigenous Expertise
LACUNAE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY
By B.K. Mathur
It was extremely nice of
President Kalam to have a question-answer interaction with the middle-level Officers
of the armed forces at the Defence Services Staff
College, Wellington Equally welcome was that the President frankly
responded to questions on politics, diplomacy and economics beside, of course,
the defence issues. One of the
questions, which this column has been raising for decades, and time and again,
pertained to indigenous weapons designing and production. One Wing Commander
doing the Course rightly and concernedly observed that a weapon designed and
developed becomes obsolete before it is inducted into the Service. The
President, who is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, was quick to react,
but evaded the truth which he knows best. over the last week-end.
The missile-man,
as we knew Kalam Sahib as the Chief of the Defence Ministry’s Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) only gave the example of the indigenously-developed
BrahMos missile and stated that the
Organisation has been asked to suggest a vision for the weapon’s platform and
sensors at an affordable cost. As the history of the DRDO tells us, the young
scientists of the Organisation are capable of achieving the target given to
them in the required timeframe. They are the envy of the world for designing
and developing state-of-the-art weapons and weapon systems. The only problem is
their production, which led to the Wing Commander’s observation: By the time
the weapon is inducted into the force it becomes obsolete.
The DRDO’s contribution to the
country’s armed forces is well-known. The defence scientists and technicians have
been designing and developing over the years military machines and systems
comparable with the ones produced in the developed countries whose defence
industry is their main economic activity. But the problem, as noticed earlier,
invariably arises at the production stage, giving one the impression that the seven defence public sector
enterprises and 40 Ordnance factories across
the country lack the capability to produce the state-of-the-art machines and
systems. However, this is far from the truth. They have the capability and wherewithal
to produce the latest, as proved by their performances since 1962, after the
Chinese invasion and again after the Kargil confrontation in 1999.
The largest Departmentally-run
undertaking is presently meeting all the requirements of the armed forces and,
importantly, can be trusted to produce all that we prefer to import for reasons
other than quality and for creating defence scandals. The latest Ordnance
factory has the capacity to produce not only the ammunition for the Bofors gun
but also the capability to produce indigenously 155 mm. howitzer gun under
technology transfer agreement. Alas, our defence planners have preferred to get
the howitzers for the Indian Army from abroad. The production capability of
this factory includes that of the India’s main battle tank, the
controversial MBT-Arjun.
The history of the production of
the MBT-Arjun clearly highlights the snag, better call it tragedy of the
Government of India’s indigenous defence production policy that has caused
unpardonably long delays in such important machines like the Arjun, which was
initially named MBT-72, as it was expected to be produced in 1972, and the
light combat aircraft (LCA). The whole
trouble is about the absence of a well-considered military equipment policy.
Take, for example again, the story of the MBT. The Army first asked during the
1960s for a 1,000 hp power-pack (engine) and then revised it to 1500 hp,
perhaps without realizing that it takes nearly 15 years to design, develop and
produce such an engine. That is the reason why the Arjun tank is presently
being produced with an imported power-pack, causing delay and, importantly,
necessitating off-the-shelf
procurement from Russia of the
T-series tanks.
The result of such an ill-advised
policy causes not only undue delays and increasing uncertainly of indigenous
projects that leads to a rush for imports and, concernedly, the scandals and
corruption associated with defence
projects which, at times, causes import of even sub-standard or obsolete
machines at high costs, despite the fact that we have an indigenous production
capability which matches any other in the world. Not only that. This policy of
the vested interests and corrupt persons, has caused neglect of the Ordnance
factories’ expertise. Several of these factories have been crying for long
about the need for modernizing their outdated machines and updating marketing
technologies through which much foreign exchange could be earned through exports
of some of their produce.
In this context it is necessary to understand some facts about the defence
industry which make it quite different from the civil, profit-making industry.
First, a modern and sophisticated equipment has a large number of components
running into thousands, and that too of different heads like the electronic
ammunition, fire power and all that. What this leads to is that no one set of
scientists and technicians can possibly
look into the production of all the components. Importantly, no defence
production unit in the world, even in highly militarily advanced countries can
produce all the components under one roof---and one unit. It is economically
not viable. Interdependence is necessary
in the defence industry.
Some years ago this writer was
told in Bangalore, the hub of defence industry,
that an American defence production company was importing from India
certain small components for production of a highly-sophisticated gas-turbine
engine. This was later confirmed by Kalam Sahib, then Chief of the DRDO. The
explanation for this import was simple.
It was economic for the US
company to import that particular component from India or anywhere else, because it
was pointless to set up a special
production facility at high costs. But over a period of time the private sector
industry in the US
has grown and set up separate facilities for production of even the smallest of
components since the entire industry there is export-oriented and is a major
component of the national economy.
India’s civil industry could also
chip in and set up facilities which could not only be used at home but also exported.
The defence industry has been suffering considerably for decades due to massive imports of highly-sophisticated machinery. In
fact, India’s
defence forces became so much dependent on imports that not much effort was
made to indigenize production of even ordinary equipment. No doubt, the
industry has license-produced most of the machinery as per the Government
policy. But in that process it did
not concentrate much on the production of spares, leading to a major crisis for
India’s
armed forces.
Doubtless,
the crisis has always been caused by the Government’s ill-advised production
and import policies, which call for a fresh look, keeping in view the fact that
our scientists and technocrats are inferior to none in the world. If they are
given the required inputs and resources, sans the politics and the interests of
the file-pushers in the Government, they are capable of producing anything the
forces need. The practice of always running for imports could be eliminated and
the expertise available indigenously exploited without compromising on quality.
The only thing is to have the will and right direction of the defence
policy-makers.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Corps Of Signals: ARMY’S CENTRAL NERVE SYSTEM,By B.K. Mathur, 12 February 2007 |
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Defence Notes
New Delhi, 12 February 2007
Corps Of Signals
ARMY’S CENTRAL NERVE SYSTEM
By B.K. Mathur
The small but crucial arm of the
Indian Army, the Corps of Signals is celebrating its 96th
anniversary today, February 15. It is
fast growing to match the sophistication of military machines and changed
battle strategies. The Corps is now equipped with the latest equipments and
seems well on way to prepare itself for the present day military developments
in an era of not only satellite communications through electronics and
computerized gadgets but also for what is being increasingly described as Star
Wars. Most militarily advanced nations have placed their satellites to monitor
the happenings in the skies and the Indian Air Force (IAF) has also started talking
about to.
In the fast-changing concept of
modern warfare, one can win or lose without fighting a full-fledged
conventional battle on the ground. But, remember, one fundamental rule of the
war game remains unchanged from the time immemorial: need for a fighting force
of a perfect communication system in a war theatre of any kind, which includes
the present day’s missile and
counter-missile war scenario. That is
the responsibility of the Corps of Signals, rightly described as the central
nerve system, the slightest malfunctioning of which can paralyse the best of
military operation. The Signal units provide complete coordination and
electronic warfare support to the fighting forces and operational communication
for the Navy and the Air Force, which have now come to occupy a dominant role
in modern warfare.
Happily, the communication system
in India’s
armed forces has developed from time to time, thanks to the country’s young
scientists and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The
induction of the state-of-the-art communication systems in the armed forces,
like the AREN-Area grid system, have proved once more that India’s defence
scientists and technicians are not lagging behind anyone in the world, given,
of course, the required financial backing, which is invariably lacking more due
to bureaucratic hassles and bad
planning. Notwithstanding the handicaps, the continuous improvements in
transistors and integrated circuits have not only led to miniaturisation and
module construction, but also to the whole question in the field on electronics
and communication techniques.
This kind of developed system is
required because the field force now needs fully integrated and automated,
secure, reliable and high-speed communication in semi-nuclear or conventional
battlefield of the future. Remember, when sword was the main weapon of a
soldier on foot and a horse and a lance of a cavalry man, the system was quite
different. Today, when a conventional army operation involves a tank, automatic
firing systems and missiles,
supported by massive air operations,
information is required to travel much faster, through electronic equipments.
Even if an operation is on a battalion level in a far-flung border area, the
Army Headquarters at New Delhi
is required to have blow-by-blow account on “one-up one down” basis. In other
words, a message travelling step by
step.
The Indian Army in the past and
now has maintained a good standard of communication too. Looking at the equipment the Corps of Signals
has today and the R&D efforts made by the Defence Ministry’s Bharat
Electronics Ltd. (BEL), one is inclined to believe that India is way ahead of others in the
region. Once our own satellites which our scientists have been launching from
time to time are being fully used for our defence communication networks, India’s
information system in the armed forces in times of operations will doubtlessly be as competent as that of advanced countries.
The Army Signals made a humble
beginning on February 15,
1911 with the establishment of two Companies. At that time most of
the Signal Officers and tradesmen were British. It was only in 1933 as part of
a drive towards Indianisation that a Boys Company was raised at Jabalpur. The World War II
saw a large-scale expansion of the Signals and its greater Indianisation 0to
meet the manpower requirement. With India declaring itself a Republic
on January 26, 1950,
the Signals were designated as the Corps of Signals---and the process of equipping the Corps with modern equipment started
in earnest. After the Chinese aggression
in 1962, heavy demands fell on the Signals. The vintage war equipment was
replaced by more sophisticated and modern systems.
The Corps of Signals was perhaps
the first in India
to launch the introduction of electronic data processing. Way back in 1964, it stressed the importance of computers as an essential tool for operational and administrative
management in the day-to-day use. It was then realized that design-making and
processing massive
amount of information and data in an ever-shrinking time-frame can only be possible with efficient computer services backing at
all levels. The military Exchange at
present handles on an average about 5,000 calls daily and the Signals Centre
about 3,000 messages per days from
the Army Headquarters. That is in peace time.
Imagine, what the position will be in time of war. Added to this is the
painstaking job of enciphering and deciphering the messages.
The phenomenal increase in the
density of electronic, electrical and electro-magnetic devices and systems
which the armed forces are required to use in a confined geographical area are
bound to generate electro- magnetic interference (EMI). It could prove catastrophic, rendering the
complete system totally ineffective. In
fact, this is one of the major problems on which the Defence scientists are
increasingly engaged, as the systems are upgraded regularly. A project study on the subject had been
undertaken sometime back with considerable success
to ensure the vital electro-magnetic compatibility. This has become more
relevant in the present-day context as the concept of warfare now is bound to extend from land,
air and sea to the dimension of electro-magnetic space. This is challenge
number one for the Signalmen of the armed forces.
Indeed, the Corps of Signals has
kept pace with the revolutionary progress
made in the field of communication electronics the world over. But what about the men of the Corps, required
to use the new equipment and systems? The personnel of the Corps, particularly the tradesmen at the
lower levels, are not being “sophisticated” at the speed on which the equipment
is being modernized, despite the fact that the training institutions have
increased in number and some Officers are sent abroad regularly to upgrade
their knowledge. Taken as a whole, the
quality of intake in the Indian Army has of late gone down. But in technical
arms like the Signals, this setback is alarming.
What really is happening is that
the electronics being a new field, qualified youngmen are finding better
prospects in civil employment. And,
alarmingly, the Officers and men of the Corps of Signals rush to put in their
papers the moment rules allow them to do so, to be able to take up more
lucrative civil opportunities. There is an urgent need to put a stop to this
trend, realizing that no war---conventional, nuclear or semi-nuclear---can be
fought without a fool-proof communication system. The Signals have always been
the Indian Army’s plus point, from the times when pigeons were used to convey
messages to the present-day
gadgets. The tradition need to be
maintained even with the latest, modern systems of communication. Any lapse on
this front would mean a crisis situation in the armed forces.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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