Defence Notes

Indo-Pak Talks

SIACHEN GLACIER ON BOIL AGAIN

By B.K. Mathur

Nothing of the sort has happened. India wants, and rightly too, Islamabad to authenticate the positions of the Indian troops in the region at present to eliminate any mischief by the Pakistan Army in claiming those strategically advantageous heights which the Indian troops are presently occupying at high costs, notwithstanding clear indications prior to the Rawalpindi talks that Islamabad was, in principle, inclined to arrive at an agreement for the withdrawal of Indian troops.  Islamabad obviously wants New Delhi to be flexible on the distance to which the Indian troops will pull back with actually no commitment about the withdrawal of troops from where to where and why.  Naturally the controversy remains unresolved, notwithstanding the diplomatic and political statements by the top leadership of the two countries.

 Strategically, the Indian troops are based at a height very advantageous to them in the event of a war. This is hurting the military rulers in Pakistan against the backdrop of its defeats at the hands of India’s armed forces in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999.  All the time the Pak forces have attacked India from the Kashmir side and had to pay heavily, despite assistance and support from powerful, developed countries. Islamabad now wants the Indians troops to be withdrawn from these heights over the Saltoro ridge, which India should not leave.  Islamabad may have lately accepted in principle the Indian troops’ positions. But there is certainly need to first get confirmation of the “actual ground position line (AGPL) as the defining line or Line of Control.

 In other words, the LoC which was earlier drawn up only up to NJ 9842 should be extended as part of a firm compromise and defined upto the end. Nothing short of which need to be accepted, notwithstanding Islamabad’s diplomatic pressure for world consumption. The Indian side, particularly the Defence side, including the armed forces, should ignore what the Pakistan Defence Secretary’s delegation had reportedly stated after the last week’s unsuccessful round, like in May last year: India has remained adamant on its demand for authentication of the present position of Indian troops, even though we had offered to “record” the positions.  This clearly means that Islamabad remains adamant to its known position that it does not want to legalise the AGPL.

 What the Indian Army insists is to have a “clearly defined operational response mechanism.”  A firm provision needs to be incorporated in the agreement, that in the event of the Pakistani troops intruding into the Indian territory and taking positions belonging to the Indian Army and withdrawn under the agreement\, the Indian troops would be within their right to undertake an operational response and re-capture the positions on the Glacier heights held by them prior to the implementation of the agreement, if any.  But before the “give and take” arrangement which PM Manmohan Singh seems willing to work out with President Musharraf, it is necessary for New Delhi to draw the LoC upto the end.

The defining of the AGPL is at the root of the prolonged Siachen problem.  Remember, following the Shimla Agreement after the 1971 war, the ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) and so delineated on the maps.  This exercise established Point NJ 9842 as the anchor around which the LoC got further defined as “thence north to the glaciers”. This controversy over the “undrawn” LoC beyond NJ 9842 and its continuation towards north or “north-east” has remained unresolved, which consequently led to the operation “Meghdoot” in 1984.  The Indian forces then occupied the strategic heights.  The inviolability of the LoC has to be maintained and made an important national objective, as stressed by former Defence and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh of the BJP.

This national objective must be kept in mind while working out any agreement with Pakistan.  It should not be treated casually because the LoC in the Siachen sector has been turned into the AGPL. If New Delhi is now considering withdrawal of troops from the heights acquired through great efforts in 1984, then there is need for secure certain commitments and assurances from Islamabad. Any formula to resolve the contentious issue must, therefore, include the confirmation of the AGPL, as the defining line, commitment against the re-occupation of the heights surreptitiously by Pakistan, defining the extent of the withdrawal and, importantly, cleaning of that part of the Glacier which has been under the Pakistani troops for a long time.

 Any withdrawal of Indian troops from the strategic heights for a military operation needs to be negotiated after obtaining adequate assurances, with a clause for immediate military action against the violator, that is, Pakistan. In this context, it must be remembered that the positions on which the Indian troops are deployed are not over Siachen but the Saltoro glacier west of Siachen.  Pakistan has attempted several times since 1984 to dislodge our troops from that height and has, in the process, lost substantial number of troops.  Evidently, therefore, any agreement with Islamabad without confirming the validity of the AGPL would amount to a violation of the sanctity of the LoC – and dilution of India’s stand all these years.

In the past successive Army Chiefs have expressed their concern about an agreement on withdrawal of the troops from these heights in a hush hush manner, at times warning of the consequences. The Chief of the Army Staff, General J.J. Singh had boldly stated: last year prior to the tenth round of the Defence Secretaries meet: “We have conveyed our concern and views to the Government and we expect that the composite dialogue will take care of these concerns and the decision of the Government will be taken in consonance with the views which have been projected.”  The Army’s main plea now, as on two earlier occasions in 1989 and 1990, is that some kind of a mechanism should be incorporated in the agreement that defines the Indian troops’ positions after withdrawal.

 Truly, it will be suicidal for India to agree on anything less than getting Indian troops present position “authenticated” before any withdrawal. This done, another “precautionary measure” must be taken: continued presence of the Indian Air Force, even if the troops are ultimately pulled back. The IAF bases of the Western forward area should remain in full “operational readiness”, because Kashmir and its annexation has always remained close to the hearts of all military rulers. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has disclosed the other day in her amended autography that Musharraf as Director of Military Operations has “sought” permission to “take” Kashmir and assure control of Srinagar in 1996.  What he wanted was foolishly attempted in Kargil in 1999. Please remember this.---INFA

  (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

New Delhi, 26 March 2007

Sentinels Of Coastline

SMALL MARINE FORCE FOR BIG JOB

By B.K. Mathur

Increasing threat from the sea is now receiving New Delhi’s attention. It is well reflected in Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s recent statements in Parliament and outside. He has talked about the urgent need to strengthen India’s Coast Guard to tackle the latest recent infiltration efforts by the militants. Those trying to sneak in to India from the sea route are not only the militants from Pakistan but also Sri Lanka’s LTTE cadres. A number of them have reportedly been found in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Antony has also talked in Port Blair the other day about the need to bolster Andaman and Nicobar security. 

He has indicated threats posed to the region by China and the terrorists.China’s fast-growing footprints in the Indian Ocean about which Antony has talked is known for long. So also the need to strengthen military infrastructure and force levels of unified theatre command in the region. Equally urgent for national defence is the need to give the much required boost to the country’s young armed force, the Coast Guard which has not received the attention it required all these 29 years it has been in existence, considering its duties to safeguard India’s long coastline. Happily, attention has now turned to the sentinels of the coastline especially, because of the tightened security of our land borders and the infiltration attempts from the sea.

 About the Unified Command which Antony indicated at Port Blair the other day another time. First the need to strengthen the Coast Guard. Believe it, this marine force is one organization which could earn more than what it spends, given the fact that the constabulary in a way was thought of in the 1970s to protect massive sea wealth and living and non-living resources in about 28.5 million sq. km. of Exclusive Economic Zone, extending upto 200 miles into the sea. India has been known for long for smuggling of gold and silver and its sea fish potential of about four million tonnes per year. If all this massive wealth is protected, the entire force could not only be financed but much of the collections could be utilized in national development.

The task of the force is all the more enormous in view of the prevailing security environment, especially the latest terror threat from the sea. In fact, the geo-strategic situation of India, the international maritime legislation, the U.N. law of the Sea and the Law of the Sea Convention have made India’s position vulnerable politically, because we have island territories far away from the mainland. India’s major interest has thus not been covered by international laws, giving rise to a complexity of legal rights and duties, the magnitude of which can be understood by the fact that the country has the largest Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf upto 350 miles from the coast in the Bay of Bengal and 300 miles in the Arabian Sea. The area has to be protected by the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard also has the challenging responsibility of facing along with the Navy the ever-growing threats to the peace and security of the country. At present the potential threat is from Pakistan which has been strengthening its Naval force since 1971. Moreover, Islamabad is gradually changing its strategy. Earlier, its sea force was dependent on its air force for any Naval operation. But now it is a real blue-water Navy, giving rise to the urgency for the Indian defence planners to draw up the maritime boundaries with Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Several times in the past Pakistan boats have been captured with explosives being smuggled for militancy. Lately, the Pak-trained militants too have started entering India.

This requires a considerable increase in the Coast Guard’s firepower and equipment to become a fighting force in the sea, rather than the constabulary. All these years since it was constituted in 1978, the force has not received its due. In early 1980s a five-year Coast Guard Development Plan (CGDP) was worked out by the Government for 1985-1990. But it could not be formally approved due to the acute crunch the country faced. The acquisition proposals were on a piece-meal basis and the amount sanctioned for the purpose was restricted to just Rs.518.88 crore. Then again in the CGDP for 1990-95 was recast to 1992-97 in line with the national five-year plan owing to severe resource crunch, leading to a two-year plan holiday.

The same treatment to the Coast Guard has continued since then. For the 1992-97 plan, a projection was made for Rs.2286.92 crore, but ultimately it was approved for only Rs.1223 crore. This reduction has led to drastic cuts in the initially projected force level required for the massive responsibilities of the force. The CGDP for 1997-2002 was initially projected for Rs.3277 crore. But it was finally approved for Rs.1850 crore. The result? Much required machinery, fighter boats, observation posts, hovercraft, helicopters etc could not be acquired and the constabulary continued to operate with obsolete machines and manpower under the control and command of the Indian Navy.  The force by itself has never been equal to its task all these 29 years of its existence.

 The Coast Guard continues to be a small force. The last figure that I have is that it is a force of just 5440 uniformed personnel---633 Officers, 4560 enrolled personnel including 82 Officers and 145 personnel from the Navy and other Defence Services on deputation. The situation is so despite the fact that the force is taking on the ever-increasing responsibilities in protecting the national interests in the maritime zone. At present, about 70 per cent of these personnel are serving at sea or manning the front line Squadrons to operate its 65 ships and 44 aircraft. Indeed, this is an excellent tooth to tail ratio by any standard. But this does not make the maritime force fully equipped to meet its challenging task. It has to be fighting force and sort of a “second line” of defence for the Navy at the time of its operation on sea.

More than 200-year-old Coast Guard forces in Britain and America, both great Naval powers in the world, are one hundred per cent fighting forces in those two countries. They can be deployed as fully combatant Navies in times of need. Doubtlessly, India cannot afford to have a parallel Navy. In fact, a lot more is required to strengthen the Indian Navy itself. But the requirements of the Coast Guard too need to be commensurate with its task. The force is also important for the Navy, which could not be expected to be fully effective without a policing force.

The strengthening of the Coast Guard with modern sophisticated machinery and fully-trained manpower of the force’s own automatically strengthens the Navy. When the fighting Navy prepares itself for a sea battle, the sentinels of the maritime zone keep an effective vigil on the vast coastline India has. They are a force which ensures India’s interests on sea adequately protected. The young Coast Guard of India has a long way to go in men, equipment and experience before it can rely on its own inherent strength. It requires as much attention as any other military or para-military organization. Remember, the country’s safety lies on the sea also, especially in the present day context when the sea terror has raised its ugly head. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 12 March 2007

 Unplanned Exercise

MORE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

By B.K. Mathur

The budgetary allocation for the coming financial year includes Rs.41,922 for capital outlay and Rs.37,458 for revenue expenditure (day-to-day expenditure) as against Rs.89,000 crore and 34,458 crore respectively initially earmarked for the current fiscal.  This means that India’s defence spending will continue to hover around 2.5 per cent of the GDP against the experts’ defence demand of 3 per cent. There is always a demand for more and more to spend, even if you can’t do it. But the most important point is that India’s defence spending continues to be less than that of immediate neighbours Pakistan and China, which have been spending around 4.5 per cent of their GDPs. But of greater concern is that the modernization plans will continue to go on in its typically slow manner, leading to failure to spend what has been allocated for the purpose.

Why does this recurring ghost of unspent funds continue to haunt India’s arms modernization programme? Failure of the Defence Ministry to improve its procurement procedures which continue to be faulty despite thoughtful recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) after the Kargil operation in 1999. In fact, if one goes by the “committed liabilities” of the Defence Ministry towards procurement of weapons and weapon systems, a major chunk of the capital outlay of Rs.41,922 crore proposed for the next fiscal should go in terms of installments towards big deals for armaments signed in recent years. Most of these deals took a long time to finalise, resulting in cost escalations and failure to fully utilize the allotted funds.

These deals include the French Scorpene submarine project costing Rs.18,798 crore, the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal for the Navy for Rs.6,900 crore, Rs.,8,000-crore British Hawk deal and the Israel Phalcon AWACS deal costing Rs.5,000 crore. The Army too has projected a plan for its artillery modernization at a cost of Rs.8,000 to 10,000 crore. Besides these, the Defence Ministry should be finalising soon its other proposals, including the Indian Air Force’s urgent requirement for fighter aircraft. It is more than one year since the Government had agreed in principle for the procurement of 126 fighter aircraft to replace the earlier outdated versions of the MiG aircraft. Informal offers have already been made by different producers, but lack of planning, not funds, is mainly responsible for the delay. 

In fact, successive Finance Ministers have followed faulty budgeting system for the armed forces all these years. In a well-researched write-up, a retired Colonel, P.K. Vasudeva, states: the “system should ensure that the right amount is spent on defence in the light of the pattern on national priorities and the right military capabilities are developed in the light of the structure of security priorities… the defence budget, in short, must be seen not only in terms of what we must defend ourselves against but what we have to defend… Once the tasks are defined, the question of building up the capabilities to perform them follows by formulation of plans for specific programmes.

“If the scarce resources are to be spent efficiently for defence the budget has to be the vehicle for implementing the programmes so planned.  This has not been possible in Indiassions and objectives”. as defence budgets are drawn up in terms of inputs (amounts spent on acquisition of arms, personnel etc) and not programmes designed to enable the defence to meet the tasks set for them. Equipment is acquired without taking account of the personnel required to use them or their training. Budgets in defence are focused heavily on “acquisition” rather than on building capabilities. No such exercise has far been undertaken to ensure that the budgetary provisions for the armed forces are based on their “mi

In an effort to ensure the objectives and accountability, the concept of Planning Programming and Budgeting (PPB) was introduced in the United States during the 1960s.  The UK too followed this method. But subsequently it was found inadequate to link the military strategy with defence budgeting. The concept of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) was then introduced for a five-yearly comprehensive review of the force structure, modernization plans and other elements of the military planning and programming for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, India’s planners and financial advisers have failed to follow what the militarily advanced countries like in US and the UK practise while planning budgets for their armed forces.

In fact, it is necessary to have in place some institutional system for budgeting for the armed forces, with much say of the Defence Ministry, which presently does not have any decision-making authority for military budgeting. The Financial Adviser (Defence Services) draws up the budget on the basis of the projection of the three military Services in isolation after, of course, bilateral discussions with the Service Headquarters and the Finance Division. The allocation is routinely decided on the basis of previous years, budget provisions and revised expenditure towards the end of the financial year and ongoing programmes without even caring the progress in those programmes finalized without working out priorities.

Again, there is need to take note of what happens in the UK before finalizing the annual budgetary allocations for the armed forces on the basis of the QDR—the 20-year plan which, remember, the late Jagjeevan Ram had thought of seriously as the Defence Minister but failed to implement the idea because of vested interests which cared more for personal gains rather than national interest. In Britain there is a Council, headed by the Defence Minister. It takes all policy decisions in consultation with the Service Chiefs and expert advisers on military strategies and force levels required to execute the strategy and lay down policy framework as the main guideline for working out the defence budget. We need to have such institutions like a defence council or defence management board.

The long-planning concept for defence budgeting, first proposed by the Plawden Committee of the UK, necessarily requires honest integration of the Service headquarters with the Defence Ministry which has been suggested by various experts and this column for years. A meaningful budget for the armed forces has need to be prepared by a body, “committee or a council or whatever you name it, comprising the Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and the other Defence departments under the Defence Minister. It is only this body which should take decisions that alone should guide the budget-makes. Routine budgeting should now stop in national interest.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 26 February 2007

Exploit Indigenous Expertise

LACUNAE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY

By B.K. Mathur

The missile-man, as we knew Kalam Sahib as the Chief of the Defence Ministry’s Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) only gave the example of the indigenously-developed BrahMos missile and stated that the Organisation has been asked to suggest a vision for the weapon’s platform and sensors at an affordable cost. As the history of the DRDO tells us, the young scientists of the Organisation are capable of achieving the target given to them in the required timeframe. They are the envy of the world for designing and developing state-of-the-art weapons and weapon systems. The only problem is their production, which led to the Wing Commander’s observation: By the time the weapon is inducted into the force it becomes obsolete.

The DRDO’s contribution to the country’s armed forces is well-known. The defence scientists and technicians have been designing and developing over the years military machines and systems comparable with the ones produced in the developed countries whose defence industry is their main economic activity. But the problem, as noticed earlier, invariably arises at the production stage, giving one the impression that the seven defence public sector enterprises and 40 Ordnance factories across the country lack the capability to produce the state-of-the-art machines and systems. However, this is far from the truth. They have the capability and wherewithal to produce the latest, as proved by their performances since 1962, after the Chinese invasion and again after the Kargil confrontation in 1999.

 The largest Departmentally-run undertaking is presently meeting all the requirements of the armed forces and, importantly, can be trusted to produce all that we prefer to import for reasons other than quality and for creating defence scandals. The latest Ordnance factory has the capacity to produce not only the ammunition for the Bofors gun but also the capability to produce indigenously 155 mm. howitzer gun under technology transfer agreement. Alas, our defence planners have preferred to get the howitzers for the Indian Army from abroad. The production capability of this factory includes that of the India’s main battle tank, the controversial MBT-Arjun.

The history of the production of the MBT-Arjun clearly highlights the snag, better call it tragedy of the Government of India’s indigenous defence production policy that has caused unpardonably long delays in such important machines like the Arjun, which was initially named MBT-72, as it was expected to be produced in 1972, and the light combat aircraft (LCA).  The whole trouble is about the absence of a well-considered military equipment policy. Take, for example again, the story of the MBT. The Army first asked during the 1960s for a 1,000 hp power-pack (engine) and then revised it to 1500 hp, perhaps without realizing that it takes nearly 15 years to design, develop and produce such an engine. That is the reason why the Arjun tank is presently being produced with an imported power-pack, causing delay and, importantly, necessitating off-the-shelf procurement from Russia of the T-series tanks.  

The result of such an ill-advised policy causes not only undue delays and increasing uncertainly of indigenous projects that leads to a rush for imports and, concernedly, the scandals and corruption associated with defence projects which, at times, causes import of even sub-standard or obsolete machines at high costs, despite the fact that we have an indigenous production capability which matches any other in the world. Not only that. This policy of the vested interests and corrupt persons, has caused neglect of the Ordnance factories’ expertise. Several of these factories have been crying for long about the need for modernizing their outdated machines and updating marketing technologies through which much foreign exchange could be earned through exports of some of their produce.

In this context it is necessary to understand some facts about the defence industry which make it quite different from the civil, profit-making industry. First, a modern and sophisticated equipment has a large number of components running into thousands, and that too of different heads like the electronic ammunition, fire power and all that. What this leads to is that no one set of scientists and technicians can possibly look into the production of all the components. Importantly, no defence production unit in the world, even in highly militarily advanced countries can produce all the components under one roof---and one unit. It is economically not viable. Interdependence is necessary in the defence industry.

Some years ago this writer was told in Bangalore, the hub of defence industry, that an American defence production company was importing from India certain small components for production of a highly-sophisticated gas-turbine engine. This was later confirmed by Kalam Sahib, then Chief of the DRDO. The explanation for this import was simple.  It was economic for the US company to import that particular component from India or anywhere else, because it was pointless to set up a special production facility at high costs. But over a period of time the private sector industry in the US has grown and set up separate facilities for production of even the smallest of components since the entire industry there is export-oriented and is a major component of the national economy.

India’s civil industry could also chip in and set up facilities which could not only be used at home but also exported. The defence industry has been suffering considerably for decades due to massive imports of highly-sophisticated machinery. In fact, India’s defence forces became so much dependent on imports that not much effort was made to indigenize production of even ordinary equipment. No doubt, the industry has license-produced most of the machinery as per the Government policy. But in that process it did not concentrate much on the production of spares, leading to a major crisis for India’s armed forces.

Doubtless, the crisis has always been caused by the Government’s ill-advised production and import policies, which call for a fresh look, keeping in view the fact that our scientists and technocrats are inferior to none in the world. If they are given the required inputs and resources, sans the politics and the interests of the file-pushers in the Government, they are capable of producing anything the forces need. The practice of always running for imports could be eliminated and the expertise available indigenously exploited without compromising on quality. The only thing is to have the will and right direction of the defence policy-makers.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)