ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 21 February 2006

Bush Visit to India

HIGH Roadblock IN NUCLEAR DEAL

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

About six years ago, Indians were excited by an American Presidential visit to India during the national festival of Holi. Two weeks before the 2006 Holi, another American President scheduled to visit India. But this time around there is hardly any enthusiasm in India. To the contrary, there are hopes in the Government circle that this visit would pass off peacefully with accompanying preparations by some political parties, particularly the Left, that the US President should realize that everybody in India does not welcome him.

When an Indian Prime Minister visits the United States, the Indian Embassy remains on its toes to ensure that the trip is adequately covered by the local media and it remains an officially satisfying event for the Indian foreign policy establishment. The US Embassy perhaps has similar expectations. No government wants that a visiting head of a state is not received well by the people and the political parties. Likewise, no political leader desires that his foreign trip turns out to be damp squib.

Unless adequate care is taken, the incoming visit of the US President, George Bush may generate disappointment for both the PMO and the White House. First of all, American Ambassador in Delhi has surrounded himself with lot of controversies. His statement on the possible impact of the Indian vote at the IAEA over Iran nuclear issue on the US Congress was interpreted by the Left parties and others as coercive diplomacy. Mulford is not a career diplomat. There was an element of truth in his statement. But some sections of people in India sought to make a mountain of the molehill. His letter to the West Bengal Chief Minister protesting against inappropriate remarks on President Bush and its political and economic repercussions again appears to be a blunt warning, but the Left parties have taken strong objection by alleging that it was interference in the country’s internal affairs.

The American Ambassador should have taken the remarks on President Bush as an unfortunate aspect of freedom of speech. After all, many in the US consider the regrettable representation of the Muslim Prophet in cartoon by a Danish cartoonist as part of the freedom of speech. Simultaneously the CPM also has been over-reacting to the letter from the US Ambassador to the West Bengal Chief Minister. If the alleged remark against President Bush is correct, the CPM is not right in considering it as a mere internal affair of West Bengal.

The second crucial issue that appears to have already dampened the spirit in India over a second US Presidential visit to India in six years is the ravaging controversy over the July 2005 nuclear understanding between the two countries over forging cooperation in civilian nuclear technology. Some independent analysts, scholars and even a few former diplomats have serious reservations over the Indo-US nuclear deal. The deal is opposed by these people on the ground that it would enhance American leverage over Indian nuclear programme, both civilian and military, would negatively affect the country’s nuclear strategy, and would force India to compromise its autonomous foreign policy decision-making.

There was a high dose of optimism and confidence in the governing circles of India and the US that the nuclear agreement between the two would be ready for signature by the time President Bush lands in Delhi. But that optimism has been replaced by certain amount of anxiety and despair, as the Indian side has begun to perceive that Washington is intermittently shifting its goalpost by demanding newer items of compliance by the Indian Government. The visa difficulty encountered by Placid Rodriguez, one of the chief architects of India’s nuclear fast breeder programme, to address a conference in the US is an indication that the nuclear deal itself has run into high roadblocks.

Ambassador Robert Blackwill, predecessor of Ambassador Mulford, often proudly proclaimed that the number of visas issued to Indian academics and students outnumbered the total number of visas issued to the rest of the world. Now an Indian scientist of a high repute is finding it difficult to attend a conference in the US, even though he has received an invitation from an American organization. The timing of a letter by three prominent nuclear non-proliferation specialists to US legislators demanding more strict conditions on India over the nuclear deal is an addition to the list of expanding discontents.

It is true that Indo-US relations are not based on any single issue. The relationship has been robust in several other areas and there is not much reflection of those in the media. It is quite likely that the Indian Government will take proper care to highlight the positive aspects of the relationship and will prevent creation of a one-sided image of Indo-US relations. So much time, energy and resources have been invested by the US and India to elevate the bilateral relationship to unprecedented levels that neither side can afford to let the critiques paint a picture of their choice.

Critiques are important to remind those aspects of bilateral issues, which could have been ordinarily ignored. They are an important part of any decision-making. But democracies need to separate the self-serving critiques from the more genuine ones. While India has to ensure that its relations with the US do not bind India’s foreign policy and strategic decisions, the Indian leadership should avoid creating an impression that Indians are too difficult a people to befriend. The two countries which will certainly be jubilant to see gaps in emerging Indo-US ties are Pakistan and China. These two countries alone should not be allowed to determine India’s choice, but New Delhi will find it an expensive phenomenon not to factor these two countries in its calculations.

The UPA Government has successfully dealt with the offensive by the Left parties. In their enthusiasm to complain against the American hegemony, the left analysts almost leaned towards Iranian theocracy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh answered the queries over the Iran nuclear issue in both the Houses of Parliament without mentioning a word about the US!

It is clear that some parties are making a football of foreign policy issues on domestic political considerations. India at the current stage of its development cannot afford to allow that yet. We are an emerging power. We are yet to emerge as a power. It is important that we do not sacrifice our national interests at the altar of domestic expediency. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 14 February 2006

Beginning Of The End

American Empire Post Cold War

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra,

School of International Studies, JNU

There are signs that the American empire has been slowly on the decline and unless the US abandons military approach and adopts peaceful diplomatic approach to international issues, the decline may further accelerate.

With a robust economy, more than the combined GDP of any combination of major powers; defence expenditure more than the combined defence expenditure of next thirteen big defence spenders; a military with most sophisticated and state-of-the-art weapons with truly global reach; the United States has been able to shape the events and issues of the globe in the post-Cold War era. During the eight years of the Clinton Administration, the American economy and its commercial competitiveness grew at a consistently positive rate and filled the US treasury with several billion dollars of surplus money.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration, no second country in the world maintains a global presence and influence except the United States. No single country appears to have the potential to rival the US power and influence in the foreseeable future. Some Americans saw the international system in the post-Soviet era as a unipolar structure and advised the US Government to seize the moment and transform the shape and the image of the world after American ideals and virtues and, of course, keeping in mind the country’s national interests.

Actually, the world was more unipolar in the post-World War II period than the post-Cold War era. The US then accounted for about half of the world production of goods, possessed monopoly over the nuclear weapons and saw the pitiable economic and political conditions in most of the former imperial powers and had the luxury of donating capital for the reconstruction of war-devastated European economies.

In less than five years, the US lost its nuclear monopoly to the former Soviet Union and in less than twenty years there were a total of five nuclear weapon powers. In about fifteen years’ time since the end of Second World War, the West Europeans and Japanese indulged the Americans in fierce competition in the international market place. In about thirty years, the mighty USA had to concede defeat in the Vietnam War and withdraw all its military operations from Indochina.

About 14 years ago the powerful Soviet Union collapsed and its empire had begun to crumble a few years prior to that. Consequently the US emerged as the sole superpower in the world and several countries in the world—the neutrals, non-aligned and former adversaries-- began to bandwagon with the remaining superpower. But notwithstanding the songs of glory sung by a few American strategic analysts, world events, one after another, indicated that the US would not be able to maintain its empire, unless it avoided behaving like Roman emperors.

The American intervention in Haiti, withdrawal of its peacekeeping forces from Somalia after a few US casualties, intermittent bombing of Iraq, raining down of missiles in Afghanistan to retaliate terrorist bombing of US embassies in Africa, aerial bombardment of Kosovo, show of force in South China Sea and many more US military approaches indicated that Washington adopted ancient Roman approach to deal with international issues. Without consulting the major powers, with the consent and cooperation of a handful of traditional allies and often bypassing the UN system, the US sought to conduct international affairs by frequently resorting to its muscle power.

The 9/11 incident is partly the response of non-state actors to perceived unbridled hegemony of the US, particularly in the Muslim World. Almost the entire international community sided with the sole superpower in its declared global war against Islamic terrorism. The massive bombing of Afghanistan to eradicate Al Quaeda took place with political, territorial and intelligence assistance by several countries, including some Muslim countries. And, that included even Pakistan, the creator of Taliban forces in Afghanistan, which in turn had housed Osama Bin Laden and his organization.

Before, Afghanistan could see some stability and peace; the Bush Administration began to resort to old American ways of handling political issues through military means. The best demonstration of it was the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and removal of Saddam Hussein from power. The rationale of this invasion was not adequate. The number of supporters to this military misadventure in the world was scant. The legitimacy of this action was almost zero.

The consequences have been devastating for the US. Iraq had no terrorists earlier, but the country soon witnessed terrorist violence as has been admitted by the US. The US forces led an international coalition force and entered Iraq as a liberating force, but soon came to be viewed as a foreign occupying force. The Iraqi resistance shows no signs of ending after about three years of the US-led invasion.

The pressure on Syria in the wake of an alleged Syrian connection to a political assassination in Lebanon, the relentless pressure on Iran on the nuclear issue, the widening differences with Saudi Arabia, the Abu Ghraib prison mistreatment issue, alleged excesses committed in Guantanamo Bay prison camp, flushing of Quran in the toilet and the current controversy surrounding “inappropriate” depiction of Muhammad in a cartoon published in Denmark and reprinted in other European media together have generated an impression that the West-led by the US is on a path of confrontation with the Muslim World.

Notwithstanding the cooperative attitude of many Muslim governments, the US has come to realize that anti-Americanism as a force has taken deep root in the Muslim World and has been consistently on the rise. In the backdrop of continuing US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is safe to presume that anti-Americanism will create enormous hurdles for the US role in the world and may become one of the forces that would be responsible for the decline of US Empire.

Today, North Korea has emerged as new nuclear weapon power in East Asia. The US multilateral diplomacy has not achieved its desires result in the Korean peninsula. Iran has decided to confront the US on the nuclear issue, despite Washington’s success in roping in four other nuclear weapon powers to get the Iran nuclear question shifted to the UN Security Council from the IAEA. Venezuela in the Western Hemisphere has been loudly defying the US power.

The Soviet Union’s demise, end of Euro-communism, China’s economic openness and liberalization and the continuing US embargo have not been able to bring Cuba on to its knees. The US specialists and political leaders are increasingly looking frustrated over the unstoppable march of the Chinese economic juggernaut. Germany and France vehemently opposed the US policy towards Iraq bringing the political differences within NATO to the surface.

All these demonstrate the decline of US power and influence around the globe. Unless, the US adopts diplomatic and economic means to conduct its international affairs, sooner than later the decline is going to pick up speed and momentum. Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World will most likely provide the spark that would induce the Americans to start some soul-searching.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 7 February 2006

Iranian Nuclear Tangle

 Challenges BeforE India

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Iran has stunned the world by refusing to compromise on its suspected civilian nuclear programme, even though the Big Five nuclear weapon powers, which are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, threatened to take the question to the Security Council.

After the majority of member countries voted in favour of the resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)meeting in Vienna last week, to refer the Iranian nuclear question to the Security Council, Tehran adopted a confrontational stance and announced that it would now begin full-scale production of enriched uranium, would end all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA and would not allow the IAEA’s short-notice inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol of the NPT.

This stance of Tehran, accompanied by its high rhetoric against the United States, Israel and the West in general, has made it difficult for countries friendly to Iran, such as India, China and Russia to take a stronger stand favourable to Iran. Germany and France, which adopted anti-US positions on the US approach to Iraq, were also prepared to assist Iran and avoid the American confrontational approach, but the Iran-EU dialogue went no where due to Iran’s intransigence and the EU-Three were also finally induced to make common cause with the United States.

India has been consistently improving its ties with Iran. Apart from its commercial and business relations, New Delhi announced a “strategic partnership” with Iran in the midst of its international isolation. The proposed gas pipeline project from Iran to India through Pakistan was given high priority considerations in India to cement Indo-Iranian cooperation. However, even New Delhi found it difficult to support Iran at the IAEA in view of its un-conciliatory attitude and offensive diplomacy.

Iran perhaps hoped that India would abstain from the IAEA voting in view of the strong pro-Iranian position of the Left parties, which support the current UPA coalition. While many Indians fail to understand the Left parties logic behind supporting Iran, it did generate expectations in Tehran. In order to make and implement an independent foreign policy, New Delhi does not have to oppose the US all the time.

But the Left appears to have drawn a line between the hegemonic US and the theocratic Iran and prefers to say and do every thing against the US, even if it would mean backing theocracy in principle.

Significantly, the Left parties have not made their position on the basis of the economic rationale, such as the gas pipeline project. The statements of Left leaders are clear that they support Iran, because the US and its allies are against Iran. It is wrongly believed that if India would have gone with the microscopic minority vote at the IAEA, it would have bolstered India’s image or served its national interests. Moreover, how can one argue, that supporting Iran would have reflected an independent foreign policy?

Having said that, India’s diplomacy will face more intricate challenges in the weeks and months to come due to its vote at the IAEA.  What is the likely future of Iran’s nuclear issue? First of all, there is still a silver-lining in the dark sky and diplomacy may ultimately triumph. Tehran has not closed all its doors to negotiations. Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, said soon after the IAEA meeting that, “Adoption of the policy of resistance doesn’t mean we are on non-speaking terms or non-cooperative. We had two options. One was resistance and the other surrender. We chose resistance.”

India has an option open for playing a role in future negotiations. The Indian Ambassador in Tehran rightly remarked that India was willing to “invite Iran and the negotiation parties to dialogue.” However, this willingness will turn into wishful thinking, unless New Delhi plays a proactive role and succeeds in coordinating a new dialogue process to resolve the Iranian tangle. The challenge would be whether Iran would be willing to listen to India after its vote at the IAEA in favour of the US-backed resolution.

Secondly, there is also a possibility that punitive measures may be adopted at the UN Security Council in the future, if Tehran refuses to budge from its current position. Russia, China, France and even Britain would make it hard for the US to follow a policy of sanctions in view of their ongoing economic and commercial interests in Iran. However, if Iranian intransigence continues, such an outcome cannot be ruled out. India is not a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. Its role and influence there would be extremely limited and indirect. But a question may arise as to whether India would support the anti-Iranian sanctions? Will not India be bound by a decision to follow the UN verdict?

The third challenge would come, if the UN Security Council fails to have a unanimous view on sanctions policy. Washington may decide to adopt unilateral sanctions against Iran, which would be stronger than the earlier Iran-Libya sanctions Act adopted by the Clinton Administration in 1996. Will India then support the US sanctions policy? If it does, the apprehensions of the Left parties that the Indian Government  is conducting its diplomacy at the behest of the US would be proved. If it does not, what will happen to India’s nuclear deal with the United States for civilian nuclear cooperation? Additionally, the whole Indian approach at the IAEA may be interpreted as a waste and a failure.

The fourth challenge would come if the Bush Administration escalates its confrontation with Iran and seeks some kind of a military solution to the whole issue. Some analysts argue against such an eventuality. They point out that Iran is not Iraq. Iran has a larger population base and deeper strategic depth. When the oil prices are skyrocketing and the Americans appear to have been stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington cannot take military action against Iran. Many Iranians will probably go along with this line of thinking. But you never know Washington, especially the Bush Administration. This Administration is a risk taker. It may not commit US troops and yet take certain military action. What will be India’s position on this? Yes, one clear position will be opposing a military approach to resolve international issues. But this will be only a position on the principle. What will New Delhi do?

There is just a little time for the foreign policy community to deliberate on such possibilities. And the considerations and discussions should begin now. ----- INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 23 January 2006

Difficult Days Ahead

INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The official excitement expressed in July last by both the Indian and American officials after an understanding on civilian cooperation arrived at between the Indian Prime Minister and the American President has been replaced by more caution after the recent visit of the US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns to Delhi.

The conviction of Indian and American officials reflected after the first meeting on this issue in October last, that the new civilian nuclear deal would be ready for implementation by the time President George Bush makes an official trip to India no longer remains after the latest meeting between Burns and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. India now feels that more dialogue with greater details is necessary and the US officials doubt if an agreement for implementation would be ready before Bush’s visit to India.

However, both New Delhi and Washington have not changed their views on the importance of this agreement for strengthening international non-proliferation efforts, as well as for meeting the energy requirements of a fast-growing Indian economy. Significantly, neither the US nor India is comfortable with sharing the content and nature of the official dialogue with their respective people. The dialogue between the officials of the two countries is shrouded with substantial secrecy.

Had it been pure economics or just a matter of energy supply, perhaps open diplomacy would have been adopted. If the Indian Prime Minister considered it important to strike a nuclear deal with the US President without first taking the Indian people into confidence or even consulting with the coalition partners of the UPA Government, one can safely assume that the matter involves issues of national security and thus open debate and discussion are not encouraged.

Democracies and open societies with vibrant media, nonetheless, cannot remain quiet and refrain from debating the issue or demanding transparency. Indians are so fond of debates that every bit of national security affairs becomes a matter of public information and discussion – the NPT, CTBT, FMCT or just name it. The aftermath of July 18 agreement between the US and India too saw a healthy debate on the issue in our country.

Several analysts expressed their fear that civilian nuclear cooperation with the US might force India to compromise its national security. They did not believe that it would be possible to separate the civilian nuclear facilities from the ones necessary for the country’s military requirements. The previous NDA Government circulated a draft nuclear doctrine that spelled out an ambitious nuclear weapons capability on the sea, land and air. Not many in India challenged such an ambition. How could the Government now achieve that goal after separating the nuclear facilities and opening up a large number of them to international inspection? Others raised apprehension that India’s nuclear weapon capability would be exposed to outsiders after the Indo-US deal was implemented.

The UPA Government initially gave an impression that the US would accord the same status to India as other nuclear weapon powers have on matters of international inspection. Probably every one, including the Indian Government, was shocked when it was revealed that it was not so. Earlier, the general feeling was that the understanding reached between the Prime Minister and American President was enough for the White House to approach the US Congress to bring about necessary legislation for enabling supply of civilian nuclear technology to India. Soon another eye opener incident occurred when Indians came to know that New Delhi would have to take certain concrete steps demanded by Washington before the US Congress would act upon the issue.

The US expectation was, however, not limited to what India would do to its nuclear programmes and facilities at home. Washington also desired India to prove and demonstrate its non-proliferation credentials on the foreign policy front. The real challenge came when the Iranian nuclear issue was raised in the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA. India had to vote on the side of the US in the process risking the proposed gas pipeline project with Iran.

Subsequently, as Tehran took up the issue with New Delhi and expected a change of behaviour next time, Washington expressed its pleasure over Indian voting and desired that New Delhi would continue to do so in the future. The Bush Administration pointed out that such foreign policy behaviour was necessary to enable it to convince the members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) the need for co-opting India into the non-proliferation regime.

All these are clear indications that the new relationship with the United States will involve rethinking of Indian foreign policy postures and stances on certain issues now and even in the future. It is important that Indian foreign policy establishment and international affairs analysts begin serious study and analysis on this subject. A vigorous foreign policy debate is called for to protect Indian foreign policy interests.

It is also required that the national security team, both in the Government and the policy analysis community, discuss the security ramifications of the proposed Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation. After India separates the civilian nuclear facilities from the military ones and gives such a list to the US, interested members of the international community will quickly know about India’s nuclear weapons facilities. Even if we discount the possibility of any nuclear exchange in the region, even theoretically the real and potential adversaries of India would be able to target India’s facilities. Such an eventuality has to be seriously considered before we go forward with the required nuclear facilities separation.

There is no doubt that the country’s improved relation with the US is significant and desirable. But the cost and benefit analysis of a nuclear deal, such as the proposed one, is essential to protect and enhance the country’s national interests and security. While the Government should maintain certain amount of secrecy for national security reasons, some amount of transparency too is necessary to evolve a healthy police approach.

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)