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Economic Highlights
Indian Floriculture Industry:CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, by Radhakrishna Rao, 7 January 2006 |
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PEOPLE AND THEIR PROBLEMS
New Delhi, 7 January 2006
Indian Floriculture
Industry
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
By Radhakrishna Rao
While both the IT (Information Technology) and biotech
industry in India have become a major contributor to the process of wealth creation and employment generation in
the country, the high-tech floriculture continues to lag behind in sofaras
emerging as the sunrise sector of the Indian economy is concerned.
Indeed, in the race to export multi-hued and gorgeously patterned flowers, India continues to lag behind many third world
countries, including Israel,
Kenya and Colombia.
However, with the demand for Indian cut flowers and floriculture products set
to go up with the improved quality standard adopted by the Indian growers,
Indian exporters are now concentrating on developing cut flowers of larger size
and with improved vase life.
“Indian flower exports though small are growing at an
encouraging pace. As against the earning of Rs.432.3-million in 2002-03, they
totaled Rs.457.4-million in 2003-04; according to sources in Agriculture and
Processed Food Products Export
Authority. The setting up of a global floriculture logistics hub in the Gulf
city state of Dubai
is expected to give a big boost to the Indian flower export enterprise.
Currently, the multi billion dollar global trade in flower
products is concentrated in Netherlands.
By routing the floricultural consignments through tax free Dubai, Indian suppliers would be in a position
to cut money and time off the delivery chain. But the sources in Dubai floriculture hub insist that it is not seeking to
take away business from Netherlands.
This centre it is hoped will open up new routes for perishable goods between
Africa and Asia.
In India,
around 60,000-hectares are under flower cultivation. Because of its salubrious
climate, diverse agroclimatic conditions, sunshine in winter, fertile soil and
a rich genetic base as well a skilled labour force that comes cheap, India is
ideally placed for the export oriented high tech floricultural industry.
Incidentally, Indian farmers grow more than 60 varieties
against 168 rose varieties that are grown across the world, .Cut roses, gerbera
and gladiolus are the three flowers that
rank top in exports. Though anthuriums too are gaining in importance,
their production in India
is quite low. As it is, India’s
current share of flower export is less than one per cent of the international
trade.
The state of Karnataka is the largest exporter of cut
flowers and high quality floricultural products in the country. India’s only flowers auction centre, considered
the second largest auction centre in the world, is located in Bangalore. The centre currently known as
International Flower Auction Bangalore (IFAB) has given a big boost to the
flower export from India.
A spokesman of IFAB sys, “internet auction facility will be
available at the centre to determine the international market trends. Besides,
they will also facilitate overseas bidders to participate in the auction”. This flower auction centre is equipped with
cold storage facilities and will provide consultancy services to the growers. On
the other hand the Talegaon
Floriculture Park
in Maharastra houses 150 floricultural units.
Meanwhile, almost unnoticed by the rest of the country, the
state of West Bengal has emerged as a
major exporter of floricultural products .Around 9,000 flower stems are being sent to Holland from West Bengal each week. The
dynamic flower exporters from West Bengal are also looking at exploiting the
potentials of Dubai
floricultural hub. Flowers meant for export are mainly grown in the hilly Darjeeling, and in parts of the districts of North 24
Paraganas, Howrah and East
Midnapore. The West Bengal Food Processing and Horticulture
Development Corporation is getting orders from private parties based in London
and New Jersey for the supply of Lotus and Marigold .These flowers are used by
the expatriate Indians during the Hindu festivals.
While Thailand has been able to forge ahead with the export
of a variety of orchids, Indian floricultural industry has not focused much
attention on this flower variety found in abundance in the Western Ghats and
north eastern parts of India .Because orchids
have a long shelf life in comparison to other flower varieties, Indian can stand to gain substantially by
taking to large scale export of orchids.
All said and done, the biggest drawback associated with the
Indian floricultural export drive is India’s glaring failure to meet the
international market’s primary requirement of pristine condition and timely
delivery of flowers due to the lack of infrastructural facilities and an
inefficient supply chain management. Clearly and apparently, the most important
requirement of the floricultural industry is the maintenance of cold chain for
keeping the flowers fresh. While Bangalore
airport has already a cold chain meant exclusively for use by the exporters of
rapidly perishable floricultural products, efforts are on set up similar cold
chains in other airports in the country.
There are now around 200 export oriented floricultural units
in India.
Today Indian cut flowers are regularly exported to countries in West Europe,
West Asia, North America, New Zealand
and Singapore.
In recent years Australia
and Japan
have emerged as favoured destinations for Indian cut flowers. The introduction
of direct flights from Bangalore to various parts of the world has
given a big boost to the export of cut flowers from this “garden city”. About
200 acres in and around Bangalore
are under high tech flower production.
According to Dr. George Eapen, a leading biotechnologist, “India can be
major player in the world floricultural market due to the availability manpower
at a relatively low cost”. Two major constraints facing the Indian
floricultural sector are the poor availability of institutional finance and
difficulties in securing high quality planting and seeding materials. But then
with vigorous efforts made by the various organizations towards improving the
lot of the floriculture sector in India, the country can surely
afford to look towards a “colorful and multihued” export future.
A study by Tata Economic Consultancy Services says that the
floriculturists should be allowed to repay their loans over a period of ten
years Floriculture industry sources in India point out that the high rate of
sickness of India’s floricultural
sector is due to the fact that many of these units had failed to do proper
homework before launching their venture.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Official, At Last:Bush AND Immigration, by Dr. SAUMYAJIT RAY, 30 May 2006 |
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ROUND
THE WORLD
New Delhi, 30 May 2006
Official, At Last
Bush AND
Immigration
By Dr. SAUMYAJIT RAY
School of International Studies, JNU
Oklahoma’s Republican Senator James M.
Inhofe’s National Language Amendment to the new immigration reform bill in the
United States Senate marks the culmination of a movement that began exactly 25
years ago. In 1981, Republican Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa of California
introduced an English Language Amendment (ELA) bill in the U.S. Senate, aimed
at amending the Federal Constitution to declare English as the official
language of the Government of the United States. The bill died at the
committee stage.
The Inhofe amendment, apart from declaring English as America’s “national language”, relieves the
federal government from any obligation to provide services to citizens and
immigrants in any language other than English and requires every immigrant
entering the United States
legally to learn English. It also recognizes the pre-eminence of the English
language in the American society. The amendment passed
with overwhelming support on May18. Even though it was a bipartisan measure,
more Republicans than Democrats voted for it.
It is not the first time, however, that a house of the U. S. federal
legislature has accorded official status to the English language. In 1996, in
the Republican 104th Congress,
the U.S. House of Representatives, led by Speaker Newt Gingrich passed the Bill Emerson English Language Amendment Act
declaring English the official language of the United States. Then President Bill
Clinton had called the amendment “objectionable” and “in bad taste”. The Senate
sat on it and the bill lapsed. Subsequent efforts to revive the bill failed.
The Inhofe Amendment also marks the culmination of years of
painstaking effort by Official English advocates across
the United States.
The Official English movement—deridingly called the English Only movement
by opponents—started when late Senator Hayakawa introduced his ELA in the
Senate and followed it up by launching an organization named U.S. English in
1983. Supported by smaller Official English advocacy groups like ProEnglish and
EnglishFirst, U.S.
English has been successful
in getting English declared as the official language of government in 27
states. In all these states, Official English emerged as a ballot initiative,
won more than 70% of the popular vote, and English became the official language
either through a statute or an amendment to the state constitution. The 1996
legislation passed by the U.S. House
of Representatives marked the first victory of the Official English movement at
the federal level. The Inhofe amendment is the second.
The Founding Fathers did not regard it expedient to lay down
in law what existed in fact. For all practical purposes, English was the
official language of the United
States. Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration
of Independence in English, the debates in the Philadelphia constitutional convention were
conducted in English, the Constitution and the laws were framed in English, the
Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution was also in English. But the
Constitution of the United
States does not stipulate English—or, for
that matter, any other language—as the official language of the U.S. Government.
Added to that were bilingual education and multilingual ballots, both of which
seriously prevented immigrants to the United States from acquiring the
English language.
The problem was compounded by unbridled immigration—both
legal and illegal—to the United
States in recent years. Most of these
immigrants came from across the
Mexican-American border, spoke no English, and settled down in certain areas in
large numbers. Never before had immigrants entered America in such large numbers, and
it was also the first time that so many immigrants came from one single
country.
In 1999, El Cenizo, a small town on the Mexican-American
border in Texas,
banned the use of English and declared Spanish as its official language.
Despite the hue and cry raised by Official English advocates and common
Americans, then Texas Governor George W. Bush remained silent on the matter. So
did then President William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton who, as Arkansas Governor,
had accepted English being made the state’s official language.
The Official English movement has come a long way. From 1981
to 1994, Democratic majorities in both Houses of the U.S. Congress had thwarted its efforts to make English the
official language of the United
States. Though the Republican National
Committee had seldom taken an official position supporting Official English,
individual Republicans—Representatives and Senators—have always been in the
forefront of the movement. In 1994, when Republicans regained control of the Congress after a gap of forty years, Official English
became a priority. Undeterred by hostile charges of being nativist, racist, and
Hispanophobic, the Republican-controlled U.S. House of Representatives passed an ELA for the first time in 1996.
Republicans are still in control of the Congress, winning seven back-to-back majorities from 1994.
Whenever an ELA was introduced in the House of Representatives even after 1996,
it was done with overwhelming Republican support (and stringent Democratic
opposition). Two-term Republican president George W. Bush, though, has never
cared to make his stand clear on Official English; during the 2000 campaign he
had said he opposed English Only, and rooted for English Plus.
His constraints were evident: he belonged to a state (Texas) with a huge Hispanic population, and
he could not afford to lose Latino voter support. A fluent Spanish speaker
himself, he could not publicly oppose the public use of Spanish.
But never had the Official English movement called for a ban
on the use of non-English languages (329 languages are spoken in the U.S.). The issue is not English only, but English primarily. The movement’s demand has
always been that public and official use of English be made compulsory, private
use of non-English (or, minority) languages voluntary.
It now depends on the U.S. House of Representatives to
approve the immigration reform bill—of which Senator Inhofe’s National Language
Amendment is an important part—which the U.S. Senate has already passed. With a Republican majority in the lower
chamber, that should not be a problem. And then, if English becomes the
official language of the United
States through an amendment to the federal
Constitution, multilingual ballots would be eliminated, and bilingual education
would turn purely transitional. English would finally get official status in
the world’s first English-speaking Republic.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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India Is Unconcerned:GROWING US-PAK SECURITY TIES, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 23 May 2006 |
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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 23 May 2006
India Is Unconcerned
GROWING US-PAK
SECURITY TIES
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
The US-Pakistan security ties and defence relations are
intensifying in the midst of an intense debate in the US and in India
on the emerging strategic partnership between India
and the US.
Interestingly, Indian strategic community and avid watchers
of foreign affairs are these days least interested in events related to
US-Pakistan relations. Unlike in the past, news relating to defence and
security relations between Islamabad and Washington rarely hit
the headlines in Indian media and edit-page articles on this issue have also become scarce and infrequent.
Attentive Indian public are more carefully monitoring the
debate on the nature of emerging security ties with the US and are hardly
interested in US-Pakistan relations. Of course, the public opinion and
interests largely depend on news coverage and media highlights.
The Indian media did not highlight enough the recently-concluded
five days of talks between American and Pakistan officials aimed at
augmenting the strategic relationship between the two countries. The May 1-5
dialogue in Washington
was the 17th annual meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group.
While this round of meeting was focussed
on counter-terrorism and ways to promote stability in South
Asia, it was agreed that the Pentagon and the Pakistani military
establishment would schedule bilateral military exercises and training
activities in 2007. Pakistan
has carefully watched, of course with certain amount of disappointment, the
rising number of Indo-US military exercises in recent years.
Unthinkable during the Cold War days, the Indian and
American military, spanning all services, have conducted numerous exercises in
the heat of Agra, height of Ladakh, jungles of
Mizoram, blue waters of the Indian Ocean and even the inhospitable climate of Alaska. The scope and
sophistication of Indo-US military engagements, moreover, have expanded from
exercise to exercise.
There is little doubt that Pakistan, a close strategic ally
of the US for decades during the Cold War and frontline state in the war
against terrorism since the 9/11 incident, has been helplessly witnessing
growth of closer security ties between its erstwhile patron and its one and
only rival in the region – India. The excitement over US decision to declare Pakistan a
major non-NATO ally was actually short-lived, as the momentum of Indo-US defence
and security interactions picked up. While clearing the sale of F-16 advanced
fighter aircraft to Pakistan,
the US also offered the sale
of similar fighter aircraft to India.
The Framework for Defence Cooperation signed between India
and the US in June 2005 and
the Indo-US Nuclear Deal announced in July 2005 have touched Islamabad’s nerves.
President George Bush’s visit South Asia in March last did
not go very well for Pakistan.
As the nuclear deal in India
was inked with fanfare, President Bush openly expressed
that Pakistan
did not deserve the same. An explosion in Pakistan
on the eve of President Bush’s visit was a stark reminder of the focus of the US engagement of Pakistan – countering
terrorism.
Against the backdrop of all these developments, Pakistan is trying hard to improve the image of
its relations with the United
States. While the American assistance to Pakistan
has enabled it to improve its economic performance and rescue the country from
becoming a failed state, the US
pressure on the front of combating
terrorism has created domestic problem for the Musharraf regime. The American
military intervention in the North West
Frontier Province
has challenged Islamabad’s sovereignty at least
in the eyes of anti-regime populace in Pakistan.
The supporters of the Taliban have not disappeared from Pakistan and are apparently jubilant over the
resurgence of the Taliban forces in parts of Afghanistan. These groups are not
only anti-American but also anti-Musharraf. The terrorist groups, which have
found it increasingly difficult to continue their Jihad in Kashmir, are also
disgruntled elements in Pakistan.
While the Bush Administration has profusely thanked Pakistan for its cooperation in countering
terrorism, Musharraf desires to show to his own people that his cooperation
with the US
is not confined to combating terrorism (read some of his own people). He also
wants to convey the message that he
is strengthening the military preparedness
of his country by forging closer ties with the US in the face of growing Indian
power.
The recent defence dialogue in Washington
between American and Pakistani officials have to be seen in this emerging
context of US engagement in South Asia. The decision to expand military exercises and
forge further cooperation in subjects, such as military equipment repair,
technology transfers, upgraded or new weapons systems and the interoperability
of equipment and tactics between the two nations has been taken to intensify
overall security ties between the two countries.
However, the primary aim of the US has been to synchronize and
expand efforts against violent extremists. Unlike in the past, the US does not seem to be interested in bolstering Pakistan’s military capabilities to make it even
handed with those of India.
While Pakistan has been
campaigning against the Indo-US nuclear deal in Washington
and elsewhere, the Bush Administration has not budged from its stand that India’s case is
an exceptional and special one.
The hyphenated relations that the US
had with India and Pakistan appear
to be a thing of the past. For the first time, the US
has positive relations with both India
and Pakistan at the same
time without invoking zero-sum perceptions in Islamabad
and New Delhi.
Simultaneously, there are two different trajectories of US relations with India and US
counter-terrorism cooperation with Pakistan.
So long as Afghanistan
remains a battleground and the US
is committed to eliminate terrorists and extremists from that country and from
certain parts of Pakistan, a
cooperative regime in Islamabad
is desirable. India
has little to fear from US-Pakistan engagement. But at the same time, close
monitoring of developments in this area is equally necessary.
The peace process
in the subcontinent is the longest one so far between India and Pakistan. It has been unfolding
under close American watch and encouragement. If it reaches its ultimate goal
and India, Pakistan and the US become a stakeholder in South
Asian peace, it could benefit the millions in the subcontinent and contribute
to lasting peace in the larger Southern Asian region.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Iran’s Nuclear Postures:Towards Inevitable Confrontation, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 9 May 2006 |
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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 9 May 2006
Iran’s Nuclear Postures
Towards
Inevitable Confrontation
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
Iran has
threatened to walk out of the NPT, if it is pressured
too much to give up its uranium enrichment programme. How is it going to help Iran? Will it
make its nuclear programme more legitimate? Will it assist
in warding off the threat of possible
international economic sanctions or military intervention?
The United States
and its European partners and the IAEA have complained that Iran has been
clandestinely seeking to develop a nuclear weapon capability. It has been
alleged that Iran
has secretly sought to acquire nuclear programme related technology and
equipment for about 18 years in the international nuclear black market.
Several years of pressures
and months of negotiations have failed to bring Iran on to its knees. Iran appears
hell bent to go its way as far as its domestic nuclear programme is concerned.
Citing political arguments based on the concept of national sovereignty,
economic compulsion based on diversification of its sources of energy and
security- related justification, based
on the limits of oil and gas resources, Iran has shown its determination to
acquire a full civilian nuclear power cycle capability. It has uranium mines
and now it claims that it has developed the capacity to domestically enrich
uranium to generate nuclear fuel to run nuclear power reactors.
Iran has been a member of the NPT, the
most extensive and inclusive nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has been a
member of the IAEA, the international nuclear watch dog. It claims rights under
international law and under the NPT and IAEA provisions to pursue a civilian
nuclear power programme.
The US
and several other countries in the West, however, do not have confidence that Iran will
confine its ambition only to acquire a capability to run a full cycle nuclear
power programme. Tehran
is suspected to have been keeping an ambition to develop nuclear weapons.
What are the bases of such suspicions? First of all, Iran has been
under the rule of a theocratic system since 1979 and has adopted a policy of
confrontation with the West. It has withstood the US pressure
and policy of isolation for long by systematically trying to cultivate good
relations with the major powers and other countries. It seeks to enhance its
capability in the face of alleged persistent US hostility.
Secondly, Iran
has witnessed the US role during the Gulf War I and Gulf War
II; and the fate of Iraq. It does
not want to take any chances and seeks a capability that could prevent foreign
military intervention. Thirdly, it has strong grievances against the Western
silence over Israeli nuclear weapons capability. Fourthly, it has seen the
emergence of a nuclear Pakistan
which has often been dubbed as a failed state and which has survived the
Western non-proliferation pressures
despite its clandestine activities and involvement in nuclear black market. If Pakistan could, why cannot Iran?
That Iran
may have an ambition to develop nuclear weapon capability is reflected in its
uncompromising stances on this issue
and its fearless rhetoric
challenging the US and its
allies, including Israel.
Never before any Middle-Eastern country threatened to obliterate Israel from the global map, as Iran did
recently. Israel,
which has won all wars fought with various combinations of Arab countries, is
also a nuclear capable country. Issuing
a threat to Israel’s
existence can have two meanings. One, the threatening country has nuclear
weapons capability. Two, the leader issuing
such threats has a target audience to woo and he does not mean what he says in
true sense of the term.
The problem is that Iranian people cannot be fooled. They
know the military capabilities of Israel and would not support any
direct confrontation with that country. That means Tehran may have developed a capability to
build a crude bomb and is indirectly demonstrating its capability by using a
combination of defiant action and rhetoric.
Tehran broke the lock and resumed its
nuclear programme contrary to IAEA directions. It stopped IAEA inspections of
its nuclear programme. It also confidently rejected the EU-3’s diplomatic
initiatives and proposals. Russia,
which has very friendly and close ties with Iran, also came up with a sound
compromise formula. But Iran
discarded it. The US Security Council passed a resolution asking Iran to stop uranium enrichment within a month,
but Iran
turned it down. On the contrary, it declared its new technological breakthrough
in the field of uranium enrichment. The latest in Iran’s defiant attitude towards the
international community and determination to go ahead with its nuclear
programme is its warning that it would walk out of the NPT.
Why is Iran
so defiant? Can a leadership be so audacious without strength – in this case
nuclear weapon capability? Iran’s
political behaviour is to some extent perplexing. Currently, there is a lively
debate in the US about the
rights and wrongs of taking military action against Iran. Although very powerful
arguments are being put forward against military intervention, the US
Government does not rule out military option.
There is no doubt that the Bush administration wants
diplomacy to complete its full course before it would decide on military means.
The past mistakes in the case of Iraq have brought significant
lessons for the US Administration and President Bush clearly would not like any
repetition of those. The Congressional elections also pose another set of
political problems for President Bush. On top of it all, his opinion ratings
among the people has been rapidly sliding down. There is no guarantee that yet
another military adventure would bring any political benefit to him.
If these factors, along with Russian
and Chinese opposition to punitive measures against Iran,
have enabled Iranian leadership to withstand the Western pressure, the world in general and Persian
Gulf in particular are safer. Even then, Iran’s
obstinate behaviour is increasingly making it difficult for Russian, Chinese and other friendly countries to
unconditionally support its stand.
The question is what happens if Iran announces its nuclear
capability after walking out of the NPT? Iran’s nuclear weapons will not be
considered legal either under the NPT or otherwise. So it may very well stay
out of the NPT and launch itself as a new nuclear weapon state. Analysts in
several western nations do not believe that Iran currently has the nuclear
weapon capability. But their prediction may go wrong, as it has been so in so
many other instances.
More hair-raising question is whether the neo-conservatives
in the Bush Administration would confront a nuclear Iran or make fences with it. (What
with Washington
dismissing. Iranian President
Mahmohd Ahmadinejad’s letter to President Bush to “propose new ways” to resolve
the matter) Will Iran face tough sanctions or even military intervention? Will
Russians and Chinese come to the
rescue of a nuclear Iran or
sit idly and watch yet another case of US unilateral intervention?
(Especially against the backdrop that both have rejected the US proposal to
invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which provides for enforcement i.e. more
sanctions and war. Instead they had
suggested another Security Council rejection to demand Iran stop its
nuclear programme) It is most likely that some sort of confrontation is in the
making as far as US-Iranian relations are concerned.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Strategic Triangle:India, China and the US, by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra,16 May 2006 |
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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 16 May 2006
Strategic Triangle
India, China
and the US
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
The emerging relations between India,
China and the US are going to
determine the future of Asian stability. These countries have never been able
to establish a durable strategic alliance in the post-Second World War history
with one another. Nor any two of them are likely to form such an alliance in
the future.
However, the future Asian stability will largely depend upon
how these three powers interact with one another. During the early years of the
Cold War, both China and India were the
newly-independent and fully sovereign states. The United
States, on the other hand, had emerged as a global
superpower with tremendous stakes in the Asia
pacific region.
India was not comfortable with the US policy of
maintaining strategic alliances and establishing military bases around the
world. New Delhi adopted a non-aligned foreign
policy in quite contrast with the US approach. Consequently, Washington came to
detest both Indian nationalism and non-alignment. Yet, it was not difficult for
the United States to
maintain a modicum of working relations with India.
On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China from its very birth was considered a
hostile political entity by the US.
After failing to bring about a compromise between Mao’s Communist forces and
Chian Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces, Washington
was unable to live at peace with Communist China. The US Containment Doctrine
was as much applicable to China
as to the USSR.
India and China nonetheless were able to forge cordial ties with each other,
despite different political systems and conviction. Democratic India had
extended its hands of friendship to Communist China and the two countries soon
pledged to maintain bilateral relationship on the basis of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Co-existence or Panch Sheel.
The political scenario began to change in curious ways since
the early 1960s and crystallized clearly by early 1970s. India and China had turned hostile with a
border war in 1962 to their credit. The US
and China had begun to share
a common enemy with widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. India by the way went closer towards the Soviet
Union, which was considered an adversary by both China
and the US.
The strategic understanding between the US and China
and between India and the
Soviet Union became completely irrelevant after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. India, China
and the United States
began to adopt a policy of constructive engagement towards one another under
the new political and security landscape of the post-Cold War era.
As the Chinese economy boomed with a galloping speed and the
entire world began to court it, India
too improved its economic ties with China. But the extent and degree of
the US-China economic cooperation was way ahead of the US-India or India-China
economic relations. The trade surplus run by the Chinese vis-a-vis the US was several times higher than the total trade
turn-over between India and
the US.
The US investment in China too was much higher than its investment in
India.
There is little doubt that China’s
economic performance outstripped India’s
partly because India
was a latecomer to the field of economic reforms and openness. The authoritarian decision-making process in China
compared with the democratic systems in India also to an extent influenced
the pace of economic growth in the two countries.
Significantly, the growing economic ties between China and the US did not make them strategic
partners but strategic competitors by the turn of the Century. As China’s economy
exploded to new heights and so did its capability to invest more in its defence
sectors, American worries intensified. The new vigorous and confident China was
expected to demand a larger share of its influence in Asian politics that would
automatically cut into the American share.
As President George Bush entered the White House with a team
of neo-conservatives, the American rhetoric on China changed from “strategic
partner” to “strategic competitor.” While the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US compelled the Bush Administration to avoid
any competition with China,
some Americans clearly saw a challenge in a rapidly growing China and
sought to contain this unprecedented growth.
The US
had two choices to manage the Chinese challenge. One was to allow Japanese
militarization. The other was to help Indian technological and economic growth.
The first choice has been a difficult one in view of the prevailing fear in the
Asia Pacific region of any resurgence of Japanese militarism. The second choice
had little problem, since India
itself had begun its engagement of the international community economically.
Consequently, the Bush Administration identified India as a new “strategic partner” and pledged
to assist India in its emergence as a global
power. The expanding defence cooperation between India and the US, the efforts
to implement a new nuclear deal, the pledge to enhance bilateral trade are all
geared towards building India’s power profile.
Some Americans and a few Indians possess a desire to establish a network of relationship
that would aim at containing the growth of a malign Chinese power. The idea of
a new containment strategy is neither beneficial for the region nor for the
world. It has the seeds of a new devastating Cold War-type confrontation that
would enhance mutual suspicions and stall the growth process.
Communist China is not a closed country, but a heavily
engaged nation in the international community. Its economic policies have
benefited many countries around the world. India
should refrain from joining any US-led network that intends to contain China. On the
other hand, the China
is a revisionist power. Some Chinese do speak of getting Asia
rid of American presence and influence. This is a containment strategy aimed at
containing American influence in Asia. India should avoid teaming up with China and possibly
Russia
in order to limit US activities in Asia.
Simultaneously, India has to guard against its own
containment, which may not be openly articulated but quietly undertaken. There
was a time when both the US
and China sought containment
of India
in various ways. There was no US-China axis at work against India. But the US was uncomfortable with India’s closeness
with the Soviets and the Chinese built up Pakistan
as a counterweight to India.
Currently, the US
favours a strong, stable and prosperous India. China, on the other hand, appears
wary of growing Indo-US ties. India
hardly complained or evinced distrust when US-China relations grew to
unprecedented heights after the Cold War. China needs little to fear from
closer Indo-US relations. But it is significant to pursue a diplomacy of
removing fears and apprehensions.
Positive engagements among India,
China and the US will be
indispensable for Asian economic growth and political stability. Suspicions
between any two of this triangle will be harmful for regional growth and global
stability. In other words, this emerging strategic triangle has the potential
for enormous economic growth and dangerous security consequences. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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