DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 7 August 2006

Enemy Within The Force

LET THE ARMY REMAIN AN ARMY

By B.K. Mathur

Following a report last month about two agents of a Pakistan-based militant organization joining the Indian Air Force, one concernedly learnt of existence of such enemies within the Indian Army every third day.  Within hours of the denial by the Air Force spokesperson of the report emanating from the National Security Council, two armymen deployed in J&K with the Rashtriya Rifles were held for connections with the militants.  And the entry of such elements in other regiments of the Indian Army is being reportedly discovered or suspected.  In fact, the trend is continuing for quite sometime now in India’s forces, which at one time used to be the envy of the world.

The latest report comes from Nashik where the Maharashtra anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) detained a retired Army Major over the week-end for allegedly passing on a sensitive military information to an agent of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.  The Major was picked up following confessions by the ISI agent. The documents recovered from the possession of the agent included several photographs of airbases in Pune, Mumbai, Jamnagar and Nashik.  Add to this the Union Home Ministry’s advisory to the Governments of the West Coast States of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Kerala and Karnataka on the eve of the Independence Day celebrations about the suspected supply of arms and landing of terrorists.

Commenting on this alarming trend in India’s mighty armed forces a fortnight ago, this column had highlighted the need to review the entire recruitment system to ensure quality intake into the forces.  Undesirable elements get into the forces because of several lacunae highlighted in that write-up.   In addition to this two other points require to be seriously looked into to stop the damaging trend: Keep the military away from civil deployment as far as possible and a thorough review of the administration of Cantonments and overhaul of their Boards, as they used to be during the Raj.  There is now urgent need to keep the Army in barracks away from the “civil pollution”, as stressed in this column time and again – and for years now.  Let the Army remain an Army.

The question about the entry of undesirable elements in the armed forces was concernedly discussed in the Lok Sabha the other day and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had very rightly observed that the function of the Army was to fight the enemy from across the border and to train for that job without getting involved increasingly in civil duties.  What Mukherjee implied was that the increasing contact with the civilians led the Armymen to getting involved with undesirable elements for some considerations which are available in plenty to the militant groups and their local agents.

Take, for example, the case of the two Armymen who were detained for passing on some information to a militant group.  On interrogation they reportedly accepted their guilt and explained that they were forced to do so in view of a threat to their families.  Well, this is no defence.  But such a situation can be avoided if only the contact of the Armymen with local police, para-military forces and civilians is reduced and the commanders at all levels in the places of deployment keep a strong vigil on their men, instead of getting involved themselves.  There comes the question of recruitment in Officer-cadres about which we talked in the last column.  Generally what is required is that the Army must be kept away from the systems failure in civil life, an increasing curse of India!

It is true that the Army deployment is difficult to avoid in Jammu and Kashmir, where foreign forces are required to be tackled, and the north-eastern States where insurgency is being increasingly supported by foreign militant groups. Of course, the Army has to be deployed in such situations.  But in such involvements also, the Commanders must ensure implementation of military discipline for which the Army is known.   In such conditions, as also in times of such calamities like cyclones etcetera, the Army needs to be deployed.  But the force must be kept away from “policing” deployment to handle problems like communal riots or disturbances.  That is not the job of the Army.  Such assignments could easily be handled by Central para-military forces, if the local police fails.

This at once reminds me of the manner in which Mulayam Singh Yadav had reacted as the Defence Minister in Deve Gowda’s Government to my question at a Press Conference in New Delhi about too much use of the Army for civil duties.  He stated in so many words that the Army was a Government organization and it is for the Government to decide how and when it is to be used. After all, the Government spends so much in maintaining such a large Army and it should be used for civil duties in peace time, when there is no war.  Similar view was earlier expressed by Bansi Lal, Defence Minister in Indira Gandhi’s Government. 

One hundred per cent correct.  But whose loss it is when the armed forces suffer from too much engagement in civil duties for two reasons.  One, increasing indiscipline because of  contact with civilian agencies and, two, suffering from inadequate training. In these days of induction of sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapon and weapon systems in the forces, the jawans, airmen and sailors need more time during the peace time to train continuously on these weapons.  If that is not done, then the forces are bound to perform badly in time of war, as happened with the Pakistani force in wars against India in 1965 and 1971.  They were provided latest, state-of-the-art machinery by big brother America but failed to use them properly due to lack of training.

Another important aspect required to be reviewed is the management of Cantonments. It is true that the Cantonment Boards across the country are headed by the concerned Sub-Area or Area commander of the Army.  But the constitution of these is such that civilian influence and vote politics prevail in their functioning.  Moreover, a lot of civilian population has come to acquire land and properties in almost all the Cantonment areas, with the result that they now look like any other mohalla in a city, where clean environment is something wholly unknown.  There was a time in my school days at Meerut, which has one of the big Cantonments in the country, one was afraid of entering the “military area”, most parts of which were out of bounds for the general public. Cantonments must return to the Raj days --- clean environment with no “civil pollution”.

If all that happens --- quality intake, controlled deployment of forces for civil duties and clean environment of the Cantonments and barracks ---there is no reason why the discipline of the forces, at its nadir today, should not improve. When there will be little contact with the civil population and when the troops will have enough time for training on modern weapons which the Government of India has planned to acquire in plenty, there would be little chance of undesirable elements getting into the forces or the militarymen having contact with spies, militants or their agents. At the moment the state of India’s armed forces is alarmingly in bad shape, requiring urgent need to review all its aspects responsible for the present state of affairs. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 25 July 2006

Review Selection Criteria

FORCES NEED QUALITY NOT QUANTITY

By B.K. Mathur

 The National Security Council has prepared a document which its Chief, M.K. Narayanan, has circulated to all the Chief Ministers. The document contains a chilling revelation that two Lashkar-e-Toyyeba cadres have joined the Indian Air Force (IAF). The alarming report has, however, been denied by the IAF spokesperson who has stated: “We have got such reports and we have looked into the matter. But there are no LeT elements in the Air Force and we have carried out stringent check.”  Welcome relief.  But there has to be some basis about the report that has been forwarded to the IAF by none other than the National Security Adviser. The counter-intelligence wings of India’s armed forces must look into it, because the danger of undesirable elements entering the armed forces cannot be ruled out.

The latest discovery by the intelligence agencies is that various militant outfits have now started recruiting educated youth qualified to join any civil or military service. The sneaking in of the jehadi elements into the armed forces is a very serious matter requiring a good hard look at the recruitment system for the three military services – the Army, Air Force and the Navy.  On paper, the system is quite foolproof, leaving no scope for any undesirable element getting in.  But to have a definite drill for in-take both in the Officer cadre and the Other Ranks is one thing. To follow strictly the prescribed criteria quite another.  Doubts about failure to select right type of boys have arisen, given increasing reports of even some senior officers in the forces indulging in undesirable activities.

The IAF’s spokesperson in the Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence has talked about “stringent checks” while denying the report of two militant cadres joining the Air Force.  But the failure of the Services Selection Boards for recruitment of the Officer cadre and Recruiting Offices for the ORs (other ranks) to select right type of boys for the training Academies is being increasingly felt.  Take the case of Officers who lead the jawans, Airmen and Sailors. First the candidate has to clear a tough entrance examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and certain number of boys is recommended to the Services Selection Boards (SSB) in order of merit.

This is where the flaw lies. The method of selection at the SSBs.  Remember, in early 1950s a feeling had fast grown among some Star Officers at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) in New Delhi that right type of boys, with the required OLQ (Officer-like qualities) were not being sent to the training Academies.  This led the AHQ to send a group of SSB, Meerut, to reassess the second-term Gentleman cadets of the 13^th course of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) at Dehra Dun.  Complete three-day selection exercise was repeated at the Academy.  The full report of the SSB has not yet been disclosed but one of the recommendations was that psychologically-centric selection mode needed to be amended.

One of the amendments then proposed was to give thought to the method followed during the Raj for selection in the British Indian Army.   Stress was given to the family background of the candidate for commissioning into the force. The second was his career profile in school and college he attended in the field of sports and other extra-curricular activities.  Which really meant that the President of the Board had more say in selecting a candidate than the Group Testing Officer (GTO) or the psychologist whose assessment is till today the main consideration for selection. Each of the three assesses --- the President, the GTO and the President --- have equal number of marks.

Even if the President of the Board and the GTO, both in service uniform, want to select a boy and the psychologist, a civilian, does not want to clear him, the candidate is out.  In this scenario chances of wrong selection are more, especially when corruption at all levels in military and civil, is the order of the day. How else would you explain the fact that so many cases of spying and corruption at the higher level are reported day in and day out. Look at the latest one: The Navy war room leak by some senior officers. One can go on and on highlighting cases of corruption and indiscipline in the armed forces. Imagine the involvement of a three Star and a two Star General in the sub-standard purchase of “Dal” for the troops.

Little wonder then that the “trio” at the SSB joins hands and selects somebody wholly undeserving. That explains the increasing trend of Staff Officers indulging in undesirable activities. At times boys with lesser score at the assessment stage get selected.  The reason? Better quality boys with seemingly high OLQ just do not want to join the armed forces, with the type of boys who look for their personal gains rather than the national interest. To fill up the vacancies at the Officer level, the Government is left with no choice but to compromise quality with quantity, with the result that bad boys manage to get into the forces and create problems like the increasing number of General Court Martials.

Now look at the increasing trend in various Recruitment offices across the country for Jawans, Airmen and Sailors… Haven’t you heard of umpteen cases from time to time of boys from the countryside having to pay for recruitment in various Regiments?  The system is getting from bad to worse, with the police enquiries being fudged for undesirable elements sneaking into the armed forces.  There is also the question of quality and quantity in the case of recruitment of the ORs.  The youth get better opportunities elsewhere than in the armed forces.

This forces the military headquarters to recruit sub-standard boys to fill up vacancies in various Regiments. The process may possibly lead to undesirable elements getting into the forces.  The situation is worse in case of employment of civilians in Regiments, Squadrons and Naval units.  People like barbers, bearers, cooks etc. can be employed on “considerations” that prevent the authorities from having proper checks on their antecedents. Remember, a Court Martial case at Mathura some years go in which an Officer was punished on charges of purchases of medicines for the civilian staff from a Chemist which did not exist. Fictitious bills were made and passed by the authorized Officer.

In such a climate which is currently prevailing in many armed forces units and where the recruitment systems at all levels is increasingly helping individuals, not the forces and, importantly the nation. As repeatedly emphasized in this column time and again, and for years, there is need, urgent need, to keep the country’s armed forces away from the deteriorating civil environment.  Recruitment norms should be changed where necessary, and strictly enforced in Selection Boards and Recruitment Offices. That will ensure quality intake at all levels. Further delay on this front would be at the nation’s peril. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 10 July 2006

India-China Military Ties

what About Aksai Chin & Border

By B.K. Mathur

 
Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited China recently and on return described the trip as “historic”, like other leaders have done in the past --- K.R. Narayanan, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee, Abdul Kalam etc.  Mukherjee’s interaction with the Chinese leaders during his three-day visit was described by his Ministry’s spokesperson as an “important milestone and a major confidence building measure in the progressive relations between India and China”.  At the end of his talks with his Chinese counterpart, Mukherjee reportedly stated that India attached great importance to the “strategic and cooperative partnership with China.”  Beijing has also pledged to step up strategic partnership with India.

The two Defence Ministers have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), to institutionalise military training, exercise engagements and regular contacts among the armed forces, Defence officials and experts of the two countries. Chinese Defence Minister was quoted as stating in the presence of Mukherjee that “friendship and mutually-beneficial cooperation were the fundamental interests of China and India and were conducive to the peace, stability and development of Asia and the world.”  Fine words these, politically and diplomatically speaking. But Indian leaders do not seem to have understood the Chinese mindset.

Several agreements for peace, goodwill and friendship have been signed right from the Nehru days. But never have the Indian leaders taken up seriously the military aspect of the Sino-Indian relations.  After all wars are always fought between two nations for territories, which are captured and surrendered. Obviously, therefore, the LAC is the main issue of military confrontation.  China has already occupied about 38,000 sq.km. in the remote Aksai-Chin area Beijing is also holding 5,180 sq.km. in northern Kashmir, ceded to it by Pakistan.  Additionally, China also claims another 90,000 in India’s eastern sector. What about these issues of great military significance, Mr. Mukherjee? Also, has China acknowledged Sikkim as part of India, as we have done in regard to Tibet?

As a matter of fact, the top brass of the Indian Army has always remained apprehensive of the Chinese designs along the border.  Almost at regular intervals China’s army patrols are found entering the Indian territory, claiming as their own.  In June 2003, when Prime Minister Vajpayee was on a goodwill visit to China, a Chinese patrol stopped Indian intelligence officers at Neimphu in Arunachal Pradesh, about 14 km inside the Indian side of the border.  This was followed by military incursion on the day Vajpayee was scheduled to reach Beijing.  This clrarly highlighted for the umpteenth time that New Delhi has failed to get the Chinese to present maps of their version of the LAC, leading to the border conflicts, which started in 1962 in a big way and has continued since then.

Vajpayee reacted sharply to the June 2003 incident in the Rajya Sabha and described it as a betrayal. Remember, he had to face a similar situation during his visit to China as the Minister of External Affairs, in the Morarji Government in 1978. China embarrassed him by attacking Vietnam and forced him to cut short his visit. This incident could have turned into a major military confrontation, like the one in mid-80s when the Chinese army had built a helipad in Sam-Rong Chu Valley in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Even though the Indian Army dismantled the helipad, the Chinese continued to claim that areas as their’s and set up a patrol post there, prompting India to move its 5 Mountain Division to Tawang.

In fact, in July that year, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman stated that Beijing does not recognize Arunachal Pradesh as part of India.  He accused the Indian intelligence squad for crossing the LAC. Unfortunately, the boundary issue, as also the Aksai Chin occupation by China, have remained unresolved in the Sino-Indian relations, leading to continued Army deployment all along the border.  Officials of the two sides have met several times since Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988.  Yet no peaceful situation. Only diplomatic comfort, even though the boundary dispute has remained a matter of concern since the Nehru days, as seen in a prolonged correspondence between the two Governments from 1954 to January 1965.

Nehru had stated at the time of the correspondence with the Chinese Government, which is contained in eleven White Papers, published by the Government of India: “It was little naïve to think that the trouble with China was essentially due to a dispute of some territory. It has also some deeper reasons.  Two of the largest countries in Asia confronted each other over a large border. They differed in many ways.  The test was whether anyone of them would have a more dominating position than the other on the border and in Asia itself”. How true today, after the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. Attention Mr. Defence Minister.

Two other irritants which affect the Sino-Indian relationship are China’s military build-up and its military assistance to Pakistan, which has a direct bearing on Islamabad’s handing over the Indian territory in Pak-occupied Kashmir to China and Beijing’s gradual occupation of Aksai Chin area. Also, the Chinese Navy is extending its tentacles in the Indian Ocean with bases in Myanmar and Sri Lanka.  It is also known that Iran, Pakistan and Syria have funded China’s weapons development programme in the M-series of missiles. Beijing has shipped to Pakistan complete M-11 missiles, capable of carrying about 1100 pounds of nuclear heads and to target up to 300 miles.

China’s military build-up is a matter of great concern to India, especially when Beijing is racing to become a major world power.  That makes it necessary for New Delhi to resolve the prolonged border dispute and take up territories in Beijing’s possession, before anything else.  History tells us that the Chinese are sensitive about their border with India and they would not mind another round of a military operation on the territory issue.  Thus, the military angle in the Sino-Indian relations is important.  It makes it incumbent on India to closely watch China’s military build-up and its relationship with Pakistan.

Nothing would please one more than the continuance of atmosphere of peace and goodwill repeatedly created during the last nearly two decades between the Asia’s two mighty neighbours.  But, at the same time, the country’s defence preparedness has to be kept in mind, especially when one finds Beijing strengthening its military machines beyond its requirement and contrary to the international climate.  Just see China is spreading its tentacles in India’s north, east and south --- and expanding and modernizing its army.  There is need to talk, and talk effectively, about India’s territories in the Chinese possession.  Surrender is no victory!---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 27 June 2006

Army’s New War Doctrine

SMALL STRIKE FORCE IN NUCLEAR ERA

By B K Mathur

The week-long military exercise in Punjab last month, code-named Sange Shakti, was designed to test the Indian Army’s new combat concept for conventional offensive operations in the plains. The exercise was basically aimed at concentrating and coordinating India’s military fire-power. With the creation of smaller strike groups, the exercise was also intended to fine-tune the Army-Air Force joint operation in a strategic battlefield and offensive operations against a nuclear backdrop. The idea of the new strike force is to speed up the troop movement to ensure early handling of any enemy attack.

The thrust of the new doctrine to suit the changing battle strategies across the world is on the formation of “integrated battle groups” drawn from the Army, Air Force and the Navy. These groups are being so trained as to be able to make swift and hard inroads into the enemy territory. The highlight of the doctrine is, and rightly, that the strikes are “limited and calibrated” to ensure that nuclear weapons do not come into play in a military operation. The need for swift strike by small integrated forces, unlike the earlier policy of moving to the front the entire strike Corps, was felt following the experience during  “Operation Parakram” in 2002.

The Army undertook a massive forward mobilisation for that operation from Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal to launch pads along the Line of Control (LoC) after the terrorist attack on Parliament House on December 13, 2001.  The movement of the three strike Corps took the Army nearly one month to get to the operational readiness along the LoC.  Imagine, if it was an actual war and the enemy attack had already taken place when the movement of the strike force started, the Indian Army would have been caught napping – and, perhaps, without the support of the air force.

Obviously, the concept of an integrated military action is welcome.  As disclosed during last month’s Operation, eight strike groups have been constituted, instead of the earlier three “strike groups” at the Corps level, based far away from a possible scene of operation.  The details of the composition of the smaller strike groups has been finalized by the Army and the Air Force commanders and approved by the Defence planners and the Cabinet Committee on Security. It is hoped that before the new doctrine was tried at last month’s operation, several aspects and drawbacks of the earlier system were considered carefully.

The concept of integrated military operation, inter-Service cooperation and joint command and control has been under discussion for a long time. At one stage the Government had almost decided to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) above the three Chiefs of Staff, those of the Army, Navy and the Air Force.  But certain difficulties were obviously seen in the CDS system which prompted the Government to re-think about the matter.  In fact, there have been sharp differences among the military commanders and Defence experts about the creation of the CDS.  One expert who has vehemently opposed the move all along told me the other day: “One of the achievements of the Vajpayee Government on the military front is its failure to create the post of the CDS.” 

The present Defence Minister was initially opposed to the creation of the post. He had indicated this in response to my question at a Press Conference.  But he seems to have changed his mind now, in pursuance to suggestions from various quarters after last month’s military exercise during which new strike concept was tried and its shortcomings were registered, especially taking into consideration the operational requirements in the nuclear era.  The Defence Minister has now sought the advice of all the political parties regarding the creation of the CDS.  The CPM has already raised some doubts about it. 

The creation of the post is a subject that requires examination in depth.  It will be taken up another time. At the moment, the creation of smaller strike forces, as tried last month, with the requirement of joint command and control needs to be carefully planned, against the experiences gained by the Army last month. Several things have to be considered, among these mainly three aspects: inter-arm cooperation within the Army, inter-Service understanding, proper training for a joint military action and ability to undertake successful operation against possible use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.  Remember, Pakistan which continues to be India’s potential enemy despite the present peace efforts by both, is a nuclear power and Gen. Musharraf had threatened several times before the peace moves about the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a war.

Experience during the wars India has fought post-independence, including the Kargil operation which professionally cannot be described as a war, shows that inter-arm and inter-Service coordination miserably failed.  In 1962, the Army was caught unawares when China attacked. The Henderson-Brooke Committee went into the causes of the disaster the Indian Army suffered. Its report has not yet been disclosed. and the Defence planners have failed to make use of the findings of the Committee for improvement in the operation strategy subsequently during wars against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Years after the report was submitted, Major-General Henderson-Brooke, who lived in Australia after retirement and passed away recently, told me during his short visit to New Delhi: “Total failure of command and control” was the cause of India’s reverses.

Several Regiment-level commanders who fought the 1971 war against Pakistan now tell us of several incidents when they failed to get air support for their forward moves. At times they had to depend only on artillery support, that too of the field artillery because till then the gunners were not provided with gunships, that is, armed helicopters, even though the other major armies of the world had them.

The Air Force failed to provide timely support because of a lacuna: faulty system being followed even now, irrespective of the composition of the strike force.  The demand for air support has to follow a chain of command that causes delay. Beside this, any war doctrine or integrated operation strategy requires a well-trained force.  Fist of all, the Army needs to be freed from increasing deployment in aid of civil power. The troops require to be put on vigorous training at all levels and in all possible scenarios.  For joint operations, the integrated groups for rapid deployment have need to be trained accordingly under joint command and control with complete coordination of the three Services.  Then only can the new war doctrine be successfully implemented. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)