ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 7 February 2006

Iranian Nuclear Tangle

 Challenges BeforE India

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Iran has stunned the world by refusing to compromise on its suspected civilian nuclear programme, even though the Big Five nuclear weapon powers, which are also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, threatened to take the question to the Security Council.

After the majority of member countries voted in favour of the resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)meeting in Vienna last week, to refer the Iranian nuclear question to the Security Council, Tehran adopted a confrontational stance and announced that it would now begin full-scale production of enriched uranium, would end all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA and would not allow the IAEA’s short-notice inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol of the NPT.

This stance of Tehran, accompanied by its high rhetoric against the United States, Israel and the West in general, has made it difficult for countries friendly to Iran, such as India, China and Russia to take a stronger stand favourable to Iran. Germany and France, which adopted anti-US positions on the US approach to Iraq, were also prepared to assist Iran and avoid the American confrontational approach, but the Iran-EU dialogue went no where due to Iran’s intransigence and the EU-Three were also finally induced to make common cause with the United States.

India has been consistently improving its ties with Iran. Apart from its commercial and business relations, New Delhi announced a “strategic partnership” with Iran in the midst of its international isolation. The proposed gas pipeline project from Iran to India through Pakistan was given high priority considerations in India to cement Indo-Iranian cooperation. However, even New Delhi found it difficult to support Iran at the IAEA in view of its un-conciliatory attitude and offensive diplomacy.

Iran perhaps hoped that India would abstain from the IAEA voting in view of the strong pro-Iranian position of the Left parties, which support the current UPA coalition. While many Indians fail to understand the Left parties logic behind supporting Iran, it did generate expectations in Tehran. In order to make and implement an independent foreign policy, New Delhi does not have to oppose the US all the time.

But the Left appears to have drawn a line between the hegemonic US and the theocratic Iran and prefers to say and do every thing against the US, even if it would mean backing theocracy in principle.

Significantly, the Left parties have not made their position on the basis of the economic rationale, such as the gas pipeline project. The statements of Left leaders are clear that they support Iran, because the US and its allies are against Iran. It is wrongly believed that if India would have gone with the microscopic minority vote at the IAEA, it would have bolstered India’s image or served its national interests. Moreover, how can one argue, that supporting Iran would have reflected an independent foreign policy?

Having said that, India’s diplomacy will face more intricate challenges in the weeks and months to come due to its vote at the IAEA.  What is the likely future of Iran’s nuclear issue? First of all, there is still a silver-lining in the dark sky and diplomacy may ultimately triumph. Tehran has not closed all its doors to negotiations. Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, said soon after the IAEA meeting that, “Adoption of the policy of resistance doesn’t mean we are on non-speaking terms or non-cooperative. We had two options. One was resistance and the other surrender. We chose resistance.”

India has an option open for playing a role in future negotiations. The Indian Ambassador in Tehran rightly remarked that India was willing to “invite Iran and the negotiation parties to dialogue.” However, this willingness will turn into wishful thinking, unless New Delhi plays a proactive role and succeeds in coordinating a new dialogue process to resolve the Iranian tangle. The challenge would be whether Iran would be willing to listen to India after its vote at the IAEA in favour of the US-backed resolution.

Secondly, there is also a possibility that punitive measures may be adopted at the UN Security Council in the future, if Tehran refuses to budge from its current position. Russia, China, France and even Britain would make it hard for the US to follow a policy of sanctions in view of their ongoing economic and commercial interests in Iran. However, if Iranian intransigence continues, such an outcome cannot be ruled out. India is not a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. Its role and influence there would be extremely limited and indirect. But a question may arise as to whether India would support the anti-Iranian sanctions? Will not India be bound by a decision to follow the UN verdict?

The third challenge would come, if the UN Security Council fails to have a unanimous view on sanctions policy. Washington may decide to adopt unilateral sanctions against Iran, which would be stronger than the earlier Iran-Libya sanctions Act adopted by the Clinton Administration in 1996. Will India then support the US sanctions policy? If it does, the apprehensions of the Left parties that the Indian Government  is conducting its diplomacy at the behest of the US would be proved. If it does not, what will happen to India’s nuclear deal with the United States for civilian nuclear cooperation? Additionally, the whole Indian approach at the IAEA may be interpreted as a waste and a failure.

The fourth challenge would come if the Bush Administration escalates its confrontation with Iran and seeks some kind of a military solution to the whole issue. Some analysts argue against such an eventuality. They point out that Iran is not Iraq. Iran has a larger population base and deeper strategic depth. When the oil prices are skyrocketing and the Americans appear to have been stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington cannot take military action against Iran. Many Iranians will probably go along with this line of thinking. But you never know Washington, especially the Bush Administration. This Administration is a risk taker. It may not commit US troops and yet take certain military action. What will be India’s position on this? Yes, one clear position will be opposing a military approach to resolve international issues. But this will be only a position on the principle. What will New Delhi do?

There is just a little time for the foreign policy community to deliberate on such possibilities. And the considerations and discussions should begin now. ----- INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 23 January 2006

Difficult Days Ahead

INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The official excitement expressed in July last by both the Indian and American officials after an understanding on civilian cooperation arrived at between the Indian Prime Minister and the American President has been replaced by more caution after the recent visit of the US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns to Delhi.

The conviction of Indian and American officials reflected after the first meeting on this issue in October last, that the new civilian nuclear deal would be ready for implementation by the time President George Bush makes an official trip to India no longer remains after the latest meeting between Burns and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. India now feels that more dialogue with greater details is necessary and the US officials doubt if an agreement for implementation would be ready before Bush’s visit to India.

However, both New Delhi and Washington have not changed their views on the importance of this agreement for strengthening international non-proliferation efforts, as well as for meeting the energy requirements of a fast-growing Indian economy. Significantly, neither the US nor India is comfortable with sharing the content and nature of the official dialogue with their respective people. The dialogue between the officials of the two countries is shrouded with substantial secrecy.

Had it been pure economics or just a matter of energy supply, perhaps open diplomacy would have been adopted. If the Indian Prime Minister considered it important to strike a nuclear deal with the US President without first taking the Indian people into confidence or even consulting with the coalition partners of the UPA Government, one can safely assume that the matter involves issues of national security and thus open debate and discussion are not encouraged.

Democracies and open societies with vibrant media, nonetheless, cannot remain quiet and refrain from debating the issue or demanding transparency. Indians are so fond of debates that every bit of national security affairs becomes a matter of public information and discussion – the NPT, CTBT, FMCT or just name it. The aftermath of July 18 agreement between the US and India too saw a healthy debate on the issue in our country.

Several analysts expressed their fear that civilian nuclear cooperation with the US might force India to compromise its national security. They did not believe that it would be possible to separate the civilian nuclear facilities from the ones necessary for the country’s military requirements. The previous NDA Government circulated a draft nuclear doctrine that spelled out an ambitious nuclear weapons capability on the sea, land and air. Not many in India challenged such an ambition. How could the Government now achieve that goal after separating the nuclear facilities and opening up a large number of them to international inspection? Others raised apprehension that India’s nuclear weapon capability would be exposed to outsiders after the Indo-US deal was implemented.

The UPA Government initially gave an impression that the US would accord the same status to India as other nuclear weapon powers have on matters of international inspection. Probably every one, including the Indian Government, was shocked when it was revealed that it was not so. Earlier, the general feeling was that the understanding reached between the Prime Minister and American President was enough for the White House to approach the US Congress to bring about necessary legislation for enabling supply of civilian nuclear technology to India. Soon another eye opener incident occurred when Indians came to know that New Delhi would have to take certain concrete steps demanded by Washington before the US Congress would act upon the issue.

The US expectation was, however, not limited to what India would do to its nuclear programmes and facilities at home. Washington also desired India to prove and demonstrate its non-proliferation credentials on the foreign policy front. The real challenge came when the Iranian nuclear issue was raised in the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA. India had to vote on the side of the US in the process risking the proposed gas pipeline project with Iran.

Subsequently, as Tehran took up the issue with New Delhi and expected a change of behaviour next time, Washington expressed its pleasure over Indian voting and desired that New Delhi would continue to do so in the future. The Bush Administration pointed out that such foreign policy behaviour was necessary to enable it to convince the members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) the need for co-opting India into the non-proliferation regime.

All these are clear indications that the new relationship with the United States will involve rethinking of Indian foreign policy postures and stances on certain issues now and even in the future. It is important that Indian foreign policy establishment and international affairs analysts begin serious study and analysis on this subject. A vigorous foreign policy debate is called for to protect Indian foreign policy interests.

It is also required that the national security team, both in the Government and the policy analysis community, discuss the security ramifications of the proposed Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation. After India separates the civilian nuclear facilities from the military ones and gives such a list to the US, interested members of the international community will quickly know about India’s nuclear weapons facilities. Even if we discount the possibility of any nuclear exchange in the region, even theoretically the real and potential adversaries of India would be able to target India’s facilities. Such an eventuality has to be seriously considered before we go forward with the required nuclear facilities separation.

There is no doubt that the country’s improved relation with the US is significant and desirable. But the cost and benefit analysis of a nuclear deal, such as the proposed one, is essential to protect and enhance the country’s national interests and security. While the Government should maintain certain amount of secrecy for national security reasons, some amount of transparency too is necessary to evolve a healthy police approach.

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 31 January 2006

Diplomatic Tug Of War

India AND Energy Insecurity

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The diplomatic tug of war surrounding the proposed deal between India and the US to establish cooperation in civilian nuclear technology is born out of emerging energy insecurity.

The American pressure on India to support its confrontational approach towards Iran and Syria in exchange of US agreement to supply civilian nuclear technology to India is the beginning of a challenge to Indian quest for assured supply of energy to fuel its growing economy.

Geo-political analysts understand that the growing demand for oil and gas and the shrinking supply of these two energy resources may provide the real basis on which future wars are going to be fought. Although the Western analysts and political leaders are focused on the rising requirement of energy resources in China and India and predict that these two emerging Asian economic giants will shortly be competing and scrambling for assured energy supplies, the Americans and Europeans are not lagging behind.

With five per cent population, the Americans consume about quarter of the world energy. While it is an oil and gas producing country, the US is increasingly becoming dependent on oil imports from external sources. The European demand for oil and gas too is consistently rising. Both India and China are late comers to the industrial age. They have started their economic and industrial performance from a low base and hence in terms of percentage of their energy demands in the future, these two economies become more visible. But the industrial economies of Europe, Japan and the US consume the larger chunk of the world energy resources and in terms of absolute quantities these countries will continue be on the top.

The major European countries, such as Germany, Britain and France; Japan and the US all are strategizing to meet the future demands of hydrocarbon resources. France, for instance, has invested tremendously in the generation of civilian nuclear power, Germany has signed a deal with Russia, the second largest oil and gas exporter, to build a pipeline to buy the Russian energy resources. The US is seeking to buy LNG from Russia. China too is developing a network of relationship with the oil and gas producing countries of the Middle-East and even Latin America. It is also in the process of acquiring basing facilities in some countries to protect the routes of its energy imports.

Compared to the Americans, Chinese and others, India’s energy consumption is much lower. Americans, for instance, consume about 20 million barrels of oil per day, the Chinese consume about 6 to 7 million bpd. But India’s figure is about 2 million bpd. China’s demands in the future will be much more than that of India. Yet, India has to meet its growing energy demands more and more through imports alone. In order to do that the Government of India has been making modest attempts to build its own energy corridors. The gas pipeline project with Iran, the proposed investment in Syria along with the Chinese, efforts towards improving energy cooperation with Saudi Arabia and India’s efforts to acquire advanced civilian nuclear technology from the United States are all aimed at managing the country’s energy security.

Politics and diplomacy, however, have erected significant barricades and it would require no less effort to overcome these difficulties. The most significant challenge is clearly coming from India’s emerging strategic partner—the United States. The American energy policy and strategy are guided by both economic and strategic considerations.

Unlike the Europeans, Japanese and other Asian countries, the US is not dependent on the Middle-East for its energy supply. It receives the bulk of its external energy resources from NAFTA partners, such as Canada, Mexico and Venezuela. The current political standoff with Venezuela does not pose such a big threat to US energy security.

But the fact remains that the power, which is least dependent on the Middle-Eastern oil, has maximum influence in this region. The US military presence in the Persian Gulf has been robust since the `1991 Gulf War and has enhanced further since 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC. The US is not as directly affected by the volatility of the Middle-Eastern politics and security as others. In the process, Washington exercises awesome leverage over its allies and friends in Europe and Asia.

The US confrontation with Iran on the nuclear issue, with Syria on the issue of assassination of a former Lebanese Prime Minister, its continuing military involvement in Iraq and unstinted support to Israel have posed serious dilemmas for traditional US allies in Europe and for emerging strategic partner like India.

During the days of non-alignment and cold war, New Delhi could afford to take diametrically opposite positions vis-a-vis the US on international events and issues. This luxury will be more and more scant as India intensifies its economic, defence and political cooperation with the United States.

The current differences with Washington on Iran and Syria are stark reminders of difficult days ahead. India has strategic, economic and even political interests in the Middle-East, which do not always converge with that of the United States. Sooner the Indian Ministry of External Affairs begins an exercise to demarcate the diplomatic boundaries on such issues better it would be for India to meet future challenges.

It so happens that India has been seeking to ensure its energy security by building ties with countries, such as Iran and Syria, which are on the hit list of the US State Department and the Pentagon for various reasons. We are building a similar ties with Saudi Arabia when the US ties with that country has been faltering since the 9/11 incident.

Unlike in the past, Washington considers India to be an influential international actor and fears that Indian engagement with difficult countries in the Middle-East could spoil the US approach. How can India befriend the US and its smaller Middle-Eastern adversaries at the same time? India has to begin preparations for getting the right answer, which can maintain and protect its national interests.--INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 17 January 2006

Despite Intense Pressure

IRAN’s Enigmatic Behaviour CONTINUES

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Iran appears determined to pursue a civilian nuclear programme according to its own sweet will, but simultaneously disregarding the fears and apprehensions of most major powers in the world.

There is not a single country in the international community which feels comfortable to stand with Iran on its nuclear stance. The Muslim neighbours of Iran, all major Asian powers, five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all genuine members of formal and informal proliferation control regimes do not desire to see the emergence of a nuclear weapon power in the Persian Gulf region.

When Tehran expresses its desire to promote nuclear industry in the country for power generation, many raise eyebrows for the simple reason that Iran is an oil and gas rich nation. Nonetheless, none opposes the sovereign right of Iran, a member of the NPT, to develop civilian and peaceful uses of nuclear power.

The problem arises when the Iranian Government seeks to pursue this course on its own terms and conditions. Tehran wants to have a full civilian nuclear fuel cycle at home, which can bring it the perfect recipes for developing nuclear weapons. It vows by its peaceful intentions, but there are many who would not take the Iranian leadership’s statements on its face value.

Iran had been given clean chits many times in the past by the IAEA on its civilian nuclear activities, but the revelations of Iranian involvement in nuclear black market, including the one run until recently by Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, have turned Iran into a suspect.

In the face of intense American pressure to punish Iran, three members of the European Union—France, Germany and Britain-- took the initiative to resolve the issue through diplomacy and dialogue. Iran cooperated for a while, but increasingly aired strong views against Israel, made disparaging remarks, issued statements that appeared unfavourable and unacceptable to the Europeans as well.

All these were regarded as Iran’s bargaining behaviour until it first threatened and then implemented its decision to resume uranium enrichment programme, suspended by the predecessor government under an understanding with the IAEA and the international community.

Russian President Vladimir Putin came up with a pragmatic solution to the entire issue by offering to process and enrich uranium on Russian territory and then pass on those to Iran for use in power reactors. For a change, even the hawks in the Bush Administration viewed this proposal as sensible, feasible and appropriate to resolve the issue without resorting to any arms twisting methods.

Iran chose instead to defy the international community and refused to entertain such a proposal. It considered it the sovereign right of the country to pursue a civilian nuclear programme at home. Had sovereignty remained the same as interpreted by Austin, reality would have been different. Sovereignty has assumed different meanings at different times. It needs considerable military might, economic independence and political will to assert sovereignty on ways that may threaten others.

As a matter of fact, the United States, the hyper-power of the globe, also appears caught in the web of global interdependence and cannot afford to dangle its sovereignty card on every issue under the sun. Why is then current leadership behaving like the emperors who claimed divine rights to perform whatever they desired?  Ahmednejad’s behaviour reminds one of Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric during the Kuwaiti crisis. Before the US-led military operations liberated Kuwait, he used to issue statements like “making Americans swim in their own blood”, if they dared attack Iraq and things of that sort.

The Iranian behaviour prompts one to suspect that the country may already have developed a nuclear weapon capability. Some would reject such a view outright. But then who knew that in the midst of international haggling, North Korea on a fine morning admitted and others believed that it had developed the weapon capability? Similar incidents are plenty in recent nuclear history of the world. The world need not be surprised that Iran, which clandestinely acquired certain nuclear equipment from the black market keeping the world in dark for years, could have developed modest capability to make at least one weapon.

The second factor for Iranian nuclear intransigence appears to be the rising energy prices in the world market. Starved of revenues until recently, the country’s treasury seems to have benefited a great deal from the recent oil price hikes. It is less concerned about its economic isolation now then it was earlier.

The third factor is Iran’s belief that it can use the oil weapon to destabilize the oil market further, if sanctions are imposed on the country on the ground of its nuclear policy. In the backdrop of rising energy prices and growing energy demands in the world, Iran’s capacity to contribute to stability in the oil market or cause chaos in it would seriously increase. 

The fourth factor is Tehran’s assessments of the ground situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Years after major military operations were declared to be over by the US and replacement of troublesome regimes in Baghdad and Kabul, the two countries are undergoing a situation where the US and its coalition partners are not comfortable to withdraw their troops. The American GIs, who seem to have got stuck in two sides of Iran—Afghanistan in the east and Iraq in the west—may not attempt to open another front in Iran—so goes the thinking in Iranian governing circles.

Finally, the Russians and the Chinese, annoyed as they may appear with Iranian intransigence, do not appear to have unanimous views with the US and NATO members on the best course to deal with the Iranians. The London meet may not be able to produce a quick fix. Troubling days are clearly ahead.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)