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Open Forum
Infantry Day Thoughts:THE GENERAL’S LINE OF LIES, by B.K. Mathur,16 October 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 16 October 2006
Infantry Day
Thoughts
THE GENERAL’S LINE
OF LIES
By B.K. Mathur
Indian Army’s Infantry has sufficient cause for celebrating
its “Day” on 27 October every year. On
this day in 1947, the combat-rich arm saved Srinagar---
and Kashmir--- from the attack of
Pakistan-supported tribals. One Infantry Company, about 130 men on foot,
bravely defeated the attack by a 700-strong force, equipped with Rifles, LMGs
and Mortars, in what is presently remembered as free India’s
first battle of Badgaon, Srinagar.
The famous Battle
set the example of courage and valour seldom equalled in the annals of the
Indian Army. The day is justifiably
celebrated with great pomp and show annually by the most battled-hardened
fighting arm, known as the “Queen of Battles”.
This year’s celebrations and get-togethers serving and
retired infantrymen is of special significance, providing a food for thought.
For the first time in 59 years, the Chief of an enemy’s army has claimed to
have defeated the Indian Army at Kargil in 1999, which was nothing more than an
Infantry operation intended to flush out some enemy soldiers who had sneaked
into the Indian territory and constructed
“conditioned” bunkers. The claim has been made by Pakistan’s President, General
Parvez Musharraf, the Army Chief who planned the Kargil operation, in his
just-published memoirs: In the Line of
Fire, described by many as In the
Line of Lies, in utter frustration following the Pakistan Army’s drubbing
whenever it dared attack India, in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999.
Musharraf’s claim has been described as a “bluff” by some
and a “military misadventure” by others.
The latter description has been made significantly, Gen. Ali Kuli Khan
Khattak who resigned from the Army in protest against the, then, Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif’s decision to appoint Musharraf as the Army Chief. Khan has described the Kargil operation as a
disaster, flawed in its conception, tactical planning and execution. He has been quoted as stating that “it
(Kargil) was an unprofessional
decision…… Kargil would continue to haunt him (Musharraf) for the rest of his
life….. Kashmir has damaged the Kashmir
cause…. A disaster bigger than the East Pakistan
tragedy……”
For India,
it was a double triumph in Kargil in 1999---military and diplomatic. Besides
the valour and patriotism which the Indian soldier proved for the umpteenth
time, the Kargil operation was equally significant for the Government of India. It scored a diplomatic triumph. The whole world, including Uncle Sam,
recognized in no uncertain terms that Pakistan was an aggressor and was required to withdraw from the Indian
territory it had illegally occupied for its strategic advantage for future
battles, if it dared to fight against India once more and thrashed. New Delhi showed to the
world it was a peace-loving country and will never ever cross the Line of Control (LoC) to gain strategic
advantage.
In this connection, it needed to be understood that if
India’s aim at Kargil had remained restricted to defeat Pakistan militarily,
the correct strategy would have been, as some IAF Commanders had openly viewed,
that armament and ammunition stores in Pak occupied-Kashmir could be attacked
from the air and the line of communication and supplies to the illegally
constructed “conditioned” bunkers snapped. The strategy could have doubtlessly helped the Indian forces complete the operation
Vijay much faster than they did. In
doing so, Islamabad and the Pak Army Chief
Musharraf could not have complained, because the occupied Kashmir is actually India’s
territory and storing of military machines and ammunition at Skardu could have
been challenged.
Actually, India’s
forces had to fight what may be described as an “unprecedented war”. They were repeatedly asked by the political
leadership not to cross the LoC in
any case Opening of two or three other fronts and encircling of the intruders
after crossing the LoC would have
helped the Indian forces to quicken the completion of the task. This did not
happen contrary to established military operation strategy, because New Delhi did not want
the Pak infiltration to turn into a full-scale war. The Kargil operation, remember, was not a
war, only an operation to throw out the intruders. The task was achieved, unprofessionally though.
However, more important than the triumph at Kargil is the
performance of India’s soldier, who is recognized all over the world as a great
fighter, valiant and courageous from the time he served under the Raj. This is remembered time and again, especially
when the Infantry Day and Regimental “Days” are traditionally celebrated every
year. The Infantryman’s courage to fight under different situations, even with
inferior machines, weapons and weapon systems, as happened against Pakistan in
1965 and 1971, continues till today.
It is now well known that the Indian Infantryman has been
ill-equipped during Kargil and earlier for a mountain battle in sub-zero
temperature. Despite this, the Indian soldier has always risen to the
task. His valour has been appreciated
during the Second World War by none other than Winston Churchill, who had
described him as a great disciplined soldier. This trait was seen in Kargil too,
when the Infantryman wor the “unprofessional
operation”. A number of “YOs” (young officers) were asked to lead the troops
and remove the enemy from unauthorized occupation, sitting comfortably in
“conditioned bunkers” at a height. But
they achieved the target which was “very difficult” by any standard.
There are umpteen instances of deeds of valour of the men in
all the 27 Infantry Regiments of the Indian Army. The acts of bravery of the Indian soldiers
have been appreciated by British Generals under whom they have fought in
various actions. One of many such
observations is what the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief of the
British Indian Army made way back in 1897, after the “brilliant defence” of the
Fort Gulistan and the Post of Sarangarhi by the 26 Sikh. Such acts of bravery have been “mentioned for
special reference” by the British commanders during the First and Second World
Wars. Post independence, there are stories galore of Infantrymen who have
fought battles with outstanding performance.
Such is the stock of India’s soldiers. They always rise to the occasion, as
re-established in Kargil in 1999. They
need to be duly recognized and remembered especially on 26 Jly every year,
described as the “Kargil Day”. It is our
duty to keep them in high morale. Their deeds of valour and service to the
nation which they are doing in Kashmir continuously since 1947 needs to be acknowledged. Kargil martyrs and their sacrifices did the
country proud, no matter what the Pakistani General has claimed in his memoirs.
----INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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Military Procurement Policy:PLAN FINE, ENSURE IMPLEMENTAIOTN,by B.K. Mathur,4 September, 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 4 September 2006
Military
Procurement Policy
PLAN FINE, ENSURE
IMPLEMENTAIOTN
By B.K. Mathur
Earnest efforts are being made by the Defence Ministry to
set right the controversial and complex process
for acquiring defence equipment that involves substantial public funds ---and
the increasing scams that go with it. The present Defence Minister, Pranab
Mukherjee initiated guidelines and worked out a Defence Procurement Procedure
(DPP) and Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) last year. This has again been reviewed and further
improved to ensure enhanced transparency and public accountability. The new policy stipulates a “collegiate
manner” for major decisions by the Defence Acquisition Council, increased
transparency in field trials and level playing field for indigenous vendors
vis-à-vis foreign suppliers.
One very good thing which the new policy has tackled is the
indigenisation of military machines production.
Successive Defence Ministers
have concentrated their efforts on this front, but have not been able to get
the required results and obtain one hundred per cent indigenisation right from
the designing stage of expensive machines.
This has been happening for years, which does not seem to have been
considered in depth in the latest Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) and Manual.
Why is it that despite the internationally-recognised fact that young Indian
defence scientists are inferior to none in the world, India has to
depend so heavily on imported machines?
And, how is it that even though the Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) has designed several state-of-the-art machines they
invariably fail at the production stage?
It is true that the Defence Ministry has taken a wise step
in including in the DPP-2006 a separate procedure for the “make category” (for
producing the military machines fully indigenously. Earlier, the procedure was laid down only for
“buy” (off-the-shelf purchase from abroad) and “buy and make” (off-the-shelf purchase
abroad with licensed production indigenously). The addition in the policy of
the “make procedure”, as spelled out by Pranab Mukherjee, is based on the
recommendations of the controversial Kelkar Committee and the Sixth Report of
the Defence Ministry’s Parliamentary Standing Committee. The procedure has been
designed to enable Indian industries to develop high-tech complex systems and
their production wholly indigenously.
In this context, it needs to be considered that production
of military machines is quite different from that of other items. A
state-of-the-art military machine requires thousands of components which cannot
be produced under one roof. No industry, whether in public sector or private,
can afford to produce all the components with their limited use. Take, for
example, the requirement of just one or two small components of a specific
design for use in a big machine. It is not economically viable for anyone to
set up a facility to produce that small component. It is either to be imported or produced in
bulk for exports to the countries which are producing same kind of machines or
some other product where that particular part could be used.
This kind of approach requires two things: Government’s
support and active cooperation of the private sector industry. None of these is
happenings, even though the Defence planners have been repeatedly talking of
increasing indigenization of defence production for decades. But when it came to acquiring a machine the
choice invariably fell on direct off-the-shelf import at high price. In this
process several vested interests got
involved and scandals erupted. Poor
Indian designers, young scientists and technicians remained dissatisfied, cursing the Defence Ministry for
inadequate support for their work.
During the last three decades or so, the DRDO and the Indian
Defence industry have undertaken production of two major fighting machines for
the armed forces: main battle tank (MBT) and the light combat aircraft (LCA)
and several smaller equipments and weapon systems. The MBT has been named three or four times
since 1972 when it was first thought of, and now some pieces produced so far
have imported engine. And, more concernedly, the Arjun tank is not going to be the
Indian Army’s MBT. It is the Russian tank which the producer updates almost on
five-yearly basis. Same is the case with
the LCA, which has undergone several trial runs with imported machines, but is
yet to be inducted into the Indian Air Force.
In the meantime, we have purchased fighter and trainer aircraft from
abroad at high costs.
Call it coincidence, if you like, but actually it is a
normal practice. About the time when Pranab Mukherjee had announced the
DPP-2006, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL)
declared the scrapping of its earlier plan to produce indigenously the
latest Su-30MKI fighter aircraft it was required to do following the
license-production deal with its Russian
producers in December 2000 --- the single-largest Indo-Russian
defence contract in 40 years. The last of
the 140 indigenously-produced aircraft were to be supplied to the IAF by
2017. Wonder what will happen to the
deal, even though the Russian
company has so far supplied 26 kits to the HAL for the assembly
of the aircraft. It would earn $350 million for this supply.
Another lacuna which the new policy has tried to tackle is
the unusual delay caused in finalizing the purchase of a modern machine. In some cases, by the time a decision is
finalized after satisfying several vested interests, the machine that
ultimately gets into the hands of the users, that is the armed forces, becomes
obsolete and a new version is ready with the producer. The new policy has
introduced a welcome change in this process.
Efforts have been made to shorten the timeframe for procurement which presently
starts with the enunciation of qualitative requirements by the armed forces,
followed by acceptance of necessity,
identification of vendors, issuance
of requests, technical evaluation and final approval.
The DPP-2006 includes a revised fast track procedure to
expedite the acquisition of equipment which the armed forces need to meet
urgent operational requirement within the shortest possible
time. Fine, but enough does not seem to
have been provided to determine the priorities for acquisition. You just can’t acquire everything that has
been produced in the world at a time and within the budget provision. Take, for example, the purchase of the most
controversial 155 mm gun for the artillery, which even caused the fall of a
Government. It is true that the
procurement of the howitzer was required in the interest of the Army’s
modernization. But the 130 mm Russian gun was well serving the purpose, as proved in
1971 and 1999 in Kargil. The priority at that time should have been on a raised
platform for the artillery.
Likewise, the Defence planners do not seem to have given
proper consideration for prioritizing the procurement of expensive equipment
for the Navy. Should the sea force first have nuclear-powered submarine or an
aircraft-carrier? Indeed, the ideal situation would be to have both. But
prioritywise, a submarine should be the first choice, which is not happening at
present. More about it another time. In regard to the procurement policy for
the armed forces which has now begun to receive attention at the highest level,
it is necessary to have full
cooperation and understanding between the users, producers and policy makers.
Merely plans on paper are not enough.
They need to be implemented faithfully--- and in the interest of the
nation, not individuals. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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Posting Flaws In AFMS:SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS IN Field AREAS, by B.K. Mathur, 21 August 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 21 August 2006
Posting Flaws In
AFMS
SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS
IN Field AREAS
By B.K. Mathur
Small matters, at times, turn out to big on crucial moments.
More so for the Defence forces, where men are equally important, if not more,
than the machines. The forces can be
equipped with highly sophisticated and expensive machines, as the Defence
Ministry has planned for the next five years, but the morale of the jawans,
airmen and the seamen has to be kept high in time of a war. One of the main factors to provide this is
the public sympathy and support, as one saw during the wars free India’s armed
forces fought in 1965 and 1971. As the
Army units moved towards the war front in special trains and other civil and
military transport, the forces were given a fitting send-off by men and women
all through the route.
More than 35 years have elapsed since the Indian armed
forces fought a major war (Kargil in 1999 cannot be described as a war). Today, if there is a major war on our
borders, a possibility which cannot
be ruled out on all fronts of the country, the forces may not get the same
civilian sympathy and support for various reasons, significant among them being
lack of respect for the forces, lack of planning and uneasy relationship
between the civil and military in view of the latter’s increasing contact with
the people of every kind during deployment in aid of civil power. Take, for example, the planning flaws. How
will you react if your land is acquired for military use without adequate
compensation, relief and rehabilitation package? Curse those who have grabbed it!
Likewise, how will you react, if in uniform and ready to
move to the front area, if there is no adequate medical facility available
there? Hell with the military career; there are so many other employment
avenues for the youth with good IQ. These may be small matters for the Defence
planners whose main aim today is to acquire expensive weapons and weapon
systems. But they are significant and
crucial for the forces. The two issues,
“land grab” and medical crunch have been studied recently by the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Defence Ministry (2005-06). In its 12th and 13th
reports tabled in the two Houses recently, the Committee has made critical
reviews of rehabilitation of persons displaced by acquiring their land without
responsibility to ensure proper compensation and rehabilitation and medical
facilities.
In its 12th report, the Committee expressed deep concerns over the shortage of doctors in
the field units to ensure a proper medical care to the troops. Let us take the medical aspect first.
Shortage of doctors in the armed forces is an old story. Young medical graduates are gradually turning
commercial minded and are not keen to join Government service, leave aside the Armed
Forces Medical Service (AFMS).
Shockingly, as many as 142 doctors quit the forces in two years, between
2003 and 2005. The issue was raised in the Lok Sabha last week and
Defence Minister Mukherjee informed the MPs that the doctors left either after
being superseded or on compassionate
grounds.
The disclosures made to the Parliamentary Standing Committee
are alarming and loud and clear about lack of planning and ineffective command
and control of the medical corps.
Knowing full well that fully-equipped field units are morale boosters
for troops in operational areas, there is shortage of doctors in field units. Surprisingly,
the number is far more than the authorized strength in Command hospitals and in
Delhi and
Mumbai. According to the Defence Ministry figures, about 450 doctors are posted
in Delhi
against the authorized strength of 250.
Similarly, the Command hospitals are having 543 doctors, though the
sanctioned number is only 331. Obviously,
as this writer keeps on pointing out time and again that “civil pollution” has
entered the forces in a big way, thanks to the increasing “civil entry” into
the Cantonments and military deployment for civil duties.
Now, take the “land grab”, which the land owners can’t help
or protest against, because the area is acquired for military use, meaning national
defence. It is another matter that the Cantonments
across the country have large areas
lying unused for years. Take, for
example, an observation of the Standing Committee which was “given to understand
that in project like the National Defence Academy (NDA), 8000 acres of land was
acquired, out of which not more than 25 per cent is utilized even after 60
years”. During the study visits of the Committee
to various projects, it had observed that there are large areas of Defence land
lying unoccupied and they have not been given back to the ex-landlords. In this connection, it needs to be remembered
that the Standing Committee in its 5th report on Cantonment Bill
2003 had recommended a separate law on Defence land, which has not happened so
far.
The Committee has also observed that the Ministry of Defence
acquires land for temporary use of the armed forces like training, mobilization
of forces and day-to-day operational purposes.
As a result the land owners/farmers have to lose their standing crops
and other properties. But the land owners do not get adequate compensation for
their standing crops and other properties. The Committee had been told that
“there was no policy for giving rehabilitation assistance
as a welfare measure to the persons displaced by the acquisition of their land
for defence purposes”. In regard to
compensation, the Ministry pays some money to land owners through the State Governments,
which routes it to the Collector concerned. The process
leads to umpteen cases in various courts of law.
The Defence Ministry informed the Committee that as many as
15,600 cases of dispute over compensation were pending in various courts across the country ---from the district courts to the
Supreme Court. There are also execution
cases, since under the Land Acquisition Act there is an in-built provision for
the enhancement of compensation. If anybody is aggrieved with the Award amount
declared by the Collector, he goes to the reference court and if he is still
not satisfied he goes in appeal to the High Court, and on to the Supreme Court.
These legal processes have been
going on. In most of these cases the acquisition and compensation has been
compensated to the utter helplessness and anger of the landowners against the armed
forces.
Greater concern is created because the Defence Ministry has
been acquiring vast tracts of land before independence and till date for the
“operational use” of the armed forces and other defence purposes. Private land is being acquired under the age-old
Land Acquisition Act (LAA), 1894 and the Defence of India Act, 1939, framed
during the British time. These laws are colonial in nature. Although they have
been amended from time to time, they are totally inadequate to meet the present
needs and aspirations of the people. Such a need was amply highlighted when the
Committee recorded evidence of the representatives from the Union Ministries of
Law and Rural Development and State Government officials.
Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need to have a comprehensive
and more democratic legislation to deal with an important matter relating to
land acquisition for military purposes and a better package worked out for
compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected land owners as a
gesture of goodwill to ensure their sympathy and support to the cause of
national defence. Also significant is the need to ensure that the military
personnel posted in forward areas are provided good and timely medical
aid. Posting of doctors of the AFMS to
border areas in difficult terrain is a crucial matter, not a small matter in
military planning. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Enemy Within The Force:LET THE ARMY REMAIN AN ARMY, by B.K. Mathur, 7 August 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 7 August 2006
Enemy Within The
Force
LET THE ARMY REMAIN
AN ARMY
By B.K. Mathur
Following a report last month about two agents of a
Pakistan-based militant organization joining the Indian Air Force, one
concernedly learnt of existence of such enemies within the Indian Army every
third day. Within hours of the denial by
the Air Force spokesperson of the report emanating from the National Security
Council, two armymen deployed in J&K with the Rashtriya Rifles were held
for connections with the militants. And
the entry of such elements in other regiments of the Indian Army is being
reportedly discovered or suspected. In
fact, the trend is continuing for quite sometime now in India’s forces,
which at one time used to be the envy of the world.
The latest report comes from Nashik where the Maharashtra
anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) detained a retired Army Major over the week-end for
allegedly passing on a sensitive
military information to an agent of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. The Major was picked up following confessions by the ISI agent. The documents recovered
from the possession
of the agent included several photographs of airbases in Pune, Mumbai, Jamnagar and Nashik. Add to this the Union Home Ministry’s
advisory to the Governments of the West Coast States of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa,
Kerala and Karnataka on the eve of the Independence Day celebrations about the
suspected supply of arms and landing of terrorists.
Commenting on this alarming trend in India’s mighty
armed forces a fortnight ago, this column had highlighted the need to review
the entire recruitment system to ensure quality intake into the forces. Undesirable elements get into the forces
because of several lacunae highlighted in that write-up. In addition to this two other points require
to be seriously looked into to stop the damaging trend: Keep the military away
from civil deployment as far as possible
and a thorough review of the administration of Cantonments and overhaul of
their Boards, as they used to be during the Raj. There is now urgent need to keep the Army in
barracks away from the “civil pollution”, as stressed
in this column time and again – and for years now. Let the Army remain an Army.
The question about the entry of undesirable elements in the
armed forces was concernedly discussed
in the Lok Sabha the other day and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had very
rightly observed that the function of the Army was to fight the enemy from across the border and to train for that job without
getting involved increasingly in civil duties.
What Mukherjee implied was that the increasing contact with the
civilians led the Armymen to getting involved with undesirable elements for
some considerations which are available in plenty to the militant groups and
their local agents.
Take, for example, the case of the two Armymen who were
detained for passing on some
information to a militant group. On
interrogation they reportedly accepted their guilt and explained that they were
forced to do so in view of a threat to their families. Well, this is no defence. But such a situation can be avoided if only
the contact of the Armymen with local police, para-military forces and
civilians is reduced and the commanders at all levels in the places of
deployment keep a strong vigil on their men, instead of getting involved
themselves. There comes the question of
recruitment in Officer-cadres about which we talked in the last column. Generally what is required is that the Army
must be kept away from the systems failure in civil life, an increasing curse
of India!
It is true that the Army deployment is difficult to avoid in
Jammu and Kashmir,
where foreign forces are required to be tackled, and the north-eastern States
where insurgency is being increasingly supported by foreign militant groups. Of
course, the Army has to be deployed in such situations. But in such involvements also, the Commanders
must ensure implementation of military discipline for which the Army is
known. In such conditions, as also in
times of such calamities like cyclones etcetera, the Army needs to be
deployed. But the force must be kept
away from “policing” deployment to handle problems like communal riots or
disturbances. That is not the job of the
Army. Such assignments
could easily be handled by Central para-military forces, if the local police
fails.
This at once reminds me of the manner in which Mulayam Singh
Yadav had reacted as the Defence Minister in Deve Gowda’s Government to my
question at a Press Conference in New Delhi about too much
use of the Army for civil duties. He
stated in so many words that the Army was a Government organization and it is
for the Government to decide how and when it is to be used. After all, the
Government spends so much in maintaining such a large Army and it should be
used for civil duties in peace time, when there is no war. Similar view was earlier expressed by Bansi Lal, Defence Minister in Indira
Gandhi’s Government.
One hundred per cent correct. But whose loss
it is when the armed forces suffer from too much engagement in civil duties for
two reasons. One, increasing
indiscipline because of contact with
civilian agencies and, two, suffering from inadequate training. In these days
of induction of sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapon and weapon systems in
the forces, the jawans, airmen and sailors need more time during the peace time
to train continuously on these weapons.
If that is not done, then the forces are bound to perform badly in time
of war, as happened with the Pakistani force in wars against India in 1965 and
1971. They were provided latest,
state-of-the-art machinery by big brother America but failed to use them
properly due to lack of training.
Another important aspect required to be reviewed is the
management of Cantonments. It is true that the Cantonment Boards across the country are headed by the concerned Sub-Area
or Area commander of the Army. But the
constitution of these is such that civilian influence and vote politics prevail
in their functioning. Moreover, a lot of
civilian population has come to acquire land and properties in almost all the Cantonment
areas, with the result that they now look like any other mohalla in a city, where clean environment is something wholly
unknown. There was a time in my school
days at Meerut, which has one of the big Cantonments in the country, one was
afraid of entering the “military area”, most parts of which were out of bounds
for the general public. Cantonments must return to the Raj days --- clean
environment with no “civil pollution”.
If all that happens --- quality intake, controlled
deployment of forces for civil duties and clean environment of the Cantonments
and barracks ---there is no reason why the discipline of the forces, at its
nadir today, should not improve. When there will be little contact with the
civil population and when the troops will have enough time for training on
modern weapons which the Government of India has planned to acquire in plenty,
there would be little chance of undesirable elements getting into the forces or
the militarymen having contact with spies, militants or their agents. At the
moment the state of India’s armed forces is alarmingly in bad shape, requiring
urgent need to review all its aspects responsible for the present state of
affairs. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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Review Selection Criteria:FORCES NEED QUALITY NOT QUANTITY, by B.K. Mathur,25 July 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 25 July 2006
Review Selection
Criteria
FORCES NEED QUALITY
NOT QUANTITY
By B.K. Mathur
The National Security Council has prepared a document which
its Chief, M.K. Narayanan, has circulated to all the Chief Ministers. The
document contains a chilling revelation that two Lashkar-e-Toyyeba cadres have joined
the Indian Air Force (IAF). The alarming report has, however, been denied by
the IAF spokesperson who has stated: “We have got such reports and we have
looked into the matter. But there are no LeT elements in the Air Force and we
have carried out stringent check.”
Welcome relief. But there has to
be some basis about the report that has been forwarded to the IAF by none other
than the National Security Adviser. The counter-intelligence wings of India’s armed
forces must look into it, because the danger of undesirable elements entering
the armed forces cannot be ruled out.
The latest discovery by the intelligence agencies is that
various militant outfits have now started recruiting educated youth qualified
to join any civil or military service. The sneaking in of the jehadi elements
into the armed forces is a very serious matter requiring a good hard look at
the recruitment system for the three military services – the Army, Air Force
and the Navy. On paper, the system is
quite foolproof, leaving no scope for any undesirable element getting in. But to have a definite drill for in-take both
in the Officer cadre and the Other Ranks is one thing. To follow strictly the
prescribed criteria quite another.
Doubts about failure to select right type of boys have arisen, given
increasing reports of even some senior officers in the forces indulging in
undesirable activities.
The IAF’s spokesperson in the Directorate of Public
Relations, Ministry of Defence has talked about “stringent checks” while
denying the report of two militant cadres joining the Air Force. But the failure of the Services Selection
Boards for recruitment of the Officer cadre and Recruiting Offices for the ORs
(other ranks) to select right type of boys for the training Academies is being
increasingly felt. Take the case of
Officers who lead the jawans, Airmen and Sailors. First the candidate has to
clear a tough entrance examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and certain number of boys is recommended
to the Services Selection Boards (SSB) in order of merit.
This is where the flaw lies. The method of selection at the
SSBs. Remember, in early 1950s a feeling
had fast grown among some Star Officers at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) in New
Delhi that right type of boys, with the required OLQ (Officer-like qualities)
were not being sent to the training Academies.
This led the AHQ to send a group of SSB, Meerut,
to reassess
the second-term Gentleman cadets of the 13th course of the Indian
Military Academy (IMA) at Dehra Dun. Complete three-day selection exercise was
repeated at the Academy. The full report
of the SSB has not yet been disclosed but one of the recommendations was that
psychologically-centric selection mode needed to be amended.
One of the amendments then proposed was to give thought to
the method followed during the Raj for selection in the British Indian
Army. Stress
was given to the family background of the candidate for commissioning into the force. The second was his career
profile in school and college he attended in the field of sports and other
extra-curricular activities. Which
really meant that the President of the Board had more say in selecting a
candidate than the Group Testing Officer (GTO) or the psychologist whose assessment
is till today the main consideration for selection. Each of the three assesses
--- the President, the GTO and the President --- have equal number of marks.
Even if the President of the Board and the GTO, both in
service uniform, want to select a boy and the psychologist, a civilian, does
not want to clear him, the candidate is out.
In this scenario chances of wrong selection are more, especially when
corruption at all levels in military and civil, is the order of the day. How
else would you explain the fact that so many cases of spying and corruption at
the higher level are reported day in and day out. Look at the latest one: The
Navy war room leak by some senior officers. One can go on and on highlighting
cases of corruption and indiscipline in the armed forces. Imagine the
involvement of a three Star and a two Star General in the sub-standard purchase
of “Dal” for the troops.
Little wonder then that the “trio” at the SSB joins hands
and selects somebody wholly undeserving. That explains the increasing trend of
Staff Officers indulging in undesirable activities. At times boys with lesser score at the assessment stage get selected. The reason? Better quality boys with
seemingly high OLQ just do not want to join the armed forces, with the type of
boys who look for their personal gains rather than the national interest. To
fill up the vacancies at the Officer level, the Government is left with no
choice but to compromise quality with quantity, with the result that bad boys
manage to get into the forces and create problems like the increasing number of
General Court Martials.
Now look at the increasing trend in various Recruitment
offices across the country for Jawans,
Airmen and Sailors… Haven’t you heard of umpteen cases from time to time of
boys from the countryside having to pay for recruitment in various
Regiments? The system is getting from
bad to worse, with the police enquiries being fudged for undesirable elements
sneaking into the armed forces. There is
also the question of quality and quantity in the case of recruitment of the ORs. The youth get better opportunities elsewhere
than in the armed forces.
This forces the military headquarters to recruit sub-standard
boys to fill up vacancies in various Regiments. The process
may possibly lead to undesirable
elements getting into the forces. The
situation is worse in case of employment of civilians in Regiments, Squadrons
and Naval units. People like barbers,
bearers, cooks etc. can be employed on “considerations” that prevent the
authorities from having proper checks on their antecedents. Remember, a Court
Martial case at Mathura
some years go in which an Officer was punished on charges of purchases of
medicines for the civilian staff from a Chemist which did not exist. Fictitious
bills were made and passed by the
authorized Officer.
In such a climate which is currently prevailing in many
armed forces units and where the recruitment systems at all levels is
increasingly helping individuals, not the forces and, importantly the nation.
As repeatedly emphasized in this column time and again, and for years, there is
need, urgent need, to keep the country’s armed forces away from the
deteriorating civil environment.
Recruitment norms should be changed where necessary,
and strictly enforced in Selection Boards and Recruitment Offices. That will
ensure quality intake at all levels. Further delay on this front would be at
the nation’s peril. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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