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Infantry Day Thoughts:THE GENERAL’S LINE OF LIES, by B.K. Mathur,16 October 2006 Print E-mail

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 16 October 2006

Infantry Day Thoughts

THE GENERAL’S LINE OF LIES

By B.K. Mathur

Indian Army’s Infantry has sufficient cause for celebrating its “Day” on 27 October every year.  On this day in 1947, the combat-rich arm saved Srinagar--- and Kashmir--- from the attack of Pakistan-supported tribals. One Infantry Company, about 130 men on foot, bravely defeated the attack by a 700-strong force, equipped with Rifles, LMGs and Mortars, in what is presently remembered as free India’s first battle of Badgaon, Srinagar. The famous Battle set the example of courage and valour seldom equalled in the annals of the Indian Army.  The day is justifiably celebrated with great pomp and show annually by the most battled-hardened fighting arm, known as the “Queen of Battles”.

This year’s celebrations and get-togethers serving and retired infantrymen is of special significance, providing a food for thought. For the first time in 59 years, the Chief of an enemy’s army has claimed to have defeated the Indian Army at Kargil in 1999, which was nothing more than an Infantry operation intended to flush out some enemy soldiers who had sneaked into the Indian territory and constructed “conditioned” bunkers. The claim has been made by Pakistan’s President, General Parvez Musharraf, the Army Chief who planned the Kargil operation, in his just-published memoirs: In the Line of Fire, described by many as In the Line of Lies, in utter frustration following the Pakistan Army’s drubbing whenever it dared attack India, in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999.

Musharraf’s claim has been described as a “bluff” by some and a “military misadventure” by others.  The latter description has been made significantly, Gen. Ali Kuli Khan Khattak who resigned from the Army in protest against the, then, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to appoint Musharraf as the Army Chief.  Khan has described the Kargil operation as a disaster, flawed in its conception, tactical planning and execution.  He has been quoted as stating that “it (Kargil) was an unprofessional decision…… Kargil would continue to haunt him (Musharraf) for the rest of his life….. Kashmir has damaged the Kashmir cause…. A disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy……”

For India, it was a double triumph in Kargil in 1999---military and diplomatic. Besides the valour and patriotism which the Indian soldier proved for the umpteenth time, the Kargil operation was equally significant for the Government of India.  It scored a diplomatic triumph.  The whole world, including Uncle Sam, recognized in no uncertain terms that Pakistan was an aggressor and was required to withdraw from the Indian territory it had illegally occupied for its strategic advantage for future battles, if it dared to fight against India once more and thrashed. New Delhi showed to the world it was a peace-loving country and will never ever cross the Line of Control (LoC) to gain strategic advantage.

In this connection, it needed to be understood that if India’s aim at Kargil had remained restricted to defeat Pakistan militarily, the correct strategy would have been, as some IAF Commanders had openly viewed, that armament and ammunition stores in Pak occupied-Kashmir could be attacked from the air and the line of communication and supplies to the illegally constructed “conditioned” bunkers snapped. The strategy could have doubtlessly helped the Indian forces complete the operation Vijay much faster than they did.  In doing so, Islamabad and the Pak Army Chief Musharraf could not have complained, because the occupied Kashmir is actually India’s territory and storing of military machines and ammunition at Skardu could have been challenged.

Actually, India’s forces had to fight what may be described as an “unprecedented war”.  They were repeatedly asked by the political leadership not to cross the LoC in any case Opening of two or three other fronts and encircling of the intruders after crossing the LoC would have helped the Indian forces to quicken the completion of the task. This did not happen contrary to established military operation strategy, because New Delhi did not want the Pak infiltration to turn into a full-scale war.  The Kargil operation, remember, was not a war, only an operation to throw out the intruders.  The task was achieved, unprofessionally though.

However, more important than the triumph at Kargil is the performance of India’s soldier, who is recognized all over the world as a great fighter, valiant and courageous from the time he served under the Raj.  This is remembered time and again, especially when the Infantry Day and Regimental “Days” are traditionally celebrated every year. The Infantryman’s courage to fight under different situations, even with inferior machines, weapons and weapon systems, as happened against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, continues till today.

It is now well known that the Indian Infantryman has been ill-equipped during Kargil and earlier for a mountain battle in sub-zero temperature. Despite this, the Indian soldier has always risen to the task.  His valour has been appreciated during the Second World War by none other than Winston Churchill, who had described him as a great disciplined soldier. This trait was seen in Kargil too, when the Infantryman wor the “unprofessional operation”. A number of “YOs” (young officers) were asked to lead the troops and remove the enemy from unauthorized occupation, sitting comfortably in “conditioned bunkers” at a height.  But they achieved the target which was “very difficult” by any standard.

There are umpteen instances of deeds of valour of the men in all the 27 Infantry Regiments of the Indian Army.  The acts of bravery of the Indian soldiers have been appreciated by British Generals under whom they have fought in various actions.  One of many such observations is what the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army made way back in 1897, after the “brilliant defence” of the Fort Gulistan and the Post of Sarangarhi by the 26 Sikh.  Such acts of bravery have been “mentioned for special reference” by the British commanders during the First and Second World Wars. Post independence, there are stories galore of Infantrymen who have fought battles with outstanding performance.

Such is the stock of India’s soldiers.  They always rise to the occasion, as re-established in Kargil in 1999.  They need to be duly recognized and remembered especially on 26 Jly every year, described as the “Kargil Day”.  It is our duty to keep them in high morale. Their deeds of valour and service to the nation which they are doing in Kashmir continuously since 1947 needs to be acknowledged.  Kargil martyrs and their sacrifices did the country proud, no matter what the Pakistani General has claimed in his memoirs. ----INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Military Procurement Policy:PLAN FINE, ENSURE IMPLEMENTAIOTN,by B.K. Mathur,4 September, 2006 Print E-mail

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 4 September 2006

Military Procurement Policy

PLAN FINE, ENSURE IMPLEMENTAIOTN

By B.K. Mathur

Earnest efforts are being made by the Defence Ministry to set right the controversial and complex process for acquiring defence equipment that involves substantial public funds ---and the increasing scams that go with it. The present Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee initiated guidelines and worked out a Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) last year.  This has again been reviewed and further improved to ensure enhanced transparency and public accountability.  The new policy stipulates a “collegiate manner” for major decisions by the Defence Acquisition Council, increased transparency in field trials and level playing field for indigenous vendors vis-à-vis foreign suppliers.

One very good thing which the new policy has tackled is the indigenisation of military machines production.  Successive Defence Ministers have concentrated their efforts on this front, but have not been able to get the required results and obtain one hundred per cent indigenisation right from the designing stage of expensive machines.  This has been happening for years, which does not seem to have been considered in depth in the latest Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) and Manual. Why is it that despite the internationally-recognised fact that young Indian defence scientists are inferior to none in the world, India has to depend so heavily on imported machines?  And, how is it that even though the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has designed several state-of-the-art machines they invariably fail at the production stage?

It is true that the Defence Ministry has taken a wise step in including in the DPP-2006 a separate procedure for the “make category” (for producing the military machines fully indigenously.  Earlier, the procedure was laid down only for “buy” (off-the-shelf purchase from abroad) and “buy and make” (off-the-shelf purchase abroad with licensed production indigenously). The addition in the policy of the “make procedure”, as spelled out by Pranab Mukherjee, is based on the recommendations of the controversial Kelkar Committee and the Sixth Report of the Defence Ministry’s Parliamentary Standing Committee. The procedure has been designed to enable Indian industries to develop high-tech complex systems and their production wholly indigenously.

In this context, it needs to be considered that production of military machines is quite different from that of other items. A state-of-the-art military machine requires thousands of components which cannot be produced under one roof. No industry, whether in public sector or private, can afford to produce all the components with their limited use. Take, for example, the requirement of just one or two small components of a specific design for use in a big machine. It is not economically viable for anyone to set up a facility to produce that small component.  It is either to be imported or produced in bulk for exports to the countries which are producing same kind of machines or some other product where that particular part could be used.

This kind of approach requires two things: Government’s support and active cooperation of the private sector industry. None of these is happenings, even though the Defence planners have been repeatedly talking of increasing indigenization of defence production for decades.  But when it came to acquiring a machine the choice invariably fell on direct off-the-shelf import at high price. In this process several vested interests got involved and scandals erupted.  Poor Indian designers, young scientists and technicians remained dissatisfied, cursing the Defence Ministry for inadequate support for their work.

During the last three decades or so, the DRDO and the Indian Defence industry have undertaken production of two major fighting machines for the armed forces: main battle tank (MBT) and the light combat aircraft (LCA) and several smaller equipments and weapon systems.  The MBT has been named three or four times since 1972 when it was first thought of, and now some pieces produced so far have imported engine. And, more concernedly, the Arjun tank is not going to be the Indian Army’s MBT.  It is the Russian tank which the producer updates almost on five-yearly basis.  Same is the case with the LCA, which has undergone several trial runs with imported machines, but is yet to be inducted into the Indian Air Force.  In the meantime, we have purchased fighter and trainer aircraft from abroad at high costs.

Call it coincidence, if you like, but actually it is a normal practice. About the time when Pranab Mukherjee had announced the DPP-2006, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL)  declared the scrapping of its earlier plan to produce indigenously the latest Su-30MKI fighter aircraft it was required to do following the license-production deal with its Russian producers in December 2000 --- the single-largest Indo-Russian defence contract in 40 years.  The last of the 140 indigenously-produced aircraft were to be supplied to the IAF by 2017.  Wonder what will happen to the deal, even though the Russian company has so far supplied 26 kits to the HAL for the assembly of the aircraft. It would earn $350 million for this supply.

Another lacuna which the new policy has tried to tackle is the unusual delay caused in finalizing the purchase of a modern machine.  In some cases, by the time a decision is finalized after satisfying several vested interests, the machine that ultimately gets into the hands of the users, that is the armed forces, becomes obsolete and a new version is ready with the producer. The new policy has introduced a welcome change in this process. Efforts have been made to shorten the timeframe for procurement which presently starts with the enunciation of qualitative requirements by the armed forces, followed by acceptance of necessity, identification of vendors, issuance of requests, technical evaluation and final approval.

The DPP-2006 includes a revised fast track procedure to expedite the acquisition of equipment which the armed forces need to meet urgent operational requirement within the shortest possible time.  Fine, but enough does not seem to have been provided to determine the priorities for acquisition.   You just can’t acquire everything that has been produced in the world at a time and within the budget provision.  Take, for example, the purchase of the most controversial 155 mm gun for the artillery, which even caused the fall of a Government.  It is true that the procurement of the howitzer was required in the interest of the Army’s modernization.  But the 130 mm Russian gun was well serving the purpose, as proved in 1971 and 1999 in Kargil. The priority at that time should have been on a raised platform for the artillery.

Likewise, the Defence planners do not seem to have given proper consideration for prioritizing the procurement of expensive equipment for the Navy. Should the sea force first have nuclear-powered submarine or an aircraft-carrier? Indeed, the ideal situation would be to have both. But prioritywise, a submarine should be the first choice, which is not happening at present. More about it another time. In regard to the procurement policy for the armed forces which has now begun to receive attention at the highest level, it is necessary to have full cooperation and understanding between the users, producers and policy makers. Merely plans on paper are not enough.  They need to be implemented faithfully--- and in the interest of the nation, not individuals. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Posting Flaws In AFMS:SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS IN Field AREAS, by B.K. Mathur, 21 August 2006 Print E-mail

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 21 August 2006

Posting Flaws In AFMS

SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS IN Field AREAS

By B.K. Mathur

Small matters, at times, turn out to big on crucial moments. More so for the Defence forces, where men are equally important, if not more, than the machines.  The forces can be equipped with highly sophisticated and expensive machines, as the Defence Ministry has planned for the next five years, but the morale of the jawans, airmen and the seamen has to be kept high in time of a war.  One of the main factors to provide this is the public sympathy and support, as one saw during the wars free India’s armed forces fought in 1965 and 1971.  As the Army units moved towards the war front in special trains and other civil and military transport, the forces were given a fitting send-off by men and women all through the route.

More than 35 years have elapsed since the Indian armed forces fought a major war (Kargil in 1999 cannot be described as a war).  Today, if there is a major war on our borders, a possibility which cannot be ruled out on all fronts of the country, the forces may not get the same civilian sympathy and support for various reasons, significant among them being lack of respect for the forces, lack of planning and uneasy relationship between the civil and military in view of the latter’s increasing contact with the people of every kind during deployment in aid of civil power.  Take, for example, the planning flaws. How will you react if your land is acquired for military use without adequate compensation, relief and rehabilitation package?  Curse those who have grabbed it!

Likewise, how will you react, if in uniform and ready to move to the front area, if there is no adequate medical facility available there? Hell with the military career; there are so many other employment avenues for the youth with good IQ. These may be small matters for the Defence planners whose main aim today is to acquire expensive weapons and weapon systems.  But they are significant and crucial for the forces. The two issues, “land grab” and medical crunch have been studied recently by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Ministry (2005-06).  In its 12th and 13th reports tabled in the two Houses recently, the Committee has made critical reviews of rehabilitation of persons displaced by acquiring their land without responsibility to ensure proper compensation and rehabilitation and medical facilities.

In its 12th report, the Committee expressed deep concerns over the shortage of doctors in the field units to ensure a proper medical care to the troops.  Let us take the medical aspect first. Shortage of doctors in the armed forces is an old story.  Young medical graduates are gradually turning commercial minded and are not keen to join Government service, leave aside the Armed Forces Medical Service (AFMS).  Shockingly, as many as 142 doctors quit the forces in two years, between 2003 and 2005.  The issue was raised in the Lok Sabha last week and Defence Minister Mukherjee informed the MPs that the doctors left either after being superseded or on compassionate grounds.

The disclosures made to the Parliamentary Standing Committee are alarming and loud and clear about lack of planning and ineffective command and control of the medical corps.  Knowing full well that fully-equipped field units are morale boosters for troops in operational areas, there is shortage of doctors in field units. Surprisingly, the number is far more than the authorized strength in Command hospitals and in Delhi and Mumbai. According to the Defence Ministry figures, about 450 doctors are posted in Delhi against the authorized strength of 250.  Similarly, the Command hospitals are having 543 doctors, though the sanctioned number is only 331.  Obviously, as this writer keeps on pointing out time and again that “civil pollution” has entered the forces in a big way, thanks to the increasing “civil entry” into the Cantonments and military deployment for civil duties.

Now, take the “land grab”, which the land owners can’t help or protest against, because the area is acquired for military use, meaning national defence.  It is another matter that the Cantonments across the country have large areas lying unused for years.  Take, for example, an observation of the Standing Committee which was “given to understand that in project like the National Defence Academy (NDA), 8000 acres of land was acquired, out of which not more than 25 per cent is utilized even after 60 years”.  During the study visits of the Committee to various projects, it had observed that there are large areas of Defence land lying unoccupied and they have not been given back to the ex-landlords.  In this connection, it needs to be remembered that the Standing Committee in its 5th report on Cantonment Bill 2003 had recommended a separate law on Defence land, which has not happened so far.

The Committee has also observed that the Ministry of Defence acquires land for temporary use of the armed forces like training, mobilization of forces and day-to-day operational purposes.  As a result the land owners/farmers have to lose their standing crops and other properties. But the land owners do not get adequate compensation for their standing crops and other properties. The Committee had been told that “there was no policy for giving rehabilitation assistance as a welfare measure to the persons displaced by the acquisition of their land for defence purposes”.  In regard to compensation, the Ministry pays some money to land owners through the State Governments, which routes it to the Collector concerned. The process leads to umpteen cases in various courts of law.

The Defence Ministry informed the Committee that as many as 15,600 cases of dispute over compensation were pending in various courts across the country ---from the district courts to the Supreme Court.  There are also execution cases, since under the Land Acquisition Act there is an in-built provision for the enhancement of compensation. If anybody is aggrieved with the Award amount declared by the Collector, he goes to the reference court and if he is still not satisfied he goes in appeal to the High Court, and on to the Supreme Court. These legal processes have been going on. In most of these cases the acquisition and compensation has been compensated to the utter helplessness and anger of the landowners against the armed forces.

Greater concern is created because the Defence Ministry has been acquiring vast tracts of land before independence and till date for the “operational use” of the armed forces and other defence purposes. Private land is being acquired under the age-old Land Acquisition Act (LAA), 1894 and the Defence of India Act, 1939, framed during the British time. These laws are colonial in nature. Although they have been amended from time to time, they are totally inadequate to meet the present needs and aspirations of the people. Such a need was amply highlighted when the Committee recorded evidence of the representatives from the Union Ministries of Law and Rural Development and State Government officials.

Undoubtedly, there is an urgent need to have a comprehensive and more democratic legislation to deal with an important matter relating to land acquisition for military purposes and a better package worked out for compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected land owners as a gesture of goodwill to ensure their sympathy and support to the cause of national defence. Also significant is the need to ensure that the military personnel posted in forward areas are provided good and timely medical aid.  Posting of doctors of the AFMS to border areas in difficult terrain is a crucial matter, not a small matter in military planning. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

 

 

Enemy Within The Force:LET THE ARMY REMAIN AN ARMY, by B.K. Mathur, 7 August 2006 Print E-mail

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 7 August 2006

Enemy Within The Force

LET THE ARMY REMAIN AN ARMY

By B.K. Mathur

Following a report last month about two agents of a Pakistan-based militant organization joining the Indian Air Force, one concernedly learnt of existence of such enemies within the Indian Army every third day.  Within hours of the denial by the Air Force spokesperson of the report emanating from the National Security Council, two armymen deployed in J&K with the Rashtriya Rifles were held for connections with the militants.  And the entry of such elements in other regiments of the Indian Army is being reportedly discovered or suspected.  In fact, the trend is continuing for quite sometime now in India’s forces, which at one time used to be the envy of the world.

The latest report comes from Nashik where the Maharashtra anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) detained a retired Army Major over the week-end for allegedly passing on a sensitive military information to an agent of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan.  The Major was picked up following confessions by the ISI agent. The documents recovered from the possession of the agent included several photographs of airbases in Pune, Mumbai, Jamnagar and Nashik.  Add to this the Union Home Ministry’s advisory to the Governments of the West Coast States of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Kerala and Karnataka on the eve of the Independence Day celebrations about the suspected supply of arms and landing of terrorists.

Commenting on this alarming trend in India’s mighty armed forces a fortnight ago, this column had highlighted the need to review the entire recruitment system to ensure quality intake into the forces.  Undesirable elements get into the forces because of several lacunae highlighted in that write-up.   In addition to this two other points require to be seriously looked into to stop the damaging trend: Keep the military away from civil deployment as far as possible and a thorough review of the administration of Cantonments and overhaul of their Boards, as they used to be during the Raj.  There is now urgent need to keep the Army in barracks away from the “civil pollution”, as stressed in this column time and again – and for years now.  Let the Army remain an Army.

The question about the entry of undesirable elements in the armed forces was concernedly discussed in the Lok Sabha the other day and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee had very rightly observed that the function of the Army was to fight the enemy from across the border and to train for that job without getting involved increasingly in civil duties.  What Mukherjee implied was that the increasing contact with the civilians led the Armymen to getting involved with undesirable elements for some considerations which are available in plenty to the militant groups and their local agents.

Take, for example, the case of the two Armymen who were detained for passing on some information to a militant group.  On interrogation they reportedly accepted their guilt and explained that they were forced to do so in view of a threat to their families.  Well, this is no defence.  But such a situation can be avoided if only the contact of the Armymen with local police, para-military forces and civilians is reduced and the commanders at all levels in the places of deployment keep a strong vigil on their men, instead of getting involved themselves.  There comes the question of recruitment in Officer-cadres about which we talked in the last column.  Generally what is required is that the Army must be kept away from the systems failure in civil life, an increasing curse of India!

It is true that the Army deployment is difficult to avoid in Jammu and Kashmir, where foreign forces are required to be tackled, and the north-eastern States where insurgency is being increasingly supported by foreign militant groups. Of course, the Army has to be deployed in such situations.  But in such involvements also, the Commanders must ensure implementation of military discipline for which the Army is known.   In such conditions, as also in times of such calamities like cyclones etcetera, the Army needs to be deployed.  But the force must be kept away from “policing” deployment to handle problems like communal riots or disturbances.  That is not the job of the Army.  Such assignments could easily be handled by Central para-military forces, if the local police fails.

This at once reminds me of the manner in which Mulayam Singh Yadav had reacted as the Defence Minister in Deve Gowda’s Government to my question at a Press Conference in New Delhi about too much use of the Army for civil duties.  He stated in so many words that the Army was a Government organization and it is for the Government to decide how and when it is to be used. After all, the Government spends so much in maintaining such a large Army and it should be used for civil duties in peace time, when there is no war.  Similar view was earlier expressed by Bansi Lal, Defence Minister in Indira Gandhi’s Government. 

One hundred per cent correct.  But whose loss it is when the armed forces suffer from too much engagement in civil duties for two reasons.  One, increasing indiscipline because of  contact with civilian agencies and, two, suffering from inadequate training. In these days of induction of sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapon and weapon systems in the forces, the jawans, airmen and sailors need more time during the peace time to train continuously on these weapons.  If that is not done, then the forces are bound to perform badly in time of war, as happened with the Pakistani force in wars against India in 1965 and 1971.  They were provided latest, state-of-the-art machinery by big brother America but failed to use them properly due to lack of training.

Another important aspect required to be reviewed is the management of Cantonments. It is true that the Cantonment Boards across the country are headed by the concerned Sub-Area or Area commander of the Army.  But the constitution of these is such that civilian influence and vote politics prevail in their functioning.  Moreover, a lot of civilian population has come to acquire land and properties in almost all the Cantonment areas, with the result that they now look like any other mohalla in a city, where clean environment is something wholly unknown.  There was a time in my school days at Meerut, which has one of the big Cantonments in the country, one was afraid of entering the “military area”, most parts of which were out of bounds for the general public. Cantonments must return to the Raj days --- clean environment with no “civil pollution”.

If all that happens --- quality intake, controlled deployment of forces for civil duties and clean environment of the Cantonments and barracks ---there is no reason why the discipline of the forces, at its nadir today, should not improve. When there will be little contact with the civil population and when the troops will have enough time for training on modern weapons which the Government of India has planned to acquire in plenty, there would be little chance of undesirable elements getting into the forces or the militarymen having contact with spies, militants or their agents. At the moment the state of India’s armed forces is alarmingly in bad shape, requiring urgent need to review all its aspects responsible for the present state of affairs. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

 

 

 

Review Selection Criteria:FORCES NEED QUALITY NOT QUANTITY, by B.K. Mathur,25 July 2006 Print E-mail

DEFENCE NOTES

New Delhi, 25 July 2006

Review Selection Criteria

FORCES NEED QUALITY NOT QUANTITY

By B.K. Mathur

 The National Security Council has prepared a document which its Chief, M.K. Narayanan, has circulated to all the Chief Ministers. The document contains a chilling revelation that two Lashkar-e-Toyyeba cadres have joined the Indian Air Force (IAF). The alarming report has, however, been denied by the IAF spokesperson who has stated: “We have got such reports and we have looked into the matter. But there are no LeT elements in the Air Force and we have carried out stringent check.”  Welcome relief.  But there has to be some basis about the report that has been forwarded to the IAF by none other than the National Security Adviser. The counter-intelligence wings of India’s armed forces must look into it, because the danger of undesirable elements entering the armed forces cannot be ruled out.

The latest discovery by the intelligence agencies is that various militant outfits have now started recruiting educated youth qualified to join any civil or military service. The sneaking in of the jehadi elements into the armed forces is a very serious matter requiring a good hard look at the recruitment system for the three military services – the Army, Air Force and the Navy.  On paper, the system is quite foolproof, leaving no scope for any undesirable element getting in.  But to have a definite drill for in-take both in the Officer cadre and the Other Ranks is one thing. To follow strictly the prescribed criteria quite another.  Doubts about failure to select right type of boys have arisen, given increasing reports of even some senior officers in the forces indulging in undesirable activities.

The IAF’s spokesperson in the Directorate of Public Relations, Ministry of Defence has talked about “stringent checks” while denying the report of two militant cadres joining the Air Force.  But the failure of the Services Selection Boards for recruitment of the Officer cadre and Recruiting Offices for the ORs (other ranks) to select right type of boys for the training Academies is being increasingly felt.  Take the case of Officers who lead the jawans, Airmen and Sailors. First the candidate has to clear a tough entrance examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and certain number of boys is recommended to the Services Selection Boards (SSB) in order of merit.

This is where the flaw lies. The method of selection at the SSBs.  Remember, in early 1950s a feeling had fast grown among some Star Officers at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) in New Delhi that right type of boys, with the required OLQ (Officer-like qualities) were not being sent to the training Academies.  This led the AHQ to send a group of SSB, Meerut, to reassess the second-term Gentleman cadets of the 13th course of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) at Dehra Dun.  Complete three-day selection exercise was repeated at the Academy.  The full report of the SSB has not yet been disclosed but one of the recommendations was that psychologically-centric selection mode needed to be amended.

One of the amendments then proposed was to give thought to the method followed during the Raj for selection in the British Indian Army.   Stress was given to the family background of the candidate for commissioning into the force. The second was his career profile in school and college he attended in the field of sports and other extra-curricular activities.  Which really meant that the President of the Board had more say in selecting a candidate than the Group Testing Officer (GTO) or the psychologist whose assessment is till today the main consideration for selection. Each of the three assesses --- the President, the GTO and the President --- have equal number of marks.

Even if the President of the Board and the GTO, both in service uniform, want to select a boy and the psychologist, a civilian, does not want to clear him, the candidate is out.  In this scenario chances of wrong selection are more, especially when corruption at all levels in military and civil, is the order of the day. How else would you explain the fact that so many cases of spying and corruption at the higher level are reported day in and day out. Look at the latest one: The Navy war room leak by some senior officers. One can go on and on highlighting cases of corruption and indiscipline in the armed forces. Imagine the involvement of a three Star and a two Star General in the sub-standard purchase of “Dal” for the troops.

Little wonder then that the “trio” at the SSB joins hands and selects somebody wholly undeserving. That explains the increasing trend of Staff Officers indulging in undesirable activities. At times boys with lesser score at the assessment stage get selected.  The reason? Better quality boys with seemingly high OLQ just do not want to join the armed forces, with the type of boys who look for their personal gains rather than the national interest. To fill up the vacancies at the Officer level, the Government is left with no choice but to compromise quality with quantity, with the result that bad boys manage to get into the forces and create problems like the increasing number of General Court Martials.

Now look at the increasing trend in various Recruitment offices across the country for Jawans, Airmen and Sailors… Haven’t you heard of umpteen cases from time to time of boys from the countryside having to pay for recruitment in various Regiments?  The system is getting from bad to worse, with the police enquiries being fudged for undesirable elements sneaking into the armed forces.  There is also the question of quality and quantity in the case of recruitment of the ORs.  The youth get better opportunities elsewhere than in the armed forces.

This forces the military headquarters to recruit sub-standard boys to fill up vacancies in various Regiments. The process may possibly lead to undesirable elements getting into the forces.  The situation is worse in case of employment of civilians in Regiments, Squadrons and Naval units.  People like barbers, bearers, cooks etc. can be employed on “considerations” that prevent the authorities from having proper checks on their antecedents. Remember, a Court Martial case at Mathura some years go in which an Officer was punished on charges of purchases of medicines for the civilian staff from a Chemist which did not exist. Fictitious bills were made and passed by the authorized Officer.

In such a climate which is currently prevailing in many armed forces units and where the recruitment systems at all levels is increasingly helping individuals, not the forces and, importantly the nation. As repeatedly emphasized in this column time and again, and for years, there is need, urgent need, to keep the country’s armed forces away from the deteriorating civil environment.  Recruitment norms should be changed where necessary, and strictly enforced in Selection Boards and Recruitment Offices. That will ensure quality intake at all levels. Further delay on this front would be at the nation’s peril. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

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