ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 9 May 2006

Iran’s Nuclear Postures

Towards Inevitable Confrontation

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

 Iran has threatened to walk out of the NPT, if it is pressured too much to give up its uranium enrichment programme. How is it going to help Iran? Will it make its nuclear programme more legitimate? Will it assist in warding off the threat of possible international economic sanctions or military intervention?

The United States and its European partners and the IAEA have complained that Iran has been clandestinely seeking to develop a nuclear weapon capability. It has been alleged that Iran has secretly sought to acquire nuclear programme related technology and equipment for about 18 years in the international nuclear black market.

Several years of pressures and months of negotiations have failed to bring Iran on to its knees. Iran appears hell bent to go its way as far as its domestic nuclear programme is concerned. Citing political arguments based on the concept of national sovereignty, economic compulsion based on diversification of its sources of energy and security-  related justification, based on the limits of oil and gas resources, Iran has shown its determination to acquire a full civilian nuclear power cycle capability. It has uranium mines and now it claims that it has developed the capacity to domestically enrich uranium to generate nuclear fuel to run nuclear power reactors.

Iran has been a member of the NPT, the most extensive and inclusive nuclear non-proliferation regime. It has been a member of the IAEA, the international nuclear watch dog. It claims rights under international law and under the NPT and IAEA provisions to pursue a civilian nuclear power programme.

The US and several other countries in the West, however, do not have confidence that Iran will confine its ambition only to acquire a capability to run a full cycle nuclear power programme. Tehran is suspected to have been keeping an ambition to develop nuclear weapons.

What are the bases of such suspicions? First of all, Iran has been under the rule of a theocratic system since 1979 and has adopted a policy of confrontation with the West. It has withstood the US pressure and policy of isolation for long by systematically trying to cultivate good relations with the major powers and other countries. It seeks to enhance its capability in the face of alleged persistent US hostility.

Secondly, Iran has witnessed the US role during the Gulf War I and Gulf War II;  and the fate of Iraq. It does not want to take any chances and seeks a capability that could prevent foreign military intervention. Thirdly, it has strong grievances against the Western silence over Israeli nuclear weapons capability. Fourthly, it has seen the emergence of a nuclear Pakistan which has often been dubbed as a failed state and which has survived the Western non-proliferation pressures despite its clandestine activities and involvement in nuclear black market. If Pakistan could, why cannot Iran?

That Iran may have an ambition to develop nuclear weapon capability is reflected in its uncompromising stances on this issue and its fearless rhetoric challenging the US and its allies, including Israel. Never before any Middle-Eastern country threatened to obliterate Israel from the global map, as Iran did recently. Israel, which has won all wars fought with various combinations of Arab countries, is also a nuclear capable country. Issuing a threat to Israel’s existence can have two meanings. One, the threatening country has nuclear weapons capability. Two, the leader issuing such threats has a target audience to woo and he does not mean what he says in true sense of the term.

The problem is that Iranian people cannot be fooled. They know the military capabilities of Israel and would not support any direct confrontation with that country. That means Tehran may have developed a capability to build a crude bomb and is indirectly demonstrating its capability by using a combination of defiant action and rhetoric.

Tehran broke the lock and resumed its nuclear programme contrary to IAEA directions. It stopped IAEA inspections of its nuclear programme. It also confidently rejected the EU-3’s diplomatic initiatives and proposals. Russia, which has very friendly and close ties with Iran, also came up with a sound compromise formula. But Iran discarded it. The US Security Council passed a resolution asking Iran to stop uranium enrichment within a month, but Iran turned it down. On the contrary, it declared its new technological breakthrough in the field of uranium enrichment. The latest in Iran’s defiant attitude towards the international community and determination to go ahead with its nuclear programme is its warning that it would walk out of the NPT.

Why is Iran so defiant? Can a leadership be so audacious without strength – in this case nuclear weapon capability? Iran’s political behaviour is to some extent perplexing. Currently, there is a lively debate in the US about the rights and wrongs of taking military action against Iran. Although very powerful arguments are being put forward against military intervention, the US Government does not rule out military option.

There is no doubt that the Bush administration wants diplomacy to complete its full course before it would decide on military means. The past mistakes in the case of Iraq have brought significant lessons for the US Administration and President Bush clearly would not like any repetition of those. The Congressional elections also pose another set of political problems for President Bush. On top of it all, his opinion ratings among the people has been rapidly sliding down. There is no guarantee that yet another military adventure would bring any political benefit to him.

If these factors, along with Russian and Chinese opposition to punitive measures against Iran, have enabled Iranian leadership to withstand the Western pressure, the world in general and Persian Gulf in particular are safer. Even then, Iran’s obstinate behaviour is increasingly making it difficult for Russian, Chinese and other friendly countries to unconditionally support its stand.

The question is what happens if Iran announces its nuclear capability after walking out of the NPT? Iran’s nuclear weapons will not be considered legal either under the NPT or otherwise. So it may very well stay out of the NPT and launch itself as a new nuclear weapon state. Analysts in several western nations do not believe that Iran currently has the nuclear weapon capability. But their prediction may go wrong, as it has been so in so many other instances. 

More hair-raising question is whether the neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration would confront a nuclear Iran or make fences with it. (What with Washington dismissing. Iranian President Mahmohd Ahmadinejad’s letter to President Bush to “propose new ways” to resolve the matter) Will Iran face tough sanctions or even military intervention? Will Russians and Chinese come to the rescue of a nuclear Iran or sit idly and watch yet another case of US unilateral intervention? (Especially against the backdrop that both have rejected the US proposal to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which provides for enforcement i.e. more sanctions and war.  Instead they had suggested another Security Council rejection to demand Iran stop its nuclear programme) It is most likely that some sort of confrontation is in the making as far as US-Iranian relations are concerned.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 16 May 2006

Strategic Triangle

India, China and the US

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The emerging relations between India, China and the US are going to determine the future of Asian stability. These countries have never been able to establish a durable strategic alliance in the post-Second World War history with one another. Nor any two of them are likely to form such an alliance in the future.

However, the future Asian stability will largely depend upon how these three powers interact with one another. During the early years of the Cold War, both China and India were the newly-independent and fully sovereign states. The United States, on the other hand, had emerged as a global superpower with tremendous stakes in the Asia pacific region.

India was not comfortable with the US policy of maintaining strategic alliances and establishing military bases around the world. New Delhi adopted a non-aligned foreign policy in quite contrast with the US approach. Consequently, Washington came to detest both Indian nationalism and non-alignment. Yet, it was not difficult for the United States to maintain a modicum of working relations with India.

On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China from its very birth was considered a hostile political entity by the US. After failing to bring about a compromise between Mao’s Communist forces and Chian Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces, Washington was unable to live at peace with Communist China. The US Containment Doctrine was as much applicable to China as to the USSR.

India and China nonetheless were able to forge cordial ties with each other, despite different political systems and conviction. Democratic India had extended its hands of friendship to Communist China and the two countries soon pledged to maintain bilateral relationship on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence or Panch Sheel.

The political scenario began to change in curious ways since the early 1960s and crystallized clearly by early 1970s. India and China had turned hostile with a border war in 1962 to their credit. The US and China had begun to share a common enemy with widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. India by the way went closer towards the Soviet Union, which was considered an adversary by both China and the US.

The strategic understanding between the US and China and between India and the Soviet Union became completely irrelevant after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. India, China and the United States began to adopt a policy of constructive engagement towards one another under the new political and security landscape of the post-Cold War era.

As the Chinese economy boomed with a galloping speed and the entire world began to court it, India too improved its economic ties with China. But the extent and degree of the US-China economic cooperation was way ahead of the US-India or India-China economic relations. The trade surplus run by the Chinese vis-a-vis the US was several times higher than the total trade turn-over between India and the US. The US investment in China too was much higher than its investment in India.

There is little doubt that China’s economic performance outstripped India’s partly because India was a latecomer to the field of economic reforms and openness. The authoritarian decision-making process in China compared with the democratic systems in India also to an extent influenced the pace of economic growth in the two countries.

Significantly, the growing economic ties between China and the US did not make them strategic partners but strategic competitors by the turn of the Century. As China’s economy exploded to new heights and so did its capability to invest more in its defence sectors, American worries intensified. The new vigorous and confident China was expected to demand a larger share of its influence in Asian politics that would automatically cut into the American share.

As President George Bush entered the White House with a team of neo-conservatives, the American rhetoric on China changed from “strategic partner” to “strategic competitor.” While the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US compelled the Bush Administration to avoid any competition with China, some Americans clearly saw a challenge in a rapidly growing China and sought to contain this unprecedented growth.

The US had two choices to manage the Chinese challenge. One was to allow Japanese militarization. The other was to help Indian technological and economic growth. The first choice has been a difficult one in view of the prevailing fear in the Asia Pacific region of any resurgence of Japanese militarism. The second choice had little problem, since India itself had begun its engagement of the international community economically.

Consequently, the Bush Administration identified India as a new “strategic partner” and pledged to assist India in its emergence as a global power. The expanding defence cooperation between India and the US, the efforts to implement a new nuclear deal, the pledge to enhance bilateral trade are all geared towards building India’s power profile.

Some Americans and a few Indians possess a desire to establish a network of relationship that would aim at containing the growth of a malign Chinese power. The idea of a new containment strategy is neither beneficial for the region nor for the world. It has the seeds of a new devastating Cold War-type confrontation that would enhance mutual suspicions and stall the growth process.

Communist China is not a closed country, but a heavily engaged nation in the international community. Its economic policies have benefited many countries around the world. India should refrain from joining any US-led network that intends to contain China. On the other hand, the China is a revisionist power. Some Chinese do speak of getting Asia rid of American presence and influence. This is a containment strategy aimed at containing American influence in Asia. India should avoid teaming up with China and possibly Russia in order to limit US activities in Asia.

Simultaneously, India has to guard against its own containment, which may not be openly articulated but quietly undertaken. There was a time when both the US and China sought containment of India in various ways. There was no US-China axis at work against India. But the US was uncomfortable with India’s closeness with the Soviets and the Chinese built up Pakistan as a counterweight to India.

Currently, the US favours a strong, stable and prosperous India. China, on the other hand, appears wary of growing Indo-US ties. India hardly complained or evinced distrust when US-China relations grew to unprecedented heights after the Cold War. China needs little to fear from closer Indo-US relations. But it is significant to pursue a diplomacy of removing fears and apprehensions.

Positive engagements among India, China and the US will be indispensable for Asian economic growth and political stability. Suspicions between any two of this triangle will be harmful for regional growth and global stability. In other words, this emerging strategic triangle has the potential for enormous economic growth and dangerous security consequences. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 3 May 2006

Hu’s In, Who’s Out!

Bush-Hu Summit Sans Breakthrough

By Monika Chansoria

(School of International Studies, JNU)

Chinese President Hu Jintao recently concluded his four-day visit to the United States. The summit between the leaders of the US and China, which has been widely seen as one of the most crucial relationships of the 21^st century, was being described as vital on various fronts that included the ongoing nuclear crisis in Iran and North Korea, China’s trade and finance policies that have racked up a whopping $202 billion annual US trade deficit with China, along with the perennial issue of Taiwan. Added to these issues, the competition for access to oil also emerged high on the agenda with US President George W. Bush categorically stating that Beijing’s ever-increasing demand for oil was one of the reasons for rising oil prices.

The White House welcome ceremony started on a discomfiture note with quite a few lapses, much to the embarrassment of the hosts. A lady protestor blemished the ceremony by standing in the photographers’ gallery and shouting slogans against the Chinese President right in the middle of his speech. She was later identified as Wenyi Wang, belonging to the religious sect Falun Gong that is banned in China. Further, adding to the misgivings, the Chinese national anthem at the welcome ceremony was introduced as the anthem of the ‘Republic of China’ (the official name of Taiwan) instead of that of the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the Bush Administration had classed the visit as an “official meeting” rather than a “state visit.” These incidents caused much concern to the Chinese who are very conscious of protocol.

President Hu’s visit highlighted the crisis in the US trade policy in general and with China in particular. Last year, the US trade deficit was a staggering $725.8 billion, and with China alone responsible for $202 billion, the biggest ever recorded with a single country. It is speculated that this could surge to nearly $300 billion in a year’s time. US officials are particularly worried about the six-to-one ratio of imports to exports reflected in the trade deficit. The American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (AMTAC) expects it to rise again for 2006.

Meanwhile, 2,885,000 US manufacturing jobs have disappeared since 2001. According to AMTAC Executive Director, Auggie Tantillo: “The trade deficit is unsustainable and must be staunched in short order. China manipulates its currency, doles out billions in non-performing loans from state banks, violates intellectual property rights, and hands out subsidy after subsidy all with the intent of driving out of business US companies forced to play by free-market rules, yet the US government seemingly is powerless to act.” He called China ‘a full-fledged superpower’ in the arena of international trade. This imbalance has spurred calls in the US Congress to impose punitive tariffs on Chinese products unless China halts trade practices that are said to be unfair. In fact, the Congress has drafted two punitive tariff bills directed at China.   

Washington blames this deficit with Beijing on an undervalued yuan, with many US lawmakers reckoning the yuan as much as 40 per cent under-valued. China states that the rate is less important than the fact that they have put in place a system that provides for increasing exchange rate flexibility, which is occurring. During his trip to Seattle, Hu signaled generous purchases from Boeing and Microsoft to help the American economy, thereby hitting the right concessional buttons on the economic sphere, since in the recent months, the Bush administration has attempted to cast the trade deficit as a global rather than a bilateral issue.

Coupled with the economic discrepancy, an evidently persistent difference of opinion on the political front also existed. President Hu stated that China was in favour of a peaceful negotiated solution to the nuke crisis in the Korean peninsula, as well as the settlement of the Iranian nuclear programme. It would be significant to mention that all this while China has been resisting imposition of sanctions on Iran. President Bush failed to get anything substantial and tangible on actions against Iran, with whom China has a close and budding economic and military relationship.

Washington believes that China’s appetite for oil and its heavy investments in Iran also affect its stance on Tehran’s nuke issue. In 2004, China used about 6.5 million barrels of oil a day and overtook Japan as the world’s second largest user of petroleum products. The largest, the United States, consumes about 20 million barrels a day. Sinopec, China’s state-owned oil giant, signed a $70 billion deal with the Iranians in November 2004 to develop the Yadavaran oil field.

The US Department of Energy believes the field could ‘eventually produce 300,000 barrels a day.’ The only available option seems to be to managing energy sources and finding alternative energy sources. Heading towards sustainable alternative fuels could be a good option for China as it has a lot of biomass-crops, forests and wood products—that could be converted into ethanol.       

Moving on to the recurrent issue of Taiwan, President Bush and his Chinese counterpart did not seem to be on the same page during their respective inaugural addresses. President Bush stressed that a solution on the Taiwan issue should be viewed in the backdrop of the 3 Communiqués signed between the United States and China, and the Taiwan Relations Act. In his statement,

Hu openly omitted mentioning the Taiwan Relations Act and only spoke of the 3 Communiqués. Hu appreciated President Bush’s commitment to a “One China” policy on various occasions, but in the same breath reiterated that Taiwan “is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory and we will never allow anyone to secede Taiwan from us by any means,” thereby rebuffing Bush’s caution to avoid confrontation with Taiwan.

Earlier, China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at a news briefing at Beijing noted that the Taiwan issue was the most important and sensitive one in the China-US relations. Yang further stated that it was in the interests of both China and the US to oppose and contain “Taiwan’s independence” and to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.

The reason for Beijing being averse to the Taiwan Relations Act is that it clearly states in its section 2, “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability.” Moreover, the President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan.           

The issue of human rights in China remains contentious. President Bush criticized China’s totalitarian system and called for greater human rights, freedom of assembly and worship much to the displeasure of Beijing. In its last two annual reports on the issue, the State Department asserted that respect for human rights was worsening in China, while China now issues its own assessment of US’ human rights infringements.

Few analysts expected Bush to win anything substantial from the summit that failed to produce any sort of factsheet, agreement or even a joint statement. Washington sought to convince Beijing to be a “responsible stakeholder” on security issues, but could not gain anything substantial. Presiding over a booming economy that is increasingly driving global growth, the leader of China came to the US with an unprecedented edge, signalling to the world a rapidly changing geo-political environment. ---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 25 April 2006

Pro-Democracy Move Wants More

KING OFFERS RETURN OF DEMOCRACY

By Anil Kamboj

Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses

While India decided to break with its long standing policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states and to an extent, successfully lobbied with the United States and European Union to put pressure on the King for restoration of democracy. Dr. Karan Singh, the Prime Minister’s special envoy to Nepal, had reportedly told King Gyanendra to have genuine dialogue with the political parties and expressed India’s readiness to support all efforts to restore multi-party democracy in Nepal in order to overcome the crisis that Nepal is currently faced with.

India had suggested a formation of interim government with sufficient executive powers to hold elections, a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution and that Monarch to be ceremonial head. The King was also informed that for its own security imperatives if the chaos spiralled out of control, India may be forced to take some drastic steps. It was not only the US and India but even China, had called for restoring democracy. King Gyanendra had been absolutely isolated. Under both internal and external pressure, the monarch at last cave in on 21 April and announced on Nepal television that he was ready to return the executive powers of the country to the people and that the seven party alliance to recommend the name of the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister would further form his cabinet and run the Government. The King would remain as the Constitutional head. The King, however, did not say anything on the formation of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. The Congress Party of Nepal has not accepted the announcement.

India has been largely instrumental in bringing the political parties and the Maoist insurgents together to restore the multi-party democracy. Though wary of the Maoists, India has noted that they have desisted from violence since the crisis in Nepal snow- balled from April 6. India had even asked the King not to use the Maoists as a trump card.

The seven political parties and the Maoists had signed a 12-point Memorandum of Understanding on November 22 last, to work for common goals of restoring peace and democracy in the Himalayan kingdom and remove King from power. Maoist had announced an indefinite ceasefire in Kathmandu and wanted peaceful solution to the problems besetting Nepal.

The US and some western countries had, in fact, wanted to keep Maoists out and had called on the political parties to call off the pact. But, without the support of the Maoists, the mass movement in the country was also not feasible. It was only due to their call that the people in the rural areas of Nepal also joined the agitation. India has to be also very careful that Maoists should not come to power in Nepal. This could fuel a claim by them for a revision of 1815 Treaty of Sagauli signed with British India. Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai had stated in May last year, that Nepal would never be able to develop until the territories lost by the Treaty of 1815 were restored to it. He meant territories of Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Sikkim and Darjeeling.

The extreme situation had developed, as the monarchy grossly undervalued and underestimated the strong commitment of the Nepalese people to democracy. Besides this, the Nepali Congress in particular can also be blamed for the failure of democratic experiment by its constant internal bickerings and squabbling, with top leadership seeking to impose a dynasty upon the party. Government of India had short-sighted judgement and is also to be responsible at the initial stages. It also paved the way for Pakistan and China, especially the latter, to step into the vacuum created by India.

The King had taken over the power last year, as he said that the Government was unable to tackle the Maoist menace but, unfortunately, the Royal Nepal Army also failed to control the insurgency effectively. Moreover, it is said the top echelon of the RNA is corrupt and arrogant. Their role model is Pakistan Army, while the King’s model was Myanmar military leadership and wanted to carry on with a heavy hand, totally regardless of the society.

The King is considered as the religious and spiritual head of Nepal, but the present situation made him as the most hated person in the country. He lost all self-respect and some section of the society may not even want him to be Constitutional head of the state. The idea that Nepal could be returned to the 1960s – resurrecting King Mahendra model of Palace-guided Panchayat democracy “suited to Nepal’s soil” – smacked more of farce. Attacking graft while his own Cabinet was tainted by corruption set the tone.

But the King’s coterie of the Panchayat-era-advisers blinded themselves to the transformation of Nepali society over the last decades and pressed on with their plan to return the clock back. Time is not far off when the political parties may demand that Royal Nepal Army be under the civil, constitutionally-elected government. If this happens, then who would protect the King in case he has to take such drastic actions in future?

With the pro-democracy movement spreading all over Nepal and the severe action taken by the security forces in the border districts with India, has been triggered a mass exodus from Jhapa to Kishanganj district in Bihar. The panicky and jittery Terai people are gradually streaming into Bihar. Thousands of Nepalese have taken shelter along the border areas in different villages in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal. The Nepalese Police in remote areas have abandoned the Thanas and those who are making a feeble attempt of imposing authority, do not know as how long could they hold on. If all goes well in coming days in Kathmandu, there may be some respite to these policemen.

The overall picture of Nepal at present is very grim, the unemployment is touching 42 per cent, the fragile economic condition in the country is close to catastrophe, and its GDP forecast for 2006 has shrunk to 2 per cent. Seeing the present economic crisis of Nepal, India has pledged a big economic package for that country but only after King Gyanandra transfers power to the multi-party democratic alliance.

There is heavy responsibility on the head of Seven Party Alliance. They have to stay united and the Maoists allow the new government to function till fresh elections are conducted. Can India claim a moral victory for the hard work it put in lately? Time has come for grand re-conciliation between the King, SPA and the Maoists. Meanwhile, India will have to carefully monitor the situation and encourage a smooth transfer of power.

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)