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Economic Highlights
Army’s New War Doctrine:SMALL STRIKE FORCE IN NUCLEAR ERA,by y B K Mathur,27 June 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 27 June 2006
Army’s New War
Doctrine
SMALL STRIKE FORCE
IN NUCLEAR ERA
By B K Mathur
The week-long military exercise in Punjab
last month, code-named Sange Shakti, was designed to test the Indian Army’s new
combat concept for conventional offensive operations in the plains. The exercise
was basically aimed at concentrating and coordinating India’s
military fire-power. With the creation of smaller strike groups, the exercise
was also intended to fine-tune the Army-Air Force joint operation in a
strategic battlefield and offensive operations against a nuclear backdrop. The
idea of the new strike force is to speed up the troop movement to ensure early
handling of any enemy attack.
The thrust of the new doctrine to suit the changing battle
strategies across the world is on
the formation of “integrated battle groups” drawn from the Army, Air Force and
the Navy. These groups are being so trained as to be able to make swift and
hard inroads into the enemy territory. The highlight of the doctrine is, and
rightly, that the strikes are “limited and calibrated” to ensure that nuclear
weapons do not come into play in a military operation. The need for swift
strike by small integrated forces, unlike the earlier policy of moving to the
front the entire strike Corps, was felt following the experience during “Operation Parakram” in 2002.
The Army undertook a massive
forward mobilisation for that operation from Mathura,
Ambala and Bhopal
to launch pads along the Line of Control (LoC) after the terrorist attack on
Parliament House on December 13, 2001.
The movement of the three strike Corps took the Army nearly one month to
get to the operational readiness
along the LoC. Imagine, if it was an
actual war and the enemy attack had already taken place when the movement of
the strike force started, the Indian Army would have been caught napping – and,
perhaps, without the support of the air force.
Obviously, the concept of an integrated military action is
welcome. As disclosed during last
month’s Operation, eight strike groups have been constituted, instead of the
earlier three “strike groups” at the Corps level, based far away from a possible scene of operation. The details of the composition of the smaller
strike groups has been finalized by the Army and the Air Force commanders and
approved by the Defence planners and the Cabinet Committee on Security. It is
hoped that before the new doctrine was tried at last month’s operation, several
aspects and drawbacks of the earlier system were considered carefully.
The concept of integrated military operation, inter-Service
cooperation and joint command and control has been under discussion for a long time. At one stage the Government
had almost decided to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) above
the three Chiefs of Staff, those of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. But certain difficulties were obviously seen
in the CDS system which prompted the Government to re-think about the
matter. In fact, there have been sharp
differences among the military commanders and Defence experts about the
creation of the CDS. One expert who has
vehemently opposed the move all along told me the other day: “One of the
achievements of the Vajpayee Government on the military front is its failure to
create the post of the CDS.”
The present Defence Minister was initially opposed to the
creation of the post. He had indicated this in response to my question at a Press Conference.
But he seems to have changed his mind now, in pursuance to suggestions
from various quarters after last month’s military exercise during which new
strike concept was tried and its shortcomings were registered, especially
taking into consideration the operational requirements in the nuclear era. The Defence Minister has now sought the
advice of all the political parties regarding the creation of the CDS. The CPM has already raised some doubts about
it.
The creation of the post is a subject that requires
examination in depth. It will be taken
up another time. At the moment, the creation of smaller strike forces, as tried
last month, with the requirement of joint command and control needs to be
carefully planned, against the experiences gained by the Army last month.
Several things have to be considered, among these mainly three aspects:
inter-arm cooperation within the Army, inter-Service understanding, proper
training for a joint military action and ability to undertake successful operation against possible
use of nuclear weapons by the enemy.
Remember, Pakistan which continues to be India’s potential enemy despite
the present peace efforts by both, is a nuclear power and Gen. Musharraf had
threatened several times before the peace moves about the use of nuclear
weapons in the event of a war.
Experience during the wars India has fought post-independence,
including the Kargil operation which professionally
cannot be described as a war, shows that inter-arm and inter-Service
coordination miserably failed. In 1962,
the Army was caught unawares when China attacked. The
Henderson-Brooke Committee went into the causes of the disaster the Indian Army
suffered. Its report has not yet been disclosed. and the Defence planners have
failed to make use of the findings of the Committee for improvement in the operation
strategy subsequently during wars against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Years
after the report was submitted, Major-General Henderson-Brooke, who lived in Australia after retirement and passed away recently, told me during his short visit
to New Delhi: “Total failure of command and
control” was the cause of India’s
reverses.
Several Regiment-level commanders who fought the 1971 war
against Pakistan
now tell us of several incidents when they failed to get air support for their
forward moves. At times they had to depend only on artillery support, that too
of the field artillery because till then the gunners were not provided with
gunships, that is, armed helicopters, even though the other major armies of the
world had them.
The Air Force failed to provide timely support because of a
lacuna: faulty system being followed even now, irrespective of the composition
of the strike force. The demand for air
support has to follow a chain of command that causes delay. Beside this, any
war doctrine or integrated operation strategy requires a well-trained
force. Fist of all, the Army needs to be
freed from increasing deployment in aid of civil power. The troops require to
be put on vigorous training at all levels and in all possible
scenarios. For joint operations, the
integrated groups for rapid deployment have need to be trained accordingly
under joint command and control with complete coordination of the three
Services. Then only can the new war
doctrine be successfully
implemented. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Kalam’s Daring Sortie:DOES IT MOTIVATE THE YOUTH?, by B.K. Mathur, 12 June 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 12 June 2006
Kalam’s Daring
Sortie
DOES IT MOTIVATE
THE YOUTH?
By B.K. Mathur
Three happenings almost simultaneously last week concerning
the Indian Air Force (IAF) were at once thought-provoking: President Kalam’s
daring 45-minute sortie as a co-pilot on the IAF’s state-of-the-art SU-30 MKI
fighter aircraft, a MiG crash about the same time that day and completion by
the Hindustan aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) of its Jet trainer’s hot weather trials at
Nagpur. Most significant of them was
indeed the 74-year-old President’s feat, which was just not a ceremonial
occasion but a significant experience that established two records: First head
of the state to fly a military aircraft and an oldest person ever to fly a
fighter jet which went supersonic mid-air and broke the sound-barrier.
Incidentally, President Kalam had evinced keen interest in
the Sukhoi fighters as the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister. The “Bhramchari missileman”
as Kalam Sahib was known during his stint in the Defence Ministry was barred
from flying the fighter aircraft as a civilian scientist. But as the Supreme Commander of India’s armed
forces he could fulfil his ambition of 1956 when he tried unsuccessfully to join the IAF and fly a military
aircraft. During his sortie last week,
the President looked like an accomplished pilot and studied the on-board Indian
computers. He experienced gravitational
force up to as much as 2G magnitudes.
The President’s sortie, which broke the sound-barrier by
clocking up to 1.26 mach (one mach is equal to 340 metres per second) at a
height of 7.5 km, is bound to motivate the youth to join the air force. As Kalam stated after the flight: “There is a
great opportunity for more youngsters to join the IAF and work in these hi-tech
areas.” The advice is indeed very timely
at a time when the youth is not keen to join military flying and is looking for
another career mainly because the risk to life involved due to lack of training
facilities in modern, supersonic jet fighters. So many accidents have taken
place in recent years, to the extent that the IAF’s MiGs have come to be
described as “flying coffins”, stupidly wrong, though.
Unfortunately, however, President Kalam’s dare-devil feat in
the skies, followed by his advice to the youth must have hurt the enthusiasm
within minutes, when another IAF crash was reported. A MiG-29 trainer crashed
into the sea off Jamnagar where the Marine National
Park is situated.
No doubt the pilots ejected safely, but the very fact that a trainer
aircraft was crashed raises the off-repeated questions: what is wrong with
training? And, is there anything wrong with the aircraft of the MiG series made
in Russia? Two high-level committees have studied the
causes of accidents in the last two decades and more – one headed by Air
Marshal La Fontaine and the other by APJ Abdul Kalam, then in the Defence
Ministry and now the President.
The Kalam Committee, as also the earlier one headed by Air
Marshal La Fontaine, went into various factors causing IAF crashes. They
included human error, technical defects, bird hit etc. The Air Marshal had also
included indiscipline among the pilots and lack of training in man-machine
coordination. The root cause of accidents has, however, never been spelt out,
or made public so far. There are only
comments galore without going into the facts and real cause behind a crash
which causes the nation dearly. But
before we go into the issue further,
I hasten to clarify that the rate of accidents is not so high as it is made out
to be, in view of the fact that the Indian fighter pilots fly much more than
their counterparts even in developed countries.
Not only that, the IAF’s fighter pilots have to fly low,
quite low, where the reaction time in distress
is too little. This reminds me of Air Chief Marshal Nirmal Suri. He had told me in 1991 as the Chief of the
Air Staff that the professional
growth in an Air Force like India’s
is most important. There is no limit to
growth. One can never remain satisfied
with whatever one has achieved. But certain basic requirements to make the
force operationally competent, commensurate with the latest trends and
sophistication, are the bare minimum to be achieved on all three sides of the
triangle – man, machine and environment, which includes the bird menace caused
by increasing pollution around military airports.
In fact, when IAF accidents are enquired into, the approach
adopted at present is wrong – and requires a change. After the accident, one
tends to automatically ask: who was responsible for the accident? But what needs to be investigated is: What is
responsible for the accident? In other
words, the emphasis in finding out the real cause of an accident needs to be on
“what” and not “who”. This clearly
requires more concentration of the authorities on air safety, including
training of pilots on the present-day, highly sophisticated fighter planes.
That really takes us for the umpteenth time to what should be described in the
least the “criminal delay” in acquiring for the “conversion” sorties an
adequate advanced jet trainer (AJT). In
this context, the HAL’s efforts to produce an Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) is
welcome.
There is, however, no denying the fact that the standard of
fighter pilots is not the same as it was earlier in view of inadequate quality
intake into the IAF which leads to poor training at the conversion into
supersonic flying stage. It is very
necessary to understand that the
quality of men behind the machines and their training prior to flying a
supersonic single-pilot, state-of-the-art fighter aircraft are two main reasons
that lead to air crashes. Failure on
both fronts leads to “killing” of our fighter pilots – the youngmen otherwise
lacking in no way in the fighting spirit, valour and bravery.
The present state of affairs on the recruitment and training
fronts, unfortunately, causes indiscipline among the fliers and the ground
staff. That is also a matter of great concern.
Former Air Chief Marshal H. Mulgaokar had taken a hard line on this
aspect during his tenure as the IAF Chief.
He was able to reduce the percentage of accidents due to human error
from 43 to 15.6 – lowest level attained so far. Later Air Chief Katre had urged
the need for a change in the training programme, commensurate with the
requirements of the present-day flying hazards. Thus, there has to be an
optimum efficiency of man-machine combination, without which one could
justifiably ask: Does President Kalam’s feat motivate the youth to join the Air
Force?---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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Spend But Be Accountable:CAG FINDS FLAWS IN ARMS DEALS, by B.K. Mathur, 29 May 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 29 May 2006
Spend But Be
Accountable
CAG FINDS FLAWS IN
ARMS DEALS
By B.K. Mathur
Defence expenditure is one thing which has never been
objected to by anyone in the country, including leaders of the Opposition
parties. It is a matter of national
security, which can’t be compromised at any cost. But what is invariably
questioned in Parliament and outside is misuse of massive
budgetary allocations and lack of accountability. Even if budgetary allocations of the Defence
Ministry have not been discussed on
the floor of Parliament for years, institutions and individuals connected with
the Ministry’s policy and planning point out grave misuse of funds in military
purchases. Parliamentary Committee
reports and scrutiny by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India highlight
again and again financial irregularities.
In its latest report tabled in Parliament the other day, the
CAG has pulled up the Government for its failure to exercise adequate care in
negotiating huge armament deals with Russia, a country which even
today is one of the major weapons and systems supplier to India. The CAG has pinpointed three major defence
deals from that country – Rs.6,500-crore agreement for the purchase of
Sukhoi-30 multi-role fighter aircraft signed in 1996, Rs.3,000-crore deal to
buy T-90 Main Battle Tanks concluded in 2001 and even the earlier agreement to
acquire T-72 MBTs was flawed, observed the country’s financial watchdog and noted
“there is need for the Government to freeze cost parameters, especially in
cases of licensed-production.”
The CAG has cautioned that care need to be taken to ensure
that transfer of technology for such expensive machines and systems should
encompass the lifetime support
system for the weapons. Failure to do
that invariably ends in a disaster. There has been an almost one hundred per
cent cost escalation in the licensed-production of Sukhoi aircraft project. The
indigenously-manufactured Sukhoi aircraft is presently costing about Rs.28.60
crore more than the import cost. In the
case of T-90 MBT kits, the supply has not been forthcoming, as time-bound
clause has not been incorporated at the agreement stage. The Assembly
of the 186 tanks was to start by March 2005, but so far only 85 tanks had been
delivered.
In this connection, remember, the stipulation of
license-production at home was the main reason why the Indira Gandhi Government
preferred to go in for modernized military armament from the erstwhile Soviet Union in late 1960s. Western equipment, though superior
to the Russian machinery, was not
preferred because the suppliers, including the US companies, were not willing to
export technology for the production of their state-of-the-art machinery. Also,
two other considerations weighed in favour of the Russian
machinery – reliability for the supply of spares etc. and Rupee-payment for all
the purchases.
Both reliability and Rupee-payment advantage are not really
available for the induction of Russian
machinery after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Only transfer of technology for indigenous production of the Russian machinery is still on offer. And, importantly, India’s defence production units
have by now become accustomed to handling or producing Russian
machinery under licence. The users too are
now comfortable on Russian machines,
be they aircraft, warships or mechanized machines for the Army. The present UPA Government at the Centre has
plans to induct several state-of-the-art military machines at high cost. Russian, American and European companies have offered their produce.
In fact, the Service Headquarters had never had it so good
as now, with Pranab Mukherjee as the Defence Minister. Official figures show
that during 2004-05 India’s
armed forces spent a staggering $6 billion to purchase from abroad weapons and
weapon systems. With India
going on a buying spree for military machines, defence industry in militarily
advanced countries has got busy in marketing their produce in the country, as
reflected in the foreign participation at the Def-Expo in New Delhi earlier this year. As many as 20 armament majors had their eyes
on India’s
plan to acquire 126 multi-role combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force,
involving a large expenditure of about $6.5 billion. Negotiations for these are on, while France has already finalized contract for the $3.5
billion submarine project and the UK has completed deal for $1.8
billion Hawk AJT (advanced jet trainer) deal.
Before going into the controversies about the charges of
slush money in the AJT and Scorpene deals, let us first understand that the
defence industry is quite different from any other production unit. State-of-the-art military machines cannot be
produced under one roof, because each one has hundreds of components, big and
small, many of which are to be imported.
It is never economically viable to set up a separate unit for their
production, and hence the easy option of direct import. That also helps the
people in authority to not only travel abroad frequently but also to make
money, call it slush money or bribery. Take the case of the AJT deal at the end
of which India
agreed to pay about Rs.800 crore more than the Price Negotiations Committee,
(PNC) had finalized. Later the, then, Defence Secretary told this writer that
extra money had been agreed to for “spares and other services.”
The latest controversial deal that constitutes part of the
present Government plan of induction of sophisticated weaponry in the three
military services is the Scorpene submarine deal involving as high an amount as
Rs.18,798 crore. This deal has many
disturbing elements, involving massive
kickbacks as revealed by the NDA Government’s former Defence Minister, George
Fernandes. The NDA has claimed that the recent exposure is one of the biggest corruption scandals of
the UPA Government which, as the Navy itself has now admitted, has gravely
jeopardized India’s
national security. This includes the infamous “War Room Leak” at the Naval
Headquarters in New Delhi.
Worse, certain foreign and Indian nationals have been
charged of involvement in the deal, leading to illegal entry of middlemen. A
four per cent commission on the
contract amount, between Rs.500-700 crore, has reportedly been offered to make
the deal through by the Thale, the French company known internationally for
bribing political leaders all over the world. The company, which has been
blacklisted by the World Bank for its questionable dealings, has offered to the
Indian agents and other concerned people the biggest-ever amount as bribery,
one that is far bigger than the much-publicised Bofors gun deal, which caused
the fall of a Government at the Centre.
The amount in that deal was a meagre chillarh,
Rs.64 crore by the present standard.
One can go on and on describing how vested interests have
finalized major defence deals in utter disregard of the national security
interest. Demand for bribery means lacunae left in final agreement. These have been repeatedly pointed out, and
for years, in this column, in Parliament and outside. But anti-national practices to serve self
interests do not seem to be ending. What the CAG has pointed out in its latest
report requires a serious thought.
Defence planners must exercise care in negotiating huge armament deals.
Failure to do that will surely be at the nation’s peril.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Attack From Within:ALARMING TREND IN ARMED FORCES, by B K Mathur,1 May, 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
1 May, 2006,
New Delhi
Attack From Within
ALARMING TREND IN
ARMED FORCES
By B K Mathur
Once an envy of militarily advanced countries for their
valour and discipline, India’s
armed forces personnel are at their nadir today. Increasing reports of their
acts of indiscipline and corruption, like war-room leaks, espionage cases, fake
encounters and continuing shortage of officers and lack of quality in-take make
one sit-up -- and perturbed about the alarming trend in Defence Services.
During the 1950s and the 60s, could one ever think of military men increasingly
challenging their own General Court Martial (GCM) decisions in civil courts
with their differences with their controllers, commanders and systems to break
India’s established military traditions.
How frustrating is a report that over 10,000 serving and
retired defence personnel have approached different civil courts, challenging
actions against them. A senior officer has been quoted by the Times of India as
stating that “it’s now almost become second nature of all officers denied
promotions to file statutory complaint with the Defence Ministry. If that does
not work, many approach courts, unlike (in) the past when it was considered bad
form.” Wonder why the military personnel, at times senior commanders,
increasingly feel hurt by the judgement of their seniors and their own courts.
Importantly, don’t those who take their complaints to civil courts demoralize
the Armed Forces?
The men in uniform have to be disciplined with a firm code
of conduct and a fool-proof command and control. They need to be stopped from
getting involved in a rut of civil courts and in an administration where
respect for authority is fast diminishing. At the same time, it must be ensured that
injustice is NOT meted out to them by the seniors in command. The armymen are
now educated people, unlike the illiterate jawans in the British Indian Army,
and are gradually becoming conscious about their rights. They have thus begun
to find umpteen lacunae in the military justice system. Naturally, therefore,
they rush to seek justice from civil courts, at the cost of military ethos the
world over.
The growing trend is undoubtedly affecting the discipline of
the forces. But the remedy does not lie in doing away with the present court
martial system; it lies in removing the lacunae. There are so many cases which
could be quoted when senior commanders in field formations have punished their
juniors on flimsy grounds. In such circumstances the procedure of the GCM is
required to be changed. As the, then, Chief of Army Staff and later a Member of
Parliament, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhary, stated in 1996 at a conference in New
Delhi of Deputy Advocate Generals, the Army Act and Rules should be reviewed.
In fact, this needs to be done time and again as military environments change.
Before considering the Army Act and the Rules, one needs to
know the existing procedures of the GCM. The Court Martial proceedings are
carried out in three stages. One, a “Court of Inquiry” is undertaken by an
officer deputed by a local commander. Following this, a “Summary of Evidence”
is prepared by the same presiding officer and, finally, Court Martial
proceedings start on the basis of the Summary of Evidence, prepared by one who
is nominated for the purpose by the local commander or even a Corps Commander.
What it amounts to is that the whole exercise can be “rigged” by vested
interest. If the local commander is unhappy with his junior for whatever
personal reasons, he can manipulate punishment for him and spoil his career,
which only the civil court can save.
The GCM rules and procedures in the interest of military
discipline are today only things of the past. This is indicated by numerous
judgements of civil courts when militarymen have gone in appeal against the GCM
proceedings and findings. Actually, the military justice system is a legacy of
the Raj with, of course, a continuous process
of amendments to the original Indian Army Act of 1912. A Department was established
in 1841 with the appointment of three JAGs (Judge Advocates General). The
native armies merged into one on January 1, 1885, leading to the centralisation
of the Army judicial system. A Judge Advocate General was accordingly appointed
for the whole Army. That set-up continues till today.
In 1947, the Department comprised a meager 27 officers, a
legally qualified cadre headed by a Brigadier.
Today this strength has swelled to about 300 officers, headed by a Major-
General. The JAG carried out about a decade ago a thorough reappraisal of
various provisions of the Army Act 1950, Army Rules 1954 and the regulations
for the Army in 1987 with a view to identifying the areas requiring
improvements. As many as 22 Sections of the Army Act were amended through a
Parliamentary legislation, called the Army (Amendment) Act, which came into
force from September 6, 1992. Some more amendments are now under the active
consideration of the Government.
The JAG Corps is also striving to uphold the traditions of
the military justice system. To begin with, the 1937 edition of the manual of
the Indian Military Laws has been completely revised. A bilingual new manual of
military laws has been published in Hindi and English in three volumes. The
regulation of the Army Act 1962 has also undergone a thorough revision by a
special cell that comprised officers of the JAG Corps under the supervision of
the JAG itself. He has also launched in 1990 a new approach for the disposal of
the military disciplinary cases by providing and extending legal advice at the
grassroots, so that commanders in
field formations have prompt access
to legal aid in times of their doubts and their difficulties while finalizing
the disciplinary cases.
All very fine. But the real flaw that continues to exist in
the GCMs’ procedures has not so far been removed. At present the GCM is
conducted by a “Bench” comprising all military officers and headed by a senior
officer (Brigadier for JCOs and ORs and Major-General for Officers) can be
influenced by the concerned Corps Commander or even the Army Commander (both
Lt.-Generals) and even the General, the Army Chief, as happened, remember, in
the court martial cases of some 14 Corps officers. After all, don’t forget India’s armed forces
are no different. These, too, are deeply steeped in the “civil pollution” of a
corrupt and irresponsible society.
What, then, needs to be done? Civil courts need not be
bothered for deciding matters and GCM decisions. The best would be to set up
military tribunals, comprising a mix of military-civil legal persons. Such
tribunals have to be free of local commanders’ influence. The Supreme Court has
already recommended the constitution of such tribunals. The Government too has
been talking about them for a long time. The idea is to keep the institution of
JAG and Court Martials alive with required amendments. Appeals against its
decisions as well as complaints against administrative decisions should be
handled by the tribunals. These need to be constituted at the earliest. Any
further delay would be at the nation’s peril. --- INFA
(Copyright, India
news & Feature Alliance)
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Sharing The Spoils:FAULTY AWARDS SELECTION, by B.K. Mathur,17 April 2006 |
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DEFENCE NOTES
New Delhi, 17 April 2006
Sharing The Spoils
FAULTY AWARDS SELECTION
By B.K. Mathur
Another annual ritual, the Defence Investiture Ceremony took
place in the Rashtrapati Bhawan the other day.
As usual, scores of military personnel were decorated with medals by the
Rashtrapati, who happens to be the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The list of recipients every year raises
several questions: who gets the award; who selects the awardees; what is the criteria
for selection; how do so many people get selected even in peace time; and,
importantly, what do the awardees get?
The list also highlights, rather concernedly, that most of the personnel
who get medals for gallantry, for valour and courage are Officers of the three
Services, giving an impression that
only the Officers are gallant and not the Other Ranks (ORs) or the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs).
In fact, the distribution of military awards is increasingly
turning into a farce. So also the
Republic Day awards which the President of India announces every year for
defence personnel. Prior to independence
detailed examination of performance and gallantry was undertaken before
bestowing high military honours. Imagine, sometime back, a Param Vir Chakra was
announced to a jawan “posthumously” only to clarify later that the hero was
very much alive. Earlier, the highest military
award was reserved for only a select few whose deeds were subjected to the
strictest scrutiny. More significantly,
most of the gallantry awards went to the fighting men, that is, the jawans as
they are the real brave personnel who risk their lives in a battle. Remember, after the II World War, of the 28
Victoria Crosses awarded to the
Indian soldiers only two went to the Officers.
The Officer-men ratio remains about the same as in the
British Indian Army during the II World War: 20 to one. It was the same during
the Kargil operation in 1999 where about 10,000 troops were deployed for what
can be described as a minor operation.
Surprisingly, in accordance with the practice since independence about
85 per cent of the gallantry awards went to the Officers. Undoubtedly, the Officers in the Indian Army
always lead an operation but the jawans, twenty or twentyfive of them, are
ready to sacrifice their lives behind one Officer. They do not watch the operation from the
sidelines or do not show any courage. Give them their due, please.
The present system of distributing gallantry awards
obviously shows that awards are given by policy makers for valour and devotion
to duty according to the rank in the Indian Army. How else can one explain the lopsided
distribution of gallantry awards mostly to Officers. The situation is
invariably worse in the case of the Republic Day honours where there is near-absence
of ORs (Other Ranks) more often than not. And what the gallantry honour means?
The Param Vir Chakra, the nation’s highest wartime medal for “most conspicuous
bravery” carries an allowance of Rs.1500 per month; Ashoka Chakra Rs.1400 p.m.;
Mahavir Chakra Rs.1200; Kirti Chakra Rs.1050; Sena Medal Rs.250. Just a pittance, indeed.
At once this reminds one of some very interesting
observations by former Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral J.D. Nadkarni made
after his retirement about the manner in which gallantry awards are distributed
to the armed forces personnel. For the
first time in independent India,
all the three defence Services, the Army, Navy and the Air Force participated
in the 1971 war against Pakistan. The Government of the day was so keen to
claim victory that it began to announce gallantry medals even before the war got
over . To make matters worse, Nadkarni disclosed, each Service began to demand
its own and proportionate share of the honours. In each Service various
Commanders wanted their own share. The Navy wanted exactly the same number to
its Western and Eastern Commands.
Worse, Nadkanri further disclosed, the entire process of awards was turned topsy-turvy when the
awardees were selected first and the Citations were written afterwards to suit
the awards. The terrible hurry about
announcing the awards led to some “hilarious” situations. The Navy bestowed an award to an Officer
believed to have gone down with the INS Khukri only to discover later that the
Officer had been hospitalized and was not on board when the vessel sank. My
own younger brother, then a young Captain in the Army, was “informally”
informed of an award he was to get for his gallantry in 1971. Alas, his name could not be recommended
because he passed away in a sailing
accident at Okhla within days of his Regiment’s return to Delhi from the War theatre after the Pakistan
Army’s surrender.
One can go on and on narrating instances when gallantry
awards, both wartime and peacetime, have been recommended to connected Officers
and some favourite Other Ranks (ORs).
Worse still, deserving personnel, (JCOs) and ORs, are left behind simply
because the recommending Officer does not like them. This growing trend ultimately demoralizes the
armed forces, which are already facing problems concerning recruitment of boys
of required calibre in military training academies. The forces are at present
suffering not only in quality but also in quantity. There is at present
shortage in the Officer cadres of all the
three defence Services.
Senior military Officers and Instructors at the academies
and training Centres invariably quote the immortal words inscribed at the
famous Chetwood Hall at the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun: “The
country comes first each and every time, and the men you command come
next. Your own comfort and wellbeing
come last each and every time.” Unfortunately,
what the advice preached is rarely followed even at the time when the military
Commanders get the opportunity to show that the country cares for India’s jawans,
sailors and airmen and awards them for their services and sacrifices for the
nation. It is a matter of great concern
that those in authority serve their own interests first and those of the men
they command and the nation next.
It is high time now that policy-makers in the Union
Government took greater interest in honouring its gallant men and Officers. At
present the selection process is
greatly flawed. An award for gallantry needs to be offered for a major action
in time of war or war-like situations as border conflicts. It must be understood that gallantry awards
for minor action would amount to devaluing them – and, worse, no one would care
to win them. Also, the number of such
awards needs to be limited so that their value increases. The increased value
of a gallantry medal will actually be all the more greater if the monthly
allowance that goes with each category of awards is increased substantially.
These are important, not minor, things to attract talented youth for the armed
forces. In regard to the military
awards, it is perfectly possible
that a gallant soldier may just not care to share the spoils!---INFA.
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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