New Delhi, 26 March 2007

Sentinels Of Coastline

SMALL MARINE FORCE FOR BIG JOB

By B.K. Mathur

Increasing threat from the sea is now receiving New Delhi’s attention. It is well reflected in Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s recent statements in Parliament and outside. He has talked about the urgent need to strengthen India’s Coast Guard to tackle the latest recent infiltration efforts by the militants. Those trying to sneak in to India from the sea route are not only the militants from Pakistan but also Sri Lanka’s LTTE cadres. A number of them have reportedly been found in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Antony has also talked in Port Blair the other day about the need to bolster Andaman and Nicobar security. 

He has indicated threats posed to the region by China and the terrorists.China’s fast-growing footprints in the Indian Ocean about which Antony has talked is known for long. So also the need to strengthen military infrastructure and force levels of unified theatre command in the region. Equally urgent for national defence is the need to give the much required boost to the country’s young armed force, the Coast Guard which has not received the attention it required all these 29 years it has been in existence, considering its duties to safeguard India’s long coastline. Happily, attention has now turned to the sentinels of the coastline especially, because of the tightened security of our land borders and the infiltration attempts from the sea.

 About the Unified Command which Antony indicated at Port Blair the other day another time. First the need to strengthen the Coast Guard. Believe it, this marine force is one organization which could earn more than what it spends, given the fact that the constabulary in a way was thought of in the 1970s to protect massive sea wealth and living and non-living resources in about 28.5 million sq. km. of Exclusive Economic Zone, extending upto 200 miles into the sea. India has been known for long for smuggling of gold and silver and its sea fish potential of about four million tonnes per year. If all this massive wealth is protected, the entire force could not only be financed but much of the collections could be utilized in national development.

The task of the force is all the more enormous in view of the prevailing security environment, especially the latest terror threat from the sea. In fact, the geo-strategic situation of India, the international maritime legislation, the U.N. law of the Sea and the Law of the Sea Convention have made India’s position vulnerable politically, because we have island territories far away from the mainland. India’s major interest has thus not been covered by international laws, giving rise to a complexity of legal rights and duties, the magnitude of which can be understood by the fact that the country has the largest Economic Zone and a Continental Shelf upto 350 miles from the coast in the Bay of Bengal and 300 miles in the Arabian Sea. The area has to be protected by the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard also has the challenging responsibility of facing along with the Navy the ever-growing threats to the peace and security of the country. At present the potential threat is from Pakistan which has been strengthening its Naval force since 1971. Moreover, Islamabad is gradually changing its strategy. Earlier, its sea force was dependent on its air force for any Naval operation. But now it is a real blue-water Navy, giving rise to the urgency for the Indian defence planners to draw up the maritime boundaries with Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Several times in the past Pakistan boats have been captured with explosives being smuggled for militancy. Lately, the Pak-trained militants too have started entering India.

This requires a considerable increase in the Coast Guard’s firepower and equipment to become a fighting force in the sea, rather than the constabulary. All these years since it was constituted in 1978, the force has not received its due. In early 1980s a five-year Coast Guard Development Plan (CGDP) was worked out by the Government for 1985-1990. But it could not be formally approved due to the acute crunch the country faced. The acquisition proposals were on a piece-meal basis and the amount sanctioned for the purpose was restricted to just Rs.518.88 crore. Then again in the CGDP for 1990-95 was recast to 1992-97 in line with the national five-year plan owing to severe resource crunch, leading to a two-year plan holiday.

The same treatment to the Coast Guard has continued since then. For the 1992-97 plan, a projection was made for Rs.2286.92 crore, but ultimately it was approved for only Rs.1223 crore. This reduction has led to drastic cuts in the initially projected force level required for the massive responsibilities of the force. The CGDP for 1997-2002 was initially projected for Rs.3277 crore. But it was finally approved for Rs.1850 crore. The result? Much required machinery, fighter boats, observation posts, hovercraft, helicopters etc could not be acquired and the constabulary continued to operate with obsolete machines and manpower under the control and command of the Indian Navy.  The force by itself has never been equal to its task all these 29 years of its existence.

 The Coast Guard continues to be a small force. The last figure that I have is that it is a force of just 5440 uniformed personnel---633 Officers, 4560 enrolled personnel including 82 Officers and 145 personnel from the Navy and other Defence Services on deputation. The situation is so despite the fact that the force is taking on the ever-increasing responsibilities in protecting the national interests in the maritime zone. At present, about 70 per cent of these personnel are serving at sea or manning the front line Squadrons to operate its 65 ships and 44 aircraft. Indeed, this is an excellent tooth to tail ratio by any standard. But this does not make the maritime force fully equipped to meet its challenging task. It has to be fighting force and sort of a “second line” of defence for the Navy at the time of its operation on sea.

More than 200-year-old Coast Guard forces in Britain and America, both great Naval powers in the world, are one hundred per cent fighting forces in those two countries. They can be deployed as fully combatant Navies in times of need. Doubtlessly, India cannot afford to have a parallel Navy. In fact, a lot more is required to strengthen the Indian Navy itself. But the requirements of the Coast Guard too need to be commensurate with its task. The force is also important for the Navy, which could not be expected to be fully effective without a policing force.

The strengthening of the Coast Guard with modern sophisticated machinery and fully-trained manpower of the force’s own automatically strengthens the Navy. When the fighting Navy prepares itself for a sea battle, the sentinels of the maritime zone keep an effective vigil on the vast coastline India has. They are a force which ensures India’s interests on sea adequately protected. The young Coast Guard of India has a long way to go in men, equipment and experience before it can rely on its own inherent strength. It requires as much attention as any other military or para-military organization. Remember, the country’s safety lies on the sea also, especially in the present day context when the sea terror has raised its ugly head. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 12 March 2007

 Unplanned Exercise

MORE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

By B.K. Mathur

The budgetary allocation for the coming financial year includes Rs.41,922 for capital outlay and Rs.37,458 for revenue expenditure (day-to-day expenditure) as against Rs.89,000 crore and 34,458 crore respectively initially earmarked for the current fiscal.  This means that India’s defence spending will continue to hover around 2.5 per cent of the GDP against the experts’ defence demand of 3 per cent. There is always a demand for more and more to spend, even if you can’t do it. But the most important point is that India’s defence spending continues to be less than that of immediate neighbours Pakistan and China, which have been spending around 4.5 per cent of their GDPs. But of greater concern is that the modernization plans will continue to go on in its typically slow manner, leading to failure to spend what has been allocated for the purpose.

Why does this recurring ghost of unspent funds continue to haunt India’s arms modernization programme? Failure of the Defence Ministry to improve its procurement procedures which continue to be faulty despite thoughtful recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) after the Kargil operation in 1999. In fact, if one goes by the “committed liabilities” of the Defence Ministry towards procurement of weapons and weapon systems, a major chunk of the capital outlay of Rs.41,922 crore proposed for the next fiscal should go in terms of installments towards big deals for armaments signed in recent years. Most of these deals took a long time to finalise, resulting in cost escalations and failure to fully utilize the allotted funds.

These deals include the French Scorpene submarine project costing Rs.18,798 crore, the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal for the Navy for Rs.6,900 crore, Rs.,8,000-crore British Hawk deal and the Israel Phalcon AWACS deal costing Rs.5,000 crore. The Army too has projected a plan for its artillery modernization at a cost of Rs.8,000 to 10,000 crore. Besides these, the Defence Ministry should be finalising soon its other proposals, including the Indian Air Force’s urgent requirement for fighter aircraft. It is more than one year since the Government had agreed in principle for the procurement of 126 fighter aircraft to replace the earlier outdated versions of the MiG aircraft. Informal offers have already been made by different producers, but lack of planning, not funds, is mainly responsible for the delay. 

In fact, successive Finance Ministers have followed faulty budgeting system for the armed forces all these years. In a well-researched write-up, a retired Colonel, P.K. Vasudeva, states: the “system should ensure that the right amount is spent on defence in the light of the pattern on national priorities and the right military capabilities are developed in the light of the structure of security priorities… the defence budget, in short, must be seen not only in terms of what we must defend ourselves against but what we have to defend… Once the tasks are defined, the question of building up the capabilities to perform them follows by formulation of plans for specific programmes.

“If the scarce resources are to be spent efficiently for defence the budget has to be the vehicle for implementing the programmes so planned.  This has not been possible in Indiassions and objectives”. as defence budgets are drawn up in terms of inputs (amounts spent on acquisition of arms, personnel etc) and not programmes designed to enable the defence to meet the tasks set for them. Equipment is acquired without taking account of the personnel required to use them or their training. Budgets in defence are focused heavily on “acquisition” rather than on building capabilities. No such exercise has far been undertaken to ensure that the budgetary provisions for the armed forces are based on their “mi

In an effort to ensure the objectives and accountability, the concept of Planning Programming and Budgeting (PPB) was introduced in the United States during the 1960s.  The UK too followed this method. But subsequently it was found inadequate to link the military strategy with defence budgeting. The concept of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) was then introduced for a five-yearly comprehensive review of the force structure, modernization plans and other elements of the military planning and programming for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, India’s planners and financial advisers have failed to follow what the militarily advanced countries like in US and the UK practise while planning budgets for their armed forces.

In fact, it is necessary to have in place some institutional system for budgeting for the armed forces, with much say of the Defence Ministry, which presently does not have any decision-making authority for military budgeting. The Financial Adviser (Defence Services) draws up the budget on the basis of the projection of the three military Services in isolation after, of course, bilateral discussions with the Service Headquarters and the Finance Division. The allocation is routinely decided on the basis of previous years, budget provisions and revised expenditure towards the end of the financial year and ongoing programmes without even caring the progress in those programmes finalized without working out priorities.

Again, there is need to take note of what happens in the UK before finalizing the annual budgetary allocations for the armed forces on the basis of the QDR—the 20-year plan which, remember, the late Jagjeevan Ram had thought of seriously as the Defence Minister but failed to implement the idea because of vested interests which cared more for personal gains rather than national interest. In Britain there is a Council, headed by the Defence Minister. It takes all policy decisions in consultation with the Service Chiefs and expert advisers on military strategies and force levels required to execute the strategy and lay down policy framework as the main guideline for working out the defence budget. We need to have such institutions like a defence council or defence management board.

The long-planning concept for defence budgeting, first proposed by the Plawden Committee of the UK, necessarily requires honest integration of the Service headquarters with the Defence Ministry which has been suggested by various experts and this column for years. A meaningful budget for the armed forces has need to be prepared by a body, “committee or a council or whatever you name it, comprising the Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and the other Defence departments under the Defence Minister. It is only this body which should take decisions that alone should guide the budget-makes. Routine budgeting should now stop in national interest.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 26 February 2007

Exploit Indigenous Expertise

LACUNAE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY

By B.K. Mathur

The missile-man, as we knew Kalam Sahib as the Chief of the Defence Ministry’s Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) only gave the example of the indigenously-developed BrahMos missile and stated that the Organisation has been asked to suggest a vision for the weapon’s platform and sensors at an affordable cost. As the history of the DRDO tells us, the young scientists of the Organisation are capable of achieving the target given to them in the required timeframe. They are the envy of the world for designing and developing state-of-the-art weapons and weapon systems. The only problem is their production, which led to the Wing Commander’s observation: By the time the weapon is inducted into the force it becomes obsolete.

The DRDO’s contribution to the country’s armed forces is well-known. The defence scientists and technicians have been designing and developing over the years military machines and systems comparable with the ones produced in the developed countries whose defence industry is their main economic activity. But the problem, as noticed earlier, invariably arises at the production stage, giving one the impression that the seven defence public sector enterprises and 40 Ordnance factories across the country lack the capability to produce the state-of-the-art machines and systems. However, this is far from the truth. They have the capability and wherewithal to produce the latest, as proved by their performances since 1962, after the Chinese invasion and again after the Kargil confrontation in 1999.

 The largest Departmentally-run undertaking is presently meeting all the requirements of the armed forces and, importantly, can be trusted to produce all that we prefer to import for reasons other than quality and for creating defence scandals. The latest Ordnance factory has the capacity to produce not only the ammunition for the Bofors gun but also the capability to produce indigenously 155 mm. howitzer gun under technology transfer agreement. Alas, our defence planners have preferred to get the howitzers for the Indian Army from abroad. The production capability of this factory includes that of the India’s main battle tank, the controversial MBT-Arjun.

The history of the production of the MBT-Arjun clearly highlights the snag, better call it tragedy of the Government of India’s indigenous defence production policy that has caused unpardonably long delays in such important machines like the Arjun, which was initially named MBT-72, as it was expected to be produced in 1972, and the light combat aircraft (LCA).  The whole trouble is about the absence of a well-considered military equipment policy. Take, for example again, the story of the MBT. The Army first asked during the 1960s for a 1,000 hp power-pack (engine) and then revised it to 1500 hp, perhaps without realizing that it takes nearly 15 years to design, develop and produce such an engine. That is the reason why the Arjun tank is presently being produced with an imported power-pack, causing delay and, importantly, necessitating off-the-shelf procurement from Russia of the T-series tanks.  

The result of such an ill-advised policy causes not only undue delays and increasing uncertainly of indigenous projects that leads to a rush for imports and, concernedly, the scandals and corruption associated with defence projects which, at times, causes import of even sub-standard or obsolete machines at high costs, despite the fact that we have an indigenous production capability which matches any other in the world. Not only that. This policy of the vested interests and corrupt persons, has caused neglect of the Ordnance factories’ expertise. Several of these factories have been crying for long about the need for modernizing their outdated machines and updating marketing technologies through which much foreign exchange could be earned through exports of some of their produce.

In this context it is necessary to understand some facts about the defence industry which make it quite different from the civil, profit-making industry. First, a modern and sophisticated equipment has a large number of components running into thousands, and that too of different heads like the electronic ammunition, fire power and all that. What this leads to is that no one set of scientists and technicians can possibly look into the production of all the components. Importantly, no defence production unit in the world, even in highly militarily advanced countries can produce all the components under one roof---and one unit. It is economically not viable. Interdependence is necessary in the defence industry.

Some years ago this writer was told in Bangalore, the hub of defence industry, that an American defence production company was importing from India certain small components for production of a highly-sophisticated gas-turbine engine. This was later confirmed by Kalam Sahib, then Chief of the DRDO. The explanation for this import was simple.  It was economic for the US company to import that particular component from India or anywhere else, because it was pointless to set up a special production facility at high costs. But over a period of time the private sector industry in the US has grown and set up separate facilities for production of even the smallest of components since the entire industry there is export-oriented and is a major component of the national economy.

India’s civil industry could also chip in and set up facilities which could not only be used at home but also exported. The defence industry has been suffering considerably for decades due to massive imports of highly-sophisticated machinery. In fact, India’s defence forces became so much dependent on imports that not much effort was made to indigenize production of even ordinary equipment. No doubt, the industry has license-produced most of the machinery as per the Government policy. But in that process it did not concentrate much on the production of spares, leading to a major crisis for India’s armed forces.

Doubtless, the crisis has always been caused by the Government’s ill-advised production and import policies, which call for a fresh look, keeping in view the fact that our scientists and technocrats are inferior to none in the world. If they are given the required inputs and resources, sans the politics and the interests of the file-pushers in the Government, they are capable of producing anything the forces need. The practice of always running for imports could be eliminated and the expertise available indigenously exploited without compromising on quality. The only thing is to have the will and right direction of the defence policy-makers.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 12 February 2007

 Corps Of Signals

ARMY’S CENTRAL NERVE SYSTEM

By B.K. Mathur

In the fast-changing concept of modern warfare, one can win or lose without fighting a full-fledged conventional battle on the ground. But, remember, one fundamental rule of the war game remains unchanged from the time immemorial: need for a fighting force of a perfect communication system in a war theatre of any kind, which includes the present day’s missile and counter-missile war scenario. That is the responsibility of the Corps of Signals, rightly described as the central nerve system, the slightest malfunctioning of which can paralyse the best of military operation. The Signal units provide complete coordination and electronic warfare support to the fighting forces and operational communication for the Navy and the Air Force, which have now come to occupy a dominant role in modern warfare.

Happily, the communication system in India’s armed forces has developed from time to time, thanks to the country’s young scientists and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The induction of the state-of-the-art communication systems in the armed forces, like the AREN-Area grid system, have proved once more that India’s defence scientists and technicians are not lagging behind anyone in the world, given, of course, the required financial backing, which is invariably lacking more due to bureaucratic hassles and bad planning. Notwithstanding the handicaps, the continuous improvements in transistors and integrated circuits have not only led to miniaturisation and module construction, but also to the whole question in the field on electronics and communication techniques.

 This kind of developed system is required because the field force now needs fully integrated and automated, secure, reliable and high-speed communication in semi-nuclear or conventional battlefield of the future. Remember, when sword was the main weapon of a soldier on foot and a horse and a lance of a cavalry man, the system was quite different. Today, when a conventional army operation involves a tank, automatic firing systems and missiles, supported by massive air operations, information is required to travel much faster, through electronic equipments. Even if an operation is on a battalion level in a far-flung border area, the Army Headquarters at New Delhi is required to have blow-by-blow account on “one-up one down” basis. In other words, a message travelling step by step.

The Indian Army in the past and now has maintained a good standard of communication too.  Looking at the equipment the Corps of Signals has today and the R&D efforts made by the Defence Ministry’s Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), one is inclined to believe that India is way ahead of others in the region. Once our own satellites which our scientists have been launching from time to time are being fully used for our defence communication networks, India’s information system in the armed forces in times of operations will doubtlessly be as competent as that of advanced countries.

 The Army Signals made a humble beginning on February 15, 1911 with the establishment of two Companies. At that time most of the Signal Officers and tradesmen were British. It was only in 1933 as part of a drive towards Indianisation that a Boys Company was raised at Jabalpur. The World War II saw a large-scale expansion of the Signals and its greater Indianisation 0to meet the manpower requirement. With India declaring itself a Republic on January 26, 1950, the Signals were designated as the Corps of Signals---and the process of equipping the Corps with modern equipment started in earnest. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, heavy demands fell on the Signals. The vintage war equipment was replaced by more sophisticated and modern systems.

 The Corps of Signals was perhaps the first in India to launch the introduction of electronic data processing.  Way back in 1964, it stressed the importance of computers as an essential tool for operational and administrative management in the day-to-day use. It was then realized that design-making and processing massive amount of information and data in an ever-shrinking time-frame can only be possible with efficient computer services backing at all levels.  The military Exchange at present handles on an average about 5,000 calls daily and the Signals Centre about 3,000 messages per days from the Army Headquarters. That is in peace time.  Imagine, what the position will be in time of war. Added to this is the painstaking job of enciphering and deciphering the messages.

The phenomenal increase in the density of electronic, electrical and electro-magnetic devices and systems which the armed forces are required to use in a confined geographical area are bound to generate electro- magnetic interference (EMI).  It could prove catastrophic, rendering the complete system totally ineffective.  In fact, this is one of the major problems on which the Defence scientists are increasingly engaged, as the systems are upgraded regularly.  A project study on the subject had been undertaken sometime back with considerable success to ensure the vital electro-magnetic compatibility. This has become more relevant in the present-day context as the concept   of warfare now is bound to extend from land, air and sea to the dimension of electro-magnetic space. This is challenge number one for the Signalmen of the armed forces.

Indeed, the Corps of Signals has kept pace with the revolutionary progress made in the field of communication electronics the world over.  But what about the men of the Corps, required to use the new equipment and systems? The personnel of the  Corps, particularly the tradesmen at the lower levels, are not being “sophisticated” at the speed on which the equipment is being modernized, despite the fact that the training institutions have increased in number and some Officers are sent abroad regularly to upgrade their knowledge.  Taken as a whole, the quality of intake in the Indian Army has of late gone down. But in technical arms like the Signals, this setback is alarming.

What really is happening is that the electronics being a new field, qualified youngmen are finding better prospects in civil employment.  And, alarmingly, the Officers and men of the Corps of Signals rush to put in their papers the moment rules allow them to do so, to be able to take up more lucrative civil opportunities. There is an urgent need to put a stop to this trend, realizing that no war---conventional, nuclear or semi-nuclear---can be fought without a fool-proof communication system. The Signals have always been the Indian Army’s plus point, from the times when pigeons were used to convey messages to the present-day gadgets.  The tradition need to be maintained even with the latest, modern systems of communication. Any lapse on this front would mean a crisis situation in the armed forces.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)